INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

As Expounded in the Tamil Classics

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FOREWORD

Ever since the inception of International Institute of Tamil Studies, avenues of fresh research on various facets of our culture, literature, arts, architecture, sculpture, medicine, science, philosophy and the like have been opened and the specialists in the particular field have made significant studies, underscoring the unique features of Tamil genius. Research on Comparative Literature, Grammar, Linguistics, Translations of Tamil Classics into other Dravidian Languages and also English, periodical seminars on relevant themes of social and cultural significance, publication of valuable and rare books etc., are some of the notable achievements of the Institute.

It is one of the main objectives of the Institute to interact with the Tamil scholars in India and Abroad and to make them involve in one way or other in the academic and research programmes of this Institute and to get their studies published especially in English for a wider audience, so that the fresh ideas, noble ideals and intellectual thoughts of the Tamils may be disseminated far and wide in the globe. To achieve this supreme objective, Dr.M.Thamizhkkudimakan, the Honourable Minister for Tamil Official Language, Culture and Hindu Religious Endowment, who is also the Chairman of the Institute has created Visiting Professorship at this Institute. Under this programme, the Selection Committee was pleased to invite Dr.S.N.Kandaswamy, a reputed Tamil scholar, multi-lingual and specialist in Buddhist Philosophy, who has an academic record of about four decades of teaching and research experience in three Universites, viz., Annamalai University, University of Malaya and Tamil University (1958-1997). He readily accepted our invitation and undertook an important and interesting topic for his intensive study with the title, "***Indian Epistemology As Expounded in the Tamil Classics***" during the year 1998-99, as Visiting Professor at our Institute. He has elaborately discussed the subject of his study under eighteen topics and has brought forth the salient features of the contribution of Tamil scholars to the field of Indian Epistemology during B.C.500 to A.D.1800 i.e. from the period of Tolkāppiyam down to the times of Sivajñāna Swamigal, the official interpreter of

Saiva Siddhānta, which in the words of Dr. G. U. Pope has been the choicest product of the Dravidian intellect. His elucidation and exposition are marked by clarity, lucidity, facundity and felicity of expression. His study reveals his erudition not only in the Tamil classics but also in the Sanskrit works and their commentaries and his intimate knowledge in the various systems of Indian Philosophy. He has already published the thought-provoking book, "*Tamizhum Tattuvamum*" (1976), earmarking the contribution of the Tamil intellectuals to the homogeneous and heterogeneous systems of Indian thought. His conclusions and findings in the present book also are impartial, balanced, transparent and unbiased delineating the originality and individuality of Tamil philosophers especially of Buddhism, Jainism, Nyāya, and Saiva Siddhānta on the one hand, and to a lesser extent the Vēdānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita on the other, as gleaned from their superb Tamil works and their exegeses. The significant conclusions and chief findings of his study are strongly supported by solid evidences, and adequate and apt quotations. The author richly deserves our thanks and appreciation on this useful study.

We express our sincere thanks to Dr.M.Tamizhkkudimakan, the Honourable Minister for Tamil Official Language, Culture and Hindu Religious Endowment, the Chairman of this Institute and also to the Secretary for Tamil Development and Culture for their constant encouragement and continuous support.

Our thanks are also due to the Sabanayagam Printers for their neat and excellent execution of the work.

S. S. Ramar Ilango

PREFACE

Epistemology is the outcome of analytical thinking, rational outlook, keen observation, empirical experience, clear insight and critical judgement. The factors of cognition, sources of valid knowledge and their practical utility in the establishment of a particular system of thought constituted the main themes of discussion in the discipline of epistemology. Pursuit of truth is the purpose of knowledge which should find out solutions to alleviate the distress and ills of society, according to the moral Tamil philosopher Tiruvalluvar (B.C.50-A.D.50). Even the monarchs followed the advice of the possessor of knowledge, "அறிவுடையோன் ஆறு", as revealed in the Sangam poetry. The Tamil savants and scholars were not dogmatic but discerning and discriminating. Great thinkers and intellectuals developed the theory of knowledge from the hoary past through the means of discussions and debates and their success has been hailed as one aspect of *Vākai-t-tiṇai* in Tolkāppiyam (B.C.500), the earliest Tamil source for the study of Indian Epistemology.

Even before the Greek thinkers Plato and Aristotle embarked on the study of philosophical theory of knowledge, the Indian dialecticians and logicians nurtured the art of debate and thus contributed to the development of epistemology. Scholars so far based their studies on Indian Epistemology, mainly focussing on the materials, collected from Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese sources. The main objective of the present research is to bring to the limelight the abundant materials, embedded in the Sangam classics (B.C.500 – A.D.300), the Buddhist and Jain Tamil Epics (A.D. 300 – A.D.900), the Saiva devotional and philosophical works and their rich commentaries (A.D.500 – A.D.1800) and to interpret and expound the essential principles of epistemology as elaborated by the erudite Tamil metaphysicians. According to the specialists, the great exponents of Indian Epistemology including Dramila Vātsyāyana I (A.D.400-A.D.450), the Sautrāntika Yogacara Buddhist logicians Dignāga (A.D.450), Samkara Swāmin (A.D.500), Dharmapāla (A.D.500 - அறவண அடிகள்) Dharmakīrti (A.D.625) and other reputed luminaries in the firmament of Indian thought were natives of *Kāñchi*, the citadel of the Imperial Pallava dynasty and the centre for advanced learning, occupying exalted positions not only at the regional and national levels, but also at the international level, as

evidenced by their works translated into Chinese and Japanese, long long ago. It is a historical fact that some of the Buddhist logicians of Kāñchi were invited in the North to preside over the destiny of the world – renowned Nalanda University. The Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimekalai bears evidence to the halls of intellectual tournaments, labelled as *Paṭṭmaṇṭapam* and to the philosophical discussions, establishing the supremacy of Buddhism, at the centre of Kāñchi. It is appropriate to note that the Tamil logicians and philosophers freely mingled with their counterparts in all quarters of India, exchanging views and enriching the field of epistemology. Consequently Indian thought was nourished also by their interaction and mutual influence.

Since the present author has already carried out his research on Buddhist Epistemology, as embalmed in the Tamil Epic Maṇimekalai (A.D.500) as a part of his doctoral dissertation in the year 1970 at the Annamalai University, it is quite natural that he felt the necessity of exploring all the relevant Tamil classics and their commentaries for a comprehensive study, with a view to assessing the contribution of the Tamil scholars to the domain of Indian Epistemology. He has undertaken this ambitious project during his tenure of one year (1998-99) as Visiting Professor at the International Institute of Tamil Studies, Chennai.

The author is beholden to Dr.M.Tamilzhkkudimakan, the Honourable Minister for Tamil Official Language, Culture and Hindu Religious Endowment, who has been instrumental for the creation of Visiting Professorship at the Institute for which he is the Chairman. Next in order, his sincere thanks are due to the Chairman and members of the Selection Committee, for inviting him as Visiting Professor to the Institute. He is immensely thankful to Dr.S.S.Ramar Ilango, Director of the Institute for his affectionate treatment, administrative help and unabated interest which sustained him to successfully complete the project within the time-frame.

The author always cherishes the company of Dr. K .Sivathampi, Visting Professor and a reputed literary critic, Dr. N. Ghadigachalam, Dr. S. Jean Lawrence and other academics of the Institute. He is ever thankful to the Eminent Professor Dr. R. Balasubramanian, Ex-Chairman, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi and formerly Director, The Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in

Philosophy, University of Madras and also to Dr.T.B.Siddhalingaiah, Professor & Head, Department of Tirumurai Research, Institute of Asian Studies, Chennai, for their useful suggestions to make the study as perfect as possible. He is also grateful to the members of the Publication Committee for recommending this research work to see the light of the day.

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S. N. Kandaswamy

I. INTRODUCTION

The term epistemology is made up of the two Greek words '*episteme*' and '*logos*' respectively meaning knowledge and discourse. So, it literally means the discourse concerning with the manifold aspects of knowledge. In its extention of meaning it denotes the particular discipline that investigates the nature, factors, forms of knowledge, objects of cognition, the ways of knowing and such other related aspects. The term '*logic*' is also emanated from the Greek word 'logos' which means discourse and also thought. This word, as we have seen above, formed the second member of the term, '*epistemology*' and hence the closeness of the two kindred branches of knowledge becomes obvious.[1] Valid reasoning and legitimacy of arriving at proper conclusions from different propositions are the prime concern of logic. The distinct feature between the two related disciplines lies in the fact that logic focusses mainly on the formal aspect and validity of statements, while epistemology examines the veracity of such statements and validity of knowledge. Epistemology also aims to explore the degrees of certainty and probability and to investigate the differences between knowing and believing. The impediments in the process of philosophizing and the bewilderment in the way of understanding are dislodged through the avenues of knowledge, accumulated by the study of epistemology. Epistemology is also considered to be the philosophical theory of knowledge. It is to be understood that both epistemology and logic are inter-related disciplines.

According to W.P. Montague[2], philosophy i.e. metaphysics and epistemology are logically interdependent and one can not operate without the other in the attainment of knowledge about the nature of absolute and ultimate reality and also in the verification of the validity of knowledge to clear the metaphysical problems. He has also pointed out that the study of epistemology aimed at the Ways of Knowing while the study of philosophy focussed on the Ways of Being. Since knowledge is fundamentally concerned with the processes of thinking faculty, epistemology is also intrinsically connected with psychology. Epistemology becomes an effective tool at the hands of philosophers not only to refute the views of their opponents, but also to establish their own tenets and concepts convincingly. The exponents of different systems of Indian Philosophy, both homogeneous and heterogeneous, have expounded

their own theories of knowledge in order to gain validity to the conclusions of their speculations. Hence, Indian Epistemology indicates the theory of knowledge, as nurtured by the different systems of Indian Philosophy.

The significance of Aḷavai

The study of *Aḷavai*, a synonym of Pramāṇa occupies a central place in the discipline of epistemology. The technical term *aḷavai* and its derivatives were very popular in the Sangam Tamil Classics (B.C.500 & A.D.300). The word *aḷavai* is used in Patiṟṟu-p-pattu[3] and Cilappatikāram[4] in the sense of grain measure. *Aḷantaṟital*, occurring in Tirumurukāṟṟu-p-paṭai[5] and Puṟanāṉūṟu[6] meant to cognize a thing through some means of measuring. *Aḷavai* etymologically means measure and in its extension of meaning indicates the tools and means used for measuring material things. Sivagrayogin, the great commentator of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār throws sufficient light on the semantic significance of the word '*aḷavai*' on the authority of empirical usages. He enumerates four kinds of measuring. Accordingly, some things are counted, while some others are weighed. There are materials which are gauged in terms of density and length. Like these types of measures (அளவைகள்), there are some unique measures, being the means of valid knowledge in the identification and cognition of the triple eternal realities viz., Pati – Absolute, Paśu – myriad souls and Pāśa – triple bonds. He designated the means of valid knowledge as "*aḷavai-p-pramāṇas*".[7]

Pandiperumal[8], another commentator of the same text (-*aḷavai-y-iyal*) has emphasised that "*aḷavai* is indispensable for a treatise" (- அளவை நூற்கு இன்றியமையாதது). The Sanskrit term *pramāṇa* also conveyed more or less the same sense of *aḷavai*. The prefix '*pra*' is an upasarga as *anu* and *upa* are respectively found in *anumāna* and *upamāna*. The root word '*mā*' in these technical terms implies measurement or assessment. Measuring knowledge with respect to its correctness or truth is called the 'measure of knowledge' according to K.Sivaraman.[9]

It is heartening to note that *mā* as an independent native word denoted various kinds of measures, as prescribed in Tolkāppiyam (B.C.500). In the Sangam classics and also in the Tamil inscriptions of the Imperial Cholas, the word mā occurred in the sense of measure, a piece of measured land etc. The word *pramā(ṇa)* seems to be a hybrid in which the prefix is Sanskrit and the root is Tamil.[10]

According to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan,[11] "the existence of things does not depend on pramāṇas, though their existence depends entirely on the operation of the pramāṇas. Pramāṇas are so called because they give us pramā. Udayana says: Cognition of the real nature of things is pramā, and the means of such knowledge is pramāṇa."

The Tamil verse, quoted in the commentary of Sivagrayogin,[12] possessing the stylistic and structural semblance of Tirumantiram (A.D.500) emphasises the need of the study of epistemology. The substance of the poem is summarised hereunder:

> "Like the people who do not know the grammar of music cannot relish melody properly; those who do not have discriminate knowledge can not discern the virtuous course and those who do not study epistemology do not get any benefit (of the study of philosophy). Hence, one should learn the discipline of Aḷavai to cognize things properly."

The significance of the study of Aḷavai is clearly underscroed in this quotation. Another poem in Venpā metre, taken from the dwindled treatise, *Aḷavai Viḷakkam* i.e. Exposition of sources of knowledge, quoted by Maraijnāna desikar is also paraphrased here below:[13]

> "Like a person who has no knowledge of music is not profited by listening to a song and like a person who is blind cannot enjoy the visual beauty, he who has no knowledge of *Aḷavai* will not understand the logical sequence and significance of classical words".

The first analogy in this poem implies that a person, who has erudition in the discipline of musicology, alone can evaluate and appreciate the standard of a musical performance. So also, only the adepts in epistemology alone can explore and estimate the validity and correctness of truth. The second analogy indirectly hints that a person without the study of epistemology becomes blind to truth. The philosophers envisages truth through the eyes of reasoning. Thus, the importance of the study of means of knowledge has been artistically underlined. With this background, let us proceed to enumerate the primary Tamil sources for the present study.

Tamil Sources

Tolkāppiyam is the earliest extant Tamil treatise. Normally it is assigned to B.C.500 i.e. the period before the advent of the available

Sangam classics (B.C.500–A.D.300). Though the treatise is essentially a descriptive grammar and also poetics of the ancient Tamil, in many aphorisms the author has indicated the primary sources of knowledge viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison and presumption. References to determinate and indeterminate cognition are also found.[14] One aphorism[15] mentions *ētu* (reason) and *eṭuttamoḻi* (-pakṣadharma vacana, or example) which according to the earliest commentator Iḷampūraṇar (A.D.1100) meant the three-membered syllogism which became very familiar with the later Tamil Yogācāra Buddhists including Dignāga, Cāttaṉār and others. Among other commentators of the text, Ceṉāvaraiyar (A.D.1200) and Teyva-c-Cilaiyār (A.D.1250) exhibited their epistemological knowledge in the interpretation of some aphorisms. The technical terms, known as *Nūlpuṇarppu,* a synonym of *Tantrayukti* are found in the last aphorism of the third book of Tolkāppiyam, deserving a special study on the position of arguments, debates and discussions which were current in the Sangam period.

Next to Tolkāppiyam, some poems of the Sangam Super-anthologies bear interesting materials on the subject. The intuitive vision and insight of great thinkers is termed "*tiṟavōr kātci*" in Puṟanāṉūṟu"[16] (B.C.500-A.D.200). The word *tiṟavōr* meant the *jñānis* with discriminate knowledge, while *kāṭci* etymologically seems to be an equivalent of *darśana* i.e. philosophy. The sublime and noble character of the immaculate thinkers is noted in Kuṟiñcippāttu (15-17). The metaphysical intellectuals are celebrated as '*Cemporuḷ kaṇṭār*', '*meypporuḷ kaṇṭār*', '*puṉmai-y-il kātciyavar, mācaṟu kātciyavar* etc., in the Tirukkuṟaḷ[17] (A.D.50). They respectively denote the mystics who envisioned the perfect and absolute reality, those, devoid of any littleness, encountered with the reality and the immuaculate thinkers. The commentator Parimelaḻakar while interpreting the contents of the couplets of Tirukkuṟaḷ applied the first three sources of knowledge viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony to highlight the master mind of Tiruvaḷḷuvar. According to him, Tiruvaḷḷuvar anticipated the cabinet ministers to be equipped with epistemological knowledge through the methodology of vyākaraṇa (- சொல்லிலக்கண நெறியானே அளவைநூலை அமைச்சர் உட்பட்டுக் கற்க).[18]

Next to Sangam classics and Tirukkuṟaḷ, the ancient Tamil epics Cilapatikāram (A.D.300) and Maṇimēkalai (A.D.500) provide rich materials for our study. The former epic contains some

interesting thoughts of Jain epistemology. However, the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai constitutes the vital source for our study. The epic poet Cāttaṉār was an erudite scholar, able logician and eminent philosopher. Though he has created a romantic narrative with the main purpose of propagating the cardinal principles of Buddhism, in the last sections he has totally devoted to discuss the epistemological and metaphysical thoughts of various systems of Indian philosophy. The 27th canto with the title "*Camaya-k-kaṇakkar tam tiṟam kēṭṭa kātai*" seems to be the earliest available Compendium of Indian Philosophy, discussing the views and doctrines of as many as ten schools which were prominent during the period of Cāttaṉār (A.D.500). They include the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāmkhya and Mimāmsa of the homogeneous systems and also Lokāyata, Ājivaka and Nirgranthavāda (-Jainism) of the heterogeneous systems. The 29th canto "*Tava-t-tiṟam pūntutarumam keṭṭa kātai*" is an excellent manual on Buddhist epistemology, intimately associated with the Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhism. The 30th and final canto, "*Pava-t-tiṟam aṟukeṉa-p-pāvai nōṟṟa kātai*" is a text on the essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. It is interesting to note that Cāttaṉār has planned his presentation in an excellent methodological manner. First, he introduced the views of other systems (-27th canto-Parapakṣa). Next, he presented the Buddhist epistemology in the 29th Canto to be followed by the Buddhist Philosophy in the final canto i.e. 30th kātai. He expected that a neophyte before mastering Buddhist metaphysics should learn other systems so that he could develop the comparative outlook and then master the Buddhist epistemology, essential for a rational understanding of Buddhist philosophy.[19]

The same methodology, adopted by Cāttaṉār, has been closely adhered by Arulnandisivam (A.D.1200), also known as *Sakalāgama Pandita*, an expert in all texts of all systems when he composed his magnum opus Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, the standard text on Saiva Siddhanta. In this metrical treatise, the first part, *Parapakkam* (-i.e. Parapakṣa) which is itself a separate book discusses in detail 14 different schools of Indian Philosophy. In the second part i.e. *Cupakkam* (-Svapakṣa), first he crisply and aphoristically presents in 13 verses under the title, *Aḷavai-y-iyal*, the essentials of Saiva Siddhanta epistemology and then proceeds to delineate the cardinal tenets of Siddhanta philosophy. The section Aḷavai-y-iyal has been commented by many great savants. Among them, Nirampa-v-aḻakiyar, Maraijñāna Deśikar and Sivagrayogin lived during A.D.1500-A.D.1600.

Jnānaprakāsar and Sivajñāna Swamigal respectively lived in the 17th and 18th centuries A.D. Sivajñāna Swamigal has been regarded to be the official interpreter of Saiva Siddhānta.

However Pandiperumal, while commenting on an early treatise, Sivajñāna bodham by Meykanṭār who lived in the early part of 13th century A.D. and also the venerable preceptor to the elderly Arulnandisivam, has written an elaborate and exhaustive commentary on Aḷavai-y-iyal, which he prefixed to the proper text. Since Sivajñāna bodham was a brief but perfect manual, no scope for introducing a chapter on epistemology was felt by the author and hence, realising the requirements of epistemological knowledge to attain a clear understanding of the tenets of Saiva Siddhanta, Pandiperumal has done a wonderful job.[20]

Among the other philosophical Tamil texts on Saiva Siddhanta, Sivaneṟiprakāśam deserves special mention. Its author Sivagrayogi, the celebrated commentator of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, has devoted 12 lengthy poems (17-28) in the text for presenting the critique of knowledge, based on Aḷavai-y-iyal and Pauṣkara Agama (A.D.300). His disciple Nandi Sivagrayogin has written an excellent commentary, highly useful to comprehend the epistemological views of the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta. Another Siddhantic treatise, that provided sufficient materials on epistemology, goes by the name Tattuvapirakāśam (A.D.1400). It has also good commentary by an unknown commentator who, according to the specialists should have been the author's disciple. Tirumantiram (A.D.500) Jñānāmirtam (A.D.1150) by Vākīśa Munivar and Sankaṟpa nirākaraṇam (A.D.1350) by Umapatisivam possess some relevanṭ materials for our study.

Among the Vedantic works, Tāndavarayaswamigal's *Kaivalya Navanītam* (A.D.1450) and Sivapirakāsaswamigal's *Vedānta Cūḷāmaṇi* (A.D.1700) form the basic source to understand the position of Vedantic epistemology in the Tamil curriculam of Indian philosophy. Some portions in Tirumantiram (A.D.500) discuss in detail the *lakṣaṇātraya*, a vital concept associated with the verbal testimony of the Vedantins. Vedānta deśikar's (A.D.1300) *Paramata Pañkam*, comprising 54 poems throw some light on the epistemological views of Viśiṣṭādvaita, based on both the Sanskrit texts 'Prastānatraya' and the Nālāyiradivya prabandha and hence called *Ubhaya vedānta*.

Nīlakeśi (A.D.900), one of the great Jain Tamil epics commences with an elaborate discussion of theological, philosophical and

epistemological doctrines, as prevalent among the Jain intellectuals. Also, in the remaining sections of the epic, the learned author (-whose name is unknown), critically examines the views of different schools of Buddhism, Ājivaka sect, Sāmkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Vaidika systems, refuting them from the stand-point of Jainism. The epic has been richly commented by an erudite scholar with the name Samadivākara Vāmanamuni (A.D.1450) who has also composed an epic with the title, 'Merumantirapurāṇam'. Cīvaka Cintāmaṇi (A.D.700) and Cūḷāmaṇi (A.D. 850) are other Tamil Jain epics, providing some salient data to discuss some of the principles of Jain Epistemology.

The celebrated studies of S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, TH. Stcherbatsky, G. Tucci, A. B. Keith, H. N. Randle, S. N. Dasgupta, S. Radhakrishnan, Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppuswami Sastrigal, C. D. Bijalwan, Dr.V.A.Devasenapathi, Dr. R. Balasubramanian, Dr. K. Sivaraman and others are the source of inspiration to undertake this study. The present author has already discussed the basic principles of Buddhist epistemology in his doctoral dissertation, *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimēkalai* (1970). So far scholars attempted to embark on Indian epistemological studies, based on the materials, available from Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit and Tibetan sources. Some scholars traced the Chinese and also Japanese sources to reconstruct the history of Indian epistemology, especially of Buddhism. The rich materials, embalmed in the Tamil classics which possess an uninterrupted history of more than 2,500 years, impelled the present author to plan and project the study on *Indian Epistemology As Expounded in the Tamil Classics.*

Plan of the Present Study

The introductory chapter surveys the Tamil sources for the study and also indicates the renowned modern authors who inspired him to undertake this research. It also presents the structure of the research work. In the next four chapters the process of methodology, the Ṭechnical terms, Doctrine of Naya and the techniques of question and answer, being the preliminary aspects in the proper study of Indian epistemology are discussed. In the sixth chapter, the maximum number of sources of knowledge are traced from the view-points of different traditions and systems. In the following chapter, the practical value of applying the pramāṇas in the correct and valid understanding of not only empirical matters but also transcendental reality has been examined. In this respect, the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta, which Dr. G. U. Pope hailed the

choicest product of the Dravidian intellect, have made a mark in the history of Indian Epistemology. In the next three chapters, the theories of perception, inference and verbal testimony are dealt with. Since the philosophers and debaters should advance their arguments on rational and scientific basis, the Indian Epistemologists paid much attention on the avoidance of logical fallacies which are elaborately discussed in the next four chapters. There are separate sections on *Vāda*, Jalpa, Vidanta and Nigrahasthāna, since they are also concerned with defective and faulty arguments and debates, to be avoided in healthy discussions. The penultimate chapter examines the validity of knowledge as upheld by the Indian epistemologists. In the last chapter, the major findings and significant conclusions are presented. Also, the areas of future research are suggested.

The methodology, adopted in the study is not only descriptive and comparative but also historical, as the context necessitated. Some unavoidable repetitions in different contexts have been made to lay stress on some important issues. They are to be treated "*anuvāda*" for a good purpose. The contributions of the Tamil authors and commentators to the elucidation and enrichment of Indian Epistemology have been underscored in the course of the present study.

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II. PROCESS OF METHODOLOGY

Vātsyāyana is held to be the earliest known commentator (A.D.400) of Akṣāpada's Nyāya Sūtra (A.D.150). According to Vidyabhusana he was also known as "*Dramila*, a native of *Dravida* [the Deccan] of which the capital was Kāñcipura."[1] The Western Indologists, like A.B.Keith and Bodas also endorsed the same view.[2] It seems that he flourished during the period of early Pallavas, who ruled from Kāñci, the renowned centre of all learning including Buddhism and Jainism. [3]Vātsyāyana opined that the Nyāya Sūtra followed the methodological processes of enunciation (uddeśa), definition (lakṣana) and critical examination (parīkṣā). It is interesting to note that in some of the philosophical texts composed in Tamil, especially of the systems of Saiva Siddhanta and Vedanta, the same methodology has been meticulously adopted to expound their view-points. Before directly proceeding to discuss the Tamil materials under reference, it would be better to briefly present the elucidation of Vātsyāyana, embodying the three technical terms which actually indicate the triple processes of treating the various categories, forming the substance of the system.

Uddeśa being the first step in the methodological process denotes the mere mention of the sixteen categories, by name, taken for an elaborate discussion in the Nyāya Sūtra. They are as follows:[4]

1. The sources of right knowledge (pramāṇa)
2. The object of right knowledge (prameya)
3. Doubt (samśaya)
4. Purpose (prayojana)
5. Corroborative instance (dṛṣtānta)
6. Proved doctrine (siddhānta)
7. Components of inference (avayava)
8. Confutation (tarka)
9. Ascertainment (nirṇaya)
10. Discussion (vāda)
11. Wrangling or Debating maneuver (jalpa)

12. Cavil or destructive criticism (vitaṇḍā)

13. Fallacy of reason or pseudo probans (hetvābhāsa)

14. Quibble or purposive distortion of the opponent (Chala)

15. Analogue or futile rejoinder (jāti)

16. The points of defeat (nigrahasthāna)

These are the main themes, expounded in the Nyāya system.

[5]*Lakṣaṇa,* the second in the process indicates the definition of each of the aforesaid categories. It underscores the specific characteristic feature of a particular category, which makes it different from other categories, and also aims to the classification of the sub-members of the same category. *Lakṣaṇa* is central and significant in all the threefold processes.

[6]*Parīkṣā,* being the third, means the critical examination, by which the definition and legitimacy, applicable to each category is ascertained.

The first chapter (adhyāya) of Nyāya Sūtra deals with the enumeration (uddeśa) and definition (lakṣaṇa) of all the sixteen categories, while the remaining four chapters are concerned with a critical examination of them. Enumeration and definition hold good, if only they were examined in the light of reasoning, to make a sound philosophy. The seriousness of any system of philosophy depends upon the extent of critical examination of the categories to ascertain their validity.

With this background, let us turn to the Tamil sources. First of all, the relevant portions in Sivaneṟi-p-pirakāśam and Vedānta Cūḷāmaṇi are to be considered.

Prior to the presentation of the epistemology of Saiva Siddhanta, the author of Sivaneṟi-p-prakāsam discusses in detail the aforesaid threefold processes, required for the ascertainment of knowledge, essential for a detailed discussion on the triple categories viz., Pati-Supreme Lord, Paśu-miriad souls and Pāśa-triple bonds viz., āṇava (-the principle of ego), karma (good and bad deeds) and māyā (-the primordial matter).[7] He proclaims that any object in the expanded universe will be treated non-existent, if it does not conform to the definition (lakṣaṇa-ilakkaṇam) and does not stand the test of pramāṇas (-aḷavai). Hence, he states that he is proceeding to

expound the definition of the triple entities, viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa and also the pramāṇas to establish their reality. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that his predecessors Meykandar and Arulnandi Sivācārya have given the titles Pramāṇa-v-iyal and Ilakkaṇa-v-iyal to the first two sections of their texts Sivajñāna bodham and Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, thereby giving importance to the identification and establishment of the triple verities through the process of pramāṇas and also definition, while the remaining last two sections are named Sādhana-v-iyal (section on the means of liberation) and Payan̲ iyal (section on the fruit i.e. beatitude).

[8]Sivagrayogin, the author of Sivaneripirakasam explicates that the non-erroneous pramāṇas have threefold processes of *uttecam* (uddesa), *ilakkaṇam* (laksana) and *cōtittal* (pariksa). However, Sivaprakasar,[9] the author of Vedanta Culamani, named the process as *upadesa mur̲ai* i.e. the method, adopted by the preceptor to instruct his disciples the ultimate truth, being the identity of the intrinsic nature of the soul with Brahman, the essence of Upanishadic teaching to the easy understanding of the disciple, constituted the three members viz., *uttēcam*, *ilakkaṇam* and *cōtanai* (parikṣā).

[10]Sivaner̲ipirakāsam explains utteśa, as naming the object (-vattuvin̲ pēr uraittal). [11]Vedanta Culamani also presents the same view, stating the thing only by its name, for it is to be further discussed and elucidated by the preceptor to the novice.

[12]Sivaneripirakasam holds that the specific characteristics of a particular object, which are not found even a little in other objects, are collectively called lakṣaṇa. [13]Nevertheless, Vedanta Culamani explains lakṣaṇa to be the identification of the object by a characteristic mark which exclusively exists in it, as the dewlap of a bull (-galakambala). However the essence of the explication in the two texts remains the same.

[14]Sivaner̲ipirakāśam elucidates that *Cōtittiṭutal* (-parikṣā) is the critical examination to ascertain whether the specific characteristics are found in the concerned object or not. The words *vattu* (vastu) and *ilakkiyam* (lakṣya) are invariably used in this text to mean the object. [15]Vedanta Culamani employed the words *ilakkiyam* and *poruḷ* to mean the thing and stated that *parīkṣā* consists in examining whether the characteristic mark, attributed to the object is really found therein or not. Though the words differ in explaining the process, they communicate the same idea. It is proper to record that Mar̲aiñāna Deśikar, one of the commentators of Sivajñāna siddhiyar,

has employed the techniques of uddeśa and lakṣaṇa while explaining the logical fallacies.[16]

After defining the three-fold processes, the two texts take up pramāṇas for a close study.

Twofold lakṣaṇas (*Iruvakai iyalpu*)

Though Sivajñāna Siddhiyār does not deal with uddeśa and parīkṣā explicitly, it has well defined the twofold types of lakṣaṇa, known as *tan̲-n̲-iyalpu* and *potu-v-iyalpu* in classical Tamil.[17] Of them, the first one is also called *Cir̲appu-iyalpu* i.e. the special characteristics. *Tan̲-n̲-iyalpu* is the *sva-lakṣaṇa* or *svarūpa lakṣaṇa.* It is also named *Asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa.*

Tan̲-n̲-iyalpu denotes the intrinsic nature of an object which is specially found only in itself, as a mark, differentiating it not only from other class (anyajāti), but also from its own class (*sva-jāti*). Sivagrayogin, the commentator of the text illustrates this lakṣaṇa with an example:

"The tawny cow (*kapila*) has its own colour, differentiating from that of other class of animals such as buffalo and also of its own class, possessing the colour of white, black and red."

[18]Pandiperumal has produced a different example:

"Mā (mango) is a tree. It does not join either with other class of trees like iruppai (-bassia longifolia), or with its own class like pul̤imā (-a species of mango, soar in taste), but stands for a tēmā i.e. mango, sweet in taste.

Potu-v-iyalpu is also known as *Sādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa.* It excludes the characteristics of other genus (*-anya jāti*) and shares the common features of its own class (*-sva jāti*). Sivagrayogin elucidates this lakṣaṇa thus:

"It denotes the absence of the features of buffalo, horse and other animals, and the presence of horn, dewlap, hoof, hump and tail, peculiarly found in all sorts of cows, forming one class."

Pandiperumal explains that the tree called mā (mango) does not join either with the class of other trees, or with a special species of its own class, but stands simply as a mango tree, being a common feature. Sivajñāna Swamigal understands by this that it stands equal, possessing common features among all the trees of its own class.

It is essential to note that Sivagrayogin following his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār has presented all the aspects of the twofold lakṣaṇas in his treatise Sivaneṟipirakāśam, which are adequately commented by his disciple, Nandi-Sivagrayogi, elaborating the already given examples.

Further, the text mentioned that all the objects of knowledge (prameya) and their varieties are to be cognised with the aid of any one of the two kinds of lakṣaṇas. One, who has thus cognised them is known as Pramāṇajña.[19]

Defects of Definition

While explaining the definition (*lakṣaṇa*), the commentator has indicated the threefold defects or fallacies, viz., *Ativyāpti, Avyāpti* and *Asambhava.*[20] The first fallacy refers to the presence of *lakṣaṇa* where there is no such object. It is actually the extension of the characteristic feature to other objects, which do not come under the class defined. If one defines a cow as a horned animal, the definition extends also to other animals such as a bull, buffalo etc., possessing horns. The second defect of definition consists in the absence of the lakṣaṇa in a part of the class defined. It denotes the limitation or narrowness of the characteristics to only a group of the genus defined. When one defines a cow as a tawny animal, the definition is narrow, since the tawny colour is not found in others of the same class. *Asambhava* is the absence of the lakṣaṇa in any place of the object. If one says that a cow is an animal with uncloven hoofs, it is improbable and impossible.

The exponent of Saiva Siddhanta has been very careful in avoiding the aforesaid defects of definition in the attempt of a critical examination of the objects, belonging to different categories, which are however subsumed under three divisions, viz., *Pati, Paśu* and Pāśa, on the grounds of their intrinsic nature and common feature.

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III. TECHNICAL TERMS

Sanskrit sources

Vidyābhūṣaṇa, the great author of "*A History of Indian Logic*" has envisaged that the *Tantrayuktis* formed the earliest phase in the art of argument and logic.[1] He has stated that in the last chapter of Artha śāstra, Kautilya has given a list of 32 technical terms called *Tantrayukti* or "the forms of scientific argument". Further, he has identified the same list in the Caraka saṁhitā and Suśruta samhitā, which are the authoritative texts on ancient medicine, composed before the period of Akṣapāda, the author of Nyāyasūtra (A.D.150). He opined that these technical terms, useful in an argument, were not first prepared either by Kauṭilya or by the authors of the medical texts, but by a person or persons who lived long before them and wanted to establish debates and discussions on a scientific basis. He considered that the terms were compiled for the systematization of the debates possibly in the 6th century B.C. He has noted that these terms have been used more widely in works on Nyāya philosophy instead in the works on Polity or Medicine. They were ingeniously employed by the debaters in learned councils (pariṣads), patronized by royal persons and lovers of knowledge.

Suśruta samhitā proclaims that by means of Tantrayukti a debater can establish his own points and refute those of his opponents who participate in the debate. It is held that in the history of Indian Logic, no work older than the Tantrayukti, being a little manual on the systematization of arguments and debates is available. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has also pointed out that in the Caraka saṁhitā, is found a list of 34 technical terms (-Tantrayuktis), amongst which prayojana (purpose), nirṇaya (ascertainment), anekanta (uncertain), pratyuccāra (repetition), uddhara (citation) and sambhava (probability) deserve special mention.[2]

Tamil Sources

It is quite interesting to note that the Tolkāppiyam (B.C. 500), the earliest extant Tamil grammatical treatise dealing with the phonology, morpho-phenemics, morphology and syntax in the first two books, and also discussing the poetics and prosody in the third book has a lengthy aphorism at the end of the whole text, enumerating 32 technical terms,[3] which are labelled *Nūlpuṇarppu* in the Tamil grammatical tradition. *Nūlpuṇarppu* denotes the architectonics, required

for the formation of a treatise (-Nūl), especially dealing with grammar. The text named the terms also as "*uttivakai*", which literally means the classes of technical devices. It is clear that the word '*utti*' is the Tamilized form of the Sanskrit term/*Yukti*/which etymologically means union, mixture and combination. [4]In the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai (A.D. 500), the usage '*kanta utti*', the Tamilized form of *gandha yukti* is found. It means the mixture of perfumes or spices. However, the word '*utti*' in *Tantira utti* (-Tantra yukti) occurs not in the sense of mixture, but in the sense of devices. A later aphorism of another grammatical text, Naṉṉūl (A.D. 1200) clearly defined *Tantira utti*.[5] Accordingly, it is the device that primarily aims to correlate the grammatical substance to the empirical and literary usages and also to ascertain that this would be the case in such and such context. The commentator of this sūtra equated the Sanskrit word *Tantra* with the Tamil word *Nūl* (i.e. treatise). He also meant by the word *Yukti*, '*poruntum vitam*' i.e. the method of conjoining.

It is pertinent to note that the list of Tantra yuktis is found both in Arthaśāstra and Tolkāppiyam at their tail ends, tempting some scholars to mention that they should have been appended to the original in the course of time by some one. However, the Tamil text seems to be sufficiently ancient, since the earliest known commentators *Iḷampūraṇar* (A.D.1100) and *Perāciriyar* (A.D.1200) have annotated the technical terms, quoting many illustrations from the whole of Tolkāppiyam, leading to the conclusion that *Nūlpuṇarppu* alias *Tantrayukti* was essentially meant the basic and potential devices for the formation and interpretation of grammatical aphorisms. In its extension of meaning, they also meant for the creation of any scientific and philosophical texts.

Apart from Tolkāppiyam, another list of 32 *uttis* (-yukti) is found in Pāṭalam, a grammatical work, probably written in A.D.600. It has been quoted in the commentary of *Yāpparunkalam*[6] (A.D.1025) and *Yāpparunkala-k-kārikai*[7] (A.D.1050), the renowned texts on Tamil prosody, composed by the Jain ascetic Amitasāgarar. His disciple Gunāsagarar has written the elaborate exegesis on the two texts. The commentary also reveals the fact that the Pāṭalam is named after the author Pāṭalaṉār, just like Tolkāppiyam is named after its author Tolkāppiyaṉār. Further, it is essential to record that the same Pāṭalam sutra has been annexed in a later treatise, Naṉṉūl (A.D. 1200), the standard manual on Tamil grammar, composed by Pavaṇandi, another Jain ascetic scholar. It has been commented by

many savants. A close study of the technical terms, found in Tolkāppiyam and Pāṭalam reveals the following facts:

1. The order of enumeration differs in the two texts.
2. Only 14 terms of Tol are retained in Pāṭalam, with minor changes in the nomenclature.
3. In Pāṭalam, 18 additional terms which are not found in Tolkāppiyam are recorded afresh.
4. The commentators have identified two more terms, which are not found either in Tol or in Pāṭalam.
5. All in all, 52 technical terms (-Tantrayuktis) are available from the Tamil sources.

All these facts suggest that though the concept of *Tantrayukti* or *Nūlpuṇarppu* belonged to the national stock of Indian grammar, to be labelled *Pan-Indian*, the major Indian languages viz., Tamil and Sanskrit should have developed their own grammatical traditions, reflecting two streams of thought.

Mahavidvan R.Ragavaiyangar has made an attempt to identify the Sanskrit equivalents with the Tamil terms.[8] But, he could not get adequate equivalents for most of the terms and also some equivalents which he has suggested were not well-suited with the Tamil terms, indicating the uniqueness of the two different lists of the 32 terms. A cursory glance at the two lists offers the following suggestions:

1. The order of enumeration in the two lists varies considerably.
2. The Tamil terms are elaborate and lengthy, while the Sankrit terms are brief and pithy.
3. No Sanskrit equivalents are available for many Tamil terms.
4. Some similarities may be accidental or due to the mutual exchange of views.

Hence, it may be presumed that the two authors viz., Tolkāppiyar (B.C.500) and Kauṭilya (B.C.350) should have some predecessors. From the old common sources, they should have adopted the technical terms to suit their requirements. It is also possible that since Kauṭilya[9] has been considered to be a South Indian, hailing from Kāñci, he should have taken the then existing Tamil tradition

of technical terms which are collectively called *Nūlpuṉarppu* in Tamil and rendered them into Sanskrit with the title *Tantrayukti*. However, these techniques and devices have been used especially in Tamil to explicate the contextual significance and semantic content of the grammatical aphorism, called *nūlpā* alias *nūṟpā*, equivalent to the Sanskrit sūtra. It is pertinent to note that the Sanskrit sūtras are terse and brief, whereas the Tamil nūrpās are mostly very long and elaborate. Also in writing a manual on grammar, these devices contributed much to its perfection and grandeur. As suggested by Vidyabhusana, they should have also been used in public debates, arranged for a particular occasion, and the participant scholars were patronized by the kings and philanthropists, who evinced interest in the intellectual tournaments. Tolkāppiyar[10] has included the success in the art of debate and exposition in the list of different types of victory which he subsumed under the specific title *Vākai-t-tiṇai* i.e. the collective patterns of victory. He has also marked eight kinds of values, qualifying the debaters and participants. They are: heredity, erudition, character, truthfulness, purity (of thought word and deed), equity, absence of jealousy and absence of desire. An ancient poem, quoted by Iḷampūrṇar[11] to exemplify the skilfulness and eloquence of the debaters, refers to the debating hall, "*tolā nāviṉ mēlōr pēravai*" which means the great assembly of the exalted scholars with never vanguished tongues. References to the occurrence of debates, word-wars and victory in such discussions are very many in the Sangam classics (B.C.500-A.D.300). In the *Tirukkuṟal* (A.D.50), the moral philosopher exhorts that a person without erudition entering the hall of debate is just like the play of chess on squareless board.[12] He has also dealt with such themes as power of speech, judging the audience, courage before councils etc.[13] In *Malaipaṭukaṭām*[14] (B.C.100), an interesting description is found:

> "*Vāti kai-y-aṉṉa kavai-k-katir iṟaiñci*
> *irumpukavarv (u) uṟṟaṉa perumpuṉa varakē*"

A free rendition is given below:

> "In wide fields, the common millet with double stalks,
> ready to be reaped, resembled the fist of a debater."

The word *vāti* is definitely derived from Vādin, meaning a disputant, or a plaintiff. The entry of this word into the Sangam vocabulary in the beginning of the Christian era, suggests the interaction between the Tamil and Sanskrit scholars in the sphere of logic. The Buddhist epic Maṇimēkalai[15] (A.D.500), refers to the *Samaya Vātikaḷ* the

philosophical debaters and the hall, where they assembled is known as *Paṭṭimaṇṭapam*. Such debates formed a part of the Indra festival, celebrated by the Chola monarchs annually at the port capital Kāvirippūmpaṭṭiṉam. The word *paṭṭi* means a straying bull. The vigorous and vital debaters resembled like a bull and hence the name. Even Dignāga[16] (A.D. 450-500), the reputed Buddhist logician of Kāñci was extolled with the title, *Tarkapungava*, a bull in debate. Tiruñāṉacampantar[17] (A.D.650) refers to the Buddhist Tamil logicians in the phrase, "*Tarkkacāttirattavar*", i.e. those well versed in Tarkasāstras. The existence of the texts on logic and also religious disputants of various schools is noted in the commentary of Yāpparunkalam[18] (A.D.1025). The same source also provides details of a Vādin, an erudite scholar, adducing reasons and producing apt and authentic quotations to refute the statements of his opponent in order to establish his own views.[19]

The aforesaid references would lead to the conclusion that the Tamils exhibited keen interest in the art of debating and developed the science of argument. They should have also exchanged views with all schools of thoughts and exponents of various systems of Indian philosophy. Bearing these views in mind, the technical terms (nūlpuṇarppu or tantrayukti) as preserved in Tolkāppiyam and Pāṭalam are presented here below along with the annotations of the commentators. The views of Mahavidwan R.Ragavaiyangar (hereafter R.R.) are also examined in the course of the discussion.

The Technical terms in Tolkappiyam

1. *Nutaliyatu aṟital* literally means the comprehension of what has been stated. It also denotes the understanding of the proposition (-nutaliyatu). Iḷampūraṇar (-hereafter Iḷam) explains this term to indicate the knowing of not only the bare sense of the aphorism, but also its import. He quotes the first aphorism in the Eḷuttatikāram of Tolkāppiyam, which actually enumerates the letters in Tamil. But, the sūtra also intends to define and determine the total number of letters.

Pēraciriyar (-hereafter Pēr) gives a different interpretation. The derivation of the prescriptive and prohibitive rules is made possible due to this device. According to him, 'nutalutal' meant proposition, pertaining either to threefold Tamiḻ conventions (-mūvakai-t-Tamiḻ Vaḻakkam), or exclusively the literary tradition, or the substance of Adhikāra, or the theme of a chapter, or of a single sūtra.

This term has been replaced by '*Nutali-p-pukutal*' in Pāṭalam. It means the author's introduction of his thematic discussion in the form of a prologue.

R.R. equates this term with Kautilya's Adhikaraṇa (1), which means a subject according to Vidyabhusana. [In the following sections also, his translation of the technical terms is being given]. However, this equation does not seem apt for the two terms connote different senses.

2. *Atikāra muṟai* (Iḷam) means the orderliness of big division of a treatise.

This term is found as "*Atikāra muṟaimai*" in the commentary of Pēr. This technique enables one to bring forth the relevant part of the early sutra or its sense in completing the meaning of a subsequent aphorism. The order of the themes (*-muṟaimai*) enumerated in an early sutra should be strictly adhered while they were taken individually for further elaboration in the following aphorisms, without any deviation.

This term is replaced by *ottu muṟai vaippu* in Pāṭalam. *ōttu* is a classical Tamil term, denoting a chapter. The commentator of this text held that the arrangement of chapters in a treatise should be orderly, rational and causal.

R.R. equates this term with the Sanskrit Vidhāna (2) of Arthasāśtra, which means arrangement. It raises a doubt why Tolkāppiyar or Pāṭalaṉār has not used Vidhāna in the place of *Atikāra muṟaimai* or *ōttumuṟai vaippu*. It seems to be a far-fetched comparison.

3. *Tokuttu-k-kūṟal* literally means summarization.

Iḷam explains that this term denotes the general summing up or subsuming up the definite grammatical aspects already discussed in a single sutra or many sutras.

According to *Per*, this device enables the author numbering the total alphabets, category of words, grammatical particles etc.

In Pāṭalam, this term has been modified as "*Tokuttu-c-cuṭṭal*", i.e.demonstrating the related features of a particular grammatical theme in a collected form of a sutra.

R.R. equates this term with Kauṭilya's Uddeśa (6), i.e. enunciation which is really different from *Tokuttu-k-kūṟal*. We

have already seen that the term denoted the enumeration of various categories by their name.

4. *vakuttu mey-n-niṟuttal* indicates establishing through classificatory arguments. According to Iḷam, it is the method of meaningful ascertainment of the assembled themes into coherent decisions. Per illustrates this term through an example. The total alphabets in Tamil are 33. This bare summing up statement is noted by the previous technical term. When this total number is further classified into 12 vowels, 18 consonants and 3 dependent letters, then it becomes a good example to this term.

In Pāṭalam, it has been abbreviated, as "*Vakuttu-k-kāṭṭal*" i.e. exhibiting the summarised themes in the classified format.

R.R. equates this term with uddeśā (6) of Arthaśāstra. It means enunciation, which he has already equated with the third term, seen above. However, the Sanskrit term is totally different from the Tamil term.

5. *Moḻintaporuḷoṭu oṉṟa vaittal* literally means this: In agreement of what is said, what is unsaid i.e. implied is to be conclusively communicated. Iḷam interprets this term thus: Though the specific aphorism provides clues for different interpretations, this technique determines that only such interpretation, which is agreeable in the explication of the immediate previous sutra, should be held.

Pēr has clubbed this term with the following one and treated them as one member. In Pāṭalam, it has been left out.

6. *Moḻiyātataṉai muṭṭiṉṟi muṭittal* indicates deducing the sense which is not overtly uttered, without any difficulty. The author (sūtrakāra) sometimes would not openly mention certain things, which are left to deduction of the commentator (bhāṣyakāra) with his keen intellect. Iḷam has labelled this device also as "*uraiyil kōṭal*", i.e. deriving through commentary. Pēr has explained that what has not been overtly stated is as good as what has been openly mentioned. In *Pāṭalam*, it is not found.

Following Pēr, R.R. also has treated the 5th and 6th terms as one, which he equated with *Arthāpatti* (13) of Arthaśāstra, meaning presumption. It is inadequate. Even in the days of Pēr, some scholars attempted to identify this terms with Arthāpatti which he refuted reasonably and established the uniqueness of the Tamil term in his commentary.

7. *Vārātatanān Vantatu mutittal* indicates the completion of what is presented from what is not presented in the aphorism. Iḷam explains that the rule, which governed a word may very well be applied to the one, which is not found in the sutra (if the two shared the commonness).

Pēr illustrates this term from the text of *Tolkāppiyam*. Accordingly, the word '*ellām*' (-all) is common both to *uyartiṇai* (human beings) and *Ahriṇai* (non-human beings and inanimate objects). Tol has prescribed that the augment *varru* would occur only along with the nouns of latter category. When he ordained that *varru* would occur before '*ellām*', it is to be understood that it does not belong to uyartiṇai in this particular context, but to *Akriṇai*.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not found.

R.R. equates this term with *Anāgatāvekṣaṇa* (27), i.e. anticipation. There is some similarity between the two terms.

8. *Vantatu koṇṭu vārātatu muṭittal* is the converse of the previous term. It denotes the completion of what is presented from what is not presented in the aphorism. Iḷam elucidates that the rule, which is applicable to the word which is not cited, may be taken from the sutra that prescribes it to a particular word.

Instead of *muṭittal* (-completion), Pēr held '*uṇarttal*' (instruction). He interpreted this term in his own way. Accordingly, on the strength of the rule, formulated in a latter sutra it may be pressed into service to get the sense which is not previously occurred. This term is not found in Pāṭalam. R.R. equates this term with *Atikrāntāvekṣaṇa* (28) i.e. retrospection. There is some similarity between the two terms.

9. *Muntumolintatan talai taṭumārru* denotes the inversion of the statement, mentioned in a previous sutra. *Talaitaṭumārru* literally means the topsy-turvey state. Iḷam elucidates that in order to gain some purpose the order of presentation of the themes, proposed in the previous sutra is distorted in the subsequent sutras.

Pēr quotes some examples from the text Tol to explicate this term. In the first chapter of Eluttatikāram, Tol has enumerated the alphabets in the order of vowels and consonants. Nevertheless, in the fourth chapter he emphatically stated that all words have in the end and initial position only the two types of alphabets, viz.,

consonants and *vowels*. Here, the order is reversed in accordance with this technical device.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not noted. R.R. has equated this term with Apavarga (22) i.e. exception. However, the Tamil term does not mean exception.

10. *Oppa-k-kūṟal* denotes equal saying. Iḷam explains that while stating the rule for a particular usage, the similars are to be completed on the authority of the same rule. Per annotated the equal functioning of the rule with regard to more than one word. The inflectional increment /iṉ/ occurring before ā (cow) and also mā (mango, due to morpho-phonemic formation) loses its initial vowel / i/. He also considered that the numbering of the heterogeneous categories such as the conjunctive participle and particle of comparison in the same sutra is an instance of *oppa-k-kūṟal*. In Pāṭalam, it is found as "*oppiṉ muṭittal*."

R.R. equates this with Upamāna (12) i.e. analogy. Though they seem to be more or less the same, they are different as evidenced by the elucidation of the commentators.

11. *Orutalaimoḻi* indicates the statement, ascertaining one or the other of the two contrary views. Iḷam considers that this term conveys the Sanskrit sense of *ekāgra* i.e. one pointedness *(-ஏகாக்கரம் என்னும் வடமொழிப் பொருண்மை)*. He explains that if the particular sutra is ambiguous, conveying more than one sense, one of them is to be determined.

This term becomes '*orutalai moḻital*' in the commentary of Pēr. According to him, *orutalai* means one portion. What is mentioned in a previous portion of the text is adopted in the succeeding portions also. In the Eḻuttatikāram, Tol stated a, i and u are the three demonstrative bases which are also applicable to the chapter on Peyariyal of Collatikāram..

In Pāṭalam, *Orutalai tuṇital* replaced this term. R.R. equates this term with *Ekānta* (26) i.e. certain (or singular conclusion). We have already noted that Iḷam equated this term with Ekāgra, which is not found in the list of Kauṭilya.

12. *Taṉkōḷkūṟal* denotes the stating of one's own view-point

Iḷam illustrates this technique from the section on cases (-Vēṟṟumai alias Vibhakti). First of all Tol mentioned that there

were grammarians who upheld the system of seven cases. In the next sutra, he presents his own view that with the addition of vocative case (-viḷi vēṟṟumai), there are eight, expressing the author's view. Per also gave similar interpretation. In Pāṭalam this term is not found.

R.R. has equated this term with *Upadeśa* (8) i.e. instruction, though the equation is not proper. It actually connotes *sva-pakṣa*, a term in the later logical treatises of the Yogācāra Buddhists.

13. *Uṭampoṭu puṇarttal* denotes the application of the rule in the sutra itself which deals with the same. Iḷam gives one example: According to Tol, /ar/ should not occur without the enunciative /u/. He illustrated it in his own sutra, "ārum aruvum īroṭu civaṉum" (Viḷimarapu, 21). Also in the description of Aḷapetai (-Pluta), Tol used the same technique.

Per held "*Muṟaipiṟaḻāmai*" in its place, meaning the non-deviation from the order. In Pāṭalam, both these terms are not found.

R.R. equated *Uṭampoṭu puṇarttal* with *Prasanga* (15) which means argument which does not tally with the Tamil term.

14. *Piṟaṉ uṭampaṭṭatu tāṉuṭampaṭutal* indicates the acceptance of the view, which has been accepted by others. Iḷam explicates this term, stating that Pāṇini's view of second case occurring in the accusative sense (i.e. as object of a verb) is also accepted by Tol.

Pēr gives a different example. The author, who writes the supplementary or secondary treatise may accept the view of his predecessor who wrote the original work. Such case comes under this category.

In Pāṭalam, this term has been modified as "*Piṟaṉūl muṭintatu tāṉ uṭampaṭutal*" (28), i.e. acceptance of the view, ascertained in other treatises (of different authors).

R.R. equotes this term with *anumata* (18) meaning assent. Though the Sanskrit term is very brief and the Tamil term is elaborate, both of them more or less convey the same sense.

15. *Iṟantatu kāttal* literally means the safeguarding of what is said previously

In the classical Tamil, *kāttal* and *ōmpal* possess opposite meanings. They denote both preservation and also prevention.

According to Iḷam, this term denotes that the meaning, not obtained from the previous sutra is derived through the following sutra. But, Pēr presents a different connotation. He envisages that this term indicates the avoidance of the sense of previous sutra through the statement of the following sutra. He also brings the rules of exception under this term.

On the basis of the semantic significance of '*kāttal*', one has to understand the functioning of this device. What has become extinct (-iṟantatu i.e. dead) is to be eschewed. That seems to be the correct sense of the term, '*iṟantatu kāttal*', which is synonymous with '*iṟantatu vilakkal*' of Pāṭalam. The later commentators uniformly annotated this term to mean the avoidance of the obsolete rules and usages.

R.R. does not give any Sanskrit equivalent to this term.

16. *Etiratu pōṟṟal* literally means the safeguarding of what is to be said afterwards. Iḷam explains this term to mean the preservation of the substance of a subsequent sutra through the sense of previous sutra. Pēr considers that this term indicates the previous statement of a different sense in accordance with the sense of oncoming sūtra. However, the connotations of the these two commentators do not seem adequate. The same term is also found without any change in Pāṭalam. It has been aptly interpreted to mean the acceptance of fresh rules, which were not current in ancient times.

[20]In Naṉṉūl, *irantatu vilakkal* and *etiratu poṟṟal* are respectively indicated by the phrases, "*palayaṉa kalital*" i.e. the passing away of the obsolete old usages and "*putiyaṉa pukutal*" i.e. the entry of fresh rules are not defects (*valu-v-ala*) in a language, but they occur due to the passage of time (*-kāla vakaiyiṉāṉ*).

R.R. does not present any Sanskrit equivalent to this term.

17. *Moḻivām eṉṟal* literally means, 'let us say in advance'.

Iḷam upholds that after mentioning some rules in a particular place, the author would say that he would relate one of them in a specific context. Pēr opines that expecting a good purpose, the author is privileged to state that he would place a rule in advance. In Pāṭalam, this term is renamed as "*Uraittum eṉṟal*". Though the sense of the term is not different, the later commentators interpreted it in a different way. If it happens for the author to state a rule in advance which actually has to be presented in a later context, he has

to briefly mention it there itself, with the implication that its elaboration would be made afterwards. R.R. does not present any Sanskrit equivalent to this term.

18. *Kūṟiṟṟu eṉṟal* means that it has already been said. Iḷam has given an illustration to understand this term: The grammar for duration (māttirai) and classification of alphabets has already been stated in the first chapter of Eḻuttatikāram in Tol. But, when the author happened to deal with the essentials of prosody in Poruḷatikāram, he has mentioned that the grammar, pertaining to duration and classification of letters remained the same, as noted already. In the same spirit, Pēr has adduced some more examples. In Pāṭalam, this term is renamed as "*uraittām eṉṟal.*"

R.R. equates this term with *pradeśa (11)* which means determination from a statement to be made. The contents of the two terms differ widely.

19. *Tāṉkuṟi-y-ituṭal* indicates the naming of the grammatical category by the author himself. Apart from the worldly usages, the author is entitled to name the grammatical categories. Iḷam presents the example, *uyartiṇai* and *ahṟiṇai* to be the names, given by the author himself. Pēr added similar examples, taken from the text.

In Pāṭalam, this term is enlarged as "*taṉkuṟi vaḻakkan mika eṭuttu uraittal*", i.e. to use in many sutras the fresh technical terms, coined by the author himself.

R.R. equates this term with *sva-saṃjñā* (23), a special term, 'Sva' means oneself and *saṃjñā* means technical term. The whole word connotes one's own technical term, which agrees with the sense of the Tamil term. In Tol, *kuṟi* also used in the sense of grammar (Poruḷ, 50).

20. *Orutalai-y-aṉmai muṭintatu kāṭṭal* denotes the fluctuating features of the author's formulations. Iḷam explains this term, indicating the commonness, displayed in many usages.

Pēr split this term into two:

1. *Orutalai-y-aṉmai*
2. *Muṭittu-k-kāṭṭal*

According to him, the first one denotes the non-compulsory character of a particular rule, while the second one denotes the statement of the views of the predecessors.

Following Pēr, R.R. takes them as two terms and equates them respectively with *Saṃśaya* (14) i.e. doubt and *Yoga* (3) i.e. union of words. It is essential to note that they do not connote the correct sense of the Tamil terms.

21. *Āṇaikūṟal* reveals the author's commanding statement.

Iḷam elucidates this term that without adducing any reason whatsoever for framing a rule, the author could proclaim his own formulation, as a command. His explanation induces one to classify this term alongwith '*Taṉkōḷkūṟal*' (12), cited above, as indicated in the commentary of Pēr. He considered that this term meant the implication of the author's view, highlighted in the sutra.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not found. R.R. equates this technical word with *Niyoga* (29), injunction. Both the words convey the same sense.

22. *Palporuṭku ērpiṉ nallatu kōṭal* means the acceptance of the good among the many agreeable senses. Iḷam interprets that though the particular aphorism provides clues to read many an agreeable meaning, one should accept the best suited of them. Pēr also had the same view. This term has been abridged as *ērpuḷi-k-kōṭal*" of a later grammatical text known from the commentary of Naṉṉūl. However, in Pāṭalam both these terms are not found.

R.R. equates this term with *Vikalpa* (30), alternative, though it does not fully agree. It would have been better, if the Sanskrit word was equated with '*Vikaṟpattiṉ muṭittal*' (19) found in the list of Pāṭalam.

23. *Tokutta moḻiyāṉ Vakuttaṉar kōṭal* indicates the derivation of one more sense on the authority of assembled words. Iḷam gives an example for this term. When Tol stated that the shortened/u/ would occur in kinship name (as in nuntai) in one sutra, then it should be understood from the same source that it would also occur in the initial position of a word. Such occurrence is very rare, since the shortened/u/ occurs only at the end as a vowel-release, preceded by any one of the six-fold plosives in Tamil. This phoneme, according to Sivajnāna Swamigal is not found in Sanskrit.

Iḷam has also equated this term with "*Colliṉ muṭipiṉ a-p-poruḷ muṭittal*", occurring in Pāṭalam (30), which is however interpreted in a different way by its commentators, as shown in the course of this article.

Pēr gives a different explication. If a formula for the structure of a grammatical category, for instance conjunctive participle (*Ceytupattern*) is framed by Tol, then the similars such as *nakku, vantu, kaṇṭu, ninṟu* etc., are to be subsumed under Ceytu. Similarly, he has identified *kāppu* i.e. protection as one of the 28 semantemes belonging to the accusative case (Col.72). Under *kāppu*, its synonyms such as *purattal, purantaral, ōmputal* and *pōṟṟal* also are classified due to this technical device.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not found. R.R. equates this lengthy term with *Samuccaya* (31), aggregation. It would have been better if this Sanskrit term was equated with *Tokuttu-k-kūṟal* (3), cited above.

24. *Maṟutalai Citaittu-t-taṉtuṇipu uraittal* denotes the destruction of the anti-thesis and establishment of one's own conclusion. Iḷam illustrated this term through an internal example. Tol held that the long vowels and aḷapeṭai (-akin to SKT Pluta) are natural and independent sounds, after rejecting the view of those who treated them to be the elongated form of the respective short vowels.

Pēr explains that Tol refuted the view of others who advocated that a single alphabet would have three mātras, and concluded that if it required elongation, it should be represented by the addition of its homogeneous short vowel.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not enumerated. R.R. equates this lengthy term with *Uttara pakṣa* (25), reply. The refutation of pūrvapakṣa is not stated by the Sanskrit term. However, the latter part of the Tamil term, *taṉ tuṇipu uraittal* is synonymous with uttarapakṣa.

25. *Piṟaṉkōḷ kūṟal* means the stating of other's view.

Iḷam explains that Tol has projected in the first sutra of Vēṟṟumai-y-iyal the view of those who upheld the concept of sevenfold cases. It does not mean that he has accepted their view.

Pēr gives a different example. Tol is basically a text on Iyal Tamil (i.e. literary language). Yet, his reference to the grammar of music (Icai) and drama (Kūttu) is a valid illustration for this term.

In Pāṭalam also, it is noted (8). It is slightly different from *Pīṟaṉ uṭampaṭṭatu tāṉ uṭampaṭutal* (14), cited already. R.R equated this term with *Pūrvapakṣa* (24), question. It is actually the *para pakṣa*. They convey the same sense.

26. *Ariyātu utampatal* denotes the acceptance of other's view, without having a knowledge of it. Iḷam quotes the accpetance of the existence of sevenfold hells, perhaps mentioned in legends and myths. Pēr presents a different explication. According to him, the acceptance of exceptional rules without having a knowledge of them is indicated by this term. The last aphorism in almost every chapter of Tol is called *Puranaṭai*, referring to the untold rules and usages in general, giving room for accommodating them within the framework of the aphorisms.

However, it is essential to note that this term finds a place in the list of Nigrahasthanās, being dealt with elsewhere in this dissertation. In Patālam, this term is not mentioned.

R.R. has not equated it with any of the Sanskrit terms, found in the Arthaśāstra.

27. *Poruḷiṭai-y-iṭutal* indicates the insertion of some new rules betwixt the related ones. Iḷam explains this term thus: When one object is said in a particular sutra, without saying its related objects along with it, the mentioning of them with an interval is denoted by this device. Pēr held the same view. He illustrates that the euphemistic usage, which deserved to be treated in the first chapter of Collatikāram was discussed in the last chapter.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not noted. R.R. brings *Vyākhyāna* (19) description, as an equivalent to this term. Both are different.

28. *Etirporuḷ uṇarttal* literally means the instruction of future rules. According to Iḷam, this term denotes the instruction of advance rules which are actually to be mentioned in the subsequent sections. Pēr opines that taking into consideration that some rules would undergo changes in the march of time, the grammarian is required to legislate appropriate formulas. Tol [Col.452] stated that the fresh entries in the lexicon should not be eschewed, if they would occur in the course of time.

In Pāṭalam, this term is not enlisted. R.R. equates this term with *Viparyāya* (16), reversion, though they do not tally with each other.

29. *Colliṉ eccam colliyāṅku uṇarttal* literally means the instruction of the remaining rules, meant by incomplete words. Iḷam gives the following explication: Tol mentioned tenfold eccam (-generally

participles). The meaning of the eccams should be understood according to the prescribed rules.

Nevertheless, Pēr differed from him and explained this term to denote the sense, derived from the implied potency of the words (-Collin eccam), which should be grasped on a par with the sense, derived directly from the words.

This term is left out in Pāṭalam. R.R. quotes *Vākyaśeṣa* (17) i.e. context, to be its equivalent. The word śeṣa corresponds to eccam. But, the lengthy Tamil term is elaborate in its connotation.

30. *Tantupuṇarntu uraittal* literally means the stating of rules, bringing to bear upon the context. Iḷam opines that bringing a particular word, found either in the previous or following sūtra to complete the sense of the one that stands between the two. Pēr feels that this term indicates the supply of ellipses in order to bring out the import of the specific aphorism. This term is not found in Pāṭalam.

R.R. equates this with *Atideśa* (10), the extended application. Some similarity is noticed in them.

31. *Ñāpakam kūṟal* denotes recalling some rules by means of related ones. However, Iḷam takes it to mean punning of the words and deriving two interpretations. It is pertinent to note the word *ñāpakam* does not mean punning, but recalling. The punning device is expressed through *iraṭṭuṟa moḻital* (11) in Pāṭalam.

Pēr considers that this device enables one to derive the forced meaning of a sutra on the ground of some unwarranted usage of words.

In Pāṭalam this term is not counted. R.R. finds *Apadeśa* (9) specification, to be an equivalent to this term, though they do not come very close to each other.

32. *Uyattu-k-koṇṭu uṇartal* refers to the understanding by induction. According to Iḷam, the exploration of the apt sense of the sūtra by inferential knowledge is denoted by this term. Pēr considers that the bringing forth of another sense along with the primary sense of the sutra is noted by this device.

In Pāṭalam, it is found as "*uyttu uṇara vaippu*" (32) R.R. equates this lengthy term with *ūhya* (32), ellipsis. More or less, they

convey the same sense. However, the Sanskrit term also means guessing. But, the Tamil term does not connote this sense.

Tol has governed some more devices which are not enumerated already by the phrase, "*Colliya alla piṟa avaṟvariṉum*". Iḷam brings forth 1. *māṭṭeṟital* 2. *colporuḷ virittal* and 3. *oṉṟiṉam muṭittal taṉ iṉam muṭittal* which are found in the Pāṭalam (14, 9 and 31). Let us consider briefly the additional technical terms, which are enlisted only in the Pāṭalam.

Additional terms in the Pāṭalam

1. ***Muṭittu-k-kāṭṭal*** **(5)**

In conformity with the procedure of the predecessors, the author has to wind up the substance of the aphorism.

2. ***Muṭivu iṭam kūṟal*** **(6)**

This term indicates the stating of apt literary usage to the grammatical rule, framed by the author himself.

3. ***Tāṉeṭuttu moḻital*** **(7)**

It denotes the quoting of old aphorisms of ancient grammatical texts in the body of the fresh treatise. In Naṉṉūl, six sūtras of Tolkāppiyam have been adopted without any change.

4. ***Colporuḷ virittal*** **(9)**

This term denotes the expansion of the case-signs, suffixes etc., which are understood in the sentence for elaborating the sense to the easy understanding of the readers. It is also applicable for annotating poetical creations.

5. ***Toṭar-c-col puṇarttal*** **(10)**

It indicates the bringing together of the inter-related words in a statement for effecting the correct and clear sense.

6. ***Iraṭṭuṟa moḻital*** **(11)**

This term refers to the framing of a sūtra in such a way as to offer two senses, one of which is plain and apparent, while the other is derived and implied.

7. ***Ētuviṉ muṭittal*** **(12)**

Ētu means reason, cause. It projects the valid reason to ascertain a definite grammatical rule.

8. *Māṭṭu eṟintu oḻukutal* (14)

Though this term is not enumerated in Tolkappiyam while dealing with the 32 technical devices, it has been mentioned simply with the title "*māṭṭu*" in the list of 34 constituent members of a literary creation, especially poetry. Naccinārkiniyar (A.D.1400), the celebrated commentator of ancient Tamil classics, has utilised this technique to the maximum extent to corroborate the sequential sense of the Idyll, Pattu-p-pāṭṭu and also the Jain epic Cīvakacintāmaṇi.

The above term denotes the lifting of a phrase in a sutra, or the whole, meant for a specific word to relate for a different word in a separate sutra, since both of them are governed by the same rule. Tolkāppiyar himself has used this devise very much in the Eḻuttatikāram.

9. *Muṉmoḻintu kōṭal* (17)

This term indicates the mentioning of a specific rule in a previous context and applies the same wherever necessary in the course of the subsequent portions of the text.

10. *Piṉṉatu niṟuttal* (18)

If an instrumental rule which is required to be stated in a previous sutra, is not stated there itself, then it may be presented in the following one.

11. *Vikaṟpattiṉ muṭittal* (19)

It denotes what is concluded by diverse (or general) rules may also be ascertained by specific rules, in order to get clear understanding.

12. *Muṭintatu muṭittal* (20)

According to the commentators, this term is the reverse of the former. What is ascertained by special rules may very well be settled by general rules.

13. *Eṭuttu-k-kāṭṭal* (24)

It denotes the illustration of apt examples given by the author to the rules, framed by himself.

14. *Eṭuttamoḻiyiṉ eyta vaittal* (25)

It connotes the identification of the grammatical rule in the example, cited by the author.

It is essential to note that these two terms (24 and 25) give importance to the examples to understand the significance of the rule. In the logical and epistemological texts in Tamil, "*Etuttu-k-kāttu*" i.e. example is found as the third member in the syllogism, meant for the transference of one's own inferential knowledge to others (*-parārthānumāna*).

15. *Innatu allatu itu-v-ena molital* (26)

When a doubt arises, the author has to ascertain in the process: "this is not, but this is."

16. *Eñciya collin eyta-k-kūral* (27)

It denotes the stating of grammatical rule to the left out words, on the basis of the rule, formulated for related words.

17. *Collin mutipin a-p-porul mutittal* (30)

When the word ends, its sense also is to be ended (-completed) there itself.

18. *Onrinam mutittal tan-n-inam mutittal* (31)

When the author discusses one thing, its related things also are to be subsumed under the same head, to avoid elaboration.

These are the additional terms, adumberated in the Pātalam. However, the commentator of Nannūl wherein this text is fully adopted, has mentioned some more terms. They are the following.

19. *Uraiyil kōtal*

The term *Ānaikūral* in Tol denoted the unique privilege of the author to present a rule in a commanding tone, without adducing any reason. Similarly, *uraiyil kōtal* assures special right to the commentators to adopt their own techniques to clarify the sense of the sūtra. They do not require the authority of the text, since they exercise their keen intellect to throw light on the aphorism.

20. *Ērpuli-k-kōtal*

It denotes the acceptance of what is agreeable in a particular context, overlooking the rigidity of the rule. It is essential to note that Pēr also has mentioned this term (Supra 22).

21. *Molintaporulotu onra avvayin moliyata tanai muttinri mutittal*

It is the combination of the 5th and 6th terms, mentioned in Tol.

Total number of the technical terms

Tolkappiyar has enlisted 32 technical terms, essential for the formation and interpretation of aphoristic literature, i.e. grammatical text. Pāṭalaṉār adopted 18 terms from this ancient text and introduced 18 more fresh terms. The later commentator of Naṉṉūl added two more terms, viz., *uraiyilkōṭal* and *ēṟpuḷi-k-kōṭal*. So, all in all there are 52 technical terms available from the Tamil sources.

From the Sanskrit sources, Vidyābhūsaṇa presented 32 or 34 technical terms. A critical evaluation of the comparisons, made by R.R. reveals the fact that six terms (17, 18, 23, 24, 25 29) agree with the Tamil terms (29, 14, 19, 25, 24, 21) and four terms (10, 27, 28, 32) partially agree with the Tol (30, 7, 8, 32). The original terms are very many in the Tamil texts, having no parallels in Sanskrit.

The proposition that the technical devices, initially intended for grammatical exposition should have been extended to the explication of theory of knowledge, holds good. Before concluding this section, it is relevant to note that Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppuswami Sastri, in the preface to his book, "*A Primer of Indian Logic*" has quoted a 'śloka' "*kāṇādam pāṇinīyam ca sarvaśāstropakārakam*" conveying the sense that "logic and grammar are indispensable aids for every branch of knowledge".

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4. *Manimēkalai*, XXVIII, 15.

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   iii. *The Cambridge Shorter History of India,* p.179.

10. *Tolkāppiyam, Poruḷatikāram* (Iḷampūraṇam) aphorism, 75 (pp.116-126).

11. Ibid., pp.121-2.

12. *Tirukkuṟaḷ,* 401.

13. Ibid., Chapters 65, 72, 73 etc.

14. *Malaipaṭukaṭām,* 112-3.

15. *Maṇimēkalai,* I 60-61.

16. *A History of Indian logic,* p.272.

17. *Tiruñāṉacampantar Tirumuṟai,* I 62.10.

18. "tarukkam āvaṉa ēkāntavātamum anekānta vātamum

    eṉpaṉa. avai: Nīlam, Piṅkalam, Añcaṉam, Tattuva

    taricaṉam, kālakeci mutaliya ceyyuḷkaḷuḷḷum

    cāṅkiyam mutaliya āṟu taricaṉakaḷ uḷḷum kāṇka"

    Vide, *Yāpparuṅkalam, viruttiyurai,* p.583.

A free rendering of the above passage, presented by the Commentator, Kuṇacakārar, the disciple of the author Amitacākarar is given below:

"Reasoning is of two kinds viz., *ekāntavāda,* i.e. argument, based on only one point of view, and *anekāntavāda,* i.e., argument based on various points of view. These two kinds of reasoning are expounded in the poetical texts *Nilakeśi, Pinkalakeśi, Ancanakeśi, Kālakeśi* and *Tattva darśana;* also in the six darśanas, commencing with *Sāmkhya.*"

From this reference, it becomes clear that in Tamil, many poetical works on logic were in existence at least during the period of *Yāpparunkalam* (1025 A.D.). Among them, the Jain epic Nīlakeśi survived the ravages of time. Perhaps, due to religious animosity, most of the texts especially belonging to Jainism and Buddhism should have been destroyed.

19. Ibid., pp.552-3. In the commentary, examples for proposition (*mērkōḷ*), reason (*ētu*) and example (*eṭuttu-k-kāṭṭu*) are given in chaste Tamil. A free rendering is presented below:

    Mērkōḷ : nilaipēṟu illai col (utterance or word is impermanent)

    Ētu : Ceyya-p-paṭutalāl (because it is produced)

    eṭuttu-k-kāṭṭu : Kuṭampōl (like a pot)

    This reasoning is applicable for one school of philosophers. But, for the Mīmāmsakas, word is permanent; because it is not produced like the space. This illustration is also found in the same commentary. However, instead of sound (sabda), col (word) is used in the above illustrations.

20. Naṉṉūl, sutra 462.

IV. DOCTRINE OF NAYA

The word *'nayam'* in Tamil has been used to denote nicety, beauty, grace, literary taste, desire, goodness, civility, love, profit, excellence etc. But, in the sphere of epistemology, it connotes a way, or a standpoint of looking at things. The doctrine of Naya gained much importance in Jainism. A thing is analysed from vairous points of view. To accept the view of one stand point is not to deny the view of another stand point. Holistic view is acquired through the use of different *nayas*. It gives freedom to thought entertaining the various views of an object.

The Jaina logicians classified all forms of knowledge into two divisions, viz., 1. Pramāṇa and 2. Naya[1] Umāsvāti (A.D.1-85), the great Jaina philosopher defined *'naya'* as the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints. In the Jaina Tamil epic Nilakesi (A.D.900), Naya is reckoned one among the fourfold supplementary pramāṇas which are designated as Lokottara by the commentator Samayadivākara Vāmanamuni. To describe the Naya he has quoted a Tamil aphorism, which should have belonged to a Jaina text, dwindled into oblivion. [2]He explains Naya as the knowledge of an object, viewing particularly the distinct feature among its various properties and without leaving others at the same time. The word *'naya'* seems to be derived from the Sanskrit root nī – to conduct, to lead (- *nayati*) and connotes that which leads one to comprehend the characteristics of an object. [3]In the Tirukkuṟaḷ, it also means justice. However, the Tamil aphorism places in the place of *nayam*, *cuṭṭu*, a classical Tamil word meaning that which points or demonstrates (a thing). The Jaina epic Nīlakesi (A.D.900) does not enumerate the different kinds of Naya, as noted in the Sanskrit and Prakrit Jaina texts. Let us briefly present them for a comprehensive understanding.

[4]In the *Tattvārthādhigama sūtra*, mention is made to fivefold nayas. They are as follows:

I. Artha Naya

1. *Naigama naya* is viewing at things from a relative stand point. It is the method to regard an object, endowed with general and specific properties. If the word 'jack' is mentioned, it indicates a number of properties, some of which are specific to the jack tree, while others are common

tȯ other trees. Thus, this *naya* aims not to distinguish between general and special characteristics but to view an object as it is.

2. *Samgraha naya* is the method which treats only to generic features of a thing, leaving its specific aspects. It is the class point of view.

3. *Vyavahāra naya* is the stand point, considering the specific feature of a thing. As the name suggests, it is the popular conventional point of view, on the basis of empirical understanding.

4. *Rjusūtra naya* is the method of looking at the state of a thing at a specific point of time, without any reference either to its past or present.

These four *nayas* are collectively called *Arthanayas*. The fifth one, *Sabdanaya* or the method of correct nomenclature is classified into three groups. They are as follows:

II. Sabda Naya

1. *Samprata* means convention. It denotes the use of a word in the conventional sense, though it has many meanings. Also, synonyms are there to denote an object. Even then, the most conventional word alone is to be considered to indicate the object.

2. *Samabhirudha* is the method of identifying the subtle differences between synonyms, on the basis of etymology.

3. *Evambhūta* is the method of applying to things only such names to suit their actual condition. The word *maintaṉ* in Tamil generally means son, but etymologically means a prowess man. Unless a man possesses strength, he should not be called *maintaṉ*.

Knowledge, obtained through the force of Nayas is only relative. If it is taken absolutely, then it would lead to Nayā bhāsas i.e. Fallacies of Naya which should be avoided.

It is essential to note that the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta,[5] Sāṁkhya and the Buddhist have developed their own view points, perhaps on the basis of the Jaina Nayas. Each of them attempted

interpreting and systematizing their experiences, claiming for absolute knowledge, discarding the view points of others. The commentator of Pali Piṭaka, Buddhaghosa has also mentioned fivefold nayas, practised by the Buddhist logicians. [6] In the Buddhist Tamil epic Manimēkalai (A.D.500) a detailed discussion on Nayams to understand the subtleties of the twelvefold nidānas has been made. They are fourfold. Let us consider them hereunder.

The Nayas in Maṇimēkalai

1. *Oṟṟumai Nayam*

The Tamil word *oṟṟumai* literally means unity. Due to the operation of this Naya, the things that stand as cause and effect are considered without difference either as cause or as effect. [7] Illustration for the application of *Oṟṟumai Nayam* is found in the epic Maṇimēkalai itself. The body is considered to be the product or effect of the deeds in pre-birth. It is also the cause of fresh deeds for rebirth. Thus, the same object i.e. body is treated at one instance as an effect and at a different instance as a cause.

In the Dependent origination (*-pratītya samutpāda*), the twelve links (*-nidānas*) originate as causal sequence. They are as follows: 1. ignorance (*pētamai*-Avidyā), 2. dispositions (*ceykai*-samskhāras), 3. consciousness (*uṇarvu*-vijñāna), 4. mind cum body (*aru-v-uru*-nāmarūpa), 5. six fields of sense (*vāyil āṟu* – saḍ āyatana), 6. sense contact (*ūṟu*-sparca), 7. sensation (*nukarvu*-vedanā), 8. thirst (*vēṭkai*-Tṛṣṇā), 9. Clinging (*paṟṟu*-upādanā), 10. becoming (*karuma*-v-īṭṭṭam or *kaṉma-k-kūṭṭam*-bhava), 11. birth (*piṟappu* or *tōṟṟam*-jāti) and 12. disease old age, death etc. (*viṉai-p-payaṉ*-jarāmaraṇa). Any one of them appears as the effect of the preceding *nidāna* and also the cause of the succeeding *nidāna*. The whole process would appear as a wheel i.e. bhava cakra.

The usefulness of *oṟṟumai nayam* is also stated in the Epic. All objects are inter-related and assembled together through the *santāna* sambandha, involving cause and effect. Nothing stands isolatory or independent. A chariot denotes an assemblage or hormonious blending of its constituent parts such as axle, wheels, the spokes of the wheels, framework, ropes, yoke etc. They are seen as a meaningful whole. That which is made up of various limbs and parts is denoted by a single name. The knowledge of this fact is generated through the *oṟṟumai nayam*.

2. *Vērrumai nayam*

The Tamil word *Vērrumai* means difference. It is the antonym of *orrumai*, seen above. This *naya* attempts to look at the cause and effect of a thing, individually, separately and differently. The thing, that seems as a whole unified structure through the *Orrumai nayam*, appears as distinct and different parts, when it is viewed from the *Vērrumai nayam*.

The usefulness of this *naya* is also noted. Because the object, that appears as one from the view point of unity (*orrumai nayam*) becomes really as its different components from the stand point of differentiation (-*vērrumai nayam*), the object itself becomes unreal and ceases to exist. The knowledge, acquired through this *naya*, exhorts the people not to have attachment over the unreal and non-existing things.

These two *nayas* elucidate the non-soul theory (-*Anānmavāda*), the central doctrine in Buddhism. Man suffers much on account of his attachment to his (suppository) soul. If he is convinced that there is no such thing as soul, he would turn away from the wordly things and develop detachment, a pre-requisite for enlightenment. Buddha analysed the human personality to be the components of fourfold psychical aspects, collectively called *nāma* and physical aspects, called *rūpa*. The aggregation of fivefold skandhas (*rūpa, vedanā, samjñā, samskarā* and *vijñāna*) constitutes the man. This is *orrumai nayam*. However, when each skandha is isolated separately and analysed individually to find out which is soul, that investigation would prove that there is nothing as soul. This is *vērrumai nayam*. Buddha proclaimed that all functions, attributed to the soul in the Vedic lore, were actually performed by the psychical and physical parts viz. nāmarūpa and hence dismissed soul as a non-existing entity. He considered that a soul without a function was an absurdity.[8] It is worth mentioning that the Bodhisattva Nagasena explained the non-soul theory to the Greek king Menanda, as revealed in the *Milinda Pañña* (B.C. 100 – A.D.100), the only Pali text of Mahayana Buddhism.

3. *Purivu-inmai nayam*

The Tamil word *purivu* means action or functioning. The whole term *purivu inmai* denotes the absence of action, deed or karma. This view-point results in the abstinence from doing karmas. It is this stand- point which explains how consciousness is useful to

establish the cause and effect relationship between a thing that can not be totally destroyed and the subsequent things, emerging out of it.

The *naya* is useful to understand that there is no agreement between the agent (*-karta*) and his action (*ceykai-karma*). The knowledge acquired through this *naya* prevents one from entangling in karmas.

4. *Iyalpu nayam*

The Tamil term *iyalpu* means nature. It is an equivalent of sahaja or svabhāva in Sanskrit. It describes the actual nature of an object. This naya is exemplified in the text. To say that paddy shoot alone will germinate out of paddy seed is the efficient *Iyalpu nayam*. It reveals that cause (-seed) produces effect (-shoot). It is neither causal effect nor different.

This naya helps one to know that cause is not effect (e.g. the seed is not the plumule) and the effect is not different from cause (e.g. the plumule is not different from seed). If man is viewed from this stand-point, it becomes evident that he is neither the fusion of fivefold aggregations (-skandhas), nor different from them, elucidating the Buddhist view, as expounded in the Miḷinda Paññā. Likewise, this *naya* is highly useful to know the real nature of each and every object.

[9]The doctrine of Naya, as presented by Cāttaṉār, the author of Maṇimēkalai is not to be traced in any of the Sanskrit or Pali Buddhist sources. It seems that the aforesaid nayas were developed by the Tamil Buddhists, as understood from the nomenclature of the terms and the examples. They are the contribution of Maṇimekalai to the Buddhist thought.

Among the four *nayas*, the first two viz., *oṟṟumai nayam* and *vēṟṟuman nayam* are pressed into service by the commentators, especially to interpret the contents of Tamil grammatical and philosophical texts. Therefore, the nayas are to be taken as techniques and methods to unravel the actual contents of these serious works.

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   ii. RADHAKRISHNAN, S., *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.I, pp.298-301.
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   ii. *Tamil Ilakkiyattil Pauttam*, Madras University Publication, Chennai, 1977, p.270.

V. TECHNIQUES OF QUESTION AND ANSWER

The techniques of question and answer have been adopted by the Tamil grammarians, etheticians and philosophers respectively to establish perfection in sentence structure, moral codes and metaphysical thoughts. They play an important role in the process of acquisition of knowledge. The philosophers were often said to be more capable of questioning the answers rather than addressing and answering the questions. They were keen on knowing the 'why' and 'how' of things, besides making others also equally inquisitve of comprehending the 'why' and 'how' of objects. The great Greek thinker Socrates actively engaged in raising questions to find out valid solutions for many problems. He adopted the method of questioning to arouse the thinking faculty and to make men rationalistic in thought and outlook. The art of questioning is not easy. The skill of answering the questions is also not so easy. Improper questions will elicit improper replies and hence both will be useless. First of all, let us consider the position of grammarians in formulating the techniques of question and answer.

1. In the Grammatical treatises

[1]Tolkāppiyar (B.C.500) was a practical grammarian who observed the transactions of the people in the routine life and formulated some aphorisms (Tol.Col.13-16; 31, 32, 35) to the perfection of syntactical expressions, concerning the method of questioning and the way of answering. He exhorted that one should not deviate from the customary way of raising questions and answers which should be appropriate in structure and substance. Cēnāvaraiyar, (A.D. 1150) the reputed commentator who was not only a specialist in grammar but also in logic, interpreted the aphorisms in such a way as to evolve a theory on the technique. He has defined a valid question and also a valid answer, in addition to their classification. According to him, a valid question is one which expresses 'what is to be known'. A valid answer is defined as one which instructs about the object, questioned. He has classified all kinds of questions into three categories and the answers into two.

Valid Questions

It is of three kinds, viz., question out of ignorance, question out of doubt and question out of known things.

1. Question of ignorance

Cēnāvaraiyar considers that an object can not be questioned, even a little of it is not initially known. He further clarifies that a thing which is known in a general way becomes the object of investigation to know about its special features.

2. Question of doubt

When two objects share the common features between them, the doubt arises with regard to the reality.

E.g. Whether the form, that appears yonder is a pillar or post?

3. Question of known things

The purpose of this type of question is threefold:

1. expecting some purpose,
2. to know whether there is any fresh idea of the object, other than his own, and
3. to instruct the real sense.

If the question is not in proper form, then the fallacy arises. The commentator illustrated the fallacy of question. If one raises the question, showing only one object, whether it is long or short, then the fallacy arises. It requires at least two objects for making such question, otherwise there is no meaning.

Valid answers

The commentator has given examples to illustrate the two kinds of valid reply. They are as follows:

1. Direct reply

Q. What is the nature of soul?

R. It has feeling as its nature.

The soul animates the body. So, the feeling is the index of an alive body.

2. Indirect reply

Q. Have you eaten?

R. My stomach afflicted pain.

If it is a direct answer, it should be: 'I did not eat'. But this type of reply, making one infer that since one had stomach pain, he did not eat, is also admitted in conformity with the worldly usage.

Improper and invalid replies would lead to the fallacy of answer, also exemplified in the commentary.

Q. Don't you go to Karuvūr?

R. The thick thread weighs 12 *toṭis* (measure of weight).

The question is different. The answer does not address the question. It is an irrelevant statement.

Q. What does a word connote?

R. It connotes no sense.

Definitely, all words possess some sense. Hence the reply is invalid. According to Praśastapāda, this invalid reply is an instance of *Svavacana viruddha,* being discussed in the chapter on Fllacies of Thesis.

Thus, the basic principles of the techniques of question and answer are presented. Further, Tolkāppiyar has made some norms with regard to the mode of questioning and replying, in the sense of contrast and comparison. They should be made with regard to the same members which may be either parts or wholes. Cenāvaraiyar has adequately illustrated them.

In the sense of Contrast

Q. Are her eyes bigger than those of other girl? (part)

R. [Yes] her eyes are bigger than those of other girl (")

Q. Does your King render justice more than our king? (whole)

R. [Yes] Our king renders justice more than your king (")

In the sense of comparison

Q. Are her eyes like those of other girl? (part)

R. [Yes] her eyes are like those of other girl? (")

Q. Does our king render justice like your king? (whole)

R. [Yes], our king renders justice like your king (").

After describing the patterns of comparing and contrasting questions and answers, Tolkappiyar has also exhorted that one should guard the norms, involving the techniques of question and answer.

In the Naṉṉūl

During the passage of time, they received also some fresh dimensions which are well preserved in the Naṉṉūl (A.D.1200), a

standard grammar of medieval Tamil. Pavaṇandi, the Jaina author of the treatise has partially adopted the old tradition and also introduced some innovations in the field.

[2]Sixfold questions

First and foremost, his views on the technique of questioning are briefly presented in the light of the commentary of Sankaranamasivāyar (A.D.1700). He has formulated six types of questioning, out of which three were already discussed in the commentaries of Tolkāppiyam. The remaining three are given below:

1. If a purchaser goes to the jewellary mart and raises the question, "Have you gold or gems?", it implies that he likes to buy any one of the two. So, this type of question is known as "question for purchase".

2. If a philanthropist or a master asked a poor fellow, "Don't you have any clothes?", then it implies the intention of the questioner to offer some dress. This type of question is called "question of gift".

3. If a master asks his servant, "Did you eat?" with a view to sending him for meal, then this type of question is known as "question of command".

Pavaṇandi has also classified all the possible types of answers into eightfold categories. They are briefly presented hereunder, as elucidated in the commentary of Sankaranamasivāyar.

[3]Eight-fold types of answers

These answers are made consequent to the questions raised.

1. *Cuṭṭu* (Demonstration)

Q. Which is the route, leading to Vañchi (-the capital of Chera kings)?

R. This is the route.

The reply is in the form of indication, denoted by the demonstrative pronoun "This". So, the name.

2. *Maṟai* (Negative)

Q. Cāttā?! Will you do this?

R. I will not.

This reply is named after the negative sense of the answer.

3. *Nēr* (Positive)

Q. Cāttā! Will you do this?

R. [Yes], I will do this.

Nērtal means acceptance. So, this type gets the name on the basis of the sense.

4. *Ēval* (Command)

Q. Cāttā! Will you do this?

R. You do.

Instead of acceptance or rejection, the replier commands the questioner to do the assignment.

5. *Viṉā* (question)

Q. Cāttā! Will you do this?

R. Do I do?

The reply becomes a question, and hence forms a separate category.

6. *Uṟṟatu uṇarttal* (Statement of what happened)

R. My body suffered.

Even without question, this sort of expression is taken as one kind of reply, perhaps in anticipation of a pertinent question. The following two types also belong to the same pattern.

7. *Uṟuvatu kūṟal* (Statement of what would happen)

R. My body will suffer.

The previous reply is in the past tense, while this reply is in the future tense.

8. *Iṉamoḻi* (Kindred utterence)

R. I will do the related one.

It seems that this reply is directed towards an anticipatory question, commanding one to do a particular work.

It is the general opinion that Pavaṇandi has formulated the rules, governing the types of question and answer, mostly in conformity with the commentary of Iḷampūraṇar (A.D.1100), the supposed first commentator of the whole of Tolkāppiyam text.

Next, let us proceed to illustrate the technique of question and answer, adopted by Tiruvaḷḷuvar (B.C.50 – A.D.50), the great moral philosopher.

II. In the Tirukkuṟaḷ

The analytical and critical approach of Tiruvaḷḷuvar in the explication of essential ethical norms to attract even a mediocre person is reflected in his adoption of the technique of question and answer method. He has composed many of his couplets in the formula of interrogation and reply. The following are the classical examples, taken from Tirukkuṟaḷ.[4]

1. Q. What is described as truth?
   R. It is the utterance, devoid of any harm.
2. Q. What is called compassion?
   R. It is non-killing.
3. Q. What is said as good path?
   R. It is the way of thinking to protect the virtue of non-killing.
4. Q. What is stronger than fate?
   R. There is nothing, since it stands forth, even if one exerts himself to find a way out of it.
5. Q. Is there anything to be said rare to be accomplished?
   R. There is nothing, if adequate efforts are initiated in conformity with appropriate time and efficient instruments.
6. Q. Is there anything more intelligent than one's face?
   R. There is nothing, since it reveals one's like, dislike and neutrality.
7. Q. Where is friendship enthroned?
   R. It is enthroned on the strength of extending help to support the friend to the possible extent.
8. Q. What is described as habitual intimacy?
   R. It is the friendship of amiable and agreeable attitude to the liberty and privilege, taken by one's friend, least affected by it.
9. Q. What is described as ignorance?
   R. It is the acceptance of things, landing one in loss and avoidance of things, yielding profit.

10. Q. What is whiteness? (i.e. stupidity)
    R. It is vanity, claiming sagacity.

11. Q. What is the touch-stone for nobility?
    R. It is the acceptance of defeat even at the hands of non-equals.

12. Q. What is more painful than one's poverty?
    R. There is nothing as painful as one's poverty.

The questions and answers cover a wide spectrum of empirical life. The moral philosopher analysed the major aspects of normative life and found out suitable elucidation and conclusion to enlighten the people to choose the right course of conduct to lead a purposeful and meaningful life on earth.

Now, let us pass on to discuss the techniques of question and answer, as adopted by the Tamil Buddhist logician and philosopher Cāttaṉār, the celebrated author of the Mahākāvya Maṇimēkalai (A.D.500).

III. In the Buddhist Tamil epic

The epic poet has felt the paramount importance of the techniques of question and answer while indulging in serious debates and discussions to establish the views of Buddhism. It is heartening to note that he has dealt with fourfold questions and answers in the last chapter which forms a manual on Buddhist philosophy.[5] They are in wonderful agreement with what the Bodhisattva Nagasena instructed the Greek king Manenda and to some extent with Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa (V.22). They are given in the following tabular form in order to have a comprehensive and comparative view of the subject under reference.

Maṇimēkalai (XXX.235-49)	[6]*Miḷindapaññā* IV.2-4
1. *Tuṇintu Collal* (To state boldy; to present determinate and deliberate reply)	i. *Ēkāmsa – Vyākaraṇīya* (That which can be explained categorically, or with certainty)
Q. Whether a thing, that came into existence, will also go out of existence?	Q. Will everyone who is born die?
A. Yes, it will	A. Yes

The transitory and temporal nature of worldly things is explained through this first technique. All systems of Indian Philosophy except Cārvāka accepted and advocated the concept of impermanence.[7] Tolkāppiyar has listed out various aspects of transience which are subsumed interestingly under the specific objective theme, known as "Kāñci-t-tiṇai."[8] Nampi Ārūrar (A.D.710) has emphatically stated that if there is birth, death is certain. Since the thought is uniformly found both in the homogeneous and heterogeneous systems, it deserves to be considered to belong to the national stock of Indian Philosophy or as Pan-Indian in character.

2.	*Kūriṭṭu moḻital*	ii.	*Vibhajya Vyākaraṇīya*
i.e.	To separate the component parts of the question and answer them individually	i.e.	That which is to be answered by making a division
Q.	Whether a dead man would be born again or not?	Q.	Is every one reborn after death?
A.	Whether he was free from attachment or not? If he is free from clinging and attachment, he would not be reborn. Otherwise, he would be reborn.	A.	One, who is extricated from passions (kleśas) is not reborn. It he is not so, he would definitely be reborn.

Through this technique, the meaning of liberation i.e. Nirvāṇa is elucidated. Liberation from the cycle of birth is attained only through the total eradication of all sorts of attachment. Tiruvaḷḷuvar has elaborately discussed on renouncing the attachment, arising out of external wealth and internal body, as a result of contemplating on their transient nature. He has also explicated the necessity of complete eradication of desire so that one could be liberated from the bonds of birth.

3.	*Viṉāviṉ viṭuttal*	iii.	*Pratipraccha vyākaraṇīya*
i.e.	To answer by a counter question or rejoinder	i.e.	That which is to be explained by putting another question.
Q.	Whether it is the seed that has appeared first or the palmyra tree?	Q.	Is man superior or inferior? It is necessary to ask:

A. The enquiry, which palmyra tree to which seed, is answer by a rejoinder. If the seed is shown and the aforesaid question is raised, then the reply should be that the palmyra tree appeared first. If the tree is referred and the same question is asked, then the reply would be that the seed existed first.

A. "In relation to what?" If in relation to animals, he is superior; if in relation to gods, he is inferior.

In this context, Cāttaṉār did not blindly use Nagasena's example. But he has presented a more suitable illustration, to underscore the significance of Buddhist thought with regard to the origin of the universe. Buddha discarded the theory of creation and also the theory of evolution. He advocated a new theory, known as *pratītya samutpāda*, i.e. Dependent origination. Accordingly, there is no first cause. Causes are inter-dependent. Therefore, Cāttaṉār specifically emphasised on the 'relative reply', in order to avoid the acceptance of the first cause and thereby god. It could not be said which nidāna among the twelve in the chain of causation appeared first. Each would appear as the first and also the last, if viewed in relation to the preceding and following nidānas. The twelve nidānas, which are ever revolving incessantly like a windmill or a wheel, represent a cause and effect series or chain. Therefore, the third technique of question and answer is meant to understand the dependent nature of the twelve nidānas.

4. *Vāyvāḷāmai*

i.e. To remain silent in answer to an impertinent question

Q. Is the sky-flower old or new

A. Silence is the best answer. It is meaningless to answer questions which do not conform to sense. Such meaningless questions should not be entertained. Instead of answering such stupid questions, it is wise to keep silence.

iv. *Sthāpanīya*

i.e. That which is to be set aside.

Q. Are the skhandhas the same as the living being?

A. This question does not merit a reply. For, the Buddhists held that there was nothing known as a living-being. [9] Vasubandhu has produced a similar question in his Abhidharma kośa (V.22): "Is the son of a barren woman black or white?"

It is essential to note that Cāttaṉār has given here, an original example, not found either in the text of Nagasena or of Vasubandhu. Nevertheless, the essence of the question remains the same in all of them.

When the disciplies of Buddha raised some metaphysical questions, he observed silence. There was no end in answering such question. So, he kept quiet. Any attempt to indulge in such enquiries would result in waste of time and make man forget his supreme goal of attaining salvation. Thus, Buddha's silence signifies his great patience and endurance, exhibited towards immature persons, harboured with unnecessary and useless interrogations. In the Miḷinda Paññā, it is mentioned by King Miḷinda that the silence of Buddha should have been due to his ignorance, or to his intention to hide and conceal something. Nevertheless, the Bodhisattva Nagasena was quite competent to instruct him that not every question deserved to be answered. Thus,[10] he expounded the fourfold questions and answers, as mentioned above.

It becomes evident that Cāttaṉār had erudition not only in Tamil, but also in the Pali and Sanskrit texts. Also, his amazing skill in the interpretation of traditional and conventional Buddhist doctrine in an idiomatic and fresh form, without sacrificing the spirit of the old, is revealed by these questions and answers. In the history of Indian thought, this technique occupies a significant place. It is interesting to record that [11]Teyvaccilaiyār (A.D.1250), one of the commentators of Tolkāppiyam has reproduced all the fourfold questions and answers from Maṇimēkalai, tempting one to surmise that Cāttanār should have developed his concept of enquiry also from the native source of Tolkāppiyam.

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VI. NUMBER OF PRAMĀṆAS

The sources of valid knowledge are very many. Their number differs from system to system. Akṣapāda, the earliest known author on the system of Nyāya has accepted perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (sabda) to be the main sources of knowledge.[1] However, he has also mentioned four more sources of knowledge. They are: 1. Tradition or rumour (aitihya), 2. presumption (arthāpatti), 3. probability (sambhava) and 4. non-existence (abhāva).[2] Further, he has indicated that these four did not have the independent and autonomous status of pramāṇas, since they are included under any one of the first four primary sources of knowledge. So, it is clear that during the period of Akṣapāda (150 A.D.), the maximum number of pramāṇas was four plus four, eight only.

The Buddhist Tamil Sources

But, when we explore the Tamil sources we come across five logical traditions, the first of which is represented by the Buddhist logical exposition as found in Maṇimēkalai (A.D.500).[3] The second tradition of the Tamil Jainistic logicians as embalmed in the epic Nīlakesi (A.D.900) and its commentary (A.D.1350) deserves special mention. The next tradition is established in the texts on Saiva Siddhānta,[4] viz., Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, Tattuvaprakāsam and Sivaneṟiprakāsam all belonged to a period extending from A.D. 1200 to A.D. 1600. The fourth logical tradition is preserved in the Advaita Vedantic texts in Tamil. The fifth one is briefly presented in the Vaishnava Tamil text, *Paramatapaṅkam* composed by Vedānta deśikar. Both the Buddhist and Saiva logical schools referred to the existence of Indian logicians who upheld the maximum number of ten pramāṇas, as against the totality of eight pramāṇas, existed in the times of Akṣapāda.

First of all, let us consider the logical exposition of the Naiyāyika as delineated in the opening portion of the 27th canto (kātai) of Maṇimēkalai, which goes under the name *"Camayakkaṇakkar tam tiṟam kēṭṭa kāṭai"* i.e. the earliest extant compendium of various systems of Indian philosophy as elucidated by the adepts in the different systems during the period of Maṇimēkalai (500 A.D.).

Cāttaṉār, the author of Maṇimēkalai was an erudite scholar not only in Buddhist logic but also in the logical expositions of all the

prominent systems of Indian Philosophy. He has enumerated a list of ten pramāṇas through the exponent of Nyāya. They are the following:[5]

S No.	Tamil term	In Sanskrit	English equivalent
1	kāṭci	pratyakṣa	perception
2	karutal	anumāna	inference
3	oppumai or uvamai	upamāna	comparison
4	urai or ākamam	āgama	verbal testimony
5	aruttāpatti	arthāpatti	presumption
6	iyalpu	svabhāva	nature or appropriateness
7	ulakurai or aitikam	aitihya	tradition or rumour (popular belief)
8	inmai or apāvam	abhāva	non-existence
9	mīṭci	pāriśeṣa	inference by elimination
10	uḷḷaneri or campavam	sambhava	occurrence or inclusion

All the eight types of pramāṇas of Nyāya sūtra are also found in the above enumeration. The additional two pramanas are: 1. iyalpu (svabhāva) and 2. mīṭci (pāriśeṣa). However, the first of these two is known to the Naiyāyikas with the name 'sahaja' or 'svabhāva linga'. But, it is not enumerated under the category of pramāṇas. Pāriśeṣa has been considered to be a derivative from śeṣavat anumāna. However, these two are not acknowledged with the status of independent pramāṇas by Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana. But, in the Tamil tradition of Naiyāyakas, Veda Vyāsa, representing the Paurāṇika school, advocated all the ten pramāṇas, as noted in the above list. Kṛitakōṭi, the earliest commentator of Uttara Mīmāmsa sūtra has accepted eight pramāṇas, which are quoted in the list of Akṣapāda.[6] Perhaps, in order to refute him, Akṣapāda contended that all the additional four members were to be brought under any one of the first four pramāṇas. Further, Cāttaṉār has stated that Jaimini has admitted only six pramanas, viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva.[7]

In the concluding portion of the Nyāya system as represented in Maṇimēkalai, there is a final statement indicating the six

pramāṇas and the exponents or founders of different systems who subscribed to a particular number of pramāṇas. They are given here below in a tabular form.

S.No.	System	Founder or Earliest Exponent	Number of Pramāṇas
1	Cārvaka (Lokāyata)	Brahaspati	pratyakṣa (1)
2	Bauddha	Jina (Buddha)	pratyakṣa and anumāna (2)
3	Sāmkhya	Kapila	+ Āgama (3)
4	Nyāya	Akṣapāda	+ upamāna (4)
5	Vaiśeṣika	Kaṇāda	+ Arthāpatti (5)
6	Mīmāmsa	Jaimini	+ Abhāva (6)

Since the exponent of Nyāya has clearly stated that these are the pramāṇas that are current in the different systems during the period of Cāttaṉār, it goes without saying that the Vedāntic school of Kṛtakōṭi, that accepted eight pramāṇas and the Paurāṇika school of Veda Vyāsa, that advocated ten pramāṇas were not very popular. Though Kṛtakōṭi has been identified with Bodhayana and sometimes with Upavarsha respectively by P.V. Kane and Kuppuswamy Sastrigal in their learned articles, as one of the earliest commentators, existed long before Adi Sankara, his system of Philosophy is not propounded in Maṇimēkalai.[8] Similarly, the philosophical doctrines of Vedavyasa are also not found in the same epic. However, the Naiyāyika was very much concerned only with the number of pramāṇas, admitted to be the valid source of knowledge by the then existing systems of Indian philosophy. Further, it is not out of place if we mention that the view, that the name Kṛitakōṭi denoted Bodhayana seems to be more plausible.

In all the polemic works of various systems, it is uniformly said that Brhaspati, the mythical founder of Indian materialism has advocated that things which stood the test of perception alone should be taken to be real. According to the Lokāyatas, even inference has its source in perception. Hence, they questioned the autonomous status of anumāna. They contended that what the scriptures or texts related were all from the common experience, synonymous with perception. So, they did not accept verbal testimony to be a separate pramāṇa.

Next in order, the position of the Buddhists is to be examined. Though some technical terms, which are frequently used in the Nyāya epistemology are also found in the Piṭakas, it is essential to note that no systematic exposition of logical means such as the pramāṇas, their application etc., are noticed in the early Buddhist works written in Pali. *Stcherbatsky, Tucci and other reputed Buddhologists are of the opinion that only in the Mahayana schools, logic was taught as a subject and the Bodhisattva was required to have a thorough knowledge in the system of epistemology in order to establish the Buddhist tenets to the satisfaction of the opponents and to refute their views critically and reasonably.*[9] In the history of Buddhist logic, Nagarjuna (200 A.D.) the earliest exponent of Madhyamika Buddhism accepted the four pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison as the valid means of knowledge.[10] But, the early Yogācāra Buddhists like Maitreya and Asanga (300-400 A.D.), admitted the first three and left the last one, thinking that it could be brought under either perception or inference.[11] Vasubandhu (450 A.D.) was the first Buddhist logician who proclaimed that perception and inference were sufficient means of knowledge.[12] Following him Dignāga, his reputed disciple advocated the theory of two pramāṇas in the opening portion of Pramāṇa Samuccaya. In his foot steps, Cāttaṉār has commenced his treatise on Buddhist logic with the statement that Adijinendra's pramāṇas are just the two viz., pratyakṣa and anumāna.[13] Cāttaṉār has indicated Buddha by the epithets Jina and Jinendra. Some authors have misconceived that these attributes denoted only Mahāvīra and not Buddha.[14] It is not so. Specialists in Buddhology have indicated that Jina and Jinendra denoted Buddha also.[15] If one who looks into the contexts in which these words occurred would be easily convinced that they definitely denoted Buddha. Jina means conqueror. It denotes Buddha who conquered his senses and advocated that self-conquest was the best conquest. In other contexts, it denoted Mahāvīra.

After accepting this, the question arises whether Buddha has said anything about pramāṇas. The reply is this: It seems to be the honorary usage, customary with Cāttaṉār who often quoted the founder or the earliest exponent, but actually such named individual is none other than the author or earliest commentator of the particular system. For instance, when Cāttaṉār said that Kapila has advocated three pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony, he is to be taken as Īśvara Krishna (200 A.D. – 300 A.D.)

who in his Sāmkhya Kārikā, which is the earliest available text on the subject has expounded the concept of triple pramāṇas to be the correct sources of valid knowledge.[16] So also, when Cāttaṉār said that Kaṇāda, the author of Vaiśeṣika sūtra (300 B.C.) has advocated five pramāṇas viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison and presumption, it is to be understood that Praśastapāda (450 A.D.), the earliest commentator of the text under reference has accepted all the five.[17] It is essential to note that Kaṇāda has noted in his Vaiśeṣika sutra only the first two pramāṇas. Similarly when Cāttaṉār referred that Jaimini has stated six pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony, comparison, presumption and non-existence, it should be interpreted that Upavarsha (200 A.D.), the earliest known commentator of Jaimini's Mīmāmsa sūtra has advocated all the six pramāṉas.[18] In this context, it is pertinent to mark that Jaimini, the author of the original text under reference has admitted the first three pramāṇas only and not six.

Therefore, it is clear that Cāttaṉār has indirectly indicated Vasubandhu, when he mythologically mentioned that Adijinendra i.e. the original Buddha has uttered the first two pramāṇas. It is not out of place, if it is stated that Vasubandhu was accredited with the honorific title "Second Buddha" on his acquired merits and all embracing encyclopedic knowledge.[19] Some neophytes attempted on flimsy grounds to identify Adijinendra of the epic Maṇimēkalai (500 A.D.) with Jinendrabodhi (725 A.D.) whose commentary on Diggaga's Pramāṇa Samuccaya is said to be available from Tibetan version.[20] Even Vidyabhusana who has nothing to say much of this later commentator, has written only eight lines about him in his monumental "History of Indian Logic."[21] In the absence of any solid and valid grounds, it is improper to conclude that Adijinendra and Jinendrabodhi denoted one and the same person. It is also essential to mention that the age of the Buddhist epic Maṇimēkalai has been established to be 450 A.D. – 550 A.D. on both internal and external evidences, derived from the linguistic, historical, sociological, theological and philosophical sources.[22] Hence, it is proper to identify Adijinendra with Vasubandhu, just like the identification of Kapila with Īśvara Krishna, Kaṇāda with Praśastapāda and Jaimini with Upavarsha. Next, let us discuss the position in the Jain Tamil epics.

The Jain Tamil Sources

Nīlakesi (A.D. 900), one of the polemic Tamil epics, aims to refute other systems and to establish the supremacy of Jainism. The

commentator of the epic, Samayadivākaravāmana māmuni (A.D. 1350) has written a brilliant commentary in Manipravala style, revealing his erudition in the original texts of Jainism and also other systems. The first section of the epic, which propounds the essential tenets of Jainism, also presents though briefly the concept of pramāṇas in chaste Tamil, as upheld by the logicians of Jainism. All the valid sources of knowledge[23] are broadly classified into two divisions: 1. *kāṭci-y-aḷavai* (-pratyakṣa) and 2. *kāṭciyil aḷavai* literally means that which is not kāṭci i.e. non-perceptual pramāṇa. *Kāṭci* means perception. So, the whole term denotes parokṣajñāna.

I. Pratyakṣa

Among the two, pratyakṣa is the direct knowledge, acquired by the soul through the aids of senses, mind etc. It is of five kinds. They are as follows.

1. Indriya pratyakṣa (*-poṟi*)

Sensory perception arises out of external objects through the contact of any one of the fivefold senses. It is not different from the one, delineated in Nyāya, Sāmkhya, Saiva Siddhānta and other systems.

2. Mānasa pratyakṣa (*-maṉam*)

Mental perception arises out of *sukhādi svarūpa* (objects of pleasure, pain etc.) and also germinates from the knowledge of memory etc., associated with the concerned objects.

3. Avadhi pratyakṣa

It denotes the knowledge of objects beyond the limits of ordinary perception.[24] In the earliest known Tamil epic Cilappatikāram (A.D. 300), which possesses rich materials on Jainism, *avadhijñāna* is labelled as "*Cintai viḷakku*" (X 167). It literally means the brilliance of consciousness. But, the commentator (A.D.1100) explains that it denotes the knowledge of the past, present and future (-Trikālajñāna), acquired by the Sāraṇas.

[25]In another Jain Tamil epic Cīvaka cintāmaṇi (A.D.700), *avadhijñāna* is noted by the name "*ōti*", and also in Nīlakesi (102). The process concerning this sort of perception is explained thus: "*uṇarntu kāṇutal*" which means perception through feeling or consciousness, and "*ōtiyiṉ nōkkutal*" i.e. spiritual perception.

In the Tamil Jain tradition, Avadhi jñāna also meant the knowledge of one's pre-birth. It denotes clairvoyance. i.e. supersensual perception of objects and occurrences, which are distant in space and time. The Cūḷamaṇi[26] (A.D. 900), an equally great Jain Tamil epic extols the superman who is endowed with this wonderful perception, as *Avadhijñāni* (352).

Samayadivākara elucidates in his commentary on Nīlakesi that this rare knowledge is acquired by the qualified soul, when all the concealments and impediments of the karmas, which obstruct jñāna and vīrya (-jīvaśakti) are totally annihilated.

4. Manahparyāya pratyakṣa (-puṇṇiya māṇtaku maṉa-p-pariyāyam)

This perception denotes the direct knowledge of reading the thoughts of others. Also, it denotes the knowledge of one's own pre-birth and of the past births of others, as per the commentary of Naccinārkkiniyar.[27] However, Samayadivākara[28] explains this perception as the knowledge of reading the thoughts of others with abundant clearness. The evolved person acquires this type of perception when he is relieved from the obstacles of the karmas that obstruct jñāna and vīrya.

5. Kevala pratyakṣa (*-kevalam*)

This rare perception denotes the unobstructed, unconditional and absolute knowledge.[29] Samayadivākara elucidates that this supreme perception is acquired by the most perfect soul, when the four kinds of ghātin karmas viz., jñānāvaraṇiya, darśanāvaraṇiya, mohanīya and antarāya which are the obstacles of attaining absolute knowledge are completely wiped out. If these four impediments and veilments are completely eradicated, then the Aghātin karmas viz., Vedanīya, Āyu, Nāma and Gotra are automatically annihilated, facilitating the attainment of beatitude i.e. parinirvāṇa.

Adiyārkkunallār (A.D.1150), a great commentator of Cilappatikāram, annotates the epithet "*pakavaṉ*" (X.177) i.e. bhagavan to mean *Kevalajñāni*. This jñāna is personified as an ocean in Cīvakacintāmaṇi (3060). Among all types of knowledge, Kevalajñāna is the supreme and absolute knowledge, leading to eternal liberation.

[30]Umāsvāti (A.D.1-85), in his Tattvārthadhigama sūtra classified the last three of the fivefold perceptions under a special category of Pratyakṣa, since they are attained not through the medium of senses, but by the perfect practice of spiritual exercises. However

Siddhasena,[31] in his Nyāyāvatāra, classified the direct valid knowledge (-pratyakṣa) into two categories, viz., practical knowledge (Vyavahārika), acquired through the fivefold senses and mind, while transcendental knowledge (Pāramārthika) being the infinite knowledge (Kevala) arising due to the perfect enlightenment of the soul.

So far, we have seen the concept of perception as advocated in the Tamil Jain epics, taking into account the details, available in the Sanskrit and Prakrit sources. Now, let us proceed to present the concept of parokṣajñāna, as noted in the aforesaid Tamil classics.

II. Parokṣajñāna

It denotes the indirect knowledge that the soul acquires through the agencies, other than the sense-organs. [32]In Nīlakesi (119), it is classified into five types, viz., 1. Niṉaivu (smaraṇa), 2. Mīṭṭuṇarvu (pratyabhijñāna), 3. Ūkam (tarka), 4. Aṇumai (anumāna) and 5. Ākamam (-āgama). They are explicated in the commentary of Samaya divākara.

1. Niṉaivu

This type of indirect knowledge is acquired by the soul through recollection and memory. It always projects the knowledge of the past.

2. Mīṭṭu-uṇarvu

This type of indirect knowledge arises out of recognising an object or person, as in the expressions, "that is this", "I am he", "that person is this person", "This is like that", "a forest cow is like the domestic cow" etc. They arise out of the knowledge of identity between two things and also of things of equal properties. The commentator seems to closely follow [33]Māṇikya Nandi's Parīkṣāmukhasūtra (A.D.800) in the elucidation of this type of indirect knowledge.

3. Ūkam

Ukam literally means knowledge from guessing. But, the commentator equates the term with "tarka", which means argumentation. It is the knowledge, arising through argumentation and investigation. This term also found a place in the list of technical terms (-Tantrayukti), already discussed.

4. Aṇumai

Aṇumai literally means that which is proximate. But, here it may be taken as the poetical form of anumāna. It is to be preserved (-pu<u>n</u>aivu cer aṇumai). It is the jñāna about the object to be proved (sādhya) through the means (-sādhana). The commentator discusses in detail the twofold sādhanas, viz., Vidhi sādhana and Pratiśeṣa sādhana with their sub-members to throw much light on the indirect knowledge of inference.

5. Āgamam

The knowledge, derived from the words of trustworthy persons and authentic scriptures is called Āgamajñāna. The author of Nīlakesi explains Āgama both in positive and negative language. It is authored by Mu<u>n</u>aivar, bereft of all kinds of karmas. They are the enlightened persons. Their utterances are devoid of falsehood. They are nothing but truth (mey-y-urai). The commentator termed it "Āptavākya". He boldly stated that Āgama denoted only the Paramāgama or Jaināgama.[34] In Cilappatikāram, the Angas are said to be revealed by Jina (X-187). They are twelve in number and treated to be the authoritative texts on Jainism.

It is essential to note that the Nīlakesi has subsumed inference and verbal testimony, which are treated separate pramāṇas in other systems, under parokṣajñāna.[35] Umāsvāti has included also comparison, presumption, probability and non-existence under parokṣa.

Three more types of pramāṇas are enunciated in Nīlakesi (120). They are as follows:

1. Vaippu

The cognition of an object through its name, form, (function), genus and quality is called *vaippu,* literally meaning placement.

2. Nayam

This has been discussed in the chapter on the doctrine of Naya.

3. Pukuvāyiḻ (-lit.entrance gate)

According to the commentator, it denotes Anuyoga, i.e. to cognize a thing through any one of the eightfold ways, viz., 1. demonstration, 2.possessiveness, 3. instrument, 4. time, 5. limit, 6. place, 7. purpose and 8.occurrence. He has quoted four aphoristic verses in Tamil to define these threefold pramāṇas which are

collectively called "*lokottara pramāṇas*", meant for the empirical life. These Tamil verses suggest the existence of a manual on the subject which is lost perhaps due to the ravages of time, carlessness and also religious animosity.

Though there is no detailed discussion on Syādvāda, or saptabhangi-naya in the Tamil poems, the word paṅkam occurs in one verse of Nīlakesi (660). The commentator connotes that the word meant saptabhanga. The valid knowledge of things, acquired through all possible stand points which are reckoned sevenfold, is derived through Saptabhangi naya. This concept indicates the comprehensive and all accommodative attitude of the Jains to get at the correct type of knowledge.

Next, we have to explore the Tamil texts and commentaries on Saiva Siddhanta which indicated the various pramāṇas as accepted in the different systems. Though there is no much difference between the accounts of Maṇimekalai and Siddhānta texts, it is essential to highlight the position of the logicians, existed during the period of Siddhānta Sāstras. First of all, let us take up Sivajñāna Siddhiyār for a close study.

In the Saiva Tamil Texts

In the opening poem of Aḷvai-y-iyal (pramāṇa prakaraṇa), Aruḷnandiśivam has noted three major classifications of pramāṇas. According to some philosophers, pramāṇas are six in number. They are:

1. Perception
2. Inference
3. Verbal testimony
4. Negation of existence (or non-apprehension)
5. Implication (or presumption) and
6. Comparison.
   Also in the Jnāmirtam (A.D.1150) and its commentary these pramāṇas are mentioned.[36] There is also a reference to Pāriśeṣa.[37] Some others admitted the following four, thus making the number of pramāṇas into ten.

7. Elimination

8. Inclusion (or occurrence)
9. Tradition and
10. Inherent nature of words (Iyalpu).

There were philosophers who advocated more than ten pramāṇas. Nevertheless, Aruḷnandiśvam concluded that all the ten pramāṇas may be subsumed conveniently under any one of the first three viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony.[38] However, there are schools which admitted one or two pramāṇas, neglecting the rest. Their inadequacy in forming the theory of knowledge has also been exposed by the commentators.

The author of Tattuvaprakāśam clearly stated that the rest of the pramāṇas are only the extension of the first three.[39] But neither Arulnandisivam nor Tattuvaprakāsar never entered into a detailed discussion in bringing out the pramāṇas under the three heads. The burden was fallen on the shoulders of the commentators who vied with each other in defining, illustrating and elucidating each of the pramāṇas before bringing them under any one of the first three pramāṇas. In doing so, they did not do any violence or distortion to the due merits of the affected pramāṇas. They fully recognised them and also applied them to the possible extent to explain some of the cardinal principles of Saiva Siddhānta. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the additional pramāṇas were accommodated under the first three.

In the Parapakkam of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, occasional references to the pramāṇas, upheld by a particular system are noticed. Though they are rarely found, they too help us to understand the actual position of the concerned system with regard to the theory of knowledge. Let us now examine the stand of the Tamil Vedāntic exponents.

In the Vedāntic Tamil texts

In the Parapakkam of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, the exponent of Māyāvāda, another name for Vedānta has stated that the Absolute Brahman is beyond the comprehension through the aid of sixfold pramāṇas, which according to the commentator Tattuvaprakācar are as follows:

1. perception, 2. inference, 3. verbal testimony, 4. comparison 5. assumption or presumption and 6. non-apprehension or non existence (abhava).

[40]In the Vedānta Culāmaṇi, eightfold pramāṇas are advocated in order to arrive at the knowledge of things. The author of the text has also illustrated each of them. Accordingly, pratyakṣa denotes the seeing of pot and other objects. Anumāna is the cognition of the existence of fire through the mark of smoke. It has three limbs viz., proposition (-patiñai < pratijñā, reason (ētu-hetu) and example (tiṭṭāntam i.e. tṛṣṭānta). Of them, proposition is the statement that the hill has blazing fire; for it has smoke is the reason. Like the "kitchen" furnishes the example.

Āgama is the trustworthy word (āpta vacana). It is the knowledge of the existence of fruit (-yielding trees) on the banks of a river from the source of a text or a truthful person. On seeing that a person is fat though he does not eat during the day time, one presumes that he eats in the night. One more illustration is also adduced in the text for elucidating arthāpatti, i.e. presumption. If one says that Devadatta is not in the house, it is presumed that he exists elsewhere. A person with his previous knowledge that a domestic cow resembled a forest cow, witnesses a wild animal in the forest and concludes that it is forest cow on the basis of similarity, gained through Viṣayañāna, i.e. prior knowledge of the object.

The cognition of non-existence of pot, arising out of the absence of pot in a lump of clay is called abhāva, or non-apprehension. Sambhava is the cognition of the inclusion of one hundred in the presence of one thousand. Aitikam i.e. tradition is the knowledge, gained by the public opinion or talk. If one says that the tree is possessed of a ghost, others believe.

Then the author has allotted the number of pramāṇas to each of the systems of Indian philosophy, as shown in the following table.

S.No.	System	S.No.	Number of Pramanas
1	Ulakāyata	1	perception
2	Jainism, Buddhism and Vaiśeṣikas	2	+ inference
3	Sāmkhya	3	+ Verbal testimony
4	Naiyāyika	4	+ comparison
5	Prabhākara (school of Mīmāmsaka)	5	+ presumption
6	Bhaṭṭa (school of Mīmāmsaka)	6	+ non-apprehension
7	Paurāṇikas	8	+ inclusion and tradition.

A cursory glance at the above table would reveal the fact that the author has not stated the position of the Vedāntic system. However, in the Kaivalya Navanītam[41] there is a clear statement that the Absolute Brahman could not be cognized with the aid of fourfold pramāṇas, though Agama reveals the means of realising the same. The advocates of Advaita Vedānta held that the absolute knowledge is possible only by study, reflection, meditation, ethical perfection and guidance of a qualified perceptor.

In the Vaishnava Tamil text

Vaishnavism, like the system of Saiva Siddhānta has been both theological and philosphical. Tattuvatraya is the cardinal doctrine of Vaishnavism. It denotes the three eternal realities acit (-matter), cit (soul) and god (Īśvara), corresponding more or less to the Pāśa, Paśu and Pati in the Saiva Siddhānta. The first two viz., matter and soul are dependent on Īśvara and the relationship between them and god has been compared to that of body and soul. The knowledge of Tattvam, Hitam and Purushārtham is essential for the attainment of eternal bliss. The philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (-qualified monism) is based not only on the Prasthāna traya, but on the devotional and mystical lyrics of Āḷvārs, as found in the anthology of Nālāyiradivya pirapandham. Though Nāthamuni (A.D.1000), Yāmunāchārya and others are said to be the earliest known exponents of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Ramanuja (A.D.1100) has been credited to be the efficient official interpreter of the system. Though his knowledge of the Tamil hymns of Āḷvārs is undoubtedly accepted, he wrote his exegetic and original works only in Sanskrit. The second great personality in the history of Viśiṣṭādvaita is the reputed exponent Venkatanātha, popularly known as Vedantadeśika (A.D.1300), whose works in Sanskrit and Tamil are the authoritative texts, held in high esteem by the followers of Vaishnavism. His Nyāya pariśuddhi and Nyāya siddhāñjana written in Sanskrit are considered to be the comprehensive logical treatises of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

However, among the nineteen works, composed by Vedānta deśika in Tamil which are collectively called Desikapirabandham, *Paramatapaṅkam* i.e. a polemical text criticising the views of other systems provides some materials to know the Vaishnava concept of pramāṇa. Like the Saiva Siddhantins, the Vaishnavites accepted perception, inference and verbal testimony to be the valid sources of knowledge.

Vedāntadeśika defines perception as direct intuitive knowledge, identified as a special class of cognition (jātirūpa) or cognition under special conditions (upādhirūpa). He treated that things are cognized with some features at the very first moment, when the visual organs came into contact with them, though they could not manifest themselves fully in the minimal span of first moment. This sort of cognition is called Nirvikalpa while Savikalpa jñāna denotes the knowledge of a thing with all its details, qualities etc.

According to him, things which transcend the senses are not known by inference. So, he held that inference is ever limited to perceptible things. However, inference can not be taken as a form of perception. He argued that concomitance between the probandum (*sādhya*) and reason (*hetu*) is grasped by the observation of many an instance and not a single instance. He gave much importance to verbal testimony. His successors like Meghanadari admitted also comparison and implication to be means of valid knowledge.

However, Paramatapaṅkam (-paramatabhanga), was originally written in Manipravala style (i.e. Tamil mixed with Sanskrit) with a view to evaluating the tenets of other systems of Indian Philosophy, finally refuting them one by one, and establishing the position of Viśiṣtādvaita. At the beginning and end of each chapter of the text, he has presented the quintessence of the contents in Tamil verse form. Such verses numbering 54 constituted a separate prabandha. It seems that the author should have written this text on the model of Parapakkam (Parapakṣa) of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār.

In this Tamil text, the Cārvakas, the four schools of Buddhism, viz., Madhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, Vedānta, Jainism, Bhāskara's mata, Vaiyākaraṇa (the grammarian school), *Kaṇāta* and *Gautama matas* (Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya), Mīmāmsaka, Sāmkhya, Yoga and Pāsupata Saivism are taken for a critical review. The correctness of his criticism is left out for a separate treatment. Nevertheless, the portions which have direct bearings with epistemology alone are to be considered briefly.

Vedāntadeśikar's refutation of the epistemological views of Lokāyata deserves special mention. The Indian materialists, variously known as Lokāyata, Cārvāka and Bhūtavādin, accepted only perception as the correct source of valid knowledge. According to them, what are cognized by perception are real and those, not perceptible to the senses are unreal. Therefore they concluded that

dharma, adharma, Īśvara, paraloka etc., which are not known through perception are unreal and false. However, their position is unacceptable to the Vaishnavites.

In the practical and empirical life, the materialists on seeing the smoke accept the existence of fire which is possible only through inference. Further, they accept the words of their close friends who communicate some news on witnessing some occurrences. It is indeed the acceptance of verbal testimony. Vedāntadeśikar also adduces some more examples. When the materialists are hungry, they consume food, thinking that it would appease their appetite. Before taking the food, they could not know by perception that it would relieve their hunger. When they state that "these are our eyes, hands etc.", it goes without saying that apart from the bodily parts, there is something which makes the claim and that is to be known as soul only through inference.

The Vaishnava disputant castigates the Buddhist logicians, notorious for their *kutarkas*(-quibbles, cavils, wranglings, etc.). He condemns the *Mādhyamikas* who rejected both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* as false and further argues that all things, seen and known, are only illusory. They held that *śūnya* alone was the absolute entity. The Yogācāras adopted that knowledge was becoming fresh at every moment and apart from jnāna, nothing was real. The Sauthrāntikas were rediculed in the most condemnable language, for their skilful and deceitful attitudes. The Vaibhāṣikas denied the subject (*-jñāta*) i.e., the knower, the object (-jñeya) and also the knowledge (-jñāna). Their views were generally criticised.[42] It is pertinent to note that Vedāntadeśikar unlike Arulnandisivam, did not take each of the issues and individually refute them. Similarly, he proceeds to present the tenets of the remaining schools and systems and advances a general condemnation. However, he disapproves the view of Vaiśeṣikas[43] who never treated [illegible] *pramāṇa* as a separate source of knowledge which they brought under *anumāna*. It is to be borne in mind that though Kaṇāda in his Vaiśeṣikasūtra accepted only the two paramāṇas viz., perception and inference, the commentator Praśastapāda admitted sabda as a distinct pramāṇa along with upamāna and arthāpatti.

Now, the views of various exponents with regard to the valid source of knowledge are taken for discussion. First let us commence with Lokāyata, the Indian materialist.

Lokāyata

Lokāyata was practical and pragmatic in viewing things. He was anti-Vedic. He had no faith in supernatural forces and in the concept of transmigration. He laid stress only on perception, rejecting the validity of other pramāṇas. His views on pramāṇa are vividly presented in the opening section of Parapakkam. The portions of the following poems are worth quoting:[44]

1. "īṇṭaḷavai kāṭci maṉamāti irumūṉṟāy
   vēṇṭum; aṉumāna mutalāna pala vēṇṭā"

2. "māyattil colliṭātē maṉam mutal āṟiṉukkum
   nēyattatāka vēṇṭum"

In the first poem, it is stated that perception is sixfold which is sufficient to cognize directly the things, and there is no need for additional pramāṇas including Anumāna. In the second poem, it is said that valid knowledge is possible if only the objects of cognition withstood the test of sixfold perception.

Tattuvaprakāśar, the commentator of Parapakkam throws much light on the sixfold perceptions which are briefly presented herebelow.[45]

1. Aiyakkāṭci

It denotes the doubtful perception. In darkness on seeing a creeper-like thing on the way one doubts whether it is a snake or a straw. This cognition arises out of the apparent common features, shared by two objects, the presence of one of them causing the appearance of another. Other forms of doubtful perception are:

1. doubting a white substance as a silver or shell.

2. doubting a post-like substance as a pillar or a person.

Since there is no original text available for understanding the clear stand of the Lokāyata, we can not be sure whether the polemic source materials as the one found in the commentary of a Saiva Siddhānta treatise are sound and genuine. However, it may be presumed that doubtful cognition was only initial and subsequently would lead also to correct perception. Determination proceeds only after doubting. Even in the Akam poetics, the convention of doubting before deciding (*aiyam* and *teḷital*) finds a place. Thus, the stand of Lokāyata in holding doubtful perception as a variety agrees with empirical life.

However, this kind of perception has been reckoned in the list of logical fallacies in the system of Nyāya, as recorded especially in the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai.[46]

2. Vāyil kāṭci

'Vāyil' literally means the gate. Here, it denotes the sensory perception. Through the entrance of the five sense organs the external objects are presented to the mind for perception. Though it corresponds to the Indriya pratyakṣa at the surface level, notable differences are also found and they may be explained when we deal with the same in a different context.

3. Vikalpak kāṭci

Vikalpa means differentiation. Therefore, this type indicates the perception of an object with all its attributes and adjuncts, such as name, genus, quality, activity and substance.

This cognition corresponds to the determinate perception.

4. Anvayakāṭci

This denotes the kind of perception through positive concomitance. The co-presence of fire and smoke is perceptually a known fact. From this perceptual experience, one derives knowledge of the existence of fire on seeing the presence of smoke. The commentator simply says: "pukaiyiṉāl aṉalaṟital" i.e., through the marker of smoke, the fire is cognized. The usual illustration is this: "Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen.

Normally, this kind of cognition is to be considered under Anumāna. Since Lokāyata did not accept inference as a valid source of knowledge, he treated it as one type of perception.

5. Vyatireka kāṭci

This indicates the particular type of perception, ascertained by negative concomitance. The usual example is the following:

"Wherever there is no smoke there is no fire,
as in the lake".

But, the commentator gives a different form: "nāṟṟattāl pū aṟital", i.e. through smell the cognition of flower. It seems that this is not a proper example for negative concomitance. Perhaps, there may be some change in the commentary.

This type of perception corresponds to one kind of inference. Since the materialist did not admit anumāna as a valid pramāṇa, it is enlisted under perception.

6. Tiripu kāṭci

This denotes the erroneous perception. Tiripu is synonymous with viparyāya. This error results out of doubtful cognition.

Eg. 1. Perceiving a snake in a rope or a straw.

2. Perceiving a person in a pillar or a post.

Among the six kinds, the first and the last are logical fallacies according to the Naiyāyikas. Whether it is right or wrong, the Lokāyata attempted to identify all kinds of perception.

It is his view that through perception and its sixfold varieties, one can grasp the fourfold objects, viz., the four gross elements (Bhūtas), characterized by solidness, coolness, heat and movement. It is the firm conviction of the Lokāyaṭa that these perceptions are enough to understand the earthly existence. He did not accept the existence of space (ākāśa). Objects (other than the aforesaid) that are said to be cognised through inference and other pramāṇas are just like the improbable hare with horns. It also shows his total disbelief in the unseen things that are remote and transcendent. Practical and empirical verification constituted the only tool for him for assessing the validity of truths.

Review of Lokāyata's theory

The deficiency of the theory of pramāṇa of this school is exposed in strong worded illustrations in the texts and commentaries. First of all, Lokāyata's denial of anumāna as a significant source of knowledge has been critically reviewed, ultimately establishing the necessity of admitting it as a vital means of knowledge. The arguments are mainly based on empirical life. They are serially given hereunder.[47]

1. One, who has lost his mother when he was a child and lost his father while he was in the embryo of his mother, became a grown up and did not visibly know his parents. Just because he did not see them, he could not deny the fact of his parents, understood not through perception but by inference only.

2. On seeing the dark and lightening clouds, the thought of heavy rainfall arises in the mind. On witnessing the sandal and other hilly woods, carried by the waves of the inundated river, one comes to the conclusion that it was the result of heavy rains in the mountain. These cases can not come under the purview of perception. They are actually some forms of Anumāna. In the former case, from the cause, the effect is predicted, while in the latter, from the effect, the cause is inferred.

3. If it is said that even Anumāna is a kind of perception known as Pūrvak kāṭci (-Purvavat, i.e. the observation of the cause, (dark cloud) determines the effect (flood), then that concept is being questioned by a counter argument. According to Lokāyata, from the assemblage of fourfold elements (bhūtas), knowledge is germinated. But this is imperceptible and hence it is to be understood only through inference.

4. The knowledge that cognises sound and other subtle elements (tanmātra) is not perceived but inferred.

5. Lokāyata holds the view that different forms are materialised out of the combination of elements (bhūtas). The knowledge of this fact is made possible not through perception but by inference.

On the aforesaid grounds, Lokāyata's rejection of Anumāna as a valid source knowledge is refuted, and the importance of inference in the processes of knowledge is emphasised.

Next, the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta proceed to reveal the folly of the Lokāyata system in excluding verbal testimony as an independent pramāṇa. The salient arguments in this respect are the following:[48]

1. The future readings of the able and efficient astrologers become true. This is due to their erudition in the astrological texts. The medicinal texts help the native doctor to diagnosis the disease which is cured accordingly.

2. On the guidelines derived by the hints and codes available in some texts, the objects that were hidden in the past in a particular place, are unearthed and brought to light.

3. The authors of the almanac well in advance predict the occurrence of the new moon day and eclipses.

Further it is to be understood that the exponent of Lokāyata system based his arguments on the strength of materials available in the text ascribed to Brhaspati, and hence in a sense he accepted the authority of verbal testimony as a pramāṇa.

Lokāyata, who does not accept the reality of soul, considers that knowledge is the quality of the physical body. This is untenable for the exponent of Saiva Siddhanta, who argues that human knowledge is greater than that of a big elephant and hence the physical feature has little to do in determining knowledge.

After establishing the necessity of holding anumāna and sabda along with pratyakṣa as valid means of knowledge, the Siddhāntin proceeds to examine the position of the Buddhists who discarded the verbal testimony as a separate pramāṇa.

The views of Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas

In the Tamil texts it is often said that the Buddhists admitted only the first two pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference. We have already noted that in the schools of Hinayana Buddhism no theory of pramāṇas was found. Only the later Yogacaras also known as Sautrāntika Yogācāras headed by Vasubandhu and his disciple Dignāga advocated the theory of twofold pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference. Therefore, the plain statements in the Tamil texts and also in some Sanskrit texts with regard to the twofold pramāṇas of the Buddhists indicated the view of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra school. According to Dignāga that things are cognized either directly through perception or indirectly by inference. All the other pramāṇas may be subsumed under these two.

It has been already pointed out that Kaṇāda, the author of Vaiśeṣika sutra also admitted only the first two pramāṇas, though the earliest commentator Praśastapāda (450 A.D.) advocated five pramāṇas, adding verbal testimony, comparison and implication or presumption to the first two. However, the exponent of Saiva Siddhānta criticises the position of these philosophers who limited their source only to perception and inference and deliberately discarded the Sabda pramāṇa i.e. verbal testimony.

Both the vehicles of Buddhism accepted Tripiṭaka and other texts and commentaries for expounding their tenets. Though they

did not accept the existence of soul and god, they accepted the doctrine of karma. They have also evolved their own theory of cosmology to accommodate the various beings according to their merits. Since heaven and hell are noted in their texts and their existence is to be proved neither by perception nor by inference but only through textual authority, it is concluded that indirectly they too accepted verbal testimony as a source of knowledge.

Sivagrayogin explains the position of the Buddhist.[49] The Buddhists arẹ "*avisamvādins*" who advocated non-contradiction in the process of knowledge. According to them valid knowledge is the pramāṇa and it is not contradicted. Non-contradiction consists in the knowledge that shows a particular object and takes one to it. It should be useful for our practical purposes. So far it serves our pragmatic needs it is held valid and thus the Buddhists discredited the validity of verbal testimony. Sivagrayogin pointed out that since paraloka (upper world) and pātala loka (nether lands) were known only through Āgama, Āgamapramāṇa should be accepted.

After refuting the views of Lokayata and Bauddha, the Saiva Siddhantins examine the validity of superfluous pramāṇas admitted in the systems of Nyāya, Mīmāmsa and Paurāṇikas.

The View of Naiyāyika

Apart from the first three pramāṇas, the Naiyāyikas treated Upamāna as a separate pramāṇa (-pratah pramāṇa). According to Akṣapāda, comparison is the means of establishing of what is to be established from the well known similarity.[50] The commentator, Vātsyāyana considered that upamāna being an instrument of cognition leads one to the knowledge of resemblence or similitude. In the opinion of the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge derived through analogy can not be obtained by any other means.

A townsman who is anxious to know the forest-cow (which is referred by the word gavayaḥ in Sanskrit, āmā and marai in Tamil), goes to the forest, enquiries the forest-dweller about the features of that animal and gets the reply that it is just like a domestic cow. Then, he happens to meet in the forest an animal with the said features of a cow and concludes that it is a bison (gavayaḥ). The result of the process is the recognition of the name as denoting a definite object. According to Vātsyāyana, the source of this cognition is the knowledge, derived from the formula, "Yathā gauḥ tathā gavayaḥ". It has its counterpart in the Tamil epic Manimekalai:[51]

"uvamam āvatu oppumai aḷavai
kavaya mā,ā-p- pōlumeṉak karutal"

Iḷampūraṇar, the earliest commentator of Tolkāppiyam has also quoted the same example: "ā-p-pōlum āmā".[52] According to him, the usefulness of comparison (upamānaphala) is twofold, viz., 1) that which is not grasped becomes cognised and 2) that which provides aesthetic joy when it is communicated. Among these two results, the latter form belongs to the province of rhetorics wherein upamāna is recognised as an independent figure of speech. The first aspect alone engaged the attention of logicians. It is the opinion of the Naiyāyika that this kind of knowledge by analogy can not be obtained through the means of the first three pramāṇas.

However, the validity of holding upamāna as an independent source of knowledge is questioned by Sivagrayogin on three grounds, finally arriving at the conclusion that it may be included under any one of the first three pramāṇas.[53]

First of all, Upamāna in the form, "this gavaya is similar to cow" is to be considered a judgement of perception, since it arises immediately on seeing the forest-cow. Because the recognition of the specific forest animal as gavaya is based on some resemblance, shared by the previously perceived domestic cow and the presently perceived forest cow, upamāna should be brought under pratyakṣa.

Next, Sivagrayogin examines the stand of the Naiyāyikas and reads the possibility of bringing upamāna under sabda. Comparison takes place only on the authority of the words of the forester and hence it belongs to the domain of verbal testimony.

Thirdly, he is inclined to include upamāna under anumāna, since similarity or resemblance between the known cow and the new animal gavaya is inferred.

Thus, Sivāgrayogin sets aside the stand point of the Naiyāyikas in holding upamāna as an independent pramāṇa.

Subsequently, he proceeds to refute the view of Prabhākara who added not only upamāna, but also arthāpatti as one of the valid sources of knowledge. In this context, it is essential to note that Praśastapāda, the earliest commentator of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra also accepted the five pramāṇas, even though some differences in the way of interpreting them are found between him and Prabhākara.

Prabhākara represents one school of Pūrvamīmāmsa system and Kumārila, another school of the same system. Though Sivagrayogin did not mention, Kumārila also was one who admitted arthāpatti as a distinct source of knowledge.

The View of Prabhākara

Arthāpatti is the knowledge derived through implication or presumption. It indicates the grasping of an unexpressed fact from the expressed statement. Sivagrayogin explains the view of Prabhākara, presenting one of the stock examples available in the writings of Mīmāmsa, in the form of a syllogism, which is produced hereunder:[54]

1. Proposition (Pratijñā)

Devatatta eats in the night.

2. Reason (Hetu)

Because he is fat though he does not eat in the day.

3. Negative Example (Vyatireka)

He who never eats either in the day or in the night can not be fat, like a person who fasts continuously for a month.

4. Application (Upanaya)

This man is fat.

5. Conclusion (Nigamana)

Therefore, this man is not a person who never eats at all and hence, it is presumed that he is one who eats in the night.

The knowledge gained by presumption has been explained in the form of parārthānumāna and thus, Sivagrayogin discredited the independent status of arthāpatti.

There is one more stock example which eventhough not mentioned by the commentator is presented here for the common understanding.

Devatatta is alive. But, he is not in the house. Therefore it is presumed that he is outside the house.

Instead of Devatatta, the personal name Caitra is also used.

The Mimāmsakas classified arthāpatti into two viz., dṛṣṭārthāpatti and śrutārthāpatti,

The first example is an illustration for śrutārthāpatti, i.e. implication from words. The second example is meant for dṛṣṭārthāpatti, i.e. implication from experienced facts. It seems that Prabhākara did not subscribe to the twofold classification. For him, dṛṣṭa means well known and 'śruta' also denotes the same sense in the empirical usage.[55] This may be the reason for the single illustration, given by Sivagrayogin to explain arthāpatti.

In Maṇimēkalai, a different example is given: When it is said that the hamlet is on the Ganges, it is presumed that it is on its banks.[56] The same example is quoted in the text of Tattuva prakāsam and in the commentary of Pandiperumal. However, this illustration is provided in theTamil Advaita Vedāntic texts for jahal lakṣaṇa i.e. Viṭṭa ākupeyar, that will be discussed later on.

Next, the commentator proceeds to examine the view of Kumārila Bhatta, who is simply mentioned as Bhattāchārya.

The View of Bhaṭṭāchārya

In the Parapakkam of Sivajñāna siddhiyār, Bhaṭṭāchārya is said to have admitted six pramāṇas, i.e. adding abhava as an additional source of knowledge. In another poem, the author has clearly stated that he is different from Prabhākara.

Jaimini, the earliest exponent of Pūrvamīmāmsa accepted only the first three pramāṇas. Only the commentators of his text elaborated and increased the number of pramāṇas.

Abhāva literally means non-existence. It denotes the pramāṇa that provides knowledge derived from the absence of a particular object in a particular place. It is also equated with anupalabdhi, i.e. knowledge by non-apprehension by Sridhara.[57] The same view is also noted by Sivagrayogin when he said: "abhāvam āvatu anupalabdhi vēttiyam" i.e. that which is cognized through its absence.[58] Advaita Vedāntin also upheld similar view.[59]

Though abhāva and anupalabdhi are invariably used to denote the same, notable difference is seen between the two. According to C.D.Bijalwan, abhāva has been discussed in two aspects, viz., 1. as an ontological reality and 2. as a means of knowledge. The first aspect is denoted by the words asat, alika, nirūpākhya, niḥsvabhāva etc., It is the actual abhāva i.e., non-existence of a thing. The second one is anupalabdhi, i.e. non-apprehension or non-perception. According to Bhatta Mīmāmsakas and Advaita Vedāntins abhāva is

a reality by negation and the way of ascertaining it is called anupalabdhi.[60]

There are varieties of abhāva, mentioned in Nyāyasūtra and in the commentary of Vaiśeṣika sūtra. Following them, Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has enumerated and illustrated the following types of abhāva.[61]

1. Atyantha abhāvam

This denotes absolute non-existence. The example cited by the commentator is: "The hare has no horns". Negation of horns in the hare is complete. It is not so in the case of a calf. When it is born, the calf has no horns. As it grows, the horn is also growing. In the case of hare, the absence of horns is absolute.

2. Illataṉ Abhāvam

It means the negation of the non-existence. The example is: "Falsehood is not found in the speech of great man."

It reveals the moral bearing of great people who never utter a lie. In the given example, 'illatu' or negation denotes falsehood as against 'uḷḷatu' denoting reality.

3. Anyonyabhāvam

This denotes negation based on identity or correlation. It is the mutual negation. Maṟaijñānadeśikar provides the following example.[62]

"The pot is not cloth and cloth is not pot." The difference between the pot and cloth is due to the absence of potness in the cloth and clothness in the pot. This mutual absence of the characteristic features of a pot in a cloth and vice verse becomes the object of perception which normally cognizes only positive categories.

One more example may also be given:

"A cow is not a horse nor a horse is a cow"

The difference that earmarks them as different animals consists in the absence of cowness in the horse and horseness in the cow. In this cognition, the knowledge of particulars involves the knowledge of difference, characterised by the nature of mutual negation.[63]

4. Uḷḷataṉ Abhāvam

This indicates the negation of the existent. This should be placed next to "illataṉ abhāvam". The illustration, given by the commentator is this:[64]

"The elephant is not to be seen in the shed". The elephant is in existence. But it does not exist in its shed. Its absence in a particular place is grasped through this abhāva. This example corresponds to: "Devatatta is not in the house" that we have noted already, when we dealt with arthāpatti.

5. Dhvamsābhāvam

Dhvamsa means destruction. Because of destroying a thing, it ceases to exist.

This type of abhāva denotes the consequent or subsequent non-existence. The example follows:[65]

"When the pot is broken, it becomes extinct."

In the above list of abhāvas, prāghābhāva is left out. It refers to the antecedent non-existence of a thing. It may be explained with an example:[66]

Prior to the production of pot, clay alone exists, and the pot is non-existent. That is why it is known as antecedent or prior negation. It is neutralized as soon as the pot is made.

Sivagrayogin refutes the view of Bhattāchārya. In the perceptual cognition of the existence of things (bhāva) the sense-contact is an essential factor. But in the cognition of the non-existence of things (abhāva) the involvement of sense-contact is to be explained. According to the Naiyāyikas, the special type of contact between the sense and abhāva is called viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāva. It seems that Sivagrayogin follows this method in elucidating abhāva.[67]

The non-existence of a pot on the ground is called ghatābhāva and it is also cognised by the eyes. The contact of the sense-organ, eye with the specific locus (-ground), helps one to know that the ground has the absence of a pot. Seeing the ground so characterised by the absence of the pot, one derives the knowledge that there is no pot. In this form, the absence of the pot (ghatābhāva) becomes a special attribute (- viśeṣaṇa) which is predicated to the ground. In

the judgement that there is no pot on the ground, abhāva (non-existence) becomes viśeṣaṇa (i.e. that which is qualified). Thus, Sivagrayogin concludes that abhāva comes under pratyakṣa pramāṇa, and it needs not be treated as a separate source of knowledge.

According to Maṟaijñāna Deśikar, abhāva may be classified either under perception or inference. His classification of negation (i.e. non-existence) is twofold:

1. Negation, derived by the sensory perception.
2. Negation, derived by sources other than perception.

Negation of objects, like pot on the ground is an example for the first type of abhāva. Negation of objects not perceptible to the sense organs like the atoms is an example to the second type of abhāva which he brings under anumāna.[68]

The Siddhāntic view is identical with that of the Naiyāyikas who maintained that abhāva was an object of perception. However, Praśastapāda, the great commentator of Vaiśesika sūtra considered that non-existence of a thing was grasped only through inference and hence abhāva should be identified as one form of anumāna.[69]

After refuting the view points of Bhatta Mimāmsaka and Advaita Vedāntin, Sivagrayogin proceeds to examine the validity of some more additional pramāṇas upheld by the Paurāṇikas.[70]

The View of Paurāṇikas

The system of Paurāṇikas is attributed to Veda Vyāsa in Maṇimekalai.[71] He is considered to be the author of eighteen purāṇas. His system, as the title suggests, would have been based on the metaphysical principles, explained in the Puranic legends. He is different from Vyāsa-Bādarāyana of Brahma Sūtras.

According to the Paurāṇika school, the sources of knowledge are ten. Pāriśeṣa, Sambhava, Svabhāva and Aitiha are the additional pramāṇas that are advocated in this school. These ten pramāṇas are mentioned in the section of Maṇimekalai that deals with the system of Nyāya as we have already seen.[72]

Sivagrayogin and Maṟaijñāna Deśikar examined critically the validity of holding the aforesaid new pramāṇas and finally concluded that they could be subsumed under any one of the primary three pramanas, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony. First in order, Pāriśeṣa is taken for discussion.

1. Pāriśeṣa

It is the source of knowledge through eliminating process. This pramāṇa is known as olipu and mīṭci moḻi in the Tamil tradition. Pandiperumal, the earliest commentator of Sivajnāna bodham explained the word "pāricēṭam" (-the Tamilised form of Pāriśeṣa) as "pārittu-c-ceṣittal" meaning "kūṭṭi-k-kaḻittal" in Tamil.[73] It suggests the sense that after collecting (the data) and eliminating, the remaining fact is to be discovered. The significant examples to illustrate this pramāṇa are sufficiently found in the texts and commentaries. The following are from Tattuvaprakāsam and the commentary of Pandiperumal.[74]

1. If it is said that the eastern habitat lost the game, it goes without saying that western habitat won.
2. Among the three suspects, two declared innocent and thereby deciding the third member is the criminal (i.e. a thief).

Among the two examples, the first one is also found in the commentary of Tolkāppiyam to explain that a particular statement would indicate its related opposite.[75] The closeness between syntactical structure and the epistemological statement deserves special mention.

Sivāgrayogin produces a different illustration from the legend of Mahābhārata to elucidate Pāriśeṣa pramāṇa:[76]

Among the four valiant persons, viz., Śalya, Jarasandha, Kīcaka and Bhīma who possessed equal strength of a thousand elephants, the question arises with regard to the person who killed Kīcaka. The reply is in the form:

Śalya and Jarasandha were not in the spot. Hence, through the process of elimination it becomes clear that only Bhima killed Kīcaka.

Since the killing is not perceived, this pramāṇa deserves to be recognised only under inference.

Cāttaṉār has .ven a different example from Ramāyaṇa, another Ithihāsa:[77]

"If it is said that Rama has won, the correlation informs us the defeat of Ravana".

Maraijñāna Deśikar has quoted the following verse containing the same illustration, perhaps from a Tamil manual on logic which has been lost due to the ravages of time:[78]

> "Cīrār olipenru ceppa-p-patuvatu tinpuvimēl
> pōrāti ninru porutār iruvartam pōrkkalattu-p-
> pārār irākavān venrān eniltan paricalintu
> nērām iravanan torracol lāki nikalvatuvē".

After a careful study, the Saiva Siddhāntins concluded Pāriśeṣa as a form of Anumāna.

Perhaps, because the school of Paurāṇikas based their philosophy on puranas and legends, the examples are aptly elicited from the two Ithihāsas also.

H. N. Randle quotes Vātsyāyana to elucidate that Pāriśeṣānumāna has been developed from the type of śeṣavat anumāna. Śeṣavat is inference from effect to cause. The reference to the view of Vātsyāyana is given here:

> "If you deny various possibilities, and hence there
> is no possibility anywhere else, you must come in
> conclusion to the remaining possibility".[79]

Though pāriśeṣa is not directly an inference from effect to cause, it is reasonably one form of inference through the process of elimination.

A. B. Keith also held that though some Mimāmsa authorities made elimination a separate proof, it is plainly a part of inference.[80]

Next, let us consider the validity of Sambhava as an independent source of knowledge.

2. Sambhava

This pramāṇa denotes the quantitative inclusion of part in the whole. It is known as uṇmai and uḷḷaneri in the Tamil tradition. The root word 'uḷ' or 'uḷḷatu' denotes that which is included and hence uḷḷaneri conveys the correct sense of the pramāṇa.

According to Praśastapāda, inclusion is neither more nor less than inference, since it is a case of something, the existence of which requires the existence of another thing. So, the inseparable connection is noticed between the two.[81]

Cāttaṉār gives the following example:[82]

"If a rod of iron revolves around a stone, then it would be understood that it is a piece of magnet."

The same example is also given in Tattuvaprakāsam and in the commentary of Pandiperumal.[83]

Maraijñāna Desikar has quoted the following poem from a Tamil logical work; which is not available in full form now.[84]

"Tuyakkaṟṟa uṇmai-y-eṉanā valarkaḷ tuṇinturaippa (tu),
iyaṟkkai-p poruḷai iṟṟeṉalām; itu tāṉuraikkiṉ
iyakkuṟṟa kālcalikkum tīccuṭum nīratu kuḷirum
vayakkuṟṟa maṇvalitu eṉṟu paṭṭāṇku valaṅkuvatē".

This tradition of explaining Sambhava as indicating the inherent quality of the natural objects has its origin in Tolkāppiyam:[85]

"iyaṟkai-p-poruḷai iṟṟeṉa-k-kiḷattal".

If one happens to mention the quality of an object of nature which stands unchanged in its quality, one should denote its nature without adducing any change or reason. The examples in the above verse to explain this pramāṇa are the following:

1. Wind blows
2. Fire burns
3. Water is cool
4. Earth is firm

In addition to the aforesaid examples, Cēnāvaraiyar gives one more illustration:[86]

5. The soul feels.

These examples reveal the svabhāva of the objects of nature. It seems that the Tamil tradition held by the word 'uḷḷatu' denotes not merely that which is included, but what exists always without a change, meaning the nature or svabhāva of a thing. In this sense, this aspect of the pramāṇa may also be subsumed under 'svabhāvalinga' that we are going to see subsequently. The svabhāva aspect of sambhava is sometimes perceived through sense-contact, though generally inferred at other times.

There is a deviation from the Tamil tradition as noticed from the commentary of Sivagrayogin. According to him.

> "Sambhava is the ascertainment of the existence of hundred in a thousand".[87]

Further, he says that hundred and thousand are connected through vyāpti (-avinābhāva), i.e. inseparable connection and hence, this pramāṇa deserves to be included under anumāna. It is clear that Sridhara (900 A.D.) has already given the same example to explain this pramāṇa.[88]

However, the two distinct traditions in elucidating the contents of this source of knowledge are to be borne in mind.

3. Svabhāvalinga

This pramāṇa is also known as Sahaja. It is synonymous with "iyalpu" in the Tamil texts. It simply means nature (of words). It is different from "uḷḷaneṟi" though both in a sense indicate the nature of things. In uḷḷaneṟi, it denoted the nature or quality of objects of nature according to the Tamil tradition. But, here it denotes the contextual nature of words.

According to Pandiperumal 'iyalpu' is also called iyaipu (-appropriateness) and taṉmai (-nature) and hence this pramāṇa is the source of ascertaining the natural and apt meaning of a particular word through some process.[89]

The homonyms indicate the appropriate meaning in a particular context. The classical example to this pramāṇa as found in Maṇimēkalai is as follows:[90]

> "When the mahut seated on the elephant's back is
>
> asked to give a stick, he can give only the goad".

The Tamil word 'kōl' has many meanings including a stick. In the context of the above example, the stick (-kōl) naturally means a goad, though it has the meaning of a righteous sceptre.

But in the poem quoted by Maṟaijñāna Deśikar, a different connotation is noticed. When the horse-rider, who is seated on the back of the horse, needed a stick (-kōl), he is given not an ordinary stick or rod but a whip. Similarly, if a young lady in the bed required a stick, it is the brush that she expected to paint her eye-brows. The poem under reference is given below:[91]

"māmēl iruntoru kōltā enilcuḷḷi-k-kōltaralum
tūmel iruntoru kōltā eniltuṇi vōṭucenṟu
pūmēvu kaṇeḷutum kōl koṭuttalum pūtalattil
tāmē iyalpeṉṟu kūṟuvar takkacol nāvalarē".

Sivagrayogin considers that Svabhāvalinga comes under anumāna, determined by positive and negative concomitance. The word 'tēmā' (-sweet mango) normally denotes a particular mango tree. It excludes other trees of the same genus such as 'puḷimā' (-sour mango). 'Tē' also means 'divine' and 'mā' the goddess of wealth and the whole word, may be taken to denote the Divine Laksmi. Thus, the word depends upon the context to convey its proper sense. Sivagrayogin says if the object of denotation is not a tree, then the word 'tēmā' does not denote it, like a stone.[92]

Maraijnāna Desikar identifies 'Svabhāva' with perception since the meaning is determined in a particular context on seeing the object.[93]

Tattuvaprakāsam gives a different example:[94]

"Four persons are suspected as thieves. The denial
of three innocent persons constitutes what is called
iyalpu aḷavai."

This example is more suited to explain pāriśeṣa than 'iyalpu'. What the author actually meant is not clear. Perhaps, he should have meant that the fourth person is naturally understood through this pramāṇa.

In the right understanding of the texts, particularly the religious treatises, this source of knowledge is highly useful. Its grammatical and syntactical implications are elucidated in Tolkāppiyam and its commentary. Some examples are sufficient:[95]

The word 'mā' has many meanings. It denotes a horse, elephant, tree, beetle, goddess of wealth etc. The difference in the sense is made clear due to the predicate of the concerned sentence.

In the above examples, the different meanings of the homonym 'mā' are determined by the concerned predicates. Such illustrations are many in the commentaries of Tamil grammatical treatises.

Examples:

Sl. No.	Subject	Predicate	English Meaning	Contextual sense of the word 'mā'
1.	mā	pūttatu	Mā flowered	Tree (Mango)
2.	mā	paṟantatu	Mā flew	Beetle
3.	mā	piḷiṟiyatu	Mā trumpeted	Elephant
4.	mā	pāyntatu	Mā jumped	Horse
5.	mā	aruḷiṉaḷ	Mā bestowed grace	Goddess Lakṣmi

However, the inseparable connection between the word and its sense is accepted and hence, Svabhāva pramāṇa deserves to be included under anumāna.

4. Aitihya

Aitihya means tradition. The etymological sense of the word is legend and traditional tale. Since the puranic legends are rooted on beliefs and traditions, it is quite natural that the advocates of the Paurāṇika system attached much importance to Aitihya pramāṇa.

In the Tamil texts, tradition is called '*ulakurai*', i.e. the word of the world, indicating the public belief, and also '*vaḻakku*' that which gained currency among the people. In Maṇimēkalai, the following example is given to illustrate tradition:[96]

"The racial memory makes one belief that the tree has a ghost".

Ghost does not become the object of perception. Equally its existence can not be inferred. It is understood only through tradition and belief.

Maṟaijnāña Deśikar has quoted the following verse in support of this pramāṇa:[97]

"koṉpayil vēlai-k kaṭalpuṭai cūḻum kuvalayattōr
aṉputaṉ ālil alakaiuṇ teṉparkaḷ eṉpatuvum
miṉpayil puṟṟil viṭanākam uṇṭeṉpar eṉpatuvum
aṉpotu cērunaṉ nāvalar tām aitikam eṉparkaḷē"

In this poem, two examples are noted. The belief, maintained by the world people that there is a ghost in a banyan tree and a poisonous snake in an anthill constitutes the content of this kind of pramāṇa.

Pandiperumal endorses the same example and goes a step further to ascertain that nobody has the right to question or doubt the tradition. That shows the deep rooted and unassailable faith of the people in tradition. He provides another example:[98]

"If the learned (-the word '*ulakattār*' denotes the exalted and educated people and not simply the ordinary people) established the existence of legendary mountains like Mahāmeru, etc., through the authority of Śāstras, others are to acept it without questioning or doubting the tradition."

Though the puranic places cannot be located in a geographical map, their existence was expected to be accepted for some reason or other, perhaps to inculcate some noble themes or moral lessons, deduced from the legends connected with those places.

Even the ethical philosopher Tiruvaḷḷuvar gives credibility to noble traditions. The following couplet from Tirukkuṟaḷ deserves to be quoted here:[99]

"Ulakkattār uṇṭeṉpa tilleṉpāṉ vaiyattu
alakaiyāy vaikkap paṭum".

i.e. Those who deny the words of the world should be treated as ghost on earth. That shows the vigour of tradition. The disbelievers in tradition are branded as nāstikas who revolted against authority and repudiated beliefs and superstitions as clogs in the path of man's progress. Even then, the Tamil Philosophers who held rational outlook respected valid traditions reflecting their cultural heritage.

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar considered valid tradition only as one form of sabda pramāṇa. If it is invalid, it is not at all a pramāṇa.[100] The reason for the Paurāṇikas to treat this source of knowledge as distinguished from Sabda may be due to the unassignable authorship to it. Vātsyāyana described tradition as having no specific author, since it has been passed over from generation to generation through word of mouth.[101]

However, the valid tradition may be treated on a par with āptavacana and hence the conclusion that it is to be subsumed under verbal testimony is tenable. The invalid tradition becomes false and hence is not treated as a source of knowledge.

Aruḷnandiśivam merely stated that there were a set of philosophers who advocated more than ten pramāṇas and did not mention what were they, and who were the claimants.[102] But the commentator, Sivagrayogin implied by the statement that these pramāṇas are governed by the twelfth poem of the Aḷavai-iyal.[103] Actually the poem under reference deals with three types of anumānas, viz., 1. pūrva darśana pramāṇa, 2. vacanalinga pramāṇa and 3. anubhava pramāṇa. The details of these pramāṇas will be discussed in due course, when we deal with the types of anumāna in a separate chapter.

However in the Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, gesture has also been recognised as a source of knowledge.[104] Thoughts are expressed not only by words but also by gestures. In the Tamil tradition they are studied under the title '*meyppāṭu*' and the classical exposition of gestures is found in Tolkāppiyam.[105] Adiyārkkunallār definitely meant that the physical expressions of one's inner feelings are equal to speech.[106] According to the linguists, gestures constituted the emblematic language. Hence, they may be brought under perception. They equally deserve to be considered under inference, since the knowledge generated by the gestures depended on the connection between them and the speaker's response. This connection is known as vyāpti (-pervasion) and what is characterised by vyāpti is legitimately to be brought under inference.

Thus, the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta accepted the first three pramāṇas as the essential sources of knowledge. They accommodated the remaining auxiliary pramāṇas under any one of perception, inference and verbal testimony, as shown in the following table.

Sl.No.	Perception	Inference	Verbal testimony
1	Upamāna	Upamāna	Upamāna
2	—	Arthāpatti	—
3	Abhāva	Abhāva	—
4	—	Pāriśeṣa	—
5	Sambhava	Sambhava	—
6	Svabhāvalinga	Svabhāvalinga	—
7	—	—	Aitihya
8	Gestures	Gestures	—

Some of the excessive pramāṇas are subsumed under more than one primary pramāṇa, since they function in more than one way. For instance comparison (-upamāna) has been brought under perception, inference and verbal testimony on the basis of its role in providing knowledge either through pratyakṣa or anumāna or Sabda.

Thus we have seen the treatment of pramāṇas in the Tamil texts. It is essential to mention that the logical sections in the Buddhist and Saiva Siddhānta Tamil works dealt with ten kinds of pramāṇas as upheld by the different systems and schools of Indian philosophy. But in the Sanskrit sources, the maximum number of pramāṇas seems to be eight, as noticed in Akṣapāda's Nyāya sūtra, though he accepted the first four to be sufficient for deriving knowledge. However, in the later school of Nyāya system references to the eightfold pramāṇas and the systems that accepted the particular number of pramāṇas have been made. For instance Varadaraja, the author of Tārkikarakṣā, has made the following statement:[107]

"Pratyakṣam ekam cārvākaḥ
Kaṇāda saugatau punaḥ anumānam ca;
tac cātha Sāmkhyaḥ śabdam ca te api;
Nyāyaikadeśino 'py evam upamānam ca kecana
Arthāpattuā sahaitāni catvāry āha Prabhākaraḥ,
Abhāvaṣaṣṭhāny etāni Bhattā Vedāntinas tathā
Sambhavaitihyayuktāni tāni Paurāṇika jaguḥ"

The substance of the passage is summarized as follows:

The Cārvākas recognized only perception, whereas the Buddhists and the early Vaiśeṣikas (Kaṇāda) accepted perception and inference. The Sāmkhyas admitted verbal testimony in addition to the first two, and one school of Naiyāyikas agreed with them in recognising all the three pramāṇas. Other schools of Nyāya accepted four pramāṇas including comparison. Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāmsa recognised five pramāṇas adding presumption, while the school of Kumarila Bhatta admitted six, adding non-existence (abhāva). The Paurāṇikas accepted eight pramāṇas taking into account Sambhava (inclusion) and aitihya (tradition).

In the above statement only Kaṇāda's view of Vaiśeṣika accepting perception and inference has been mentioned. But, the

view of Praśastapāda, the Commentator of Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is not stated. In the same statement there is no mention of ten pramāṇas, attributed to the Paurāṇikas, as we found in the Tamil sources. It is proper to suggest that the Tamil texts revealed the position of pramāṇas as upheld by the advocates of a particular system in the South.

The enumeration and classification of pramāṇas as found in the Tamil texts provide sufficient background to reconstruct the history of Indian logic on a historical basis. One should not neglect them, just because they are written in Tamil. Actually they contained some rare facts and valuable accounts, indispensable for a broad and clear understanding of Indian epistemology. In most cases, the Tamil classics agree with the Sanskrit texts and wherever they differ, they reflect the original and unique thoughts in the domain of logic as preserved in the South.

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VII. APPLICATION OF PRAMĀṆAS

The primary function of the pramāṇas consists in generating knowledge and elucidating the real nature of things. The application of the pramāṇas to grasp the cardinal tenets of philosophical systems, especially the southern tradition of Saiva Siddhānta has been made less by the authors of the texts and more by the commentators. Among them, the commentator of Tattuva-p-pirakāśam (A.D.1350) seems to be the earliest to interpret the fundamental principles of Saiva Siddhanta in the light of logical knowledge from Akam aspect. Next to him comes Sivāgrayogin, who has commented on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār and also composed Sivaneṟi-pirakāśam, an excellent text on the subject. His erudition in epistemology and metaphysics is revealed both in his commentary and text. Pandiperumal, who lived long before Sivajñāna Swamigaḷ wrote an elaborate commentary on Sivajñāna bodham. Since in this text there is no section, devoted to the discussion on pramāṇas, Pandiperumal knowing fully well the need for logical knowledge in the right understanding of the subject, introduced the entire section of Aḷavai-y-iyal, being the opening portion in the Supakkam of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, with his rich and useful comments, before annotating the contents of the first aphorism in Sivajnānabodham. These three commentators have contributed considerably to the application of pramāṇas, when they explicated the sections of the concerned texts, exclusively dealing with epistemology.

While commenting on the text, the commentators used to explain the pramāṇas in two ways which they called *Puṟam* and *Akam*. These two technical words, literally meaning respectively that which is external and internal, are already used in the Tamil poetics, grammar and religion with different connotations. In the poetics, puṟam and akam denote respectively the objective and subjective themes.[1] In other words, *puṟam* included warfare besides social, cultural and other related themes, whereas *akam* meant the erotic themes. In grammar,[2] the technical terms Aka-k-karuvi, Puṟa-k-karuvi, Aka-c-ceykai and Puṟa-c-ceykai denoted the morphophonemic rules, operating between the end of the standing word and the beginning of the on-coming word. In religion,[3] Aka-c-camayam indicates the various sects of the same faith, while Puṟa-c-camayam refers to the different sects of other faith. However, in the philosophical commentaries pertaining to epistemology, these two technical words

have their own significance, without losing their fundamental sense. Thus, Puṟam explains the empirical aspect, providing mainly wordly examples, while Akam denotes the metaphysical aspect, elucidating the principles of Saiva Siddhānta. Hence, it is held that the pramāṇas may be operated both for wordly understanding and for spiritual knowledge. Since the empirical examples have already been cited in the preceding chapter, herein the application of the pramāṇas in their Akam aspect has been highlighted.

Akam and Puṟam aspects

The essential purpose of the pramāṇas is to endow an insight to the proper grasping of the reality.[4] The commentator of Tattuvap-pirakāsam equates the high pramāṇa (-mel aḷavai) with 'supreme consciouness' (-melām uṇarvu). It is the ultimate view of the Saiva Siddhantins, that the atman's cit-śakti (-the soul's intelligence potency) pervaded by Siva's cit-śakti, is the only pramāṇa in the right understanding of all objects, both temporal and spiritual. However, the commentator's reference to 'supreme consciousness' seems to indicate the atman's cit-śakti, without which no knowledge is ever made possible, eventhough the manifestors of knowledge are present.

According to the commentator,[5] pratyakṣa indicates the supreme consciousness, directly perceiving Sivajñāna. Normally, perception is concerned with sense-contact with the object. It is the application for cognising the external objects and the perception is concrete. But, here it is not so. The atman's cit-śakti perceives the supreme or ultimate knowledge known as Sivajñāna, which is something abstract. The consciousness of the soul in conjunction with the supreme jnāna śakti of Siva becomes eligible to come face to face with the divine wisdom, known as Tiru-v-aruljñānam and Sivajñānam. This is something internal and intuitive. This kind of perception is the ultimate aim of all aspirants. This sort of elucidation comes under the purview of Akam aspect.

Similarly, the commentator explains inference which in the Puṟam aspect denotes the knowledge from the seen to the unseen, discerning the existence of unseen fire from the presence of seen smoke, while in the Akam aspect indicates the contemplation of Sivajñāna.[6] This contemplation is possible for one who has already experienced the perception of Sivajñāna.

[7]In the Puram aspect, the knowledge derived from the study of texts provides wordly knowledge (-aparajnāna). But in the Akam aspect, the critical and constant study leading to the realisation of the philosophical import of the contents, embodying Sivajnāna constituted the Āgama pramāṇa.

Let us proceed to present some of the remaining explications of Akam aspect.

Doubtful perception

[8]Aiya-k-kāṭci or Samśaya pratyakṣa denotes doubtful perception. Doubt arises due to the apparent resemblance between two objects, in the determination of one of them. In the Puram aspect, the stock example is: "Kurriyō makanō tōnrā ninrā uruvu", i.e., "Is the object, appearing at a distance, a pillar or a person?". However, in the Akam aspect, the doubtful perception would be in the following form:

"Whether the preceptor who has condescended to instruct us is the heavenly Śiva Himself or an earthly person?" This example is presented by the author himself in the Tattuva-p-pirakāśam. The disciple bewilders that the supreme knowledge could not be imported by a mortal, and hence surmises that the preceptor must be Lord Śiva Himself. However, on second thoughts, he revises his judgement, since the preceptor is in the form of a human being. So, the novice is doubtful, unable to arrive at a conclusion.

Pandiperumal[9] has produced two different illustrations to doubtful cognition. They are as follows:

1. Whether the universe is a product or self-existent?
2. Whether the universe in its involution rests in Śiva or Māyā?

The first doubt arises due to the variation of the views, upheld in different systems of Indian philosophy. The advocates of Lokayata system treated the world, not created but ever-existing. The adherents of Sāṁkhya, Saiva Siddhānta and others considered it to be a product, evolved from the Primordial matter. The neophyte is not mature enough to settle the question and hence the doubt.

In the second example, the doubt arises as to the involution of the universe. Some held that it rested in Siva, while others argued that it resolved in Maya. Hence the doubtful cognition takes place.

Erroneous perception

It is known as Tiripu-k-kāṭci in Tamil and viparyāya in Sanskrit. The usual example for erroneous cognition is deciding the pillar as the person or the rope as the snake, because of the semblance found between the pairs. This illustration is quoted for the Puṟam aspect of erroneous perception. For the Akam aspect, the illustration is the wrong perception of the Supreme preceptor Lord Siva, as a mere human being. It is the culture of the religious Tamils to treat the guru i.e. Acharya as god in human form, deserving all reverence. That is the proper perception. Treating him as one among the mortals is erroneous, according to [10]Tattuva-p-pirakācam.

[11]Pandiperumal quoted two different examples. Perceiving the universe as self manifested and its resolution resting in Siva are cases of perverted perception.

Twofold natures

To explicate the intrinsic nature (-Taṉ-ṉ-iyalpu or Svarūpa lakṣaṇa) and attributive or accidental nature (Potu-v-iyalpu or Tatastha lakṣaṇa) the commentators have presented adequate illustrations from the Akam point of view. Very briefly they are given here below.

[12]Sivagrayogi opined that the differences, noticed between the two kinds of nature of Tripadārthas, viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa may be clearly understood through the proper application of pramāṇas. According to him one, who has efficiently grasped with the aid of pramāṇas, the twofold nature of the threefold eternal entities, viz., the Supreme Lord, the plurality of souls with their threefold divisions and the bonds which are collectively called "pañcamalas", becomes a pramāṇajña, i.e. he who has rightly understood the pramāṇas.

[13]Pandiperumal explained in his commentary the twofold nature of the triple realities. As far as Pati is concerned, His intrinsic nature consists in discharging the fivefold cosmic functions through His inseparable Śakti. His general nature rests in His Citsvarūpa. The state of Jivanmukta is the svalakṣaṇa of soul. Also it includes the fivefold functions of the soul through its śakti. The liberated pure state of soul is its Citsvarūpa. Without becoming one with pāśa and getting the name of Jivanmukta, the soul standing in its svabhāva is its general nature. The svabhāva of the soul is its

association with its triple energies known as icchā (-willing), jñāna (-knowing) and kriyā (doing), experiencing the fruits of its deeds in the form of pleasure and pain and existing in the fivefold avasthas, viz., jagra, svapna, suṣupti, turiya and turiyātīta. The svalakṣaṇa of Māyā consists in its differing from the karmas which are alien to it, not standing in its svabhāva, but positioning itself in the productive condition of various evolutes such as kalā (-The commentator implied by the term .Maya only the evolutes of Miśramāyā and Prakṛtimāya). The pre-evolutionary state of Maya denotes its general nature.

However, the aforesaid explications and illustrations of Pandiperumal are subject to further study, since what he has given for general nature actually meant for the instrinsic nature and vice-versa. Perhaps, a critical edition of the commentary may help one to clarify the matter.

[14]Sivagrayogin illustrates the inference for others (parārthānumāna). The Akam aspect of this pramāṇa denoted the establishment of the existence of triple realities, viz., Pati, Paśu and Paśa, by the preceptor and this knowledge is transmitted to the novice through the technique of five-membered syllogism. He has given importance especially to the functioning of threefold reasons in imparting the knowledge.[15]Tattuva-p-prakāśam has its own peculiar presentation. Pakṣa (-proposition, or thesis), Supakṣa (-similars) and Vipakṣa (-dissimilars) are to be explicated initially from the Akam point of view. The examples are as follows:

Pakṣa is the statement or proposition to be established. The statement that, "Karma exists in Maya", is pakṣa. The statement, "Karma would appear in manas (-mind), becomes sapakṣa. The statement that the substratum for Siva is Śuddhamaya and Aśuddhamaya becomes Vipakṣa.

Thus the threefold propositions are presented. It is essential to note that the commentator has indicated more than once that *Akam aspect denoted jñāna.* So, it becomes clear that the elucidation of Akam point of view aimed to present the esoteric sense or jnāna of the concerned subject. Then, Tattuva-p-pirakāsam proceeds to explain the three types of reason, from the Akam aspect.[16]

1. Iaylpu or Svabhāva hetu

Tattva denotes generally the evolutes of Māyā. Nevertheless, if the first five tattvas as a group or class are referred, then it should

naturally be the Śuddha tattvas, the evolutes from the Pure Primordial Matter (-Śuddha Maya). This illustration is meant for Iyalpu etu or Svabhāva hetu.

2. Kārya hetu

Ignorance indicates the existence of Āṇava, the principle of ego and a co-tenent of soul. One of the chief products (i.e. Kārya) of Āṇava is ignorance (-avidyā). So, from the effect (-kārya), the cause (-kāraṇa) is deduced. This illustration is given for Kārya hetu.

3. Anupalabdhi hetu

The expansion of one's intelligence indicates the extirpation of Āṇava. Āṇava is an eternal entity (-mūlamala). It could not be destroyed altogether. But, by virtue of one's own exertion, ethical equipment and intellectual perfection, the potency of Āṇava is dissipated and it becomes like a fried nut and boiled paddy, without having its energy to fructify. So, the presence of intelligence suggests the removal of āṇava. This illustration is meant for Anupalabdhi hetu.

[17]Sivagrayogin has produced entirely different examples to explain the threefold reasons from the Akam point of view. They are presented hereunder.

The existence of the universe indicates the existence of a Supreme being (Pati), souls (paśu) and matter (pāśa). This illustration for svabhāva hetu requires some elucidation. According to Saiva Siddhanta, the universe is an emanation from Primordial mater, called Māyā. So, the product denotes naturally the existence of its first cause, Māyā i.e. Pāśa. Since Maya is inert, it cannot evolve all by itself, and hence an intelligent being with omnipotence and omniscience is required to effect the universe from Māyā. So, the necessary existence of Pati is naturally inferred. The universe is created not for the Supreme Being i.e. Pati, but for the benefit of souls, and hence the existence of Paśu is naturally inferred.

Wihtout the creator, there is no creation. The created universe suggests the existence of its creator i.e. Pati. Since the body in isolation is insentient, it requires a sentient principle i.e. Paśu to animate and activate it. Thus, the existence of Paśu or soul is naturally inferred.

Without cause, there is no effect. The universe as effect implied its material cause, Maya which is a reality in Saiva Siddhanta, unlike Vedanta where it is an illusion.

Anupalabdhi hetu is further elucidated. If there is no cause, there is no effect. Negation of cause indicates negation of effect.

Examples:

If there is no creator, there is no creation of the universe.

Similarly, if there is no soul, there is no body. If there is no Māyā, the evolutes do not come into existence.

The illustrations, provided by Pandiperumal do not vary from those of the two commentators, seen above. [18]However, he explains Iyalpu ētu as the indication of the existence of something. He gives the following statements:

"There should be Pati

There should be Paśu

There should be Pāśa

For kārya hetu and Anupalabdhi hetu, he has produced the same examples, given by the other two commentators.

[19]Further, for Vyatireka anumāna, he has given an example of the Akam aspect:

"Whatever is not created is not impermanent,
like Pati, Paśu and Pāśa."

According to Saiva Siddhanta, these three entities are ever existing, eternally. Eternity does not mean equality. God is god, soul is soul and māyā is māyā with their own characteristic features.

The examples for the elucidation of the ten kinds of pramāṇas from the Akam point of view are quite interesting. They are mainly interpreted by the commentator of Tattuva-p-prakāśam and Pandiperumal. Let us consider them briefly.

Akam aspect of Pramāṇas

According to the commentator of Tattuva-p-pirakāśam,[20] perception meant the direct communion with Sivajñāna, while inference indicated the contemplation of Sivajñāna and Āgama (verbal testimony) denoted the realisation through the study of the texts on Sivajñāna.

Next,[21] the commentator of Tattuva-p-prakāśam explains Abhāva (-inmai) which occurs after perceiving an object in one place without

winking and seeing in a different place where its form seems to appear.

[22]Pandiperumal quotes a fresh illustration. If it is said that acit (inert substance) could not be evolved from Cit (entity of intelligence), it is to be accepted.

Presumption (Poruḷ aḷavai or arthāpatti) from Akam point of view is exemplified in Tattuva-p-pirakāśam[23] in the following way:

"If it is said that there is one who has created the entire universe, then it is to be meant that the creator transcends the limits of the universe".

[24]Pandiperumal explains the same in a different way. "If it is stated that the body cognises, then it should be presumed that because it is inert and cannot function, the soul pervading the body cognises the objects."

In Tattuvappirakāśam[25] comparison is explained thus: "If it is mentioned that Śiva likens kāla tattva (i.e. the principle of time), then it is to be understood that all the threefold functions are performed by Śiva, as the nature of threefold aspects of time."

Pandiperumal[26] explicates comparison to be the cognition concerning Maya and its products, gross elements etc. which are just like earth and its products vessels, pots etc. He has also given one more example, discerning that the soul and its inherent impurity āṇavamala are like the copper and its inseparable verdigris. Also the knowledge that the function of god is similar to that of the sun is given an additional example of comparison.

Pāriśeṣa pramāṇa (oḻipu, mīṭci) is illustrated in Tattuvappirakāśam very briefly.[27] If it is said that the world is not an intelligent entity (-acit), then it is to be understood by this pramāṇa that the remaining entity Śiva (and also soul) are intelligent realities.

Pandiperumal[28] produces two interesting examples to explain this pramāṇa from Akam aspect:

1. "If it is said that a person attained liberation (mukti), then it is to be understood that he has totally destroyed all the bonds.
2. If it is mentioned that among the threefold entities viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa, bhoga is not meant for the first and last, then it is to be inferred that Paśu alone is entitled to experience it.

Sambhava (unmai) is briefly explained in Tattuvappirakāsam:[29] "If it is said that the soul (among the three entities) experiences pleasure and pain, then it is to be taken as such. Pandiperumal[30] explains this pramāṇa thus:

> "If it is said that in the presence of one the cosmic functions are performed, then it should be known that the agent of the functions is none other than Paramesvara who is eternal, liberated by nature, devoid of any support and the embodiment of absolue knowledge."

Aitika (-ulakurai) is the belief of the people. The commentator of Tatttuvappirakāsam[31] observes: "If it is said that Śiva manifested Himself in this form, then, it should be taken as such."

Pandiperumal[32] produces a difference example: "If the people ascerted the existence of the Mount Mahameru and other cosmological objects through the authority of śāstras, one should not doubt it, but should accept it as such.

Svabhāva (-iyalpu) is illustrated in the commentary of Tattuvappirakāśam[33] "If it is said that He, who dissolves the universe is the Supreme Being, then it is to be naturally understood that for the deities who do not perform the function of dissolution are not entitled for supremacy."

Pandiperumal[34] explains this pramāṇa in his own way. The word Śiva is a homonym. It connotes auspiciousness, goodness, the first evolute of Śuddhamāyā and the Supreme Lord Śiva. Among the varied meanings, one should grasp the particular meaning in a specific context. Thus, in the interpretation of the stanza, "....... cuttamām civattu oṭuṅkum" (-Siddhiyār, Sutra 2, poem 72), the word Siva meant only the evolute of Śuddhamāyā.

Thus, the commentators have adopted the methodology of Akam aspect in the elucidation of the pramāṇas, to bring out the theological and metaphysical aspects of Śaiva Siddhanta. *This type of interpretation seems to be native, and has been followed by the preceptors to transmit the esoteric knowledge to the aspirants.*

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18. *Sivajñāna bodham*, p.44.
19. Ibid., p.47.
20. *Tattuva-p-pirakāśam*, p.14.
21. Ibid., p.22.
22. *Sivajñānabodham, p.25.*
23. *Tattuva-p-pirakāśam*, p.22.
24. *Sivajñānabodham*, p.25.
25. *Tattuva-p-pirakāśam*, p.22.
26. *Sivajñānabodham*, pp.25-26.
27. *Tattuva-p-pirakasam*, p.22.
28. *Sivajnanabodham*, p.26.
29. *Tattuva-p-pirakāśam*, p.22.
30. *Sivajñānabodham*, p.26.
31. *Tattuva-p-pirakāśam*, p.22.
32. *Sivajñāna bodham*, p.27.
33. *Tattuva-p-pirakāśam*, p.23.
34. *Sivajñāna bodham*, p.27.

VIII THEORY OF PERCEPTION

After subsuming all the pramāṇas under perception, inference and verbal testimony, the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta proceed to define, illustrate and classify each of them. In order, perception has been taken first for detailed exposition. The Sanskrit word pratyakṣa corresponds to the Tamil word 'kāṭci' to denote perception. In both the terms, the word denoting eye (akṣa and kaṇ) is significant, since in the initial stage the visual perception was considered very important and subsequently all the other sensual perceptions were subsumed under the major division of Pratyakṣa pramāṇa.

According to Arulnandisivam, the impeccable perception (-mācaṟu kāṭci) is the faultless congnition (-ācaṟa aṟivatu), free from doubtful and erroneous apprehension (-aiyam tiriviṉṟi), preceded by nirvikalpa jñāna, i.e. indeterminate perception.[1] The commentators elucidated the statement of Arulnandisivam clearly. According to the interpretation of Sivajñāna Swamigal, valid perception is the cognitive power of the soul (-atman's jñāna śakti) which has the direct and immediate knowledge of the object (-nērē aṟivatu), free from doubt and error, preceded by nirvikalpa jñāna.[2] Though in the text of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, the reference to jnānaśakti and the element of immediacy, being an essential character of perception is not overtly made, the commentator brought them to present a full definition of perception. It is to be borne in mind that the author of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār has obviously mentioned mediacy as an essential character of inference and hence Sivajñāna Swamigal should have derived immediacy to be the essential feature of perception.

The idea, that atman's jnāna Śakti which is also known as cit-śakti is the pramāṇa, is expressed in a subsequent poem of Sivajnana Siddhiyar in the phrase,

"uyiriṉ ōṭu uṇarvu" (6)

which has been explained by Sivajñāna Swamigal to mean the ātman's cit-śakti that is directed towards objects. It is called jīva cit-Śakti in Sivaneṟiprakāśam.[3] It seems that the same idea has already been stated in Pauskara āgama. Sivagroyogin's knowledge in Pauṣkara āgama is attested not only by his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyar but also by his treatise Sivaneṟi prakāsam and its commentary by his disciple Nandi Sivagrayogin, who has indebted much to his master.

It is essential to note that Sivagrayogin has given one more point in defining perception, i.e. it should be free from previous memory, 'pūrva smaraṇai' as found in his commentary.[4] It is also indicated as "*munninaivu inri*" in Sivaneriprakāśam.[5] It is to be understood that since validity of memory comes under inference, it is excluded from perception.

The processes of perception are identified by the commentators. The cit-śakti i.e. cognitive power of the atman pervaded by the Cit-śakti of Siva perceives the objects through the instruments of internal organs and sense organs. The mere contact of these organs with the external object is not to be taken as perception. Normally sense-contact with the objects is held to be perception. Mind and sense-contact and sense-cum-object contact may seem to be perception. But, perception is knowledge, whereas the objects as well as the internal and external organs are inorganic and insentient. They are physical and material, since they are the products of Maya. They serve only as aids and instruments in the process of cognition to the soul. Knowledge is the property of the soul and hence the exponent of Saiva Siddhanta has considered that the Cit-śakti of the soul (i.e. atman's Cit-śakti) is to be held as the perceiver of the external objects.

Cit-Śakti i.e. cognitive energy is the quality or nature of the soul. The relationship between the soul and its cit-śakti is that of substance and its quality (guṇa guṇi bhāva). They are inseparable. Since the soul is fettered by Āṇavamala (-impurity), its quality i.e. knowledge is obscured. The removal of obscuration required the help of not only the organs of cognition being the products of Maya, the Primordial Matter, but also the pervasion of the Cit-Śakti of Śiva. The degree of clarity of soul's knowledge depends upon the extent of removal of its impurity, caused by the association of Āṇava mala.

The modern epistemologists and psychologists differ in naming the objects of perception. The realists call them sense-data, while the idealists name them impressions, ideas or sensations. According to the latter, who are subjective, the external objects are only the expansion of mental reflections and events. Apart from mental plane, they do not have independent external existence. But, the realists who are objective, advocated that the objects have their own existence in the external world, without the super-imposition of the mind. The exponents of Saiva Siddhanta being realists subscribed to the view of naming the sensed objects as sense-data.

Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka

According to Saiva Siddhanta, valid perception has two inter-connected features viz. the indeterminate (*Nirvikalpaka*) and the determinate (-*Savikalpaka*). In this context, it is essential to record that Vācaspatimiśra, the great commentator of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was the first to introduce the technical words *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* in the Nyaya.[6] Kumarila of the Bhatta Mimamsa school initiated the proper study of these two forms of perception in Indian Philosophy in clear-cut terms[7] Even before him, Dignāga the Buddhist logician knew the two terms, since he accepted the first form as valid and rejected the second, for it fell under inference.[8] Be that as it may. First, let us consider the indeterminate perception, as per the details available from the source of Saiva Siddhanta.

Nirvikalpaka Perception

Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa is also called *"vikarpam illā-k-kaṭci"* i.e. the perception free from imagination and thought – construction.[9] It is inexplicable knowledge: *"vinṭalilā arivu"*.[10] When a particular object is presented to the senses, its characteristic features do not infringe into the domain of the cogniser's consciousness. There is a general awareness or a vague apprehension. In this cognition the bare existence of something without its adjuncts such as name, genus, quality, activity and substance is perceived. This kind of cognition is also defined by Arulnandisivam thus:[11]

"Poruḷin uṇmai māttirattin arivu"

i.e. the knowledge of the mere presence of an object. Sivagrayogin further explains that it is the knowledge of an object without associating it with a name, genus etc.[12] His definition of Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa corresponds to what Dignāga, the reputed logician of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra school of Buddhism has stated in Pramāṇa Samuccaya:[13]

"Pratyakṣam Kalpanāpodham" (I, 3 p.8)

i.e. perception is that which is free from imagination and it indicates direct cognition or pure sensation. It is the presentative cognition. It is also known as *"Cuṭṭuṇarvu"* in Maṇimēkalai (29:49-50). In another context, it is also noted thus:

"poruḷ uṇmai māttiram kāṇpatu" (27.57)

The aforesaid statement of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār seems to be identical with this statement of Cāttaṉār. It seems that similar statements are related to what Tolkāppiyar has stated "*poruṇmai cuṭṭal*" when he dealt with the patterns of predicate to a subject. The great Commentator Cēṉāvaraiyar, who was also a good logician elucidated this technical phrase with an example. His commentary runs thus:[14]

> "*ā uṇṭu*
> *uṇṭu eṉpatu paṇpu mutalayiṉa cuṭṭātu*
> *uṇmaiye cuṭṭaliṉ vēṟu kūriṉar*".

The above commentary is rendered into English in the following way:

i.e. Ex. "Cow is". In this example ā (-cow) is subject. The predicate 'uṇṭu' (-is) does not indicate the quality etc. of the object cow, but the mere being of a cow without any adjuncts and hence the author used it in a different sense. It is not for certain that Tolkāppiyar had any logical import in his statement. But the way in which it is explained by Cēṉāvaraiyar reveals the logical relevance to this aphorism. It seems that Cēṉāvaraiyar is influenced by Jayanta, the author of Nyāya mañjari (850 A.D.). According to Bhaṛtrhari, the great exponent of grammarian school of logic, there is no such thing as *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, since the perceptual cognition of things is always qualified by words and hence it is *Savikalpaka*. Jayanta criticised his theory stating that though the given example, 'This is cow' comes under the type of verbalised knowledge, the initial sense perception is essentially *nirvikalpaka.*[15] Hence, the commentator's acquaintance with Jayanta may be inferred.

According to some schools of logicians, even the genus (-i.e. cow in the above example) differentiating it from other organic beings such as horse, elephant and donkey of the animal category, different birds, trees, plants etc. of other categories should not be identified in Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa.

Nevertheless, the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta never said categorically that indeterminate perception meant something which was totally devoid of all the adjuncts and accessories of an object that are presented in determinate perception (-Savikalpaka pratyakṣa). As a staunch advocate of *Satkārya vāda*, he held the view that what existed already there with the object were brought to light afterwards at a given context, under particular circumstance.

So, the concept of Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa in Saiva Siddhanta and that of other schools like Sautrāntika Yogācarā Buddhism differ considerably. However, the indeterminate prception of Saiva Siddhanta school stands partial comparison to the concept of pratyakṣa of the Buddhist school which admitted only *nirvikalpaka* and totally rejected *savikalpaka.*

Nevertheless, in the example cited above, though the sensed object is given as 'cow', its specific species such as Kapilai, Kārā, Sevalai, Veḷḷai, etc., and its name, shape, activity and worth are not apprehended. Thus, this example suits well for the Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa as envisaged in the system of Saiva Siddhanta.

Let us consider the elucidations of some more commentators on the subject.

The interpretation of Pandiperumal is quite interesting and his illustration seems to be related to a higher level of understanding. According to him, Nirvikalpaka is the knowledge of the Svarūpa of the object (i.e. the intrinsic form of the object) at a single moment (*-oru māttirai*) without discrimination.[16] So, the cognition of an object at the first moment is Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa for the commentator. This concept corresponds to the definition of pereption according to the Buddhist logicians of Dignāga school. Further, Pandiperumal defines it to be free from illusion (abhrānti), without assigning to three-fold times viz., past, present and future, three fold places viz., first person, second person and third person and free from constructions such as name, class, etc. It is called "*tannaṟi kāṭci*", i.e. self-knowing perception. It is the personal realisation i.e. 'Svānubhūti'.[17] The ascetics are the best example for having this kind of perception. The realised seers never expressed what they experienced (*'kaṇṭavar viṇṭilar'*).

Again, it seems that Pandiperumal has known Dharmakīrti, the author of Nyāya Bindu and a disciple of Dignāga who added one more essential character to the definition of perception. He explained perception as direct cognition without illusion (-abhrānti), besides being free from imagination (Kalpanāpodham) which aspect has been emphasised by his master.[18] However, the content and purpose of the definitions of Dharmakīrti and Pandiperumal vary, since they belong to totally different schools of thought.

Sivajnana Swamigal explains Nirvikalpaka as the jñānaśakti of the soul cognising the bare existence of an object without

discriminating its name etc.[19] In the system of Saiva Siddhanta all forms of knowledge, let them be *nirvikalpaka* or *savikalpaka*, valid or invalid etc., are attributed to the ātman's Cit-śākti also known as Jñāna Śakti.

According to Sivaneriprakasam, Nirvikalpaka perception is in the form: "This is something" (*-o̱ṉṟu itu*).[20]

The Commentator of Sivaneṟiprakāśam has compared Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa to the vague awareness of an object by a young child or a dumb person.[21] They can see but can not speak. The perfect jnāni, as illustrated by Nandisivagrayogin is just like a child (-'Cēypōl iruppar' in the words of Paṭṭiṉattār) and a mute, since words do not come out from such persons, for he is in direct cognition of truth. The proverb goes that 'silence is the limit of wisdom of realisation' ["mōṉam eṉpatu ñāna varampu"]. But, the examples vary serving different purposes. At the empirical level, Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa is just like the awareness of a child or dumb person. But at the transcendental level, it is just like the absolute realisation of a perfect jnāni as understood by Nandisvagrayogin.[22]

It seems that Nandi Sivagrayogin, the Commentator of Sivaneriprakasam has taken the illustrations of a child and mute for elucidating the indeterminate perception from Kumarila, the exponent of Bhatta Mimamsa School.[23]

In Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa, the function of external organs is conspicuous. The statement that the general awareness of a thing is indeterminate perception requires some elucidation. In this kind of vague awareness, each sense organ is used as an instrument to grasp a particular thing by the atman's Cit-śakti i.e. Jñāna Śakti. For instance, the jñāna Śakti of the atman through the sense organ eye perceives the bare existence of an object, the properties of which are not presented for cognition at the first moment. Similarly, the same Śakti through the ear apprehends a sound, but its nature and feature are not understood. When the Cit-Śakti comes into contact through the sense organ, tongue with bare taste, it is not apprehended whether it is sweet or salty, savoury etc. Likewise, when it cognises through the instrument of nose, a smell and skin a resistence or friction, the nature of these cognitions are not clear. Such kinds of general perception, i.e. nirvikalpa pratyakṣa take place through the gates of five-fold sense organs and hence Nirvikalpaka Jñāna of the sensory perception is called 'vāyil kāṭci' which corresponds to the Sanskrit term 'indriya pratyākṣa'.

It is essential to note that since one sense organ can not do the function of another, all functions which are ascribed to the individual senses are actually done by a single agency, viz., the jñāna śakti of the soul.

Sivajñāna Swamigal is very clear in interpreting that the organs themselves can not be called indriya i.e. sense organ, if they do not perform their respective function as in the case of a blind man, mute, deaf etc. They should not be defective. So, the organ, which is capable of serving as an instrument for sensing the object to atman's Cit-Śakti is alone qualified to be called as sense-organ. He has also pointed out the errors, which are arising not only of the defective sense-organs, but also due to lack of sufficient light, intermingling of subtle elements (tanmātras) and also triple guṇas. Such errors individually or collectively become an impediment either for generating sensory perception or producing doubtful or erroneous perception. So, he is very cautious and careful in interpreting the definition of indriya pratyakṣa to be the atman's cit-śakti (i.e. the cognitive potency of soul) having direct cognition of the objects in the indeterminate manner (nirvikalpaka), free from doubt (samśaya) and error (viparīta) ultimately leading to determinate perception (Savikalpaka pratyakṣa).[24]

It is not out of place to mention that nirvikalpa jnāna, characterised by indication of bare existence of a thing has been included in the list of eight kinds of logical fallacies in the Nyāya system as preserved in the exposition of Maṇimēkalai.[25] However, to the advocates of Saiva Siddhānta, it is held valid, since it is the first step in the process of cognition, leading to Savikalpaka jñāna, aiming at cognising the object in a special way with its adjuncts and attributes very clearly.

Savikalpaka perception

According to Arulnandisivam, Savikalpaka pratyakṣa is the discriminating cognition identifying the name, genus, quality, activity and substance of the object of perception.[26]

Sivagrayogin has indicated the involvement of the principle of intellect i.e. buddhi tattva in this kind of perception. He explains the determinate knowledge through an illustration:

"The tree, from its possession of amorous buds, being the arrows of the cupid's bow (of sugar cane), fragrance and the musical note of kokila bird, is to be cognised as the sweet mango tree."[27]

From this illustration, it is understood that the attributes, viz., the enticing buds, fragrance and melody of the bird are not to be found in any other types of mango tree, except in the particular type, known as "tēmā" i.e. sweet mango tree. So, according to Sivagrayogin, the Savikalpaka pratyakṣa denotes the perception determining the particular from the general due to the presence of the specific adjuncts in the former.

Pandiperumal explains the word *'vikalpa'* to mean differentiation. According to him, the word *'poruḷ'* (*-vastu*) denotes the substance with its name, genus, quality and action. He elucidates that the discriminative knowledge identifies that this (object) has this name; it belongs to this class; it inheres this quality; it has this function and it has this colour.[28]

Sivajñāna Swamigal interprets that jnānaśakti (of the atman) cognising clearly through savikalpaka pratyakṣa the existence of five attributes, viz., name, class, quality, action and substance (dravya) as they are in every object.[29]

Tattuvaprakāśam and Sivaneriprakāśam endorsed the same view, as found in Sivajnanasiddhiyar.[30] The commentator of the latter text quotes Pauṣkara Āgama to support the stand point of its author.[31]

Fourfold types of Perception

Next, let us proceed to deal with the fourfold classification of perception as stated in Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, the related texts and in their commentaries.

According to Aruḷnandiśivam, the four kinds of pratyakṣa are the following:[32]

1. indriyakkāṭci, also known as indriya pratyakṣa and vāyilkāṭci.
2. mānatakkāṇṭal or mānasa pratyakṣa or maṉakkāṭci
3. taṉvetaṉai-k-kāṭci or svavedanā pratyakṣa, and
4. yōka-k-kāṇṭal or yo-ka-k-kāṭci or yoga pratyakṣa.

They are respectively translated as sense-perception, internal perception, self-consciousness-perception and yogic perception or intuition. First of all, let us consider indriya pratyakṣa. Giving prominence to the dominant role assigned to the indriyas (-senses),

the perception is called Indriya pratyaksa or sense-perception. Since they serve as gates for carrying the external objects inwardly, they are called gate-perception i.e. *vayil katci*. Sivagrayogin in his Sivaneriprakasam named it *'pura-k-katci'* i.e. external perception which means perception through the media of external sense-organs, without doubt and error.[33]

I. Indriya Pratyaksa

Arulnandisivam defines that the ātman's cit-sakti, (-uyirin etu unarvu) cognising the objects without imagination (-vikalpa) through the senses and subtle elements like light and colour, is called indriya pratyakṣa.[34] This indeterminate perception, not coloured with any kind of imagination is the sense-perception.

Sivagrayogin throws some light on the process of sense-perception. According to him, atman's Cit-Sakti with the accessories of vital air (-prāṇa vāyu), mind and external sense organs and with the help of illumination of sun and other lights, contacting with colour and other aspects of object, free from the defects of doubt, error and memory which are born out of previous experience, cognising the name, genus etc., of the objects in a special and clear way, is called the *indriya pratyakṣa.*[35] By this, the Commentator seems to mean the general awareness of name and other attributes of the object, the particulars of which are to be cognised through the follow-up perception called *mānasa pratyakṣa.*

Pandiperumal considers that perception without vikalpa denotes parajnāna, the supreme intelligence of Lord Śiva's Śakti pervading the atman's Cit-Śakti.[36] In what way it is concerned with indriya pratyakṣa is a matter for discussion. However, it is the indeterminate perception before which, the discriminations and differences understood through the attributes and adjuncts embodying the phenomena do not arise, and hence in the exalted and evolved state, it is identified with parajñāna i.e. supreme intelligence which is essential to realise the Absolute Reality.

However, Sivajñāna Swamigal accepts the role of the sense-organs, elements and subtle-elements serving as aids to the atman's Cit-Śakti in the process of sense-perception. He also admits that it shall be free from the defects of doubt and error. He does not mention about memory. He subscribes to the view that indriya pratyakṣa is nirvikalpaka jñāna without the descrimination of name, genus etc. of the object presented to the vision. But he does not mention that it is parajñāna.[37]

Tattuvapr̲akāśam also attested to the participation of sense organs and also internal organs in the process of indriya pratyakṣa. The Commentator of this text explained that the sense-perception aimed to evaluate the merits and demerits of external objects through the instrumentality of internal and external sense organs.[38]

Sivaneriprakāśam deviates from Sivajñāna Siddhiyar in classifying the sense-perception. The author of this text, Sivagrayogin closely follows Pauṣkara Agama in the classification and elucidation of sense-perception. There are only three kinds of perception arising out of sense organs, mind and jnāna free from ignorance.[39] They are the following:

1. Indriya pratyakṣa also called pur̲akāṭci or Bahyendra pratyakṣa.
2. Mānasa pratyakṣa also known as Vijñāna pratyakṣa.
3. Cit-pratyakṣa also called 'Sivajñāna Pratyakṣa'

Among them, the definition of indriya pratyakṣa is in complete agreement with his elucidation of the same found in his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār that we have already seen. The Commentator of Sivaner̲iprakāśam called it Bahyendra pratyakṣa, perhaps to differentiate it from the next type of perception, known as 'mānasa pratyakṣa'. Also he adduced the authority of Pauṣkara āgama to support the view points, recorded in the text and also in the commentary.[40]

Sense-object Contact and Perception

According to the Nyāya Sūtra, the senses (indriyas), their objects (arthā), the contact of the senses with the concerned objects (*-sannikarṣa* or *samyoga*) and cognition due to the sense-object contact (*-jñānam*) are the essential factors involved in the process of perception. However, the contact between the sense-organ and object has been considered by the exponents of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mimāmsa systems of Indian Philosophy to be the pre-requisite for perception. This contact is known as '*indriyārtha samnikarṣa*' in the Nyāya Sūtra of Akṣapāda.[41] However, Kaṇāda in his Vaiśeṣika Sūtra has also dealt with the involvement of soul in the contact with indriya and artha and hence the phrase, "*ātmendriyārtha samnikarṣa*" occurs in the text.[42] In a subsequent portion of the same text, manas (-mind) has been added as the fourth factor in the contact. Thus the contact of soul, sense-organ, mind and object is collectively called as

Catuṣṭaya by Praśastapāda, the great commentator of Vaiśeṣika Sutra.[43] So, the phrase "*ātmendriya manortha samnikarṣa*" finds a place in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (V.ii.15). It is a development of thought in the identification of the various factors of contact as understood from the Sūtrakāras and Bhāṣyakāras (viz. authors and commentators).

Vātsyāyana, the reputed commentator of Nyāyasūtra clearly stated that in every perception, the contact of the self with the mind, the contact of the mind with the sense and in turn the contact of the sense with the object are the essential precondition. He also pointed out that the mind-sense contact and the sense-object contact are indispensable for perception, while the self-mind contact is general to perception, inference and other pramāṇas.[44]

The Naiyāyikas held that perception occurs due to the modification of the self through the sense-object contact. It is curious to note that Sivagrayogin, one of the earliest Commentators of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār has called '*indriyārtha samnikarṣa*' as '*Viṣayendriya Samnikarṣa*'.[45] Instead of artha, he used the word *viṣaya* i.e. the object of perception. According to him, Samnikarṣa and Sambandha are synonymous. But, Uddyotakara opined that samnikarṣa does not mean samyoga, but means only 'becoming' an object of sense or standing in a definite relation to the sense-organ, as noted by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.[46] Nevertheless, Bijalwan explained the view-point of Jayanta, the author of Nyāya Mañjari in this regard. His elucidation is as follows:[47]

> "Jayanta states that sannikarṣa does not mean simply a proximity, it rather implies the prāpyakāritva (going out and grasping the object) by the sense".

So, it is clear that 'Sannikarṣa' means also a proximity or conjunction, besides indicating the function of going out and grasping the object. However, Sivagrayogin's intimate knowledge in the system of Nyāya can not be ruled out. He mentions that due to the differences among the objects of perception (-*viṣayabheda*), the differences of sense contact (*sambanda bheda*) are reckoned. They are sixfold, as given below:[48]

1. Samyoga
2. Samyukta samavāya
3. Samyukta samaveda samavāya

4. Samavāya
5. Samaveta Samavāya and
6. Viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya bhāva.

These types of sense-object contact with their illustrations are presented also in Pauṣkara Āgama and the Tamil treatise, *Patipacupaacappaṉuval.* Following these texts, the commentators viz., Maṟaijñāna Deśikar and Sivagrayogin elucidated the six kinds of sense-object contact.

In this context, it is essential to note that all these six types of sense-object contact are also discussed by Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta, the eminent exponents of the Nyāya system, who lived definitely before 1000 A.D. With regard to the Pauṣkara Āgama, it existed long before the Tirumuṟais [A.D. 500 - A.D. 1200] and the Meykanda Sastras (1150 A.D. to 1350 A.D.) and its exact date is not established [perhaps A.D. 300]. However, the common thoughts found in the various sytesms should be taken not exclusively to be the property of a particular system, but belonging to the national stock of Indian Philosophy from which the concerned system has derived and elaborated them in its own way.

According to Sivagrayogin, among the six types of sense-object contact *samyoga, samavāya* and *viśeṣaviśeṣaṇabhāva* are the fundamental contacts of the simple type. The remaining three types are the complex kinds resulting due to the combination of *samyukta* and *samavāya.* These contacts are essential for perception. Illustrations to all these types are also presented in the commentary of Sivagrayogin.[49] Let us consider them one by one.

1. Samyoga

Samyoga means conjunction. The direct contact of the sense organ eye with the object pot is known as samyoga. The rays of light of the sense organ eye come into direct and immediate conjunction with the substance pot. The contact is between the sense and the object.

The author of Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval calls *Samyoga* as *Saiyoga* which has been explained by him as the conjoining of the indriya with the substance. Samyoga means the good contact, while Saiyoga means the intimate and close contact like the union of husband and wife. However, both the words are invariably used in the commentary of Sivagrayogin to denote the same.

The couplet that describes the first type of sense-object contact, found in Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval is presented here below:

> *"Intiriyam attattu iṇankutalś caiyōkam*
> *anta-p-poruḷuṇarcci-y-ām".*[50]

It means that Saiyoga denotes the intimate contact (-iṇaṅkutal) of indriyas with the object (-attam, a Tamilised form of Sanskrit artha). So, it is clear that the conjunction of the sense and object is essential for perception.

2. Samyukta Samavāya

This has been translated as 'Inherence in the conjoined', or 'Inherence in that which is in conjunction'. In this type of contact, the relation exists between the sense and the quality of a substance. Here, the contact is with the guṇa of a dravya. The contact with the substance is direct but with the quality, it is indirect.

The relationship between dravya (substance) and guṇa (quality) is inseparable. For instance, a leaf is a dravya and its greenness is a guṇa. Though they are counted as separate categories, one can not exist without the other. Leaf forms the substrate for the colour greenness. The green colour inheres in the substance. The inherance is called *samavāya*.

The contact of the sense with the quality is a complex one, since first the sense comes into contact with the substance through samyoga, and next with the quality i.e. colour through Samyukta Samavāya, i.e. the contact of the sense with the inherence in that which is in conjunction.

In the Tamil text Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval, this contact is called "*Saiyoga Samavāya*". The author of this text has stated in the following couplet that not only the contact of the sense and quality (colour, sweetness etc.) but also the contact of the sense and generic nature of object (-jāti) belonged to this type of relationship:

> *"Cātikuṇam taṉṉircai yokacama vāyamām*
> *pōtamuḷar tāṅkāṇum pōtu".*[51]

However, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has clearly stated on the authority of the Nyāya texts that "the relation between a substance and its quality or genus and individual is one of inherence or samāvāya".[52] Hence what is stated in the aforesaid Tamil text is in complete agreement with the details of the Nyāya texts.

Now, let us proceed to consider the third type of sense-object contact.

3. Samyukta Samaveda Samavāya

This has been rendered into English as "Inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined". This contact is also a still more complex one, since in this type of contact, the sense organ eye comes into contact with the general nature of quality known as 'jāti' which inheres in colour which abides in the object with which the eye initially comes into contact through samyoga.

Due to this contact, the qualitiness of an object is cognised. There is a difference between quality and qualitiness. Green is a quality that is seen in a particular dravya, whereas greenness is the qualitiness to be seen in different dravyas possessing the same colour. For instance, if we say that the leaf is green, we talk about the quality of the object leaf. But if we denote the greenness found not only in a leaf, but in various plants, insects, gems, etc., then we are concerned with the generic nature, being the universal of the concerned quality. This universal character i.e. greenness is called the qualitiness which forms the concept of genus (-jāti) or universal (-sāmānya). In the Tamil grammatical tradition it is noted as '*Cāti orumai*' i.e. jati eka vacana.

Qualitiness is called sāmānya by Sivagrayogin, since it is generally seen in objects possessing the same quality. What is found in 'Particular' (*Viśeṣa*) is also found in 'General' or 'Universal' (*Sāmānya*). These two viz., 'Particular' and 'Universal' are treated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to be separate categories and hence perception of these two is defined to take place through two different contacts. Through the second type noted above, the 'Particular' i.e. quality is perceived, whereas through the third type, i.e. the present one 'the general' or 'universal' i.e. qualitiness is perceived.

Sāmānya is referred to by the term "guṇattva" in Patipacu-pāca-p-paṉuval. Guṇa is different from "guṇattva", the former denoting quality while the latter the qualitiness as we have seen already.

Since this kind of sense-object contact is mediated by two intermediary terms, it becomes still more indirect. If one perceives the greenness of a leaf or a plant, the Universal i.e. colourness inheres in the colour (-green) which again inheres in the substance leaf or plant which is already conjoined with the eye. To put it in

other words, the qualitiness inheres in the quality which inheres in the substance which is in conjunction with the eye. So, perception of greenness by the sense organ eye requires two successive inherences and also one conjunction.

Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval calls this type of sense-object contact by the term 'Saiyukta veta Samavāya Sambandham'. Due to metrical exigency, samaveta is noted simply by 'veta'. Instead of 'samyukta', the author of the text used 'saiyukta'. The couplet that defines this type of the contact is given here under:[53]

> *"Caiyutta veta camavāya campantam*
> *eytum kuṇattuvatti lē".*

The technical terms are Tamilized forms in this couplet, as also in other poems of the same text.

4. Samavāya

Samavāya means inherence. It is different from the Samavāya which has been classified by Praśastapāda, the great Commentator of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, to be the last among the six kinds of categories (padārthas). In the Nyaya system, samavāya denotes the contact of a sense with its object that resides as a quality in the sense itself. The sound, being the quality inheres in its object ākaśa (-ether), a part of which is the sense ear. So, in the auditory perception of the sound, the sense organ ear comes into contact with sound which inheres in it. This kind of sense-object contact is called '*samavāya*' It is also known as '*samaveta*' in Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval. This text explains that due to samaveta, the sound becomes the object of perception to the sense ear. The couplet runs thus:[54]

> *"Cattam Camavetat tālē cevi-p-pulattuk(ku)*
> *attamām eṉṟē aṟi".*

Sivagroyogin also explains that the Sambandha (contact) between strotra (-ear) and sabda (-sound) is called samavāya.

This simple type of contact is different from the second type, viz., *samyukta samavāya* which enables one to perceive the quality, colour (i.e. rupa) inherent in an external object, whereas this contact of samavāya helps one to perceive the quality, sound (-sabda), inherent in the sense itself. The object of perception i.e. sound, being the quality of ether in which it is inhered, and the ear, the auditory sense organ being the substrate for a part of ether are united

together and their union i.e. the contact of ear and sound is technically termed '*samavāya*'. So, it becomes clear that there is no need for the sense ear to be in conjunction with any other substance, since directly it grasps the sound which inheres in it.

In the "History of Indian Philosophy" it seems that the statement, "the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavāya"[55] requires sufficient clarification.

Next, let us pass on to deal with the fifth type of sense-object contact.

5. Samaveta Samavāya

This belongs to the complex type of sense-object contact. Sivagrayogin elucidates that this contact is between 'Sabdattvajāti', i.e. soundness of sound or the generic character of sound, and ear (-strotra). The author of Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval denotes the generic character of sound by the phrase "Sāmānya Sabda" to differentiate it from Vyakti Sabda, i.e. the specific sound.

The contact between the sense of hearing i.e., ear (strotra), and the quality of soundness (-sabdatva) is known as 'samaveta samavāya sambandha' by which the generic nature of sound i.e. sabdattvajāti or sāmānya sabda is cognised in the auditory perception. The object of perception i.e. soundness inheres as quality in the ear and generality in the sound.

Since samaveta and samavāya are synonyms according to the author of Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval, it is possible to interpret that this contact, samaveta samavāya indicates two related inherences viz., the inherence of soundness in sound and the inherence of sound in the ear.

Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval beautifully projects this type of contact in the following couplet without omitting the essence of the definition:[56]

> *"Cattattil cāmāni-y-attai-t- tarumataṉil*
> *vaittacama vetacama vāy".*

In this poem, samavāya becomes 'samavāy' due to metrical exigency. In dealing with the fourth type of contact, the author treated samavāya as samaveta. But, here he used the regular terminology, 'Samaveta Samavāya'.

Next, we have to deal with the sixth type of sense-object contact known as "*Viśeṣaṇa Viśeṣyabhāva*".

6. Viśeṣaṇa Viśeṣyabhāva

Viśeṣaṇa means attributes or specific qualification, while *viśeṣya* denotes that which possesses the specific qualification. The contact between these two constitutes viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya bhāva, i.e., the relation between the qualification and the qualified. This type of sense-object contact is called "*abhāva viśeṣaṇatva*" in Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval. It is also known as "*Viśeṣaṇatā*".[57]

The Naiyāyikas hold that there are two kinds of reality. One is positive denoted by the term 'bhāva'. The other is negative denoted by the term 'abhāva'. The positive reality includes the six kinds of categories (-padārthas), viz., *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (universal), *viśeṣaṇa* (particularily) and *samavāya* (inherence) among which the first three were mentioned by Gaṇāda, the author of Vaiśeṣikasūtra and the last three by the Commentator Praśastapāda. It is clear that the Naiyāyikas admitted all the padārthas, adumbrated in the Vaiśeṣika system. The negative reality i.e. abhāva denotes the absence or non-existence of any one of the six kinds of categories. Like bhāva (i.e. existence), abhāva i.e. non-existence is also considered to be a perceptible entity. The perception of non-existence or negation is possible through the sense-object contact known as *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāva*.

The existence of a pot on the ground becomes the object of perception. Likewise the non-existence of a pot also becomes the object of perception through the qualification of the ground, characterised by the absence of pot (ghatābhāva). The latter one is called perception through negation or abhāva. Udayaṇa (1000 A.D.) treated abhāva as one of the categories in his text 'Kiraṇāvali'.[58] Since the Naiyāyikas were realists, they treated everything objectively real, let them be negative or positive.

Sivagrayogin compares between the first type of sense-object contact, viz., *samavāya* or *saiyukta* and the last type, viz., *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāva*, since both of them share some common features. The first type of contact aims to perceive the presence of an object on the ground, while the last type, the absence of the same object. He adds the term '*saiyukta*' both to *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* in elucidating both *bhāva* and *abhāva* aspects of perception. He calls the contact, that exists between the sense eye and the object cloth on

the ground (paṭa), being the basis for samavāya, to be saiyoga. Similarly the contact, that exists between the sense eye and the ground, being the basis for abhāva i.e. non-existence of cloth is also called saiyoga.

After making such a statement to strengthen that both *bhāva* and *abhāva* of an object in a particular locus can be equally grasped through saiyoga, the commentator proceeds to present two sets of two-fold forms-one to explain *saiyukta viśeṣya* and the other for *saiyukta viśeṣaṇa*. The first form is meant for *samavāya* and the next for *samaveta*. The first set of two forms is given to elucidate the perception of bhāva, i.e., the existence of an object and another set for the perception of abhāva i.e. the non-existence of the same object. Let us present the forms so that the fact that the first and last types of sense contact sharing common features would become evident from the point of view of the Naiyāyikas.

For the perception of bhāva

1. When cloth (-paṭa) becomes the object of perception due to the contact of the sense eye with it, the quality of cloth i.e. clothness that inheres in it becomes perceptible through samavāya sambandha, then the contact is described as *saiyukta viśeṣya sambandha*.

2. If it is said that clothness in the cloth is grasped through samaveta, the contact is described as *saiyukta viśeṣaṇa sambandha*.

For the perception of abhāva

1. When it is said that the absence of pot (Ghatābhāva) on the ground (bhūtala) becomes the object of perception due to the contact of the sense eye with it, then the bhūtala (ground) becomes *viśeṣaṇa* and ghatābhāva (-the absence of pot) becomes *viśeṣya*.

2. The contact between the sense eye and abhāva is called *saiyukta viśeṣyatā sambandha*.

When it is said that the ground (-bhūtala) has the absence of pot (ghatābhāva), the abhāva becomes *viśeṣaṇa* and bhūtala, the *viśeṣya*. The contact involved in this perception of negation is called *saiyukta viśeṣaṇa*.

In the first of the aforesaid two forms the ground becomes *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) and ghaṭābhāva the *viśeṣya* (-the qualified). In the second from the relation between the ground and ghaṭābhāva is reversed i.e. the last one becoming *viśeṣaṇa* and the first *viśeṣya*.

The following couplet in Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval clearly states that this kind of sense-object contact will give the same result, obtained through *samavāya sambandha*:[59]

"tavātacama vāyacam pantam tarumkāṉ
apāva viceṭaṇattu vam."

After examining critically the six types of contact, Sivajnānswamikal smelt the allegeance of not only the authors of Pauṣkara Āgama and Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval but also the Commentators Maraijnāna Deśikar and Sivagrayogin to the system of Nyāya. He was bold enough to expose the folly and also inadequacy of the Naiyāyika views in his commentaries on Sivajñāna bodham and Sivajñāna Siddhiyar. Let us present his rejoinders to the Naiyāyika theory of sense-object contact.

In the sense-object contacts, both the sense and the object are materials. Hence, the mere contact cannot generate perception. According to Saiva Siddhānta, the substance and its quality are in the Guṇi-guṇa bhāva and hence they are inseparable and non-different from one another. So also, the generic nature (jāti) and individuality (vyakti) are held. Their relationship is described as *tādātmya* (identity). But only in the Nyāya system, guṇa and guṇi, jāti and vyakti are treated as separate entities and hence Sivajñāna Swamigal refuted such contacts to go against the principles of Saiva Siddhānta. He also criticised the author of Pauṣkara Āgama for his leanings towards the Naiyāyaka system, and mildly attacked him by stating that the author has projected only the doctrine of other school (-piṟar matam kūṟutal).

However, the Naiyāyikas did not think, when they dealt with the sense-object contact, that there was no involvement of self in the contact. We have already noted the threefold contacts viz., the contact of the soul with mind, mind with sense and sense with object. So, when one talks about mind-sense contact and sense-object contact, it goes without saying that the soul is automatically involved in such contacts. Even in the system of Saiva Siddhānta, the pervasion of the ātman's Cit-Śakti not only with the internal organ but with the senses has been emphasised in the process of perception.

Sense-object contact in Buddhism

It is not out of place to record that Nagarjuna, the great exponent of Madhyamika school of Buddhism has emphasised in his immortal treatise, Mādhyamikakārikā (III.4.7) the sense-object contact through a beautiful simile. It is because of the contact of the father and mother the birth of a son becomes possible. So also, it is only due to the contact of the eye and formal object, the knowledge is produced. The kārikā runs thus:

"Pratityā mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putra-sambhavaḥ
Cakṣu-rūpe pratītyaivam ukto vijñāna-sambhavaḥ".

It is interpreted by the idealistic Buddhists in their own way. The birth of a son is inferred only on the assumption of the existence of his parents. So also, the presence of the object of sensual cognition and the act of seeing are anticipated by the pre-existence of knowledge. Thought in the text, the sense of sight is noted, it may be extended to apply to other senses also.

Thus, it is clear that almost all the logicians have admitted the sense-object contact as a prerequisite for the perceptual knowledge.

II. Mānasa Pratyakṣa

Arulnandisivam defines *mānasa pratyakṣa* in the following way:

"The unforgotten sensory knowledge (-*indriya jñānam*) associating with the five-fold subtle elements viz., sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa and gandha, becomes determinate, free from confusion due to the involvement of buddhi tattva (-the principle of intellect)".[60]

This definition has been further elucidated by the commentators who are very clear that Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa and Mānasa Pratyakṣa are non-different. They mean one and the same perception. Sivagrayogin explains that the mental reflection or contemplation (-anusandhāna) of the doubtless and errorless experience, obtained through the sensory perception by means of the contact with the five-fold objects beginning with sabda is called *mānasa pratyakṣa.*[61] In his text Sivaneriprakāśam, he states that the contemplation or thinking of the object obtained through indriya pratyakṣa is *mānasa pratyakṣa.*[62] This elucidation is in complete agreement with what he has said in his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār noted above.

Pandiperumal clarifies that the determinate knowledge, that is generated from the atman's Cit-Śakti through the sensory perception, free from imagination (-vikalpa), arising out of the contact with the five-fold subtle elements is called *mānasa pratyakṣa.*[63] He has identified this perception with *pāsajñāna*, literally meaning the knowledge concerned with matter (*-pāśa*). Sivajnana Swamigal elucidates *mānasa pratyakṣa*, which is the follow up perception of indriya pratyaksa. It involves the following processes:[64]

1. The indriya pratyakṣa (-the sensory perception), after cognised the fivefold subtle elements in conjunction with them, is free from forgetfulness.

2. It is established after reflection by citta, free from error due to name, class etc.

3. It is revived in buddhi tattva in a determinate way which is cognised by the atman's cit-śakti.

This type of cognition is called *mānasa pratyakṣa.*

Nandisivagrayogin, the commentator of Sivaneriprakāśam explained that the internal reflection of the object, partially experienced through the five-fold sensory organs is called *mānasa pratyakṣa.*[65] To support his view he quotes the authority of Pauṣkara Āgama.

Tattuvaprakāsam rendered *mānasapratyakṣa* as "*manakkāṭci*", which is nothing but perceiving the objects provided through indriyapratyaksa with the help of mind and other internal instruments.[66]

Like the *indriyapratyakṣa* in which the indriyas are involved, so also in the *mānasa pratyakṣa* the *antakaraṇas* are involved. Then it should have been called *antakaraṇa pratyakṣa.* But it is named *mānasa pratyakṣa* which recognised manas as the only internal organ. However, the Meykanda Sastras identified four antaḥkaraṇas, viz., *citta, manas, ahamkāra and buddhi*, each of which is so called because of its specific function in the process of cognition. Sometimes, citta has been considered to be a modification of manas and thus there are only three antakaraṇas.

Again, Sivajñāna Swamigal interprets the role of the antakaraṇas in the *mānasa pratyakṣa* in the light of the aforesaid Sāstras.[67] What is presented by the senses (-indriyas) in indeterminate

perception is grasped by citta, the function of which is reflecting on the features of the sensed object. Subsequently, it is passed over to manas (-mind) which is held responsible for *sankalpa* and *vikalpa*. Sankalpa denotes the positive way of thinking and Vikalpa, its opposite. It doubts whether the form cognised through nirvikalpakajnāna is a pillar or a person. If it thinks that it is a person positively, then it is a case of sankalpa. If it thinks a person as a pillar it is a case of vikalpa. In sequence, the principle of ahamkāra rises to ascertain the object. Ultimately the buddhi tattva assures, on perceiving the movement and other animating features of the object, that it is a person with a name, class, quality, action and worth-thus completing the process of determinate perception. It is again to be remembered that the atman's Cit-Śakti with the aid of the internal organs and senses is responsible for the mānasa pratyakṣa.

Sivajñāna Swamigal categorically stated that *Savikalpaka pratyakṣa* is nothing but *buddhi pratyakṣa*.[68] Since, it is generated initially through the agency of manas (-since citta is a modification of mind and hence it is held that it is not different from it), this kind of perception is attributively called *mānasa pratyakṣa*. He further quotes from the text of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār to the interchangable usage of buddhi and manas and establishes that *mānasa pratyakṣa is the buddhi pratyakṣa*. However, all the types of pratyakṣa and even other pramāṇas are generated ultimately by ātman's Cit-Śakti which is the sole pramāṇa in the system of Saiva Siddhānta.

In the Naiyāyika system, mānasa pratyakṣa has been defined as the particular perception by which memories of previous perceptions through the indriyas become associated with a percept, cognised at a given time.[69] When one perceives a flower, at once perceives that it is fragrant. Its fragrance is cognised not by the sense but by the manas directly associating the visual percept with it. The fragrance of the flower is brought here through previous experience and hence memory has a role in the mānasa pratyakṣa of the Naiyāyikas. According to them, cognition is a quality of the soul like pleasure and pain, to be cognised directly through the contact of mind and soul. The perception of one's own states is also mānasa pratyaksa. Vātsyāyana included mind (-manas) under the category of sense-organs.[70]

Dharmakīrti, the logician of Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhism has identified *manovijñāna*, i.e. mental perception as one of the four kinds of perception admitted in the Buddhist epistemology.[71] It is in

continuation of sense perception and actually arises at the second movement to indriya pratyakṣa. If the eye ceased to function for a moment, then there is no mental perception. If the sense of eye continues to see, the perception of visual or sensual form becomes possible.

In the Sāmkhya system, the internal organs viz., buddhi (-intellect), ahamkāra (-ego) and manas (-mind) formed the apparatus, channelising the external objects to be apprehended by the subject in a determinate way. This kind of apprehension is called pratyakṣa in this sytem.[72]

Each system of Indian Philosophy developed its own theory of perception depending on the metaphysical thoughts that it developed. Now, let us pass on to discuss the third type of perception viz., Svavedana perception as adumbrated in the texts and commentaries of Saiva Siddhānta.

III. Svavedana Pratyakṣa

The word vedanā actually means sensation. It is as old as the Pāli Piṭakas. It has been counted as the seventh nidāna in the chain of causation known as *pratītyasamutpāda.* In the Sutta Piṭaka there is a section with the title, '*Vedanā Samyukta*' which describes that due to the sense-contact (-sparca) with the external objects a person experiences sensation (i.e. vedanā) which has the following three forms:

1. That which is pleasurable
2. That which is painful and
3. That which is indifferent.

The Piṭaka section under reference advised that one should not cling to the first, but to neglect the second and forget the third.[73] In the Sautrāntika Yogācāra School of Buddhism, *svasamvedanā pratyakṣa* has been counted by Dharmakirti (650 A.D.) as one of the four kinds of perception.[74] Svasamvedanā means self-consciousness in its states of pleasure and pain. It is the direct intuition revealing the self in the form of consciousness. Only through the perception of its states of pleasure or pain the self is perceived. In the epistemology of Saiva Siddhānta, one kind of perception with the name *svavedanā pratyakṣa* is spoken. There it cannotes a different meaning. It is the third type among the four kinds of perception.

In Svavedanā pratyakṣa i.e. self-sensational perception, the results of one's own deeds become the object of experience to the atman's Cit-Śakti. Normally the word Vedanā, occurring as a loan in Tamil empirical usage, denotes the painful experience. But Sivajñāna Siddhiyar explains that it denotes both pleasurable and painful feelings given to ātman's Cit-Sakti (*-uḷḷattu aṟivu*) by the functioning of rāga and other evolutes (of impure primordial matter), being the accessories to the former.[75]

Sivagrayogin further elucidates that joy and sorrow, produced from objects, are directed to ātman's Cit-śakti by Vidyā tattva, the source for rāga and other evolutes, and subsequently the knowledge in the forms that 'I am enjoyer', or 'I am sufferer' etc., occur.[76]

Pandiperumal explains that *svavedanā pratyakṣa* is the experiencing of the pleasure and pain bestowed by *icchā, jñāna* and *kriyā śaktis* to ātman's Cit-śakti.[77]

The credit goes to Sivajñāna Swamigal whose interpretation clarifies the distinct roles of the evolutes of Aśuddha Māyā, viz., kalā, vidyā, rāga, kāla and niyati in effecting the knowledge through this kind of pratyakṣa.[78] In conjunction with these five evolutes, the ātman gets the name puruṣa, readily becoming an experient (-bhokta) to reap the consequences of its own deeds. Ātman's Cit-Śakti has three aspects based on their functions, viz., *kriyā, jñāna* and *icchā*. These three are also śaktis respectively denoting the conative, cognitive and volitional sides of consciousness. Kriyā Śakti is activated by *kalā tattva*, while *jñāna śakti* is illumined by *vidyā tattva* and *icchā śakti* is aroused by *rāga tattva*. The principle of time (*-kāla tattva*) assigns the span of experience, while *niyati tattva* apportions the quantum of karmic results either pleasurable or painful to the concerned puruṣa, depending upon the nature of one's own deads. Sivajñāna Swamigal further explains when the determinate knowledge, obtained through the means of *mānasa pratyakṣa*, becomes pleasurable if it is associated with *sattva guṇa*, and painful *with tamas*.

In the Mahabhāṣya on Sivajñāna bodham, the same commentator elucidates the position of buddhi tattva in the process of this type of cognition. The buddhi tattva being an internal organ which associated itself with the external objects like sandal, garland, etc., assumes their forms and then becomes the object of the experience of ātman's jñāñana śakti. Vīdyā tattva is instrumental of

Cit-Śakti in the svavedanā pratyakṣa which aims to cognise the buddhi which assumes the forms of sensed objects. He has also stated that *the buddhi manifests the jñāna rūpa as well as vedanā rūpa.* From the commentaries, it is evident that all the impressions of the sensory perception are preserved in the principle of buddhi tattva which becomes the object of svavedanā pratyakṣa.

Hence, it is evident that svavedanā pratyakṣa occurs only after the first two types of pratyakṣa viz., the indriya pratyakṣa and mānasa pratyakṣa. It is actually one's own experience known to one self. It is an inward perception in which either the senses or internal organs do not directly involve.

According to the Naiyāyikas, as the result of the conjunction of antakaraṇa and soul, the abstract sensations such as pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, volition and cognitions are apprehended.[79] The complex functions of the different evolutes of Maya as noted in the Saiva Siddhānta do not find a place in the system of Nyāya.

Next, let us proceed to deal with the *yoga pratyakṣa* as understood in Saiva Siddhanta.

IV. The Yoga Pratyakṣa

The first three kinds of perception are common to all persons. But the yogic perception is supernormal and it is not possible for all. It requires perfection in the prescribed yogic practices.

Arulnandisivam defines *yoga pratyakṣa* as the knowledge, obtained through the practice of *samādhi* (-concentration), eliminating the impurities (-that enveloped the intelligence of soul), to have direct cognition of all things in the universe and all events of (threefold) times, stationing onself at a particular space-time.[80]

The Commentators further elucidated the content of the definition given by Arulnandisivam.

Sivagrayogin classified *yogapratyakṣa* into two kinds, viz., 1. savikalpa jnānam and 2. nirvikalpa jnānam. Due to the constant practice of Sivajnānānda yoga consisting of *yama, niyama, āsana, praṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇa, dhyāna* and *samādhi*, the impurities that cloud the cit-śakti of the atman are wiped out, and the soul manifests its extra-ordinary super-power of cognising all the things existing in the triple world and the matters occurring in the threefold times, viz., past, present and future. The yogin attains the

intuitive power of clairvoyance (Dhūradṛṣṭi) and clairaudience (-dhūra śravaṇa), stationed himself at a specific point of space-time. In this perception there is no involvement of indriyas (-atindriya). It is just like seeing emblic myrobalan in one's palm (kara sthala āmalaka). This supreme power of atman's Cit-śakti is the savikalpa jnāna or determinate knowledge of yogic perception. The intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of the soul contains in the manifestation of experiencing wisdom and bliss (-*jñānānanda anubhava*). Realisation of this nature is the nirvikalpajnāna or indeterminate knowledge of the yogic perception. The commentator also explained that svabhāva and ātman are inseparable, since their relationship is that of identity (-tādātmya). It is to be understood that due to the envelopment of malas (-impurities), the svabhāva is not manifested. The yogic practices serve as an antidote to the impurities to recover the atman's svabhāva which remains to be *jñāna* and *ānanda.*[81] This kind of elucidation helps one to understand the stand-point of the Saiva Siddhantins who are the advocates of Satkāryavāda which runs thus: "What is already there with the soul becomes manifested when conditions are ripe and favourable. What is not there with the soul can never be realised."

Pandiperumal elucidates that due to the practice of the *yama, niyama, āsana, praṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇa, dhyāna* and *samādhi*, the influence of indriyas becomes dead and the power of yogic perception dawns on the individual to cognize all the expanded objects with their space, time and nature, the percepient being placed at a particular place (and time). Further he mentions that the yogin attains eightfold siddhis, which are the superhuman powers viz., 1. power of atomization, 2. power of increasing one's size at will, 3. power of making oneself heavy at will, 4. power of levitation, 5. power of obtaining eveything, 6. power of accomplishing anything desired, 7. power of supremacy and 8. power of subduing all to one's own will. These are collectively called "*Aṣṭamāsiddhis*". He also gains the power of perceiving the real nature (svarūpa) of *bindu* and *nāda.*[82]

According to Sivajnāna Swamigal, though the yogin exists at a particular space-time is able to cognise all the evolved objects of the triple worlds and threefold times, because of his constant practice of *aṣṭāṅga yoga* that dispels the power of malas, obscuring the intelligence of atman. The cit-śakti of atman that perceives all things of all times is synonymous with *yoga-pratyakṣa.*[83]

Saiva Siddhanta postulates that the soul is by nature intelligent and its intelligence is clouded due to the association of *āṇava*, the root-evil. In order to eliminate the power of āṇava, Lord Siva out of mercy has created the universe from Primordial matter and endowed the soul with body, instruments, world and objects of experience. The evolutes of Maya, being the sensory organs, the principles of kalā, vidyā and rāga etc., are helpful to the soul in the removal of impurity to a certain extent. But, the practice of yoga contributes much to exterminate the impurities that are enveloping the ātman's Cit-Śakti and enables the Cit-Śakti to exercise its intrinsic vital power which is limitless and beyond the conditions of *teśa* (-space) and *kāla* (time). In the first three kinds of perception, the śakti of malas is removed partially due to the aids of sensory organs and antakaraṇas. But in the yogic perception, the full manifestation of ātman's Cit-Śakti is present and as a result, the real nature of the soul and the wide range of its intelligence are revealed.

Tattuvaprakāśam is succint in defining yogic perception. The text and its commentary admitted the super-normal power of the soul's intelligence, but adduced the union of ātman with the kriyā śakti of Lord Śiva to be the means for the transcendental perception.[84]

In Sivaneriprakāśam, in the place of yoga pratyakṣa, two kinds of supernormal perception are expatiated. They are 1) *Vijñāna pratyakṣa* and 2) *Sivajāna pratyakṣa*.[85] Among them, the first one comes very close to *yoga pratyakṣa*. The withdrawal of senses and dissociation with the antakaraṇas viz., buddhi, manas and ahamkara resulting in the excellent practice of yoga, the powers of āṇava are wiped out and the knowledge of trikāla known as vijnāna pratyakṣa occurs. Sivajñāna pratyakṣa denotes the direct experiential knowledge (-which has been described as 'the great grand wisdom' (*-aṟa—periya jñānam*)), of realising the non-different (*-ananya*) of atman and Śiva. The commentator further explains that through the means of Paripūrṇa jñāna (-complete and perfect wisdom), the realisation in one's own experience (*svānubhava*) of the non-difference of *ātmasvarūpa* and *Śivasvarūpa* is known as *Śivajñāna Pratyakṣa*. This kind of twofold classification is found in Pauṣkara Āgama.[86]

It is essential to note that in the system of Nyāya also, the perception of yogins finds a place. It is known as *yogaja pratyakṣa* that is not mentioned in the Naiyāyika works of the old school.

Only the authors of Navya-Nyāya school dealt with it.[87] It is found in the list of three new forms of supernormal or transcendental perception, the other two being *sāmanya lakṣaṇa* and *jñāna lakṣaṇa*. All the three are collectively called *alaukika pratyakṣa*. They are not *laukika* or concerned with the ordinary or wordly persons. Here, let us consider only the *yogaja pratyakṣa*. Jayanta referred it as *yogajasannikarṣa* in his Nyāya Mañjari. It is generated by the ascetic power born of the constant practice of meditation (-yoga) to perceive intuitively the entire gamut of truth. This transcendental perception is divided into two types, viz., 1. the perception of yukta yogin and 2. the perception of viyuktayogin. In the yukta condition, the antakarṇa supported by the merits acquired through the practice of yoga invests the yogin with errorless intuition to perceive the imperceptible padārthas, viz., qualities (guṇa), actions (-karma), universals (-sāmānya), inherence (samavāya) and also the invisible subtle substances viz., soul and mind of oneself and also of others, ether, air, space, time, atom etc. This type of perception is known *yukta yogin pratyakṣa*. The second type of supernormal perception gets the name *viyukata yogin pratyakṣa* which denotes the intuitive perception of the very subtle, abstract, the hidden and also the distant objects, due to the extraordinary powers generated by the practice of yoga. A perfect yogin becomes a jnāni of threefold times.

Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician explains yogic intuition in his own way. According to him among the four kinds of perception, the last one is yogic perception.[88] The four noble truths being the fundamental principles of Buddhism are not apprehended by the ordinary means of knowledge. It is only through yogic intuition, free from error and intellectual taint, that the aforesaid truths are cognised.

However, though the concept of the perception seems to be more or less similar at the surface level, its purpose and content vary in the different systems including the system of Saiva Siddhanta to mark their individuality and unique feature in the realm of thought.

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IX. THEORY OF INFERENCE

Definition of Anumāna

The technical terms *anumāna* in Sanskrit and *karutal* in Tamil denote inference. The word *anumāna* consists of two words viz., anu and *māna*. The second word is the same found in the suffix of the term *pramāṇa*. Māna literally means measurement, whose equivalent in Tamil is *Aḷavai*. '*Anu*' means /sub/or/after/. So, the whole word *anumāna* means the measuring after something. It is the knowledge obtained after proof. The knowledge derived through this pramāṇa is not direct, since it makes use of previous knowledge obtained from perception, verbal testimony and such other sources of knowledge, and enables one to explore further knowledge. The exponent of the Nyāya system, as found in Maṇimēkalai, has defined that inference is the knowledge of the unseen object through a seen object with the help of threefold reasons, viz., *mutal*-pūrvavat, *eccam*-śeṣavat and *potu*-sāmānyatodṛṣṭam (27:37-40).

Let us present the definitions of Anumāna as envisaged by the expositors of Saiva Siddhanta. First of all, the view of Arulnandisivam is quoted in his own words:[1]

> *"anumānam avināpāvam*
> *pecuṟum ētuk koṇṭu maṟaiporuḷ peṟuva tākum"*

The above passage literally means that Anumāna is the getting of the hidden object through the reasoning of universal concomitance (i.e.*avinābhāva*). The commentators attempted successfully to interpret the above textual statement. Pandiperumal elucidates the technical term *avainābhāva* in his own way. According to him, '*vinā*' means leaving or being separated and hence '*avinā*' means without leaving or without being separated, while *bhāva* indicates existence. Thus the whole word, '*avinābhāva*' denotes the relationship between two objects through their inseparable connection which is otherwise called univeresal concomitance.[2]

The usual example to illustrate the avinābhāva sambandha between the two objects is the smoke and fire. The observation of the smoke determines the existence of fire. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Smoke is the *hetu* (-probans) to infer the hidden presence of fire, the *sādhya* (-probandum). So, the reason i.e. smoke is inseparably connected with the *sādhya* and the relationship between

the two is also known as *sahabhāva* (Co-existence) and also as invariable antecedence (*kramabhāva*).

The knowledge of the necessary co-presence of smoke and fire leads one to infer, on seeing only the smoke on the mountain, the positive existence of its cause, the fire. Smoke is perceptible and visible, while fire is imperceptible and invisible. Through the previous knowledge of inseparable connection between smoke and fire, the observer comes to the conclusion that the fire is hidden. The hidden object is mentioned in the text as "*maṟaiporuḷ*". Here it is fire. Hetu is the linga or mark which is smoke. In this context, the Tamil proverb "*illāmal pukaiyātu*" (-without fire it will not smoke) deserves to be stated (Actually the proverb implies that without any base no rumour is possible). Through this kind of inferential knowledge, the unknown is cognized from the known.

In Tattuvaprakāśam there is no specific definition for inference. But, in Sivaneṟiprakāśam we have a clear definition for anumāna in the following passage:[3]

> "*kuṟaivilā vyāttiyāl maṟaiporuḷai-k- kāṇṭal*
> *kūṟiyiṭum anumāṉam*"

In the place of *avinābhāva*, the author of this text introduced the technical term '*vyāpti*'. According to the author, *anumāna* denotes the inferential cognition of the hidden object through the help of defectless *vyāpti*. The commentator of this text explains *vyāpti* as a sambandha without upādhi, i.e. freed from any adjuncts.

Vyāpti means pervasion. It is the main ground for making inference. In the instance 'smoke and fire', the former is said to have the vyāpti or pervasion with the latter. The existence of smoke is invariably followed by the existence of fire. On the converse, the non-existence of fire is invariably followed by the non-existence of smoke. So, smoke is called the *vyāpya* (-pervaded) in relation to fire which is known as the *vyāpaka* (-pervader).

It is essential to note that Arulnandisivam laid stress on '*avinābhāva*', while Sivagrayogin, the author of Sivaneriprakasam emphasised on '*vyāpti*' in the process of inferential cognition, though the two served the same end. They are complimentary to each other and not contrasting. They are useful and helpful to get knowledge through inference.

Sivagrayogin's Definition of Anumāna

Sivagrayogin, as one of the commentators of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār, has presented his own definition of anumāna in conformity with the contents of the text for a clear understanding of inference.[4] He elucidates *avinābhāva* to be the inseparableness of cause and effect (*-kāraṇa kāriyaṅkaḷ uṭaiya pirivinmai*). - He introduces a new term, '*dṛṭa vyāpti*' which is not found in the text. Dṛṭavyāpti denotes the universal concomitance between the hetu, i.e. effect and the object of cognition i.e. cause. The hetu, also known as sādhana or probans is perceptible (*-parokṣa*), whereas the object, also called sādhya or probandum is hidden and hence imperceptible (*-aparokṣa*). Through the instrumentality of *avinābhāva sambandha* of smoke and fire, from the seen smoke, the existence of the unseen fire is ascertained. Sivagrayogin calls this kind of cognition as anumāna.

Next, let us consider the view-point of Pandiperumal in the interpretation of Anumāna.

Pandiperumal's elucidation

Paṇdiperumal has attempted to classify hetu (probans) into two classes.[5] They are the following:

1. hetus (probans) that have inseparable connection with the object, i.e. *sādhya* (probandum), and

2. hetus (probans) that do not have inseparable connection with the probandum.

These hetus are normally valid. But at times, they also turn to be invalid. They are of four kinds, viz.,*ētu, potu, eccam* and *mutal.* These Tamil terms more or less correspond respectively to the Sanskrit words hetus, sāmānya, kārya and kāraṇa. They are illustrated by the commantator sufficiently.

Illustrations

1. Hetu

Though the commentator has stated that this kind of reason is both valid and invalid, he has given example only for the valid hetu.

Example:

Through smoke, being the kāraṇānumāna inseparably associated with fire, the *anumeya* i.e. the object of inference viz., fire is cognized.

2. Potu

Pandiperumal has clearly stated that the terms 'potu' and '*sāmānya*' are synonyms. In the Nyāya school, this kind of inference is called Samānyatodṛṣṭa, which is translated as "commonly seen". The example cited by him to explain this type of anumāna is given hereunder:

The rider of an elephant seated on its back blows his trumpet or horn and the listener of the sound, who does not see the elephant, infers the presence of the elephant due to his past experience, eventhough there is no concomitance between the sound and the elephant. The commentator ably points out that one cannot trust on Sāmānyānumāna, since the blowing sound and the elephant are not related through inseparable connection, as in the case of smoke and fire. Even if there is no elephant, the rider or someone may blow horn and hence Sāmānyānumāna has occasions to falsify.

It is essential to note that the definition and illustration of this type of anumāna has already been presented when Cāttaṉār has summarized the substance of the Nyāya system in the 27th chapter of Maṇimēkalai (27 : 31-32).

3. Eccam

Pandiperumal clearly mentions that the terms '*eccam*' and kārya are synonymous. In the Nyāya school, this anumāna is known as *Śeṣavat*. He explains this anumāna in the following way:

Through the *kārya hetu* (i.e. effect), the *kāraṇa* (cause) is ascertained. However, he does not give the stock example i.e. smoke and fire to illustrate this kind of anumāna. He quotes a different example, given hereunder:

> On seeing the flood in the river, one infers
> the rainfall in the far off mountin.

In this context, it is to be pointed out that the exponent of Nyāya system has given the above illustration as recorded in Maṇimēkalai (27: 33-34). But the commentator criticised that the flood and rainfall are not necessarily connected through *avinābhāva sambandha* (-inseparable connection), since even without rainfall there may be flood in the river due to the breakage in the dam. Thus, the commentator exposes the limitation of *kāryānumāna*.

4. Mutal

The commentator has mentioned that the terms *mutal* and *kāraṇa* convey the same sense. In the Nyāya school, this type of anumāna is called *pūrvavat*. The commentator has quoted the traditional example, given hereunder:

On seeing the dark clouds, one infers
that there will be heavy rain.

It is to be known that not all dark clouds positively bring rain. At times, though the dark cloud is there, it does not rain. So, concomitance between dark cloud (i.e. cause) and rain (i.e. effect) is not predictable. However, the same illustration is already presented in Maṇimēkalai (27: 35-36).

After explaining the aforesaid types of anumāna, the commentator comes to the conclusion that all the remaining forms of anumāna are felt through inferential cognition and hence they deserved to be subsumed under the general category of anumāna pramāṇa.

Further Pandiperumal has classified all the probans on the basis of time. According to him, smoke and the sound of horn belong to the present, and the flood to the past, while the cloud to the future.[6]

It seems that Pandiperumal has also been well-informed about the threefold classification of inference in the Nyāya system known as pūrvavat, śeṣavat, samanyatodṛṣṭam.

The logical tradition of the Nyāya system as preserved in the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai (500 A.D.) and in the commentary of Pandiperumal has been connected with Akṣapada's Nyāya Sūtra and Vātsyāyana's Commentary. Specialists in Indian logic including Vidyabhusana are of the opinion that Vātsyāyana is also known as Dramida or Dravida, an equivalent of Tamil, thereby suggesting his origin associated with the Tamil country.[7] *Elsewhere the present author has identified the parallels of logical thoughts between Cāttaṉār, the author of Maṇimēkalai and Vātsyāyana.*[8] It is possible that both of them should have some predecessors in the Tamil country, perhaps in Kāñchi which has been a celebrated centre of not only Buddhist learning but also of various systems of Indian philosophy.

However, with regard to the classification of inference into pūrvavat (mutal), śeṣavat (eccam) and sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ (potu), which are originally introduced by Akṣapāda, the author of Nyāyāsutra (150 A.D.) have been interpreted in two different ways by the *Dramida Vātsyāyana*. Let us briefly reproduce his interpretations.

As per the first set of interpretation, the definition and illustration for the pūrvavat and śeṣavat are the same. With regard to the third type of inference i.e. 'commonly seen' a different example is cited as given below.[9]

From the observation of the different but continuous positions in the orbit of the Sun's course, it is inferred, by the analogy of ordinary movements of movable beings, that the Sun moves although its motion is not grasped by one's perception.

The above illustration holds good to the old traditionalists before the advent of the scientist Copernicus (A.D.1543), who discovered that the earth rotates the sun which is not actually moving.

In the second method of interpretation, different examples are quoted. Accordingly, the *pūrvavat* is the particular type of inference based on one's previous experience of the concomitance between two objects, as in the case of smoke and fire. Even if one does not actually perceive the concomitance at a later period in a given context, he infers on seeing the smoke, the positive existence of fire which is not perceived. This type of inference is made possible due to the previous experience on witnessing the co-presence of the cause and effect.

Śeṣavat signifies the remainder. Among the many possibilities to attribute a particular fact, all except one are rejected through the process of elimination, ultimately the remaining one is inferred to be the characteristic feature of the object. In proving the real property of sound either as a substance, quality or activity, if the first and last are rejected, then the remaining quality may be attributed to be its feature.

For the third type, *Sāmānyatodṛṣto*, which is an inference in which the relation between the cause and effect are imperceptible is established through the means of abstract similarity with something else of the hetu. For instance, the existence of soul established by the fact that desire, aversion, willing etc., are all qualities which require a substrate to inhere, and this substance is known as self.

Nevertheless, the limitation of the aforesaid threefold inferences has also been pointed out by the commentator Vātsyāyana. The first type may become invalid. The swollen river is not necessarily due to the heavy rain in the yonder hill. It may be due to an embankment. The second type also tends to become incorrect. Normally it has been a common belief that if the ants carried their eggs in an array, it would rain. This belief, as noted in the commentary of Vātsyāyana, has already been recorded in *Pūranānūṟu* (200 B.C.), one of the ancient Sangam classics. The passage under reference is quoted here:

poyyā eḻili peyviṭam nōkki
muṭṭai koṇṭu vaṟpulam cērum
ciṟunuṉ erumpiṉ ciloḻukku ēyppa-c-
cōruṭai-k- kaīyar viṟuvīṟu iyaṅkum[10]

Though the poetry has no direct reference to the Nyāya view, its content deserves to be summarized. Like the small tiny ants, carrying their eggs (-white in colour), move in an array towards the elevated hard region for safety on seeing the never failing cloud which intends to rain, the very tender children along with their relatives move from the residence of the philanthropist, Paṇṇaṉ, bearing in their hands the balls of cooked rice. The poem is panegeric, extolling the food-gift of a chieftain and the poet is none other than the mighty Chola monarch Kiḷḷivaḷavaṉ who was very generous to pay glowing tributes to a sub-ordinate feudatory.

From the above reference, one can sufficiently infer the Pan-Indian beliefs which catered the needs of a creative poet and also a great logician.

However, Vātsyāyana exposes the limitation of the second type of inference by stating that the ants that are affected and disturbed by some miscrients who caused damage to their anthills may also move with their eggs in search of a safer place. Hence, one cannot be certain that the movement of ants with their eggs indicated the would-be downpour of the cloud.

Similarly, the scream of a peacock is also associated with the rain. But, an ingenious person also may mimicry like a peacock and hence the third kind of inference also may falsify.[11]

Nevertheless, the Naiyāyikas upheld the validity of the threefold inferences, refuting the criticisms advanced by some

opponents in a convincing manner. A single cause alone would be true. Plurality of causes would make the inference defective. Hence, the Naiyāyika argued that the appearance of plurality or the seeming plurality is the result of improper analysis. Plurality vanishes if the effect is adequately defined. He finds apparent difference between the inundation due to rain and flood on the one hand and due to the breakage in the dam on the other. The former one is characterised by ferocious currents, excessive foam, carrying the creepers, twists, trunks of the wood, while the latter is not so. Similarly there is significant difference between the caravan of ants carrying naturally the eggs to a place of safety and those leaving their damaged nests. So also, the natural scream of the peacock is different from the human mimicry of the bird's scream.

Thus, the Nyāya system established the essentiality of the aforesaid triple reasons.

Another set of threefold causes

It seems that the Indian thinkers have had a fascination for the number three, as understood from the classification of many categories into three. Aruḷnandiśivam has introduced the concept of threefold causes not in the Aḷavai-y-iyal, but in the Pramāṇa-v-iyal i.e. the section that discusses in detail the reasons for establishing the existence of the triple realities, viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa. According to him, there are three causes for the creation of any object. In other words, an object requires three causes for its production. They are known as *mutal, tuṇai* and *nimittam* in Tamil (1.1.18). Mutal is also called '*upātāṉam*' (1.1.25) which is the Tamilized form of Upādāna. Mutal or upādāna indicates the material cause or the source cause. Mutal also means the first. Hence the material cause is also known as the first cause. *Tuṇai* denotes the auxiliary cause while *nimittam* means the efficient cause. *Tuṇaikāraṇam* is also named *sahakāri* in the commentary of Sivagrayogin. This term is definitely taken from the Nyāya. These three causes differ from each other. However, for the production of any object all of them are equally important. Aruluandisivam gives an empirical example to illustrate the requirement of the threefold causes for the creation of a thing. Pot is a product. It is in need of these three causes for its manifestation. Clay is the material cause. The potter's wheel and other tools form the auxiliary cause or the instrumental cause. The potter is the efficient cause (-nimitta kāraṇa). If there is no clay, there is no use of having the instruments and the potter. Even if there are clay and

wheel, there can be no pot if there is no maker. Though clay is the primary cause, pot cannot emanate all by itself from it. Even if the clay, tools and the potter are there, if he has no will to create there could be no pot. One can multiply the example. For the creation of a chair, wood is the primary or material cause, the instruments are the auxiliary cause and the carpenter is the efficient cause. For the production of cloth, cotton is the material cause, shuttle and other tools form the instrumental cause and the weaver, the efficient cause. So, it becomes very clear that any product for its creation should necessarily have all the three causes.

Sāṁkhyas believed that everything has been orderly emanated from the Primordial Matter (-Prakrti) without any intelligent or efficient cause in the form of God. That is why their philosophy was called the Niriśvara Sāṁkhya. But, the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta emphasized the essentiality of all the aforesaid three causes for the evolution of the Universe, on the basis of the known objects being produced through the operation and co-operation of the triple causes. For the Siddhāntin, all the things that are objectively seen are all products from the substance of Maya, a synonym for the Sāmkhya term prakriti which is also used in the text to denote the same substance. For the creation of the universe, Maya is the primary or material cause. The inseparable Śakti is the instrument cause and Lord Śiva Himself is the efficient cause. Out of mercy and compassion towards the innumerable souls which are unborn and eternal as the Lord, Śiva created the universe from Maya through the instrumentality of His Divine Śakti to bestow the souls with the body, limbs, habitat and objects of livelihood in order to make them undergo the earthly life, meet with different experiences, and get into the transmigration according to the ethical law and finally after realisation, the souls are released from the bondage to reach His feet to station themselves in eternal bliss.

So, in order to explain the creation of the universe, the Saiva Siddhantin upheld the concept of triple causes as noted above. It seems that in the systems of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also reference to them is made. In the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (X,2.1-7), three different causes are mentioned. They are: 1. *upādāna* 2. *asamavāyi* and 3. *nimitta*.[12] The *upādāna* which is the material cause is the stuff from which the effect is produced. Thread is quoted as the material cause for the effect cloth. The material cause is always a substance. The second one is known as *asamavāyi* or the non-material cause. It has been explained in various ways. It is mainly a quality or an action. The

colour of the thread comes under non-material cause. In this case, it denotes the quality. Though the threads are in bundles, the cloth can not be produced. Only after they are interwoven, it is made. In this aspect, the non-material cause denotes the activity. The *nimitta* kāraṇa is the efficient cause which is different from the first two viz., upādāna and asamavāyi. It denotes the motive power responsible for the production of the object. It is essential to note that in Tarkasamgraha, the efficient cause has been classified into two viz., the general and the special. Under the first division are included God, his knowledge, desire and action along with the antecedent non-existence, space, time, virtue and vice are collectively counted. According to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the three kinds of causes correspond to Aristotle's material, formal and efficient causes.[13]

Thus, the common aspects in the realm of epistemology, found between two systems deserve special mention. Next, let us briefly deal with the commentary of Sivajnanaswamigal on the concept of anumāna, as admitted in Saiva Siddhānta.

Sivajñāna Swamigal's elucidation

He clearly explains that anumāna is the *jñānaśakti* of the ātman which cognizes the hidden object not by direct means but by some indirect means, i.e. through the knowledge of a hetu which has invariable and universal concomitance with the sādhya, i.e. the imperceptible hidden object.[14]

It is to be understood that among the commentators, Sivajñāna Swamigal is very particular in explaining any pramāṇa, having rooted in atman's cit-śakti. According to him, though the proban serves as an auxiliary means to the cognition of the unknown object, it is after all an aid and the actual anumāna pramāṇa remains to be ātman's Cit-Śakti pervaded by the Lord's Jñāna-śakti. This kind of interpretation is said to have based on the authoritative Saiva text, Pauṣkara āgama. The degree of clarity and the potency of cognition depended on the extermination of *āṇava mala*. Those who have completely destroyed the strength of āṇava, gain the absolute knowledge beyond the limits of space and time. Even for the acquisition of other forms of knowledge, the removal of āṇava is an important factor. The increase of knowledge through inference or perception involves the decrease of the principle of ego. *This kind of interpretation of the acquisition of knowledge is peculiarly enshrined in the Saiva agamas and Siddhantic texts.*

So far we have seen the view-points of the authors and commentators of Saiva Siddhānta texts with regard to the definition and elucidation of Anumāna Pramāṇa. Next, let us proceed to explain the twofold classification of inference.

Twofold types of Inference

The division of inference into *svārthānumāna*, i.e. inference for oneself and *parārthānumāna*, i.e. inference for others has been introduced only after Akṣapāda (150 A.D.). In his Nyāya Sutra there is no mention about this division. Even Kaṇāda is silent about the twofold types of inference, as evidenced from the absence of any reference to them in his Vaiśeṣika Sutra. It is clear that the earliest logicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system concentrated only on the conventional forms of debate and discussions. For the first time in the history of Indian logic it has been expatiated by Dignāga (400-450 A.D.) and Praśastapāda. Specialists on the subject differ in holding either of these two logicians to be the first to discuss the two types of inference. However, Stcherbatsky, the great authority on Buddhist logic and A.B. Keith, a renowned author on Indian Logic preferred on some valid grounds that Dignāga, the Buddhist logician of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra school, was the first to introduce *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* in the technical sense of the terms. Subsequently they were also discussed by Praśastapāda in his commentary on Vaiśeṣika sutra.[15] It seems that both Dignāga and Praśastapāda were contemporaries, the former being the elder and the later being the younger.

Svārthānumāna etymologically means the inference intended for oneself, while *parārthānumāna* denotes the inference for others. Dignāga, in his Pramāṇsamuccaya, has elaborately dealt with the inference for oneself in the second chapter and inference for others in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter of the same treatise, he has detailed out the trairūpya theory of reason, which occupied a central place in medieval Indian logic. *Parārthānumāna* is always preceded by *Svārthānumāna* for the simple reason that one can communicate to others the same inferential knowledge, attained by the individual. Inference for oneself indicates an internal process of cognition, whereas inference for others is meant to communicate the inferential knowledge to others in the form of syllogism. The latter type is the verbal expression of the former through the process of various steps which are indicated by the concerned members.

Praśastapāda has dealt with the usefulness of parārthānumāna.[16] According to him, it is the communication through the five-membered syllogism of the probans, ascertained for oneself. It is useful in three ways:

1. It dispels the doubt of others.
2. It effects a change in the person who holds a contrary view and
3. It instructs a person who is ignorant of the features of the sādhya.

Parārthānumāna is highly useful in philosophical debates and discussions. The forum for such intellectual tournaments is conventionally called in the Tamil tradition as '*Paṭṭimaṉṟam*' as evidenced from the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimekalai and the Saiva devotional literature Tiruvācakam.[17]

In the Tamil tradition

In conformity with the Indian logical tradition, the expositors of Saiva Siddhānta named the twofold inferences as '*taṉporuṭṭu aṉumāṉam*' which is an equivalent to *svārthānumāna* and '*piṟarporuṭṭu anumāṉam*' which is synonymous with *parārthānumāna*. In connection with the elucidation of these two types of inference are involved three kinds of proposition and also three types of reason that are explained in the texts of Saiva Siddhānta. Let us consider first the propositions with three forms.

Threefold pakṣas

So far we have noted the definitions and elucidations for the twofold inferences as envisaged by the authors and commentators especially of Saiva Siddhānta texts. Now, let us consider what Arulnandisivam has meant by *pakṣa, sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. In the following stanza, he has presented his view on the subject:

mūṉṟu pakkam:pakkam, nikar pakkam nikaril pakkameṉa-t-
tōṉṟum pakkam tuṇiporuḷukku iṭamām; uvamai nikarpakkam;
āṉṟa poruḷeṉṟu aṭaiyāta pakkam nikaril pakkam; mutal
ēṉṟa iraṇṭum poruḷuṇmaikku iṭamām; oṉṟu poruḷiṉṟām. (9)

The substance of the stanza may be summarized thus:

Pakṣa is threefold, viz., proposition, similar proposition and dissimilar proposition. Among them, *pakṣa* denotes the locus of the object to be proved which is known as *'tuṟiporuḷ'*, an equivalent to the Sanskrit term *sādhya*. *Sapakṣa* denotes similar minor terms. It is also called homologues or similar statements. It is used as a comparison to establish the existence of the object expressed in the *pakṣa*. So it becomes the locus of the object to be quoted as a similar instance to prove the existence of the same object mentioned in pakṣa. The locus, where the object to be proved does not exist, is known as *vipakṣa* or heterologue. The first two viz., *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* become the locus for the existence of the object to be proved, while the last, i.e., *vipakṣa*, becomes the locus of the non-existence of the same object.

In the text of Sivajnāna Siddhiyar, no example is cited to explain the triple minor terms. But in Tattuvaprakāśam, they are adequately explained as noticed in the following passage of the same text:

Cērpakkam kuṟittaporuḷ terikkum iṭamākum

kuṟimalaiyiṉ neruppuenṟāl malai-p- pakkam ākum

kōlum aṭukkaḷai pōlum eṉṟal nikarpakkam

niṟainīriṉ neruppueṉṟal nikarāp pakkam. (11)

According to this text, *pakṣa* denotes the locus that indicates the presence of a particular thing. In the proposition, "The Mountain has fire", the mountain is *pakṣa*. *Sapakṣa* is the statement in the form: "like a kitchan". The statement, "like the fire in the lake with full water", is the *vipakṣa*.

The subtle views of the commentators in the course of elucidating the *pakṣa-traya* deserved to be substantiated. First of all, let us present the commentary of Sivagrayogin.[18]

He explains *pakṣa* to be the hill associated with smoke becoming the locus (-*āṣraya*) of the fire, being the object to be ascertained. He elucidates *sapakṣa* to be *upamāna sthala*. He gives the usual example 'kitchen' (-pākacālai) in the following form:

This hill has fire

Because it possesses smoke

Like the pākacālai (kitchen).

Next, he proceeds to define *vipakṣa* as the possessor of the non-existence of the object to be ascertained and give the traditional illustration in the following form:

Whereever there is no fire, there is no smoke

Like the deep pond.

He continues to explain that *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* possess the object of ascertainment either through perception or inference, while *vipakṣa* possesses the non-existence of the same object as cognized by either of these two sources of knowledge (i.e. perception and inference).

Pandiperumal has elucidated and illustrated the threefold *pakṣas*, more or less in the same way adopted by Sivagrayogin, but with some fresh notes.[19] According to him, *pakṣa* is the locus of the object of *sādhya* to be proved through some sādhana. To put it in other words, it becomes the locus for stating that the hill has fire in its region. It is the *svabhāvahetu*. "Because of smoke" is the *kāryahetu*. Sapakṣa is the locus that reveals the sādhya through analogy. Vipakṣa is the locus, untouched by the object of sādhya. Pakṣa and sapakṣa are the places for the existence of the object of sādhya, while vipakṣa is not so.

Sivajñānaswamigal's commentary deserves special mention.[20] According to him though *pakṣa* is the locus of the object to be proved, in the initial stage of cognition its existence in the locus is doubted and subsequently ascertained through the mark or linga. On observing the presence of smoke in the hill, one infers the positive existence of fire based on his knowledge derived from the co-existence of smoke and fire in similar places. The hill is the pakṣa. The observer doubts whether the hill has fire or not, since it is not visibly seen. Directed by his previous experience of seeing the co-presence of the inseparably connected smoke and fire, he passes the judgement that the hill should have fire, since it has smoke. So, the hill becomes the pakṣa which is the locus of fire which was first doubted and finally ascertained. The locus that possesses the object of sādhya that is produced as an analogy to *pakṣa* is called *sapakṣa*. The locus that does not possess the same is *vipakṣa*. The first two are the locuses for the understanding of the existence of the *sādhya* (-object), while vipakṣa is the locus to the understanding of its non-existence. In the proper understanding of the universal concomitance (i.e. *avinābhāva*) sapakṣa and vipakṣa are absolutely necessary.

The commentator of Tattuvaprakasam explains the *pakṣatraya* in the following manner:[21]

Pakṣa is the base where the proven object appears. Sapakṣa is similar pakṣa. The statement, that 'kitchen is the locus for fire' is sapakṣa. The statement, that the full water (-lake) has fire, is vipakṣa since it is not the base for fire.

So far the definitions and elucidations in regard to the threefold pakṣas have been presented as per the texts and their commentaries. Let us consider the characteristics of threefold reasons as enunciated in them.

Threefold reasons

After explaining the triple propositions, Arulnandisivam proceeds to deal with the related forms of reason which are also of three kinds, viz., 1. Iyalpu, 2. Kārya and 3. Anupalabdhi. Let us consider them serially (1.10).

1. Iyalpu etu

Iyalpu literally means nature, not in the sense of physical nature, but in the sense of characteristic feature. It is also known as *svabhāva* hetu or *sahajalinga*. According to Sivagrayogin, *iyalpu* is a synonym of *dharma*. The texts give the example "mā indicating the mango tree". In the Tamil vocabulary, the word mā has many meanings such as tree, elephant, horse, beetle, etc., So, Iyalpu hetu has been explained to be the particular connotation of a homophonous word according to the context in which it is used.

According to Sivagrayogi in the statement "*mā taḷrttatu*" (-mā sprouted), the predicate 'sprouted' ascertains the contextual meaning of the word 'mā' to be the mango tree. He infers *dharmin* from its *dharma*. Sprouting is the dharma of the mango tree which is the dharmin. He names the relation between the dharma and dharmin as '*tādātmikam*' i.e., identity. Further he explains that 'tādātmika svarūpa' indicates the union of abheda and also a little bheda and gives an example for this kind of union. The word 'mā' as a tree viewed in a generic sense is non-different (abheda) from other trees. This is possible due to the pervasion (vyāpti) of *vrikshatvam* (treeness). Since it possesses the mangoness as its specific and essential nature, which the commentator calls '*Cūtattva*', it is different (bheda) from other trees. All these aspects are inferred from the context, especially by the predicate.[22] The word cūta means mango tree.

Sivajnānaswamigal elucidates that *iyalpu ētu* is the inherent potency of the words like mā etc., to mean tree and other objects.[23] Iyalpu literally means the intrinsic nature of any object. Hence, by the strength of the inherent nature, the words such as mā etc., are said to have the potencies (Śakti) to indicate a tree and other objects according to the context. They connote the sense on their own right and capacity, without any dependence on any other extraneous agencies. Apart from the potency of the word there is no other cause to ascertain the meaning of the word. His commentary discloses the fact that there is concomitance between the word and its meaning and this relationship exists by virtue of its nature and hence the hetu is called *iyalpu* or *svabhāva.*

In Tattuvaprakāśam the example is extended:[24]

> If it is said that mā and mā with long hand (i.e. trunk) would come, it is to be inferred that the first mā denotes only horse, since the second one with its descriptive expression naturally indicates elephant".

Thus it is understood that the word 'mā' has the *śakti* (potency) to convey the sense of a horse and an elephant. A particular word is said to possess as many meanings as possible, based on its inherent nature and potency.

In Śivaneriprakāśam, iyalpu hetu is known as *dharma dharmin anumāna.*[25] It denotes the inferential cognition of dharmin through dharma.

> **Eg.** Coldness is the dharma that is felt by one laying inside the house, leading him to infer the existence of the dharmin, i.e. dew outside the house.

From the above example, it is understood that the inseparable connection between dew and coldness belongs to the type of identity (i.e. tādātmya).

So far, we have seen the available views on *iyalpu* i.e. *sahaja hetu*. Here it is essential to mention that *iyalpu hetu* was already treated under Svabhāva, which has been considered by some schools as an independent pramāṇa. Now, let us pass on to deal with the second type of reason viz., *kārya hetu.*

2. Kārya hetu

Kārya hetu has been illustrated in Sivajñāna Siddhiyār in the following passage:

uṟukāriyam pukaitaṉ ātiyaṉa aṉalkāṭṭum[26]

The effect (*kārya*) is smoke and the cause (*ādi*) is fire. Thus the effect smoke indicates the presence of its cause fire due to the previous knowledge derived from the invariable and universal concomitance between the probans and probandum (hetu and sādhya). In this type of inference the knowledge of vyāpti is essential.

In Sivaneṟiprakāśam, this type of hetu is known as "*Kāryātkāraṇānumāna*" i.e. inference from the effect to the cause. The example, cited in its commentary in this:

> On witnessing the increasing inundation in the river (Cauvery) which is both confused and reddish, and which is being the effect, one infers its cause, i.e. heavy rain in the Kuṭaku hills."[27]

Further mention is made to the reverse of the same anumāna. This type of anumāna is named '*Kāraṇātkāryānumāna*'. The author of the above text defines this kind of inference as "kāraṇattāl kāriyattai-t-terital" i.e. inferential understanding from the reason to the effect. To put it in other words, the absence of a proban indicates the absence of its probandum. The text provides the following example for kāraṇātkāryānumāna:

> On seeing the black cloud with thunder and lightning, one infers well in advance that it will rain.

In many occasions, such a cloud used to rain. So, there is concomitance between the cause cloud and the effect rain. On the strength of the previous knowledge, one expects the rain out of the dark cloud.

Sivajñāna Swamigal also has presented in his commentary the aforesaid example to elucidate kāraṇātkāryānumāna.[28] It is the avowed conviction of the advocates of Saiva Siddhanta, who are staunch supporters of Satkāryavāda, that the effect should have existed in a subtle form in its cause. Hence, it is quite natural for them to forecast the downpour on noticing the dark lightning cloud. Even if there is no rain, it may be argued that it exists in an unseen subtle form in the cloud (i.e. cause) and it will be raining as and when the requirements for the downpour are adequately fulfilled. Till then, it is supposed to be existing in the cloud. Since whatever is not in the cause cannot be in the effect, kāraṇātkāryānumāna has its own place in the process of inferential cognition.

So far the second type of hetu has been explained. Next, Arulnandisivam proceeds to deal with the third type of hetu known as *anupalabdhi hetu*. Let us consider the characteristic features of this hetu in the light of the texts and commentaries.

3. Anupalabdhi hetu

The following passage in Sivajnāna Siddhiyār explains this cause through an illustration:

> *anupalattiyatu*
> *Cītam inmai pani-y-inmai kāṭṭal*[29]

It literally means that *anupalabdhi* shows the absence of dew, due to the absence of cold. Anupalabdhi is the negative inference denoting the non-existence of an effect due to the absence of its cause.

According to Sivagrayogin, the quality of the cause is ingrained in its effect. Sītam or coldness is the *tanmātra* (-subtle element) of the dew. So, the absence of cold naturally proves the absence of dew. He further mentions:[30]

> Whatever effect has no cause
> then there is no effect.

So, dew is the cause that is associated with cold. Coldness and dew are inseparably connected through pervasion (*vyāpti*) and universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*). Hence, the absence of one indicates the absence of the other. In the given statement that we have already seen, the absence of cold (-*Cītaminmai*), being the effect is first mentioned. It is followed by the absence of the cause, i.e. dew.

Sivajnāna Swamigal interprets anupalabdhi hetu to indicate the *kāryābhāvas* such as the absence of cold etc., denoting the *kāraṇābhāvas* such as the absence of dew etc., and also the *kāraṇābhāvas* such as the absence of dew etc., denoting the *kāryabhāvas* such as the non-arrival of cold etc. Finally, he concludes that the aforesaid threefold causes are due to the three different kinds of feeling.[31]

Anupalabdhi has been considered as an independent pramāṇa in the Nyāya school of the later period. However, in the system of Saiva Siddhānta, it has been subsumed under the general head of inference, as we have already seen.

The author of Sivaneriprakasam dealt with four kinds of hetu out of which we have discussed above the first three, viz.,

1. *dharmātdharmin anumāna*, 2. *kāryāt kāraṇānumāna* and 3. *kāraṇātkāryānumāna*. The fourth type is "*upamānumāna*" in which the upamāna (-comparison) determines the sādhya.[32] Upamāna serves as a means of cognition through similar features between a known and unknown object. The traditional elucidation provided in the text is the cognition of an unseen forest-cow (gavaya) from its similarity to the domestic cow through the details given by a forester.

Though in the systems of Nyāya, Mimāmsa and later Vaiśeṣika, Upamāna has been enjoying a unique status of a separate pramāṇa, the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta treated it as one form of anumāna that we have noted elsewhere.

Next, let us pass on to deal with the two major types of inference. First, inference for oneself is taken for discussion.

Inference for oneself

The Saiva Siddhānta texts denote *svārthānumāna* by various terms "*taṉporuṭṭu anumānam*", "*tāṉaṟital*" and "*anumānam taṉakku*". Arulnandisivam defines inference for oneself thus:[33]

> *pakkam muṉṟiṉ muṉṟētu-v-uṭaiya poruḷai-p- pārttaṟiya-t-takka jñāṉam taṉporuṭṭām.*

It may be rendered thus:

> Inferential cognition of the atman's Cit-Śakti in the form of examining the threefold propositions of the major term as characterised by one of the three middle terms (-probans) in regard to their universal relation of concomitance is known as "Inference for oneself."

Tattuvaprakāśar has also given the same definition but in a different expression. However, the interpretations of the commentators on this subject deserve to be briefly summarized.

According to Sivagrayogin *anumitijñāna*, a common term for both the inferences for oneself and others, denotes the ascertaining of the sādhyas in union with hetu through *dṛṣṭivyāptis* with the help of hetu trayas viz., *sahaja* (-iyalpu), *kārya* and *anupalabthi* in the threefold statements, i.e. *pakṣa, sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Further, he explains that *svārthānumāna* denotes the personal inferential knowledge. He elucidates that it is the inferential cognition of the *vyāpti* on the basis of one's previous knowledge of observing the co-existence of smoke and fire at a particular place. Then, when the

same person observed the presence of smoke in a different place, he ascertains the existence of the unseen fire through the inferential knowledge of the vyāpti i.e. *vyāptijñānam.*[34]

According to Pandiperumal, svārthānumāna is the inferential knowledge of the sādhya through the threefold reasons, viz., *hetu, nimitta* and *kāraṇa* which are considered to be the respective equivalents of *sahaja, kārya* and *anupalbdhi* occurring in the prepositions of *pakṣa, sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa.*[35] Normally nimitta kāraṇa denotes the efficient cause. But, it is beyond our understanding what actually the commentator meant in equating hetu etc., with sahaja etc.

According to Sivajñāna Swamigal, *svārthānumāna* is the cognition of atman's Cit-Śakti examining the sādhya on the basis of *avinābhāva* through *pakṣatraya* involving any one of the threefold probans starting with *sahaja.*[36] As we have pointed out elsewhere, it is the unshakable opinion of this great Commentator that inference for oneself is nothing but the soul's power of intelligence in the cognizance of the hidden object through the means of inseparable connection between the effect and cause, guided by the process of threefold propositions and reasons.

So, it becomes evident that inference for oneself results in the acquisition of personal knowledge without doubt and error of an unseen object, aided by the understanding of universal concomitance.

Next, let us pass on to deal with the definition for *pārarthānumāna*, i.e. inference for others as understood from the Tamil sources.

Inference for others

Though knowledge is personal, it is of no use if it is not resorted for communication to others. What one gains should be distributed or transmitted to others. Hence inference for others is essential to disseminate the personal knowledge. Even in discussions and debates, this kind of inference is very important to convince and also instruct others. We have already pointed out much of this type of inference. Aruḷnandisivam defines *pārathānumāna* in the following passage:[37]

"piṟartam poruṭṭām anumāṉam
tokka ivaṟṟal piṟar teḷiyac collal ākum; accollum
mikka aṉṉuvayac col vetirekaccol eṉa iraṇṭām".

The above passage may be translated thus:

> "Inference for others is the effective and lucid exposition of one's own inferential knowledge through the hetu traya. Such an exposition should be based on the two fold methods of positive and negative expressions."

The author of Tattuvaprakāśam also has stated the same view, laying stress on the communicative aspect.[38]

So, it is very clear that both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* require for their realisation the *pakṣatraya* and hetu traya. Let us ponder over the exposition of the commentators driving forth some additional but related ideas for the lucid understanding of *parārthānumāna*.

Sivagrayogin meant by '*paropadeśa*', inference for others. Its main purpose is to illuminate and enlighten others. The pakṣatraya is essential for this form of inference, which is to be transmitted in the form of a syllogism consisting of five members (-*pañcāvayava*). The five membered syllogism should contain inferences of positive and negative types which are respectively called the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* by Arulnandisivam. Sivagrayogin calls the former as agreeable statement, and the latter disagreeable statement.[39]

Pandiperumal clearly mentions that *piṟarporuṭṭu aṉumāṉam* aims to communicate the personal inferential knowledge to the correct and lucid understanding of others (-to the clarity of others' mind).[40]

Sivajnāna Swamigal rightly observes that it is a clear teaching or instruction (i.e. *pōtittal*) to others' apprehension, using the same techniques i.e. pakṣa traya, hetu traya etc. which are first useful for the acquisition of one's one inferential cognition and then made use of other's understanding. In the place of the technical terms *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, he uses the pure Tamil equivalents *uṭampāṭu* (positive) and *maṟai* (-negative). The usage '*upadeśa*' of Sivagrayogin and '*pōtittal*' of Sivajñāna Swamigal potentially denote the same.

The commentator of Sivaneriprakāśam also mentions the five members of the syllogism, viz., *pratijñā, hetu, udhāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana*. He has also used the word '*pōtittal*' i.e. instruction which is the main purpose of this type of inference.

Since the inference is made mainly on the basis of *vyāpti,* it is proper that the advocates of Saiva Siddhānta have paid sufficient attention on the subject. Let us consider the significance of Vyāpti in Indian epistemology with special reference to Saiva Siddhānta.

The Significance of Vyāpti

Already it has been pointed out that the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta have identified three kinds of hetu, viz., *svabhāva* (-iyalpu), *kārya* and *anupalabdhi* on the basis of *vyāpti* existing between the probans and probandum (-hetu and sādhya). Further a set of three types of vyāpti are introduced by Sivagrayogin in his text Sivaneriprakasam and his commentary on Sivajnāna Siddhiyar.[41] They are the following:

1. Kevalānvayi vyāpti – Purely positive concomitance
2. Kevala vyatireki vyāpti – Purely negative concomitance and
3. Anvayavyatireki vyāpti – Positive and negative concomitance.

However, Arulnandisivam has deliberately mentioned only two kinds of concomitance, viz., anvaya and vyatireka. So, it is better to commence with the theory of two-fold concomitance and then pass on to deal with the three types. Before directly proceeding to discuss these types of concomitance, it is better to outline the significance of vyāpti and its varieties as propounded by the logicians of the different systems of Indian Philosophy for a clear understanding of the subject.

The Concept of Vyāpti

According to the Naiyāyikas, *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmata* are the two essential grounds of inference. Vyāpti denotes the universal and inseparable concomitance between the hetu and sādhya. For instance, smoke and fire are inseparably connected. The relationship between these two is called vyāpti. Pakṣadharmata denotes the presence of the dharma in the pakṣa. It can be exemplified. One infers the existence of fire in the hill on seeing the smoke on it. This is an instance of pakṣadharmata. In this example, hill is the pakṣa and its possession of fire is its dharmata. However, Indian logicians attached much importance to vyāpti. The knowledge of vyāpti was considered to be pivotal for making a valid inference.

Vyāpti literally means pervasion. It implies two related things, one of which is the pervader (-*vyāpaka*) and the other, the pervaded

(*vyāpya*). If an object (eg.smoke) is inseparably connected with another object (-eg.fire) in the manner that the existence of the first object (i.e.smoke) or the non-existence of the second object (i.e.fire) is compulsorily followed respectively by the existence of the second object (i.e. fire) and the non-existence of the first object (i.e. smoke), then the first object is said to have pervasion (-*vyāpti*) with the second. The former is the pervaded (-*vyāpya*) and the latter is the pervader (-*vyāpaka*). In the case of smoke and fire, smoke has pervasion with fire. In the case of fragrance and flower, fragrance is the *vyāpya*, while flower is the *vyāpaka*. Since the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta are the adherents of Satkāryavāda, the cited example is not out of relevance.

The term *vyāpti* is known by various other names also. The Vaiśeṣikas called it *prasiddhi* which is nothing but a well known relation between two things related through *kārya* and *kāraṇa* as in the case of smoke and fire, and also kāraṇa and kārya as in the case of dark cloud and rain. The Sāmkhya denoted vyāpti by the term *pratibandha*. As per the account of the specialists, even the author of Nyāyasutra and its earliest commentator Vātsyāyana did not use the word vyāpti to describe the inseparable connection between hetu and sādhya. The terms *niyama* and *aniyama* were current in the early Nyāya system to denote respectively the invariable concomitance and variable concomitance. It is said that Praśastapāda, the earliest commentator of Vaiśeṣikasūtra has used the term *avinābhāva* in the sense of vyāpti. However, only in the Navya-Nyāya school, the term vyāpti has gained frequent usage.[42] It is heartening to note that in the texts of Saiva Siddhānta both the terms viz., *viyāpti* and *avinābhāva* are used to describe the inseparable connection and universal concomitance between the probans and probandum. If one penetrates into the texts and commentaries of Saiva Siddhānta, he can easily grasp the minute difference between *vyāpti* and *avinābhāva* of which we have referred elsewhere in this chapter. The stock example to illustrate these two relations between hetu and sādhya is smoke and fire and not fire and smoke, for fire can exist even without smoke, but smoke cannot come out in the absence of fire.

It seems that the logicians of Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhism were the first to advocate the importance of the knowledge of vyāpti, as evidenced from the harsh attack levelled against them by the advocates of Nyāya system.[43] Vācaspatimiśra (850 A.D.) criticised

the concept of vyāpti on the ground that the relation between hetu and sādhya as in the case of smoke and fire should be unconditional, since conditions are absent in the natural relation. He argued that the relation between fire and smoke is restricted, conditional and not universal, since it requires the presence of wet wood or fuel. Only in such conditions smoke is made possible. In all other circumstances, fire can exist even without smoke. E.g.Fire in a hot iron exists even with the absence of smoke. He concluded that the relationship between the sādhana (-means) and sādhya (-probandum) should be natural and unconditional. Jayanta also is of the view that vyāpti does not determine dharma existing between hetu and sādhya. In the place of vyāpti, repeated observation was held a valid means of determining the concomitance between two terms. However, other logicians like the Sāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas accepted the necessity of the concept of vyāpti without which one can not infer for oneself and subsequently transmit his inferential knowledge to others.

So far we have outlined the various views with regard to the concept of vyāpti. It is pertinent to briefly mention the prominent types of vyāpti which are indicated in different terms.

Various kinds of vyāpti

In the Bhatta school of Mimāmsa, *samavyāpti* and *viṣamavyāpti* are advocated. If the pervasion in the space or time is similar between the pervader and pervaded, then it is known as *samavyāpti* i.e. equal pervasion. If the pervader occupies a lesser space or time than the pervaded, then the relation between the two is said to be *viṣama vyāpti* i.e. unequal pervasion. The terms *sama* and *viṣama* occur in the same sense even in the realms of prosody and rhetorics of Indian tradition.

Another set of pervasion is called *antar vyāpti* and *bahir vyāpti*, depending upon the manner of the relation of indissoluble connection existing between two terms. If the invariable concomitance between the probans and probandum is inferred in an abstract manner, it is called antar vyāpti, i.e. inward pervasion. If the relation of concomitance between hetu and sādhya, as in the case of smoke and fire, is openly known then it is called bahir vyāpti, i.e., outward pervasion. There are many more types and sub-types of vyāptis which attest to the genius of Indian logicians of various schools, revealing their unabated interest in discovering the possible relations between two terms, ultimately leading to discover the nature of truth. However, most of them gave prominence only to two types of concomitance

which go by the name 1. *Anvaya vyāpti* and 2. *Vyatireka vyāpti* which are also adopted by Arulnandisivam in his Aḷavai-y-iyal.[44] The classification of hetus is mainly based on the distinction found in the various kinds of concomitance (i.e. vyāpti).

The specialists are of the opinion that Praśastapāda, the bhāṣyakāra of Vaiśeṣikasūtra (450 A.D.) was the first to identify Anvaya and Vyatireka types of vyāpti in the process of inference for oneself and also for others.[45] However, it is pertinent to mention that the Buddhist logicians of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra school as recorded in the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai were conversant with the terms anvaya and vyatireka, sādharmya and Vaidharmya.[46] There is a reference in the Nyāya system to the third type of concomitance with the name *anvayavyatirekavyāpti* which seems to be the clubbing of both anvaya and vyatireka. All the three types found in the texts and commentaries of Saiva Siddhantins reveal their involvement in the pursuit of knowledge and its transmission to others. First of all, let us take *anvaya vyāpti* for a brief discussion.

Anvaya Vyāpti

Anvaya vyāpti denotes the positive concomitance. Arulnandisivam explains this type of concomitance through an illustration in the following passage:

"*pukaiyal analuṇṭu aṭukkaḷaipōl eṉṉa-p-pukaṟal annuvayam*".[47]

It means thus: "Anvaya is the statement that there is fire because of smoke as in the kitchen." This statement may be presented in the form of a syllogism which is given hereunder.

Pakṣa	:	The hill has fire
Hetu	:	Because it has smoke
Dṛṣṭānta	:	Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen
Upanaya	:	This hill is so
Nigamana	:	Therefore the hill has fire.

In this syllogism, the middle term i.e. hetu (-smoke) and the major term i.e. sādhya (-fire to be proved) are in agreeable connection which is otherwise known as positive concomitance. In this instance smoke has pervasion over fire. It is correct if one infers that wherever there is smoke, there is fire and not vice versa. i.e. The

statement, "whereever there is fire, there is smoke" is not fully correct. Even without smoke fire can exist. But, without fire the existence of smoke, its effect is not possible. According to Saiva Siddhānta, smoke has its pre-existence in its cause fire, in a subtle and unseen form and has come out as the condition and cause necessitated. However, the two are inseparably connected and this type of connection is named *anvaya vyāpti*. Next, let us deal briefly with the *vyātireka vyāpti* as enunciated by Arulnandisivam and others.

Vyatireka Vyāpti

Vyatireka vyāpti denotes the negative concomitance. It has been elucidated in the following passage of Sivajnāna Siddhiyar:

> "*Vakaiyām aṉalillā iṭattu-p- pukaiyiṉ ṟākum malarinoṭu*
> *mukaiyām nīriṟ pōleṉṟu moḻital vetirekac col*".[48]

The contents of this passage may be thrown into the following syllogistic form:

Pakṣa	:	The hill has no smoke
Hetu	:	Because it has no fire
Dṛṣṭānta	:	Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke as in the lotus lake
Upanaya	:	There is no fire in the hill as in the lotus lake
Nigamana	:	Therefore the hill has no smoke.

The hill is the locus for the fire and smoke i.e. cause and effect. It is not so with the lotus lake, since water and fire are basically opposed substances. In order to establish the proposition that the hill has no smoke and hence no fire, the negative example i.e. lake has been cited. In this case the inference is based on the disagreeable nature of smoke and lotus lake, as opposed to smoke and fire. So, this kind of negative inference is called *vyatirekānumāna*.

One more version to authenticate this kind of negative concomitance is worth mentioning. In the aforesaid syllogism, the proposition was that the hill has no smoke and hence no fire. But, here in the syllogism, given below, there is a contrary thesis which is again proved through negative concomitance.

Pakṣa	:	The hill has fire
Hetu	:	Because it has smoke
Vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta	:	Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in the case of lotus lake.
Upanaya	:	So, unlike the lotus lake, the hill is not devoid of smoke.
Nigamana	:	Therefore, unlike the lotus lake, the hill is not devoid of fire, i.e. it has fire.

The propounders of this version of vyatirekānumāna opined that not only positive concomitance but also negative concomitance is also useful to establish the proposition, i.e. sādhya.

Sivagrayogin explains that anvaya denotes the existence of fire due to the presence of smoke as in the kitchen. Vyatireka indicates the absence of smoke due to the absence of fire as in the lotus lake.[49]

Sivajnañāswamigal comments that the word anvaya indicates kitchen in the form of affirmative analogy, while the word vyatireka denotes the lotus lake in the form of negative analogy.[50]

So far, the two types of vyāpti as adumberated in Sivajñāna Siddhiyār and its commentaries have been discussed. Next in order, the threefold types of concomitance viz., kevalānvayin, vyatirekānvayin and anvaya-vyatirekin are to be analysed. It is said that Uddyotakara (575 A.D.) was the first logician to introduce these three types of inference into the domain of Indian logic.[51] They are advocated also in the system of Saiva Siddhānta by Sivagrayogin and others. Let us consider them one by one.

Kevalānvayin

If the probans (i.e. hetu ~ middle-term) is only positively related to the probandum (i.e. sādhya ~ major term), then the relationship between the two terms is known as purely positive concomitance, i.e. *kevalānvaya*. The prefix/kevala/ in this technical word conveys the sense only and purely. In such vākyas, the hetu necessarily exists in the pakṣa (-subject) and sapakṣas (-similars) only and it is necessarily absent in the vipakṣas. It is not out of place to record here that the characteristic features of pakṣa, sapakṣa and vipakṣa are first introduced by the Buddhist logicians of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra school.[52] For this simple reason, the authors

of the Nyāya texts and their commentators used to criticise them. Be that as it may.

The stock example to substanate kevalānvayin is given below:

Pakṣa	:	Pot is a knowable thing
Hetu	:	Because it is nameable
Sādharmya	:	Whatever things are knowable, they are nameable, as a cloth.
Upanaya	:	So is the pot
Nigamana	:	Therefore it is a knowable thing.

Here, the concomitance between the knowable and nameable things is purely positive and hence the vyāpti is called kevalānvayin. It is true that all knowable things are nameable. But the converse is not true. To put it in other words, that all unnameable things are not knowable, is not correct, since the concomitance between the hetu and sādhya is absent in dissimilar statements (i.e. vipakṣas).

According to Saiva Siddhānta, the world undergoes threefold changes due to the cosmic functions of Lord Śiva. This proposition has to be established only through the purely positive concomitance, as shown in the following syllogism.[53]

Pakṣa	:	The world is subject to the triple processes of origin, sustenance and destruction.
Hetu	:	Since it is made up of parts to be known either as a he or she or it.
Sādharmya Dṛṣṭānta	:	Whatever is made up of parts is subject to the processes of origin, sustenance and destruction, as a tree.
Upanaya	:	The world is made up of parts
Nigamana	:	Therefore, it is subject to the triple processes of origin, sustenance and destruction.

The proposition, that the world undergoes the threefold changes, can be proved only through the method of purely positive concomitance (kevalānvayin) existing between the probans and probandum. It is not possible to prove this proposition through the means of purely

negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin), since in the empirical world we can not come across things which do not have parts and components, demonstrable as he, or, she, or it. All things that constitute the universe are divisible and demonstrable on the basis of gender. Hence, the absence of a thing that does not have parts and gender distinction drives one to the conclusion that the proposition can not be established through kevala-vyatirekin.

The commentator of Sivaneriprakasam explains kevalānvayin to be the hetu (-reason) without vipakṣa (-dissimilar). He elucidates the purely positive concomitance through the following three-membered syllogism:[54]

Pakṣa	:	The world, being an effect, should have been produced by a creator (-kartā)
Hetu	:	Because it is a product
Sādharmya	:	Like the pot, produced by the potter
Dṛāṣṭānta		

In such statements, the concomitance exists between the product and the efficient cause, i.e. creator. It has no vipakṣa.

Kevala-vyatirekin

If the hetu is negatively related to the sādhya, it is known as purely negative concomitance i.e. kevala-vyatirekin. Since the hetu exists in the pakṣa and not in the vipakṣas, the vyāpti is realised only through the means of agreement in absence, i.e. negative concomitance. A.B. Keith throws considerable light on the purely negative concomitance as evidenced from his elucidation based on some Nyāya works.[55] It is presented here in the form of a three-membered syllogism:

Proposition	:	Living organisms have souls
Reason	:	Since they possess animal functions
Negative example	:	Whatever that has no soul, has no animal functions as in the case of pot.

Further he explains that the positive proposition viz., that which has animal functions has a soul can not be illustrated, since the conclusion (-i.e. nigamana) has precisely the same extension as the subject (-i.e. pakṣa), and cannot therefore be found anywhere outside it.

The commentator of Sivaneriprakasam defines kevala vyatirekin to be the hetu without sapakṣa (-similars). It has only vipakṣa. His illustration to substantiate this kind of vyāpti is given below:[56]

Pakṣa	:	All effects are true
Hetu	:	Because they are produced
Negative example	:	Whatever is not true, it is not produced like the hare's horn.

Since all the effects become the pakṣa, there is no sapakṣa.

It is true in the case of kevla-vyatirekin, one cannot produce any similar instances, i.e. sapakṣas. Similarly in the case of kevala-anvayin, any counter example or contrary illustration (i.e. vipakṣas) can not be adduced.

One more illustration to substantiate the kevala-vyatirekin may be quoted in the following syllogistic form:

Proposition	:	Earth is different from the rest of the gross elements.
Reason	:	Since it has smell
Negative example	:	Whatever is not different from the rest of the gross elements, other than earth, has no smell, as for example water.

Smell is the tanmātra exclusively belonging to the earth. This proposition has been established through the purely negative concomitance between the probans and probandum.

The following is a well-known syllogism authenticating the proposition through kevala-vyatirekin:

Proposition	:	The body has soul which is different from the physical limbs such as the sensory and motor organs, and psychical or internal organs, etc.
Reason	:	Since it has cognitive, conative and volitional powers.
Reason	:	Whatever that does not possess soul is devoid of such powers, as in the case of a pot.

The proven fact i.e. sādhya in the above syllogism cannot be arrived at by a purely positive concomitance. It is possible only through purely negative concomitance. The impossibility of producing 'similars' (-sapakṣas) and the only possibility of submitting 'dissimilars' (-vipakṣas) necessitate to use the method of kevala-vyatirekin (i.e. the purely negative concomitance) to establish the probandum.

According to Sivagrayogin both Kevalānvayin and Kevalavyatirekin individually possess four *avayavas* (i.e. limbs). He illustrates the two in the following syllogistic method.[57]

1. The tree is prameya

Because it is asat (-matter)

Like the stone (pāṣāṇa)

The above kevalānvayin which is devoid of vipakṣa, has no *vipakṣād vyāvritti*.

2. The living body has soul

Because it has the respiratory air, etc.,

Whatever is not in union with soul

it is not in union with respiratory air

Like the pot.

The above kevalavyatirekin which is devoid of sapakṣa has no sapakṣatva.

The above illustrations reveal the commentator's insight in the system of Indian logic.

The third type of vyāpti to be seen is anvaya vyatirekin, which has been elucidated by Sivagrayogin in his Sivaneriprakasam and in his commentary on Aḷavai-y-iyal.[58] Let us briefly deal with this category of concomitance.

Anvaya vyatirekin

If the hetu is both positively and negatively related to the sādhya, then the relationship existing between the two terms is known as anvaya vyatirekin. In this type of inference, the hetu exists in the pakṣa (-minor term) and also in all sapakṣas (-similars) but does not exist in the vipakṣa (-dissimilar).

According to the commentator of Sivaneriprakasam, Anvaya-vyatirekin denotes the inference formed by the syllogism consisting of five members, viz., *pratijñā* (-pakṣa), *hetu*, *udāharaṇa* (-dṛṣṭānta), *upanaya* and *nigamana*. The illustration to this type of inference found in the commentary is given below:

Proposition	:	The mountain has fire
Reason	:	Because it has smoke
Example:positive	:	Like the kitchen
nagative	:	Whatever has no fire, has also no smoke like the lake.

Thus the proposition has been established through both positive and negative means.

In the commentary of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār, Sivagrayogin has enlisted five characteristic features of Anvaya-vyatirekin anumāna.[59] They are also found in the commentary of Sivaneriprakasam, written by his disciple Nandisivagrayogin.[60] They are the following:

1. Pakṣadharmatva
2. Sapakṣatva
3. Vipakṣadvyā vṛtti
4. Abādhitaviṣayatva and
5. Asatpratipakṣatva

A hetu which possesses these essential features leads one to the inference of a conclusion. The defective probans are those which do not have all the five characteristics. Even if any one of them is absent, then the hetu is said to be erroneous, leading to logical fallacy. In the light of commentaries, let us briefly deal with the aforesaid features of hetu one by one.

Pakṣadharmatva

The presence of the reason in the pakṣa is known as *pakṣadharmatva*. The example given in the commentary is this:

> "The Mountain, being the pakṣa, possesses
> a long column of smoke".

It may be presented in a syllogistic form:

Pakṣa	:	The hill has fire
Hetu	:	Because there is smoke pervading the space
Dṛṣṭānta	:	Whereever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen.

In this syllogism, the hetu 'smoke' is the dharma of the fire existing in the hill, which is the subject i.e. pakṣa. Hence, the pakṣa is said to possess the dharmatva, i.e. the characteristic feature of smoke. In other words, the hill is the pakṣa and the presence of smoke is the dharmatva of the pakṣa.

Sapakṣatva

If the hetu exists in the sapakṣas i.e. similars (homologues), which also possess the sādhya, then it is said to have the characteristic feature known as *sapakṣatva*. What is characteristic in pakṣa is also characteristic in sapaksa. Both in pakṣa and sapakṣa, the presence of dharma i.e. smoke is visible.

So, the existence of smoke, being the hetu, in the sapakṣa i.e. kitchen is known as *sapakṣatva*. Sivagrayogin states that the co-presence of smoke and fire in the kitchen is sapakṣatva.

Vipakṣadvyāvritti

This is also called *vipakṣatva*. If the hetu, i.e. smoke does not exist in the vipakṣa (e.g. lake) then the hetu is said to possess the characteristic feature of *vipakṣatva*. In other words the absence of smoke and fire in the dissimilars or heterologues is said to be the *vipakṣatva*.

Abādhita viṣayatva

According to Sivagrayogin, the absence of any other source of knowledge for inferring the existence of fire due to the presence of smoke is said to be the particular characteristic of hetu, and this feature is known as *abādhita viṣayatva*. It is one of the essential features of the hetu when its presence in the pakṣa is compatible with the sādhya.

Asatpratipakṣatva

The absence of a *viparīta hetu* i.e. counteracting reason going against the sādhya is said to be the essential feature of *Asatpratipakṣatva*. The proban smoke, that is adduced to prove the existence of fire in a remote hill, is said to possess *asatprati pakṣatva*, since there is no alternative dharma (i.e. pratidharma asat) to get associated with the subject (i.e. pakṣa). So, *asatprati*

pakṣatva indicates the absence of counter reason which is the last characteristic feature possessed by the middle term.

Sivagrayogin clearly stated that the hetu should have all the aforesaid fivefold characteristics. Further he has pointed out that the absence of any one of them would result in the fallacy of reason (i.e.hetvābhāsa).

It is to be mentioned that there are instances where the hetu cannot possess the feature of vipakṣatva, if the inference made is purely affirmative. So also the hetu cannot possess the feature of sapakṣatva, if the inference is purely negative. In both the cases, the remaining features are possessed by the concerned probans.

From the commentary of Sivaneṟiprakāśam, it is clearly known that all the fivefold features of hetu are elucidated in the light of the materials found in the Pauṣkara Agama. However, it is essential to note that Jayanta who lived in the early part of the 9th century A.D. has also dealt with these five features which would emphatically establish the presence of vyāpti between the two terms, viz., hetu and sādhya.[61]

After the elucidation of concomitance, Arulnandisivam proceeds to present the views of others who used the five-membered syllogism (*-pañcāvayava vākya*) with the positive and negative anumānas for the benefit of others (*-parārtha*). It is essential to note that the number of the constituent members of syllogism, meant for *parārthānumāna*, varies in the different systems of Indian Philosophy. Hence a brief account about the different types of syllogism deserves to be presented before proceeding to define each of the members of the syllogism.

Types of syllogism

The logicians of both the homogenous and heterogeneous systems of Indian Philosophy have evolved at least four types of syllogism, purely based on the number of avayavas (-members) which constituted them. However, the five membered syllogism consisting of *pratijñā* (-preposition or thesis), *hetu* (-reason) *udāharaṇa* (-example), *upanaya* (-application) and *nigamana* (-conclusion) has been initially introduced by the Naiyāyikas as recorded in the Nyāyasūtra of Akṣapāda (150 A.D.).

Initially the syllogism was meant for one's own inferential process of knowledge. When it was given verbal expression, then it

was known as inference for others.

However, Vātsyāyana (450 A.D.), the earliest bhāṣyakāra of Nyāyasutra, recorded in his commentary the existence of ten-membered (*daśāvayava*) syllogism. Nevertheless he supported only the theory of Akṣapāda's five-membered syllogism. According to A.B. Keith, the contribution of Akṣapāda, who was also known as Gautama, to the development of Indian logic included the removal of the additional five members, thus simplifying the system of syllogism.[62] So, it is understood that before the advent of Nyāyāsutra, there were logicians who upheld the *daśāvayava* theory. The additional five members are enumerated here under:

1. *jijñāsa*-the desire to know the object through inquiry.
2. *samśaya*-the doubt leading to question the reason.
3. *sakyaprāpti*, or *sakyatāprāpti*-the belief in the possible solution or valid means.
4. *prayojana*-the usefulness, and
5. *samśaya vyudāsa* – the removal of the doubt.

Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (575 A.D.) criticised the theory of *daśāvayava*, since the additional five members did not find a just place in a syllogism, though they played a role during the course of discussion before the development of formal investigation of the process of logical inquiry. The exponents of the Nyāya system did not see any wisdom in upholding the theory of *daśāvayava*, as they envisaged that the additional five members were not at all essential for communicating convincingly one's personal inferential knowledge to others.

According to Vātsyāyana, *jijñāsa*, the first additional member is not restricted to inference only. It is also the fundamental principle even in other sources of knowledge. The next member i.e. doubting occurs also in savikalpaka type of perception. It includes a sense of aspiration to know the real characteristics of an object. The third additional member, i.e., the validity of methods or the means of solution can not be considered as a constituent member in the syllogism, since it is equally essential in other forms of knowledge. Vātsyāyana similarly disposes the fourth additional member, i.e. prayojana, stating that it can not be a factor of the Nyāya vākya i.e. syllogism, since it results only after the realisation of the statements.

The last member viz., the removal of doubt is treated by Jayanta, the author of Nyāyamañjari to be a different statement. According to him, these additional members are merely the psychical processes of the knower (-pramātā) and hence they do not find a place in the syntactical structure of the syllogistic form.[63]

However, almost all the exponents of the Nyāya system advocated the five-membered syllogism. They found in it the presence of all the four pramāṇas that were admitted in their systems. The first member of the syllogism, i.e. proposition indicates the credible testimony (śabda *viṣaya pratijñā*). The second member i.e. reason denotes inference. Example, being the third member has reference to perception (*pratyakṣa viṣayam udāharaṇam*). The fourth member i.e. application is only comparison in the form 'so is this' (*Upamānam upanayaḥ tathety upsamharāt*). The conclusion and the proposition do not materially vary from each other. Thus, Vātsyāyana elucidated the significance of five-membered syllogism through which all the approved four fold instruments of knowledge are pressed into service to communicate one's inferential knowledge effectively to others.

It is in all probability that Arulnandisivam should have also meant Akṣapāda, the earliest known author of a treatise on Nyāya, when he stated that there were logicians who propounded the five-membered syllogism.[64] The great commentators Maraijñāna Deśikar and Siagrayogin deliberately mentioned that the five-membered syllogism was used by the Naiyāyikas and Saivas. Maraijñāna Deśikar has also noted in his commentary that the Bhattas of the Mīmāmsaka system accepted only the first three members of the syllogism viz., *pratijñā, hetu* and *udāharaṇa* and the Buddhists admitted two membered syllogism consisting of *udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*.[65] Let us consider briefly the view-points of the advocates of the syllogism with five, three and two members.

In the opinion of G.Tuci, Maitreya and Asanga, the early exponents of Yogācāra Buddhism along with Sthiramathi and Sāntirakshita admitted the five-membered syllogism into the field of Buddhist logic.[66] According to S.Vidyabhushana and T.H.Stcherbatsky, Asanga (350 A.D.) was the first Buddhist logician to introduce the five-membered syllogism of the Naiyāyikas to the Buddhist theory of knowledge.[67] It was endorsed by the author of Nyāya praveśa (500 A.D.), a notable Buddhist text on the subject. Following these predecessors, the Tamil Buddhist poet Cāttaṉār has also dealt with the syllogism of five members in his epic Maṇimēkalai.[68] In this

context, it is proper to state that *Maraijñāna Deśikar has quoted a poem from a logical Tamil text with the title "Tarkka paripāṭai" authored by Kālinkarāyar enumerating the five limbs of a syllogism.*[69]

However, Dignāga, the great Buddhist logician accepted the syllogism consisting of *pakṣa, hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta* for the first time in the history of Buddhist logic. Instead of the technical terms pratijñā and *udāharaṇa* of the Naiyāyikas, he introduced the words pakṣa and dṛṣṭānta which were accepted even by the later exponents of the Nyāya system.[70] It is interesting to note that the three-membered syllogism was current during the period of the authors of Nyāya praveśa and Maṇimēkalai.

According to Dignāga, the last two members of the five-membered syllogism, viz., *upanaya* and *nigamana* are redundant and they are to be treated under *pakṣa*. However, Cāttaṉār opined that these two superfluous constituents are to be subsumed under *dṛṣṭānta*. Those who favoured the three-membered syllogism are the early Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhist scholars. In addition the Mīmāmsakas, as already noted by Maraijñāna Deśigar, subscribed to the trayavayava theory of syllogism. Further, the exponents of Sāmkhya system upheld the same theory.

In the later Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhism, the theory of two-membered syllogism was first enunciated by Dharmakirti (625 A.D.) the author of Nyāyabindu.[71] According to him, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta* are sufficient to transmit one's inferential knowledge to others. It is quite interesting to note that Tirujñāna Sambandhar, a contemporary of Dharmakīrti, has made a passing reference to the logical school of Dharmakīrti, when he repudiated the Buddhists that the Self-Effulgent Absolute could not be apprehended through the means of the two-membered syllogism consisting of *ētu* (-hetu) and *eṭuttukkāṭṭu* (dṛṣṭānta).[72] As a mystic he believed that insight and intuition alone could make one realise the Absolute and not the logical means.

In Jainism, pakṣa and hetu are accepted by Akalanka and Māṇikyanandi to be the two necessary and sufficient constituents of syllogism. It is the general opinion of the Jain logicians that the number of the constituents varies according to the grasping power of the receiver. They argued that dṛṣṭānta (-example) did not help one either for the apprehension of the sādhya or for the ascertainment of vyāpti. It is clear that in the two-membered syllogism of the

Buddhist school of Dharmakirti, pakṣa was omitted, while in the Jainistic logic of Māṇikyanandi dṛṣṭnta was left out. However, both Buddhist and Jain logicians were the first to reduce the number of the constituents of a syllogism to two. Nevertheless, the Naiyāyikas never accepted the syllogism with either three members or two members, since they laid stress on all the five members which are essential syntactical constituents, collectively contributing for the clear transmission of one's inferential knowledge to others.

So far we have seen the various views in the acceptance of the members that constitute a syllogism. Though there is no clear statement with regard to the stand of the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta, it seems that Arulnandisivam has accepted the three-membered syllogism as implied from the contents of the eleventh poem of Aḷavai-y-iyal. We have already noted that he has also mentioned about the upholders of the syllogism with five members. From this statement, the commentators Maṟaijñāna Deśigar and Sivāgrayogin concluded that both the three-membered syllogism and five-membered syllogism were acceptable to the Saiva Siddhāntins. Sivajñāna Swamigal mentioned in his commentary that apart from the Tārkikas (i.e. Naiyāyikas), there were others who accepted the five-membered syllogism.[73] While making this reference, he should have had in his mind the Vaiśeṣikas, the Madhyamika Buddhists and perhaps the early Mimāmsakas and Sāmkhyas.

Pandiperumal has implied by the reference "Colluvārum uḷar" that there are others who do not subscribe to the five-membered syllogism, since in their view the last two members, viz., *upanaya* and *nigamana* are contained in the first three. He further states that the first three are of primary importance. Though he concluded with the acceptance of the three-membered syllogism, he quoted a lengthy verse from the Saiva Agamic Tamil text Jñāṉāmirtam to establish the existence of God through the means of five-membered syllogism.[74]

Tattuvaprakāśam calls the five members as fivefold *anvayas*.[75] Since each avayava (member) is syntactically connected with one another, the term '*anvaya*', literally meaning an aggreeable constituent, to denote each member in the syllogism seems to be suitable and meaningful.

Though there is no direct reference in Sivaneriprakasam to the number of the members in a syllogism, the commentator makes a clear mention to the *pañcāvayava*.[76] The definitions and also the

statement illustrating the avayavas of parārthānumāna which are found in the commentary are the same found in the commentaries of Sivagrayogin and others.

The significance of the Avayavas

The importance of each avayava in the Nyāya-vākya (-syllogism) and its role in the process of cognition have been highlighted by the commentators. The five members which are popular in the Nyāya system are the following:

1. *Pratijñā* (proposition), 2. *Hetu* (reaons), 3. *Udāharaṇa* (example), 4. *Upanaya* (application) and 5. *Nigamana* (conclusion)

These terms excepting the first are respectively called apadeśa, nidarśana, anusamdhāna and pratyāmnāya by some logicians of the Vaiśeṣika system.[77]

Now, let us briefly note the significance of each of the terms constituting the syllogism.

Pratijñā or Pakṣa

This member is variously known as dharmin, minor term, subject, statement, thesis, proposition etc. It is the first member in the order of enumeration of the pañca-avayavas as found in Nyāya Sūtra. The commentator of Sivaneriprakasam defines pratijñā to be the primary member which declares what one likes to establish (i.e. declaration of *iṣṭārtha*).[78] It is a mere declaration of a probandum. It informs the locus and also the object of inference. It is a tentative judgement in the form of a subject and predicate. It is a hypothetical statement possessing either positive or negative relation existing between the minor term and major term (-sādhya), devoid of any justifying grounds. It simply presents one's own opinion requiring for its validity the support of the subsequent members. In a sense, the thought of conclusion is found in it, waiting for its proof.

Annam Bhatta has defined pakṣa as the subject in which the predicate or that which is to be proved is doubted.[79] The proposition is only a suggestion. The stock example to illustrate pratijñā is this:

The hill has fire.

In this statement, the hill is the subject or minor term while 'has fire' is the predicate or the major term which is to be proved.

Hetu

Hetu is the second member. It is also known as linga, sādhana, mark, sign, proban, middle term, ground, the means of proof etc. It states the presence of the reason in the pakṣa. It serves to establish the probandum through positive or negative example. Nandisivagrayogin explains hetu to have pervasion with the sādhya.[80] This elucidation is in conformity with that of Praśastapāda who defined it to be the statement of mark (-linga) or probans which has invariable concomitance with the probandum. So, it is evident that the hetu asserts either a positive or negative relation.

Dignāga (450 A.D.) has been regarded to be the first logician to propound the trairupya theory of reason.[81] He envisaged that a valid reason has three characteristics which are also advocated by the Buddhist Tamil epic poet Cāttanār in the following passage.[82]

moḻinta pakkattu ūṉṟi niṟṟalum

Capakkattu uṇṭātalum

Vipakkattu iṉṟiyē vitutalum

It denotes the necessary presence of the probans in the subject wholly, and in the similars only, while its absolute absence in the heterologues is essential. The subsequent writers on Buddhist logic like Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara also advocated the trairūpya theory. Even the Jain logicians like Samantabhadra, Akalanka and others also supported the same theory.

But, the logicians of the Nyāya school never subscribed to the Buddhist theory. We have already enumerated the five characteristics of anvayavyatirekin, one of the three fold types of hetu, as propounded by Uddyotakara and Jayanta. According to the former, Kevalvānvayin and kevalavyatirekin individually possesses four characteristic features, which are also noted by Sivagrayogin in his bhāṣya on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār. These logicians opined that the presence of all the specific features in the hetu can establish the presence of inseparable connection between the probans and probandum. Hetu is usually presented in the following form:

Because there is smoke.

The reason is always followed by example.

Udāharaṇa - Dṛṣṭānta

This is the third member of the syllogism. It is also known as example. Akṣapāda considered example as a similar instance having the essential property of the major term. He has identified twofold examples. viz., Sādharmya i.e. the positive and Vaidharmya, the negative. In Maṇimēkalai these two terms are also used to denote respectively the affirmative and negative types of examples.[83]

Nandisivagrayogin defines example which provides the invariable and universal concomitance between the hetu and sādhya.[84] Since concomitance is formed in two ways viz., positive and negative, the examples are also two fold. The example, cited in favour of the universal concomitance agreeably present between the proban and probandum, is known as sādharmya dṛṣṭānta i.e. positive example. If it is in support of the absence of the concomitance between the two terms, it is known as vaidharmya dṛṣṭānata, i.e. negative example. The stock examples for the two types of dṛṣṭānta are the following:

1. Positive example : Whereever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen

2. Negative example : Whereever there is no smoke there is no fire as in the lake.

The example cited for the agreement in presence between the proban and probandum is sādharmya. The example adduced for the agreement in absence between the said two terms is vaidharmya.

Upanaya (Application)

It is the fourth member of the syllogism. It is the application of a general principle to a specific instance. It indicates that the pratijñā can be accomodated under general principle. Actually it helps one to know that the general principle with its example is equally applicable to the bare statement of pratijñā that is to be ascertained and established.

Upanaya denotes that the hetu exists in the pratijñā, just like the dṛṣṭānta refers to the universal concomitance between the hetu and sādhya. Upanaya is exemplified by the following statement found in the commentary of Sivagrayogin.[85]

Like the kitchen, this hill has smoke.

Upanaya should not be taken as a repetition of the proban.

The difference between hetu and upanaya is to be noted. Hetu provides simply any positive or negative consomitance existing between the hetu and pakṣa, while upanaya supports the relation between them. Upanaya dispels all doubts with regard to the presence of the hetu in the pakṣa (-subject) and this aspect is essential for arriving at the right conclusion.

Nigamana (Conclusion)

It is the fifth and last member of the syllogism. It is the final judgement or conclusion of the proposition (-pratijñā). It confirms the relation between the minor term (-pratijñā) and the major term (-sādhya). So, it should not be misunderstood that the pratijñā and nigamana are the same. Being the concluding part of the syllogism it synthesizes all the other four members and establishes the existence of the predicate in the subject.

Though nigamana resembles pratijñā at the surface level, there is a difference between them. While pratijñā is a bare and tentative statement waiting for ascertainment, nigamana is the proven statement strengthening the validity of the proposition. The stock example for illustrating nigamana is this.[86]

Therefore the hill has fire.

Thus, the process of parārthānumānaa in the form of a syllogism becomes complete through nigamana.

Next in order, Arulnandisivam deals breifly with the three varieties of anumāna. They are the following.[87]

1. *Pūrva-k-kāṭci aṉumāna*, i.e. *Pratyakṣanumāna* (perceptual inference)
2. *Karutal aṉumāna*, i.e. *anumānanumāna* (conceptual inference)
3. *Uraiyāl aṉumāna*, i.e. *āgamānumāna* (Inference of testimony)

It is heartening to note that in the texts of Siva Siddhanta and their commentaries, we have already come across with the three-fold types of inferences in more than one form. To recall, pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyato dṛṣṭo constituted one set. Svabhāva, kārya and anupalabdhi formed one group. Anvaya, vyatireka and anvayavyatireka made one set. Now, as a fourth group of threefold

inferences, the aforesaid perceptual inference etc., are propounded by Arulnandisivam. In this context, it is proper to mention that Uddyotakara (575 A.D.) has interpreted the term *'trividham'* (Nyāyavārtika, 1.1.5) in various capacities to evolve many threefold types of inference.

The Tamil commentators of Saiva Siddhanta texts reveal their intimate knowledge in the various schools of Indian logic, besides exhibiting their keen observations, critical acumen and clear insight. Let us briefly present the elucidation of the commentators of the aforesaid three new types of anumāna.

Pūrva-k-kāṭci anumāna

This is perceptual inference. It is based on the smelling of the fragrance of a particular flower which is not seen. The previous knowledge of the fragrance which is inseparably connected with the said flower enables one to infer the existence of the same flower at a later period. The phrase "*pūrva-k-kāṭci*" in the text throws some light on the nature of the inference. It means the previous perception of the co-presence of the flower and its fragrance. Perception includes the cognition not only through the eyes but also through nose and other sense organs. The knowledge thus obtained later on guides the observer to infer, after smelling only the fragrance, the positive existence of the unseen flower.

Since fragrance is the dharma of the flower, which is the dharmin, this type of anumāna is also known as *dharma-dharmin anumāna* according to Sivagrayogin. He also calls it *purvadarśana anumāna.*[88] It is clear that *pūrvakkāṭci* and *pūrvadarśana* are the same.

Sivajnāna Swamigal elucidates that atman's Cit-śakti cognizing the flower and other objects through the probans smell, etc., is known as *pūrvakkāṭci anumāna.*[89]

Karutal anumāṉam

This is known as Anumānānumāna or the conceptual inference. The knowledge of a particular person is imperceptible. Nevertheless, the volume of his knowledge can be gauged from his utterances. The contents of the speech, the way of expressing ideas, the quotations that he produced, the usage of apt words, the power of argument etc., are the clear indicators to his standard of knowledge. There is a reference in Tirukkuṟaḷ to this type of inference:[90]

So, measuring one's knowledge through the probans of his words which are associated with his knowledge is called conceptual inference. According to Sivagrayogin, this type of inference is known as *Vacanalingānumāna*, i.e. vacana (-speech) becoming the marker to infer one's knowledge.[91] Pandiperumal calls this *karuttu anumānam*.[92]

Sivajnana Swamigal explains that atman's Cit-Śakti cognizing the stuff revealing the limits of one's knowledge through the probans of one's speech is known as *karutal anumāna*.[93]

Āgamanumana

It denotes the inference of testimony. The inferential knowledge, which is derived from the source of Āgamas (-scriptures) which inform that the pleasure and pain, experienced by somebody in the present birth, are the results respectively of his virtuous and vicious deeds committed in his previous birth, is called Āgamanumana. It is very difficult to see in this existence that a particular virtuous deed would yield a specific benefit, while a certain vice would produce some sorrow. Hence, the results of one's deeds are to be understood only on the basis of the Agamas containing the trustworthy words of aptas. Normally they are held to be the revelations of God.

Sivajñana Swamigal adds that the inference, generated by atman's Cit-Śakti about the future existence on the basis of the deserts of one's own deeds in accordance with the statements proclaimed in Vedas and Agamas is known as *Ural anumāna*.[94] The word '*ural*' connotes many meanings such as statement, speech, commentary, etc. Here, it denotes *aptavacana*.

Since the statements in the scriptures formed the marker or linga to infer the status of a person, this kind of inference is also called *Āgamalingānumāna* by Sivagrayogin.[95] Pandiperumal simply calls it *Sastrānumāna*, since sastra includes not only agamas but all other trustworthy utterances, like the Meykanda Sastras and Twelve Tirumurais.[96]

Sivagrayogin and Sivajñāna Swamigal have clearly stated in their commentaries that all the other pramāṇas, apart from perception, inference and verbal testimony as noted in the first poem of Aḷavai-y-iyal, are to be reckoned on a par with pratyakṣanumana under the general category of anumāna pramāṇa. It is to be pointed out that if the verbal testimony is also taken as a means of inference,

it is appropriate to broadly classify all the pramāṇas under the two major categories, viz., perception and inference, as we find in the early Vaiśeṣika system and also the Sautrāntika Yogācāra system of Buddhism.

Two more types

In Sivaneṟiprakāsam, Sivagrayogin has further classified inference into two kinds, viz., *arthānumāna* and *sabdānumāna.*[97] The word and its meaning are inseparably connected. Even great devotional poets used to give the comparison of sabdārtha to the intimate and inseparable union of Śiva and Śakti. However, Sivagrayogin or the commentator being his disciple Nandisivagrayogin never explained what was meant by sabdānumāna and arthānumāna. Nevertheless, the commentator makes a mention that such a classification is found in Pauṣkara Āgama. Perhaps, these two kinds may correspond to *artharūpatva* and *sabdarūpatva* as propounded by Sivāditya in his Saptapadārthi. Accordingly, the former one indicates the inference for oneself, characterized by substance, while the latter one denotes the inference for others, characterized by sound or words. In the words of Dharmottara, the svārthānumāna was considered to be notional (*jñanātmaka*) in character, while parārthānumāna to be verbal (*sabdātmaka*).[98]

So far the detailed features concerning the theory of Anumāna as found in the Siddhānta texts and related other works have been presented. Next in order, Arulnandisivam proceeds to propound the concept of verbal testimony as adumberated in the system of Saiva Siddhānta, to be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

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20. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivajñāna Swamigal urai, pp.17-18.
21. Tattuva-p-pirakāśam, pp.17-18.
22. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, pp.66-67.
23. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivajnānaswamigal urai, pp.18-19.
24. Tattuvapirakāśam, p.25.
25. Sivaneripirakāśam, p.25.
26. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 10.
27. Sivaneriprakasam, p.25.
28. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivajnānaswamigal urai, pp.18-19.
29. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 10
30. Ibid., Sivagrayogi urai, pp.67.
31. Ibid., Sivajñānaswamigal urai, p.18.
32. Sivaneṟipirakāśam, p.25.
33. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai 8, p.17.
34. Ibid., Sivagrayogiurai, p.63.
35. Sivajñāna bodham, Pandiperumal virutti, pp.41-42.

36. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, Sivagnanaswamigal urai, p.18.

37. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 8.

38. Tattuvapirakāsam, p.17.

39. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, p.63.

40. Sivajñāna bodham, Pandiperumal virutti, p.42.

41. i. Sivaneṟiprakāam, p.26.

    ii. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, p.63.

42. Bijalwan, C.D., *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, Heritage Publishers, N.Delhi, 1977, p.146-7.

43. Ibid., p.151.

44. Sivajñāna Siddhiyar Aḷavai, 8, p.17.

45. *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p.164.

46. *Maṇimekalai*, XXIX 86-90, 137-141.

47. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 11, p.19.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., Sivagrayogi urai, p.67.

50. Ibid., Sivajñānaswamigal urai, p.19.

51. *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p.143.

52. *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimēkalai*, pp.272-3.

53. Sivajñāna bodham Sūtra 1, First Adhikaraṇa, Sivajñānaswamigal urai (Kazhagam), pp.10-11.

54. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, Nandi Sivagrayogi urai, p.27.

55. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p.119.

56. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, p.27.

57. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, pp.70-71.

58. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, p.27.

59. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, p.70.

60. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, Nandi Sivagrayogi urai, p.27.

61. *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p.167.

62. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp.85-8.

63. i. *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p.169.

    ii. Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies – *The tradition of Nyāya – Vaiśesika*, pp.187-8.

64. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 11, p.19.

65. "*mērkōl ētu tiṭṭāntam upanayam*

nikamanam eṉa muṟai nikaḷa-p- paṭumavai"

Vide, Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aṟuvar urai, Sivajñāna bodha yantra sālai edition, Sindatiripettai, Chennai, Carvari Year, Vaikasi, p.190, p.195.

66. Tucci, G. *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, P.XIX.

67. i. *History of Indian Logic*, pp.263-6.

 ii. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol.I, p.29.

68. *Maṇimekalai*, XXIX, 57-8.

69. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aṟuvar urai, p.190.

70. *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimekalai*, p.262.

71. i. *Tamiḻum Tattuvamum*, p.289.

 ii. Nyayābindu, Peterson's edition, pp.115-6.

72. *Tirujñāna Sambandhar Devāram*, III, 54.5.

73. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivajñāna Swamigal urai, p.20.

74. Sivajñān bodham, Pandiperumal virutti, p.49.

75 Tattuvapirakāśam, pp.18-19.

76. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, p.28.

77. *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp.167-8.

78. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, p.28.

79. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.II, p.76.

80. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, p.28.

81. *Buddhism As Expounded in Manimekalai*, pp.272-3.

82. *Maṇimekalai*, XXIX, 122-4.

83. Ibid., XXIX, 136-140.

84. Sivaneṟiprakāśam, p.28.

85. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, p.69.

86. Ibid.

87. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 12, p.20.

88. Ibid., Sivagrayogi urai, p.71.

89. Ibid., Sivajñānaswamigal urai, p.20.

90. *Tirukkuṟaḷ*, 959; also 641-650.
91. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, p.71.
92. Sivajnana bodham, Pandiperumal virutti, p.50.
93. Sivajnana Siddhiyār Sivajnana Swamigal urai, p.20.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., Sivagrayogi urai, p.72.
96. Sivajnana bodham, Pandiperumal virutti, p.50.
97. Sivaneriprakasam, 22, p.21.
98. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp.122-3.

X. THEORY OF VERBAL TESTIMONY

Verbal testimony has been accepted by most of the systems of Indian Philosophy to be one of the valid sources of knowledge. Before directly proceeding to deal with the theory of verbal testimony as upheld in the system of Saiva Siddhānta, it is useful to briefly present the views of various systems with regard to the validity of verbal testimony.

Among the heterodox systems of Indian Philosophy, the Cārvākas-the Indian Materialists did not accept verbal testimony to be a valid source of knowledge. They admitted only perception to be the sound means of knowledge. They questioned the tradition and other forms of testimony. They rejected the Vedic authority. In their opinion, the Vedas were written by the Brahmins and the rituals and religious injunctions prescribed in these scriptures were meant only for earning their livelihood. So, they never approved the Vedic thoughts.

In Buddhism, only the Mahayana schools gave prominence to the study of epistemology. Nagarjuna, the exponent of Madhyamika school, Maitreya and Asanga of the Yogācāra school of Mahayana Buddhism accepted verbal testimony as one of the valid means of knowledge, as understood from G. Tucci's Pre-Diññaga Buddhist texts on Logic from Chinese sources. However, Vasubandhu, the celebrated teacher of Digññāga and the earliest exponent of Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school of Buddhism was the first to advocate only perception and inference as the valid source of knowledge.[1] According to Dignāga and Cāttanār, verbal testimony was one version of inference and hence there was no need to treat it as an independent source of knowledge.[2] The logicians of this school adduced the intention of a speaker to be the essential cause and as a result the sentences are uttered. Just like a person who infers the existence of fire on seeing its effect i.e. smoke, on hearing the word the substance is cognised. They held that the word was the middle term (hetu) to grasp the sense of the speaker's utterances. So they brought verbal testimony under inference.

However, the Jain epistemologists accepted testimony as a valid source of knowledge. They divided it into two categories. Under the first category the original scriptures of Jainism delivered by the Tīrthankaras, Arhats, Acharyas and others are included. In

Cilappatikāram (300 A.D.) the scriptures are called 'Perumakaṉ Tirumoḻi' (10:47). 'Jnānat tirumoḻi', 'Meyppāṭṭiyaṟkai' (11.115) etc. The Tirthankara is extolled as "Ankam Payantōṉ" (10.187) i.e. 'He who delivered the Angas'. Under the second type of verbal testimony all the other Jain scriptures, authored by the great ascetics and specialists are subsumed. The knowledge, derived from the study of these scriptures is called *Śrutijñāna*. This kind of verbal knowledge covers all the objects existing in the past, present and future. The Jain logicians envisaged that the scriptural knowledge, which did not go against the facts arrived at by direct knowledge (i.e. perception), should be held valid.

When we turn to the homogeneous systems, all except the early Vaiśeṣikas, accepted verbal testimony as a useful source of valid knowledge. In the Nyāya Sūtra, Akṣapāda defined Sabda pramāṇa thus:

"Āptopadeśa : Śabda:" (N.S.1.7.1)

It literally means that Sabda is the upadeśa of Āpta, a trust worthy person. Tāyumānavar (1700 A.D.), the great Tamil mystic-saint emphatically expressed that the utterance of the Āpta would never turn to be false when he referred to the statement occurring in the Kenopaniśad that even an atom can not move without Him (-the Absolute God):

Avaṉaṉṟi ōraṇuvum acaiyātu eṉum
āptar moḻi poyyākumā?

The word '*āptavacanam*' becomes '*āptar moḻi*' in the above passage.[3] Vātsyāyana, the great commentator of Nyāya Sutra has defined the term āpta as one who has direct knowledge of the moral law (-dharma) and has the power of perceiving things in their true nature, besides possessing the capacity to transmit the acquired knowledge properly to other people with a view to guiding them in the right perspective.

It is true that the Naiyāyikas have attached much importance to verbal testimony, since it forms the major source of knowledge. We learn the historical and cultural traditions only through the texts. Even those schools, which do not recognise verbal testimony as an independent source of knowledge, rest on the texts of their own exponents. The Naiyāyikas and the school of grammarians have

studied much about the nature of sounds, the significance of sounds and the structure of sentences in order to bring forth the full import of Sabda pramāṇa. According to them, a word may consist of a single phoneme (-letter) or more phonemes to denote an object. The relation between the word and its meaning is explained in many ways. Cēṉāvaraiyar (1200 A.D.) the celebrated commentator of Collātikāram (-the vyākaraṇa section) of Toḷkāppiyam (500 B.C.), has classified the words into two groups:[4] 1. The isolated word (-Taṉimoḻi) and 2. The phrase and sentences (i.e. Toṭarmoḻi). The first type of words explain the object through 'Camaya āṟṟal', an equivalent to 'Samaya Śakti' in Sanskrit. It means the denotative power of the individual word to signify an object through the convention (-samaya), made by Iśvara that such and such a sense should be grasped from such and such a word. This convention is known as Īśvara saṁketaḥ or Saṁketa rūpa śakti. The Naiyāyikas of the later period suggested that such conventions may very well be established by the people also. The sentences made up of words should convey the meaning through *avāynilai* (ākāṅkṣā), *takuti* (-yogyatā) and *aṇmainilai* (-sannidhi). By the time of Cēṉāvaraiyar, the logical and grammatical schools became very popular and hence he has introduced these technical words to elucidate the relation between the two types of words and their meanings, though Tolkāppiyam is silent on the subject. Let us explain each of these three technical terms.

1. Ākaṅkṣā denotes the mutual dependence of the words occurring in a sentence. A word occurring in a sentence requires the help of another word to convey the complete sense.

2. Yogyatā denotes the compatibility to accord with the sense of the sentence. The usual example is 'Nīrāl naṉai' i.e. "Drench it with water". If one says, 'Drench it with fire' there is no consistency or compatibility between the words drenching and fire, and hence the sentence can not convey the right sense.

3. Sannidhi denotes the utterance of words in quick succession without undue pause or gap between one word and subsequent words. Then only the sequence of the sense will be understood from the syntactical structure of the sentences.

Further, the logicians and grammarians have identified three major ways by which a word conveys the sense. They are denoted by the technical words abhidā, (mukhya), lakṣana and gauṇya. Each word has a sense which is considered to be the relation between the word and the object it denotes. Abhidā, also known as mukhya or vācaka, indicates the primary denotative power of the word which gives the explicit meaning of an object. If the word denotes an object implicitly, then it is known as lakṣaṇa. If the particular word indirectly denotes the related quality as a substance, then it is called gauṇya, which is attributed as one aspect of lakṣaṇa. Teyvaccilaiyār, one of the eminent commentators of Tolkappiyam elucidated the significance of *icai, kuṟippu* and *paṇpu* of Tol. Col.293 in the light of *abhidā, lakṣaṇā* and *gauṇya.*[5] Though the Naiyāyikas accepted the verbal testimony as the valid source of knowledge, they never subscribed to the theory of eternality of the Vedas, as upheld by the Mīmāmsakas.

In the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, Kaṇāda did not mention verbal testimony. Like the Buddhists, he advocated only the first two pramāṇas, viz., perception and inference. Nevertheless, in the commentary of Praśastapāda, it was recognised as an independent source of knowledge. In the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai (500 A.D.). when its author Cāttaṉār referred that the Vaiśeṣika upheld five pramāṇas including Sabda, he should have had in his mind the celebrated commentator Praśastapāda.

In Sāṁkhyakārikā, Īśvarakrishna has accorded an autonomous position to verbal testimony.[6] The exponents of Samkhya system had their own views on Āptavacana. They never accepted the eternality of the four Vedas. They claimed that though no personal authorship is ascribed to the Vedas, their inherent potency (Śakti) to denote various objects has been instructed to the discples by the most reliable persons who are called the āptas. According to Vācaspati Miśra, one of the earliest commentators of Samkhya kārikā, the word śruti denotes the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence made up of words: "Śrutiḥ vākya janitham vākyārtha jñānam". The Samkhyas never accepted the view of the Yogācāra Buddhists who treated āptavacana under inference. Since the meaning of the utterance becomes the object of cognition, the sentence, as it is, can not be considered as linga or mark, which is not the property of the object as in the case of smoke and fire. So, it can not be brought under inference. It deserves to be given an independent status.

In the Yoga Sutra (1.7), Patañjali has accepted Scripture as one of the valid sources of knowledge. According to the Yoga system, the knowledge, acquired through perception and inference by the most perfect and reliable persons, communicated for the benefit of others through the device of language is known as Āgama Pramāṇa.

In the Pūrva-Mīmāmsa Sūtra, Jaimini gave prominence to verbal testimony. According to the Mimāmsakas, the Vedas are eternal, not created either by Gods or human beings including the seers and saints. The words possess inherent potency by which they communicate the sense by themselves to denote the objects. So, the relation between the word and its sense is not due to convention but due to nature. In other words, the meaning of the words is not made or organised either by scholars or popular convention and hence the Mimāmsakas attributed the natural relationship between words and their significance. The validity of the enternality of the Vedas was questioned by many systems including Saiva Siddhānta that we will see in the course of this chapter. Before that, let us consider the Vedantic view of verbal testimony.

The exponents of Vedānta upheld verbal testimony to be the most reliable among the various sources of knowledge. The Prasthānatraya, comprising the Primal Upanishads, Bhagavadgīta and Brahmasūtra, their commentaries by Adi Śankara and other related supplementary texts consituted the main corpus of verbal testimony. In the Tamil text[7] Vēdanta Cūḷāmaṇi (A.D.1700), all the scriptures of Agama pramāṇa are classified under three categories, viz., 1. Vidhi texts which are injunctive, prescribing the rituals, duties, obligations etc. to be performed by the people; 2. Niṣedha texts, which prohibit one from performing interdictory actions, and 3. Siddhārtha bodhaka texts which assert and instruct clearly the theme of identity of Siva and soul. The most popular Vedāntic Tamil text[8] Kaivalya Navanītam (A.D.1500) emphatically stated that the Vedas never falsify and the apparent contraditions, if any, in the Vedic statements could be resolved by the interpretation of threefold lakṣaṇas.

Normally the technique of *lakṣaṇātraya* has been adopted by the grammarians to explain the semantics of some strange sentence structures. Nevertheless, the philosophers also followed them.

Thirumantiram (A.D.500), the tenth among the twelve Saiva Cononical works, which has been usually treated the earliest extant

text on Saiva Siddhanta, possesses also sufficient materials on Advaita Vedanta. Its author, the great mystic and yogi Tirumūlar has beautifully discussed the *lakṣaṇātraya*[9] in its eighth section. In the grammatical tradition, a word primarily conveys the direct sense which is variously called *mukhyārtha, vācyārtha* and *abhidārtha*. It is normally the etymological sense or the primary sense. But in special contexts, the same word generates a special meaning being indirect and figurative, known as *lakṣyārtha*, which the interpreter brings forth to drive home the implied sense. *Lakṣyārtha* is of three kinds which are named in Tamil by Tirumūlar, as 1. *Viṭṭatu*, 2. *Viṭātatu* and 3. *Viṭṭuviṭātatu*. However, he has employed only the third type which alone instructs and asserts the identity of the Absolute soul, Brahman and individual soul, Atman. In other Tamil texts especially Kaivalya Navanītam and Vedānta Cūḷāmaṇi, the other two kinds of *lakṣyārtha* are also treated. Let us consider them briefly.

Viṭṭatu (Jahal)

The Tamil term connotes that which is left out, while the Sanskrit word indicates that which is discarded. In the oft-quoted statement,"The hamlet is on the Ganges", the primary sense of the word Ganges is the flow of the river. But, it can not be the substratum of the hamlet and hence, the primary sense (*mukhyārtha*) is left out. However, through the contextual or secondary sense (-*lakṣyārtha*), the same word generated the sense, the banks of the river. Thus, the statement, "The hamlet is on the Ganges" becomes meaningful that it exists on its banks.

Viṭātatu (Ajahal)

The term literally means that which is not left out. In Kaivalya Navanītam, the given example is this: "The black and red runs." In this statement, the words black and red do not exactly mean the colours, but the horse in which they inhere. Therefore, the words do not give the primary sense of quality, but the secondary sence of substance i.e. horse. Herein the *lakṣyārtha* is derived without giving up the *mukhyārtha*.

In the Tamil Vedānta Cūḷāmaṇi,[10] a different illustration is produced. In the statement, "The spear goes", the primary sense of the word spear, which is inanimate and inert and hence can not go all by itself, does not hold good. Then, it is derived that the man who wields the weapon marches on the way. In this example, the word spear without excluding the primary sense, provides the significant secondary meaning.

Viṭṭuviṭātatu (Jahal Ajahal)

This term indicates that which is both left out and not left out. The usual example is: "That Devatatta is this Devadatta". This statement is found in all the three Tamil texts, quoted above. In this statement, the demonstrative pronouns 'that' and 'this' denote the same person Devadatta, respectively in relation to his boyhood and adulthood. 'That' refers to the past youthful personality, activity, position etc. of Devadatta, while 'this' indicates the present position of the same person, his aged condition, declining faculty, physical changes etc. Though the meanings with mutually contradictory attributes viz., 'that' and 'this' could not be adequately related to each other, they denote the same person without any contradiction. One, who knows very well Devadatta both in his formative period and the present times, identifies the intrinsic core i.e. *ekarasa* in the person. What is left out is the adjunct and what is remained is the intrinsic person of Devadatta. This example is quoted to explicate the esoteric significance of the Chandogya Upanishadic statement, "Tat tvam asi" literally meaning. 'That thou art' to establish the identity of Brahman and Atman.

In the Mahāvākya,[11] which Tirumular named *Pērurai* in classical Tamil, the words "tat"and "tvam" (-literally meaning that and you) respectively convey the direct primary sense, Iśvara and jīva, while 'asi' their existence as one entity. Nevertheless, the esoteric significance of this mahāvākya reveals the fact that Iśvara denoted by the word 'tat' and Jiva, denoted by the word 'tvam' has the same rasa or core. Hence, if their adjuncts (upādhi) are removed, they remain the same Brahman, the only Reality which is absolute and supreme.

Thus, it becomes evident that the exponents of Advaita Vedanta accepted verbal testimony as the vital and valid source of knowledge to expound their cardinal principle of Monism. However, they upheld that the utterance of a person holds good, if its contents are not invalidated by other sources of knowledge. Though they accepted the eternality of Vedārtha i.e. the Vedic substance, they denied the eternality of the Vedic texts, as upheld by the advocates of Purva Mimāmsa.

Ramanuja, the eminent exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Mādhva, the interpreter of Dvaita Vedanta have also accepted Āgama Pramāṇa to be an independent source of knowledge. Now let us pass on to deal

with the view of the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta on Āgama Pramāṇa.

Saiva Siddhantin's view of Verbal Testimony

Since Saiva Siddhanta is chiefly based on the scriptures, viz., Vedas and Agamas, it is proper that the exponents of this system have accepted verbal testimony to be one of the primary sources of knowledge to establish the basic principles. In Tirumantiram (500 A.D.), there are two chapters glorifying the significance of Vedas and Agamas (1.2.1-6;3.1-10) which, according to Tirumular, are revealed by Lord Śiva for the benefit of all beings. It is essential to note that greater importance is adduced to the Agamas than to the Vedas. Tirumantiram itself is held in high esteem by the Saivites to be the first Tamil̲ Āgama possessing the quintessence of all the Sivāgamas. In the devotional lyrics of the Saiva apostles (600 A.D.-900 A.D.), references to the divine authorship of Vedas and Agamas are many. The Meykanda Śastras also attached much importance to these scriptures. Arulnandisivam categorically stated in a verse that Lord Siva manifested Himself in the form of a divine preceptor and delivered the scriptures which are known as Vedas and Agamas.[12] However, he laid stress on the paramount importance of the Agamas in the right understanding of the principles of Saiva Siddhanta. He declared that the message of the Vedic knowledge is of a generic nature, while that of the Agamas is of a specific nature. He claimed that the Agamas are essential and indispensable for Saiva Siddhanta, whereas the Vedas are common:[13]

"āraṇanūl potu; caivam arumcir̲appu nūlām"

He denoted the Agamas by the word 'Caivam' (-Saivam) which actually meant the Saiva religion. It is clear that he treated the Agamas and Saivism are the same, thereby hinting the very close and intimate relation between them. Manickavasagar (800 A.D.), the celebrated author of Tiruvāsagam has made a clear mention to both the Vedas and Agamas in Sivapuranam the opening poem of the devotional literature. He extolled Lord Siva to be very subtle Supreme Being, untouched by the utterances of the Vedas.[14] Thus he implied that the Vedic knowledge is insufficient to comprehend the Absolute Reality. In a different portion of the same poem, he addressed the Lord to be the compassionate one who assumes the divine form of the Agama to bestow grace on his devotees.[15] Indologists are of the opinion that all the Indian speculative thoughts

are to be classified into two categories, viz., the Vedic and the Agamic. Both of them reflect two different trends and streams of Indian cultural tradition. Though early references to the Agamas are available in the Sāntiparva of Mahabharata and Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma Sutra, scholars like Pawate are of the view that the Agamas are as ancient as the Vedas.[16] We have to understand by such statement that the Agamic thoughts are native and original, whereas Vedic thoughts have included at least some of the native thoughts but most of them are foreign. The construction of temples, the principles of worship, the concept of Supreme Being, the doctrine of transmigration of souls according to one's own deeds etc., are considered to be pre-Aryan and since the Agamas, that have elaborately dealt with these aspects, are naturally to be treated as the product of the natives. Subsequently divine authorship should have been attributed to them. The Agamic tradition is awefully preserved in the hymns of Tirumuṟais and Meykandasāstras.

Lord Siva has been praised by Sambandar (650 A.D.) as "Ākamac celvar" i.e. the Rich one who revealed the Agamas.[17] His contemporary and an elder Saint Tirunavukkarasar (590 A.D. to 671 A.D.) mentioned in one of his devotional poems that Lord Śiva preached the Agamas to Śakti under the marutam tree in the shrine at Tiruviṭaimarudūr.[18] Sundarar (710 A.D.) recorded in his Tiumuṟai about the revelation of the Agamas by Siva and the adepts in them chanting the Sivamantras.[19] His contemporary Pallava King Rajasimha has been honoured in one of his inscriptions with the title 'Āgamapiriyaṉ', meaning "the lover of Agamas", and also eulogised as an expert in Saiva Siddhānta.[20] The earliest available Tamil metrical lexicon, Pinkalantai Nigandu (800 A.D.) meant jnāna by the word Agama, thereby indicating the significance of the jnāna portions of the Agamas which actually dealt with the fundamental tenets of Saiva Siddhānta.[21]

The exponents of Saiva Siddhānta never neglected the Vedas, though they gave lesser importance to them. In their opinion, the Vedas provided the authoritative source materials to many systems of Indian philosophy, and hence they were to be taken as general, whereas the Agamas formed the bedrock on which the edifice of Saiva Siddhanta has been raised. *For this reason Saiva Siddhanta has also been known as Āgamānta, i.e. the end of Agamas.* In other words, Saiva Siddhanta chiefly codified its tenets out of the materials, culled out from the Saiva Agamas, which are primarily 28

in number. In one of the hymns of Tirujnanasambandhar, Agamas are also known as '*Śivadharma*'.[22]

Since the system of Siva Siddhanta is based on the Agamas, it is quite natural that its expounders included Agama as one of the three major sources of knowledge. There are objects which are not comprehended either through perception or inference. But they are cognized only through Agamas. Thus verbal testimony, not contradictory with perception and inference acquired an autonomous position in the theory of knowledge as upheld in Saiva Siddhanta. Arulnandi Sivam, in his Aḷavaiyiyal, has defined the verbal testimony thus:[23]

"Kācaṟum uraiim mānattu aṭaṅkiṭāp poruḷaik kāṭṭum"

The substance of the Tamil passage is this:

"The defectless utterance (-urai) shows the objects (for cognition) which are not subjected (for cognition) to inference)".

The Agama is refered by the word '*urai*' which simply means word, utterance, speech etc. It indicates the words of a trustworthy person who is none other than Siva Himself. In Tattuvaprakasam also, the verbal testimony is denoted by the word urai.[24] Tāyumāṉavar denotes it by the word '*āptar moḻi*', an equivalent of Aptavacana.[25] Now, let us consider the elucidation of the commentators on the Agamas.

[26]Sivagrayogin explains Vedāgamas, that are revealed by the Supreme Īśvara who is All-knower, All-pervader and All-compassionate to all souls, in order to inform all the objects and thoughts which are not cognized through pratyakṣa and anumāna. Pandiperumal[27] calls this source of knowledge as 'Śāstrapramāṇa' that reveals the things untouched by pratyakṣa and anumāna. Sivajñāna Swamigal defines that ātman's jnānaśakti cognizing the objects, that are not comprehended by perception and inference, through the means of Āptavākya without doubt and error, is known as *urai-y-aḷavai* or verbal testimony.[28] It is pertinent to note that the commentator has also used the term Aptavākya to denote Agama pramāṇa. The Commentator of Tattuvaprakāśam explains verbal testimony to be the realisation, effected as a result of persistent study of texts on Sivajnāna.[29]

Sivaneṟiprakāśam categorically mentioned that the Vedas and Sivāgamas, that are given by the grace of Siva, constituted the

Agama pramāṇa.[30] So, both of them are held to be the authoritative scriptures for Saiva Siddhanta philosophy, though the Vedas are general and Agamas are special. Further, Sivaneṟiprakāśam delineates the auspicious and divine qualities of Lord Siva, the divine author of the aforesaid scriptures. He is limitless in His knowledge, activity and compassion. He is the soul of all souls. He is devoid of favour and hatred. He transcends the time principle of day and night. The commentator of the above text clearly elucidates that the Lord is Sarvajña, the author of all creation, the bestower of grace to all. He is the inner ruler and thus the soul in all souls. He has no likes and dislikes. He is beyond the kevala (pre-creative and dorment) and sakala (after creative) states which are attributed to the souls only. He is the Supreme Śiva whose graceful utterances are the Vedas and Agamas. The commentator further mentions that all these aspects are presented in accordance with the contents of Pauṣkarāgama, which is considered to be the main source book for the better understanding of the epistemology and metaphysics of the system of Saiva Siddhānta.

In the penultimate poem of Aḷavai-y-iyal, Arulnandisivam has defined that Agama is the text of Aṟivaṉ who is from the very beginning (i.e. by nature) immeculate.[31] Hence, Agama came to be known as '*aṟivaṉ nūl*'. The Tamil word Aṟivaṉ occurs for the first time in the earliest available Tamil grammatical text, Tolkāppiyam (500 B.C.) where it meant the omnicient who is cognizant of the past, present and future. The word denoted both the seer and his equally competent disciple. These omniscient persons were considered to be the early founders of Saiva Siddhānta philosophy. Dr.S.Radhakrishnan came to this conclusion, when he observed:[32]

> *"The earliest Tamil works like Tolkāppiyam, refer to the Aṟivars or the seers, who chalked out the path to freedom and bliss".*

Sivagrayogin described the Lord to be the embodiment of knowledge i.e. Citrūpa and bereft of all blemishes from the beginningless beginning (anādi). He clearly mentions that the āgamas commencing from Kāmika and ending with Vātuḷa are twenty eight and the Vedas are four in number which are the revelations of Lord Siva. According to him, the word Agama consists of three syllables each of which contains a special sense. The first syllable of the word āgama is 'ā' which means Sivajñāna, the Divine Wisdom of Siva, while 'ga', the middle syllable indicates mokṣa-sādhana i.e. the means of liberation and the last syllable 'ma' denotes malanāśa i.e.

the destruction of the impurities, associated with the souls.[33] So, assembling all the three syllables together, the word 'Āgama' ultimately means the authorative text that provides the Divine knowledge of the Supreme Being, Siva and also the means of liberation for annihilating the effects of āṇavamala, the principle of ego that clouds the soul.

Sivagrayogin also explains the etymological significance of the word Veda which helps one to know the objects.[34] The root of Veda is "vid" which means 'to know'. Like the root 'bud' meaning intellect, becomes bodha, the root vid becomes Veda.

We have already mentioned that Pandiperumal calls these texts as Śāstras i.e. Scriptures. Sivajñānaswāmigal subsumed all the Vedas under the division of Agamas on the authority of Śrikanta Bhāsya on Brahmasūtra.[35] He did not subscribe to the view of the Tārkikas (i.e. Naiyāyikas) who propounded that, on the basis of the current words like kuṭam (-pot), paṭam (-cloth) etc. in the transactions of day-to-day life to know the concerned objects, was also verbal testimony, since they did not reveal the objects that were not apprehended through perception and inference and they could be subsumed under the category of Svabhāvalingānumana as evidenced from such words as mā etc., denoting tree etc.[36] He is of the opinion that verbal testimony manifests not only objects that do not come under the purview of perception and inference, but also the objects that are cognized through these two pramāṇas, further stating that the latter aspect of cognition is called *arthavāda.*[37] In other words *arthavāda*, on the authority of trustworthy word, provides one with the correct knowledge of an object that comes under the purview of perception and inference. The same commentator in his elaborate commentary on Sivajñānabhodam mentions that though the eternal triple realities viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa can be proved by verbal testimony, anumāna pramāṇa has also been pressed into service in order to instruct the novice. So, it becomes clear that what is known by perception and inference is also established through Agama pramāṇa. Similarly what is known through Āgama is also very well established through the means of other two pramāṇas. Then the question arises with regard to the necessity to hold Agama as an independent and autonomous source of knowledge. The commentator answers to such questions thus: There are objects like heaven, hell etc., and their existence and characteristic features are to be understood only through Āgama pramāṇa, i.e. Āptavākya.

Threefold Divisions of Āgama

The authors of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār and Tattuvaprakāśam have clearly stated that there are three divisions of Agama. They are known as Tantra, Mantra and Upadeśa. They are also called Tantrāgama or Tantirakalai, Mantrāgama or Mantirakalai and Upadeśāgama or Upadeśakalai according to the commentaries of these two texts.[38] Generally, Agamas are identified to have four parts viz. Caryā, Kriyā, Yoga and Jñāna. Pinkalantai Nigandu has explained the Agamas comprising these fourfold portions. Sekkizhar, the hagiologist of the Saiva saints has conspicuously noted this fourfold division when he narrated the biography of saint Tirumūlar, the great Sivayogin whose Tirumantiram of three thousand poems has been extolled to be the first Tamiḷ Āgama.[39] So, the question arises with regard to the component parts of Sivāgama which according to one school consisted of three sections and another school, four parts. However, Sivagrayogin ably reconciles this difference through his intrepretation which holds that the portions dealing with Caryā and Kriyā which discuss elaborately the services to God and His devotees, construction of temples, rituals etc., are to be identified with Tantra, and Yoga i.e. the characteristics of meditation with Mantra portion. Actually the Jnānapada in the Agamas presents the metaphysical principles of Saiva Siddhanta which become the main subject of Upadeśa, and hence these two parts denote the same.

[40]Sivajñāna Swamigal holds the view that not only the Agamas but also the Vedas contain three divisions which are known as Karmakānda, Upadeśakānda and Jñānakānda. Though these three seem to differ respectively from the former classification consisting of Tantra, Mantra and Upadeśa, actually they do not vary in their content and purpose. It is important to mention that the commentator of Sivaneriprakasam has made a successful attempt in equating Tantra with Karmakāṇḍa, Mantra with Upāśanakāṇḍa (-yoga) and Upadeśa with Jñānakāṇḍa.[41] Such attempts reveal the commentator's commitment to compromise the apparent parities and to arrive at a common consensus of opinion with regard to the structure and substance of an authoritative text.

Now, let us consider the significance of the threefold parts of the Saivāgamas. First, in order, comes Tantra.

Tantra (part of) Āgama Pramāṇa

Arulnandisivam simply states that the Tantra portion of the Agama should be faithfully observed without any contradiction between the latter (statements) and the former (statements):[42]

"pin̲āti mār̲in̲r̲i-p- pēṇal tantiram"

This brief account of Tantra has been elaborated by the commentators, exhibiting their own association with the Agamic text. Since the Tamil text advises that the Tantra portion should be understood avoiding contradiction in its preceding and succeeding statements, it is implied that the said portion of the Agamas has some apparent contradictions. They should be reconciled and interpreted in such a way that the text ultimately presents a coherent thought without any doubt and confusion. Sivagrayogin felt very much for the necessity of introducing some methodology in the proper understanding and potential interpretation of the Tantra so that the seeming contraditions would be settled and solved. Since his erudition in the complete texts of Agamas was something penetrative and astounding, he was able to point out the major hurdles to be surmounted in the correct comprehension of the Tantras.

The author of Tattuvaprakāśam defines Tantra very succinctly in the following passage:[43]

"tantiram ākamattāl ner̲i ar̲ital"

The commentator elucidates the word '*ner̲i*' to denote '*ulakaner̲i*' which means the path that is practised by the great souls. It is also known as '*vaḻakku*', meaning 'usage', which indicated the usage of the high noble people as evidenced from the aphorism: "Vaḻakku enappaṭuvatu uyarntōr mēr̲r̲ē".[44] Further, the commentator explains that '*ulakaner̲i*' or the path of the great indicates ethics etc., (-that includes the right means of acquiring wealth, pleasure and bliss), finally denoting the purusharthas viz., the main objectives of earthly existence, being *dharmārtha kāmamokṣa*. Among the four objectives, liberation i.e. mokṣa has been considered to be *parama purushārtha* i.e. supreme objective. According to the commentator, Tantrāgama is the knowledge about the fourfold aims of life through the study of Agamas, Vedas and Puranas.

Sivagrayogin has gone deep into the arrangements and structures of the Agamas in general and the Tantra portions in

particular, and identified the complicated forms of different-utterances. First of all, he has advocated that it has been essential to reorganise the right type of simple sentence, which he calls '*ekavākya*', from the complicated structure of the text, containing the essence of the statement. Next, the apparent contradictions, as noticed in the initial, middle and concluding portions of the Tantra part with regard to the performance of a ritual or anything, should be avoided, after a careful study through the application of the means of Sabda sāmarthya and Artha sāmarthya, and also with the help of vastu śakti (i.e. the potency of the word and its object).[45] Thus, he has provided threefold techniques which require further clarification.

Sabda sāmarthya denotes the primary significance of a word indicating its expressive power. Artha sāmarthya conveys the correct meaning of a word. Vastu śakti means the intrinsic potency of the object. Sivagrayogin calls his method of interpreting the Tantra part of Agama as "*Upakramopasaṁhāra*" which seems to be a Naiyāyika term. According to him, this method is also applicable for the proper and correct study of the remaining parts of the Agamas. Further, the same commentator has pointed out that the Tantras instruct one to perform the rituals such as Agniṣṭoma sacrifice which is considered to be Vedic and Sivapūja which is specifically Agamic in nature.

[46]Pandiperumal, while elucidating the Tantra part of the Agamas, simply stated that the devoted study of the Śāstras, revealed by the Śarvajña (-omniscient) is known Tantrakalā. It is clear from his commentary that he has not restricted verbal tesitmony only to Agamic texts, but taken it in a broader sense to include all relevant scriptures. Besides the Vedas, Agamas and Saivapuranas, the twelve Tirumuṟais and fourteen Meykanda Sāstras are taken by the adherents and exponents of Saiva Siddhanta to be authentic and valid source of knowledge. It is their conclusion that the authors of Saiva devotional and canonical works were freed from the taints of triple impurities through their sincere worship, meditation and realisation. They were pure and divine. Hence, their words had been inherently potential and infallible. They wrought many a miracle due to their spiritual and moral excellence that added strength in their verbal expressions which were extolled to be mantras. Tirujñāṉasambhandar, the child prodigy who had the rare chance of consuming the divine milk of wisdom at the tender age of three, has proclaimed that his words were the words of Lord Śiva.[47] It is to be understood that God has spoken to the humanity through his voice. So, his poems are held to be more sacred, authoritative and powerful.

This kind of potential mantric poetry had its origin long before the times of Tolkappiyar who has classified it as one of the sevenfold literary genres which according to him were current long before him. Pēraciriyar, the great commentator of Tolkappiyam has explicitely stated that what Tolkāppiyam has meant by '*mantiriam*' and '*vāymoḻi*' belonged to the Tamil tradition.[48] The very ancient mantras constituting one of the prominent Tamil literary genres were lost, though their existence has been recorded in many aphorisms and poems.

According to Sivajñāna Swamigal,[49] Tantra portion of Agama-pramāṇa is the soul's jñāna śakti (i.e. cognitive potency), that, after acquiring the proper discernment of the unity of the related statements of karmakānda, cognizes the non-contradictory observation (of the rituals). It is his conclusion that such a knowledge of Tantra part is highly important to perform the Sivapūja and related duties perfectly. Then only the practice of such of the rituals enjoined in the Tantras would yield the due results. In addition, the commentator mentions that some of the inner schools of Saivism also upheld the concept of Tantra-Agama pramāṇa. In their opinion, the identification of the Agama vākyas themselves (-Agamic sentences) without internal contraditions, in establishing the existence of the threfold realities, viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa and also in delineating their intrinsic and attributive natures, constituted the Tantra Agama.

Mantra (part of) Āgama Pramāṇa

As we have already seen, Mantra portion of Agama is primarily concerned with the yogic methods of meditative worship. Actually it deals with the inner worship (-*akappūcai*) through which the worshipper dedicates his mind to God. Arulnandisivam elucidates this part of the Agama Pramāṇa in the following passage:

"*mantiraṅkaḷ maṉātikaḷ aṭakki-t- teyvam vaḻipaṭum vāymai ākum*"[50]

It means that 'Mantras constitute the truth (-*vāymai*) indicating the worship of God after subjugating one's internal organs such as mind, intellect etc. Withdrawal of the antaḥ karaṇas from rambling and roaring is an essential factor in the process of meditative worship.

The author of Tattuvaprakaṣam explains the same pramāṇa in the following passage of the text:[51]

"*mantiramtāṉ patamvaṉṉam kūṭṭi*
niccayitta mantirattai cepittal nēr niṟṟal"

According to this text, Mantra portion denotes the method of reciting the mantras which are (i.e. esoteric formulaes) consisting of mystic syllables and words, and simultaneously stationing oneself in the prescribed way in contemplation.

The commentators, however, went deep into the matter and furnished some additional information in the interpretation of Mantra-Agama pramāṇa. First, let us consider the view of Śivagrayogin.

According to Sivagrayogin, the word 'mantra' is a compound, made up of two words viz., *man* and *tra*. The first word '*man*' means one who contemplates on God (in the form of mantra) while the second word '*tra*' means that which protects. So, the whole compound word '*mantra*' would mean that which protects one who incessantly contemplates on it. His commentary unfolds the fact that Mantra portion of Agama deals with the yoga form of worship. First it teaches the means of controlling the internal organs (-antaḥkaraṇas) beginning with mind. Then, the detailed particulars connected with the worship of a particular deity are provided. The practitioner (-*sādhaka*) is required to know the following:[52]

1. *Nyāsa* – touching the particular part of the body with the fingers in caryā; but, here it denotes the meditative posture.
2. *Ṛṣi* – the seer of the hymn
3. *Chandas* – the metre of the hymn
4. *Adhidevata* – the presiding deity eulogised in the hymn
5. *Bījākṣara* – the seed-letter i.e. the mystic syllable pertaining to the mantra, and
6. *Śakti* – the application of the hymn concerning with the worship.

Thus, the Mantra part of the Agama elucidates the practitioner to faithfully observe and understand the aforesaid components before entering into deep meditation. Finally, he should develop his inner faculty to conceive the manifestation of God in the form of Mantra (i.e. mantramūrti) with all resplendence to be his own self and thus to concentrate on contemplating the Divinity inwardly.

Pandiperumal very briefly explains that the Mantrakalas are to be pronounced during the worship of personal God after the control over the organs, like mind.[53]

Sivajñāna Swāmigal defined this particular part of Agama pramāṇa to be the ātman's Cit-śakti congizing the valid means of worshipping the personal deity, without doubt and error, after subjugating all the sense organs including mind, as enunciated in the Upāsanakāṇḍa of Āgama. Further, he implies that this pramāṇa manifests the contemplation of the unification of the worshipper-self and the object of worship, i.e. God. It has already been pointed out that Upāsanā and Mantra are invariably used to mean one and the same portion of the Agama text.

The Commentator of Tattuvaprakāśam furnished much particulars concerning the mystic letters (varna), words (pada) and their combination. The mantras are eleven in number and the letters are fifty one out of which are produced the 81 mystic words which are known as 'Padamūrti' (-the Mantric forms). Ultimately they form themselves into seven crores of mantras ending with the seven suffixes, viz., namaḥ, svāhā, vaushad, vashad, sudha, padu and hum.[54] Such elucidation of the Mantra portion of the Saivagams is traced to Tirumantiram which has provided all the details pertaining to the subject under reference.

Upadeśa-Āgama Pramāṇa

Arulnandisivam defines upadeśa part of Agama Pramāṇa thus:

"tanāti iṟilātāṉ taṉmai uṇarttutal upatēcamtāṉ"[55]

Upadeśa portion o4f the Agama deals with the nature of the Absolute who has neither beginning nor end. Though the ultimate aim of this portion of Agama is to provide sufficient knowledge with regard to the existence of the Supreme Being and Its intrinsic and attributive qualities, incidentally it has also dealt with the other two realities, viz., paśu (souls) and pāśa (bonds). Thus, all the characteristics of the triple realities, viz., *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* are delineated in the Upadeśa part of the Saivāgamas.

According to Sivagrayogin, *upadeśa* means informing and instructing. So, he explains that *upadeśa* part of Agama instructs the svarūpa of Śiva. It is the intrinsic form of pure intelligence. The Lord is devoid of birth and death. It also teaches about the soul possessing a body which is subject to birth and death. In addition, the characteristic features of the threefold pāśas viz., *āṇava, karma* and *māyā* that are held responsible for the birth and death of the material body of the soul, are elaborately discussed in the Upadeśa

part. In short, the whole of this part of Agama deals with the features of the triple realities known as Pati, Pāśu and Pāśa along with their vyāpti and vyāpakā (i.e. pervasion and pervasiveness).[56]

Pandiperumal is very brief when he has stated that Upadeśakalā teaches the real nature of the Absolute without origin and end.[57] Sivajñānaswamigal defines in the usual way that atman's Cit-śakti, cognizing without doubt and error, the eightfold auspicious qualities of Śiva that are not different from Him and apprehending the real nature of the other two entities viz., paśu and pāśa, which are respectively His slaves and possessions, are different from Him, for its own realisation and for the purpose of instructing others, is called Upadeśa-Agama pramāṇa.[58]

Tattuvaprakāśam is unique in defining the Upadeśa Urai i.e. the utterance of Upadeśa, which denotes the treatise on jñāna ('ஞானநூல்) which is classified into two categories, viz., Pūrva and Siddhānta.[59] Pūrva portion discards the texts of external religions, while Siddhānta portion critically examines the logical issues put forth by the authors of external religious texts, refuting their views one by one, furnishing suitable replies and finally establishes the unique condition of reality. So, it is clear that Upadeśa part of the Agama comprises two sections, the first of which consists of the presentation of and refutation to the heterogeneous systems, while the second section contains the reasoned statements to establish the position of one's own view-points, after discrediting and distancing the alien schools. If we look into the structure of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār, two portions are noticed. The first part is entirely a separate treatise with the title 'Parapakkam' (-parapakṣa) which is synonymous with Pūrvapakṣa. Similarly, the second part is also to be treated as a different book with the title 'Supakkam' (-svapakṣa) which is otherwise known as Siddhānta. In this second treatise, the author, in the opening portion has introduced the principles of epistemology admissible in the system of Saiva Siddhanta, and then proceeded to establish logically the existence of triple entities, viz., Pati, Paśu and Pāśa, and also dealt with their characteristic features, the means of liberation and the ultimate result of spiritual life. Thus, the second part is properly known as Svapakṣa or Siddhānta, which according to the Naiyāyikas meant '*śāstrārtha niścaya*', i.e. the ascertainment of the real sense of scriptures.[60]

It is essential to mention that Arulnandisivam, the author of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, is said to be an expert in all Agamas and

hence, he is praised as Sakalāgama Pandita. Here, the word Agama has a wider connotation, since it denotes not only the Saivagamas, but the religious and philosophical texts of other systems. For instance, theTripitakas of the Buddhists are referred by the Tamil Commentators as 'Pitakāgama'[61] and the twelvefold Angas of the Digambara Jains are noted as 'Aṅkāgama'.[62] Even Vātsyāyana's Kāma Sūtra is named as '*matanāgama*' by Saint Arunagirinathar (1400 A.D.).[63] Hence, it is clear that the word Agama generally meant a detailed treatise on a particular subject.

Though Tattuvaprakāśam has been composed atleast two or three centuries after Sivañāna Siddhiyār, it is proper to suggest that its author has presented the twofold classification of upadeśa part of Agama in accordance with such divisions found atleast in some of the ancient Agamas which he studied, and thus he has presented a sufficiently old classification that existed in the Agamas many centuries even before the advent of Aulnandisivam. Pauṣkarāgama, the date of which is unascertained [perhaps A.D. 300], has been quoted by the commentator for containing the twofold parts of upadeśa.

Divine authorship

According to Saiva Siddhanta, the author of the Vedas and Agamas is said to be Lord Śiva who has been denoted by two epithets, viz., Amala<u>n</u> and A<u>r</u>iva<u>n</u>. Sivagrayogin raises the question with regard to the necessity of having the second epithet, since some may suggest that the first alone is sufficient. Then he answers that since the word '*amalan*' meaning 'one without impurity' is equally applicable even to the inert 'Śuddha Māyā' (i.e. Pure Primordial Matter), it is essential to identify the Divine author with the unique epithet A<u>r</u>iva<u>n</u> i.e. the embodiment and source of All knowledge which is pertinent only to Lord Śiva.

In the hymns of Tēvāram and Tiruvācakam, references are many to the Divine authorship of Vedas and Agamas.[64] It is said that Lord Śiva has delivered these scriptures beneath the banyan tree to the Antaṇar, who are compassionate to all living beings. These texts included the six angas. The Agamas are also known as Mantiram and Tantiram (i.e. Mantra and Tantra), perhaps reminding the divisions found in them. According to Saint Tiruāvukkaracar, Lord Siva assumes the form of both Mantra and Tantra.[65] In some hymns, the word 'Mantra' denotes the Mantra portions in the Vedas. In one poem, saint Tirujñānasambhandar has clearly mentioned that

Lord Siva has revealed the significant message of the Vedāntas.[66] Lord Siva has been extolled as '*Veda Vedāntan*' indicating that He is the Supreme principle of Vedas and Vedantas.[67] Here, the word Vedānta may be taken to denote the Upaniṣads and also the Vedānta Sūtra. Nilakaṇṭa Bhāṣya on Vedanta Sutra establishes the spiritual supremacy of Lord Śiva. The Upaniṣads are also known as '*Curuticira urai*' (i.e. the utterances of śrutisiras).[68] A new interpretation to the fourfold vedas is visibily found in the Tirumuṟal literature. The hymnologists attributed the fourfold purusharthas viz., *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa* which aptly correspond to the Tamil concept of *aṟam, poruḷ, iṉpam* and *vīṭu*, to be the theme of the fourfold *Maṟais*, an equivalent to the Sanskrit Vedas and also Agamas.[69] It is interesting to note that the Pinkalantai Nigandu has meant by the word Agama, the fourfold purusharthas.[70] It is quite natural that the word *Nāṉmaṟai* (-Caturveda) in the Tamil hymns also indicates the Sivāgamas which preached the four ends of life. In Sivāneriprakasam, there are three lengthy poems delineating the significance of purushārthas, being the quintessence of the Sivāgamas.[71] According to this Siddhanta Sastra, the human beings are destined to lead a virtuous married life, accumulating wealth in a righteous manner and enjoying as per the ethical norms. Any deviation or transgression is condemned. When one is indulging in the dharmārthakāma, he is required to get initiation into the spiritual culture through the deep study of the characteristic features of Pati, Paśu and Pāśa under the guidance of a perfect preceptor with a view to getting the ultimate liberation, i.e. mokṣa, the parama purushārtha.

It is very interesting to mention that the author of Tattuvaprakāsam has well understood the significance of Agamas and Vedas as recorded in the Twelve Tirumuṟais and organised his treatise accordingly.

In the hymns of Tevaram, it is mentioned that not only the Vedas, Agamas and the related scriptures, but even the various systems of religions are also propounded by Lord Śiva to meet the standard of spiritual maturity of the different stratas of the humanity. Such references exhibit the catholicity of Saiva Siddhanta in accommodating all the religious texts under certain levels, since they are also held to have divine authorship.[72]

So, the concept of Agama pramāṇa is something unique in the tradition of Saiva Siddhanta.

There are some more discussions found in the parapakṣa of Sivajnāna Siddhiyar and the commentary of Sivagrayogin, with regard to the validity of Agamas, involving the exponents of other systems like the Mimamsakas and the prompt and pertinent answers adduced by him. Let us briefly present them so that one can have supplementary information with regard to the view of Agama pramāṇa as upheld by the adherents of Saiva Siddhanta.

In the Parapakṣa

In the Parapaksa of Sivajñāna Siddhiyar, Arulnandisivam examines first the Bhatta school of Mimamsaka's view with regard to the eternality of sound. At the outset, the arguments in favour of the Bhattacarya are enumerated.[73]

Bhattacarya follows closely the treatise of Jamini who pronounced that apart from the four Vedas there was no God, and Vedic rituals were sufficient to accomplish the expected desires and benefits.

The souls are eternally shrouded with the evil qualities such as lust, hatred, misery, arrogance, malice and ego. If these qualities themselves will endow one with knowledge, then there is no use of Vedic statements. The limit of one's knowledge depends on the extent of his study. The illiterate adults are like the young children and dumb persons.

If an author devoid of ātmic qualities is needed to deliver the ever-existing Vedas, then it follows that the divine author also required a corporeal form and thus associated with ātmic qualities. Then the author's knowledge depends upon the extent of the study of texts. If one argues that he has no form, then the Vedas are not created either by divine agency or human author. They are ever-existing and hence eternal.

Even the celestials, ascetics, siddhars and human beings uttered that the authorship of Vedas was beyond their cognition. So, it is said that the Vedas continue to exist from the very beginning. The analogy, that like the water in a well, the Vedas came into existence, is not acceptable, since the well requires a person for its creation.

The Veda includes the sixfold angas viz., Śikṣa, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nrukta, Jyothiṣa and Cantas and threefold Upavedas, viz., Ayurveda, Dhanur Veda and Gandharva Veda. All the objects

are contained in them. The Veda has no origin, no end and eternally exists.

In this connection, it is essential to point out that the above statement finds a personified expression in Maṇimēkalai in which the exponent of Mimāmsa personified the Veda as a Puruṣa with Kalpa as his hands, Cantas as foot, Jyotisha as eye, Nirukta as ear, Śikṣā as nose and Vyākaraṇa as face. Further it is stated that the Veda puruṣa has neither beginning nor end. The exponent is noted by the word 'Vēdiyan̲' – one who expounds the Vedas.[74] Mimāmsa is also known as Vediyan̲ urai, i.e. Veda Vāda in the Buddhist tradition recorded in Maṇimēkalai. However, Cāttan̲ār totally rejected the view of Mimāmsa which did not conform either to reality or to experience, without going into the details one by one as done by Arulnandisivam.

Arulnandisivam has also stated that the Bhatta Mimamsa opined that the Veda itself assumed a form known as Veda puruṣa. According to this sytem, those who perform the vedic rituals without any deviation are released from bondage and attains bliss known as āptadana.[75]

The following are some of the rejoinders advanced by Arulnandisivam against the aforesaid views of the Bhatta Mimamsa.[76]

1. In the entire gamut of the Vedic texts, nowhere a Vedic statement, expressing its eternally existing character is noticed.

2. If the Bhatta quotes from Mahabharata to strengthen his stand, it is to be known that the Ithihasa, which is authored by Vyāsa, is held in esteem as the fifth Veda. So, like the Mahabharata, the Veda also has an author. Without one's creation, the dolls made up of earth and cloth could not come into existence. So also without an author, the Vedas could not manifest all by themselves.

3. If it is said that the Vedas illumine all objects, besides themselves just like the lamp does, then they become within a limitation, loosing their transcendental greatness.

4. Like the cloth requires a weaver for its production, so the Vedas being the sabdārtha require an author for its creation.

After refuting thus the view of the Bhatta Mimamsa, the Siddhantin concluded that the eternal Lord Himself manifested in order to reveal the Vedas for the benefit of the humanity. The eternal character of the Divine author has been ascribed figuratively (upacāra) to the Vedas. It is just like naming the king's proclamation, 'ōlai' (leaf) as 'Tirumukam' (the sacred face) which is placed by the citizens in their own heads and honoured with the same respect, accorded to the king himself. Further Arulnandisivam has pronounced that the statement, that the Veda has no author resembles the statement that the children have no parents.

In the Parapakṣa, the Bhatta school which was founded by Kumarila was first mentioned. After refuting this school, Arulnandisivam has taken up the views of the Prabhākara school and also Sabda Brahmavāda for condemnation on similar lines that we have seen above.

Now, let us consider the criticism of the commentators on the view of the Mimāmsakas.

The Commentator's view

Sivagrayogin examined the view of the Mimāmsakas who advocated the authority and efficacy of the Vedas which, according to them were not revealed by God or created by any divine or human author.[77] They did not have any faith in the existence of God and for this reason they were atheistic. They developed a firm conviction that the Vedas were '*svayambhu*' –"self made" and hence were eternal. They did not have either a beginning or an end. They were ever existing. Nothing was superior to the Vedas. Since the theory of sacrifices, rituals, religious injunctions etc., which formed the pūrvapakṣa of the Vedas i.e. *karmakānda*, the Mimamsakas treated only that part of the Vedas as very important. For this reason, their system was also known as Pūrva-Mīmāmsa, as opposed to Uttara-Mīmāmsa denoting the *jñānakānda* of the latter portions of the Vedas comprising the Upaniṣads which clearly investigated the existence of Brahman, Atman, the source of the universe etc., Uttara-Mimamsa is otherwise called Vedānta. Here the concern of the commentator is directed only towards the advocates of Purva Mimamsaka, who are generally known as Mimāmsakas i.e. without the prefix Pūrva. They cared little for the Absolute, since they treated the Vedas themselves to be supreme and infallible. They never treated the Agamas on a par with the Vedas. They were prepared even to accept the validity of the Smṛtis including the text

of Manu. According to them, the Vedas and Smṛtis secured the recognition and approval of the Mahajanas (= the great people). *The shear negligence of the Agamas by the Mimāmsakas is a clear indication that the Agamic culture is totally opposed to the Vedic culture.* However, the theological schools including Saivism attempted to harmonise the two through the wise interpretations of the contradictory statements occurring in these two different scriptures representing two different cultural currents and thought patterns. Even then, these theistic systems laid greater stress and significance on the Agamas than the Vedas.

Let us enumerate herebelow the reasons, adduced by the Mimāmsakas for the total rejection of the authority of the Agamas:[78]

1. Since the Agamas are uttered by human beings, they are not eternal and free from defects.

2. They do not have their source in the Vedas.

3. They do not gain the recognition and acceptance of the great people.

4. The fourfold purushārthas, that are delineated in the epics like Mahabharata, have their roots only in the Vedas. Likewise, the Agamic utterences do not have their source in the Vedas.

5. Contradictory connotations are often presented to the Agamic statements.

6. the Puranas blame the adherence to the observances of the Tantras (-Agamas).

7. The Agamas were brought to existence by Siva and Visnu to provide the means of livelihood for the Brahmins who sought refuge unto the two Gods after they were cursed by the six great seers viz., Durvāsa, Dadici, Gautama, Kaṇva, Bhṛgu and Upamanyu. Hence, the Agamas do not have any superior value except extending some means for the Brahmins to eke out their bread.

8. The Agamas were also meant to delude the Aśuras.

9. It is heard that Śāndilya and Chitranāma, the Dravidian kings went to the hell for the simple reason that they closely followed the prescriptions of the Agamas.

The aforesaid points, adduced by the Mimāmsakas, very clearly indicate the animosity of the staunch supporters of the ritualistic Vedic religion towards the faithful followers of Agamic cult. Since it is noted that the Dravidian kings, who were the adherents of the Agamic religion, were destined to the hell, it is inferred that the Agamas, unlike the Vedas, were originally belonged to the Dravidians. In this context, it is pertiment to quote the view of A.P. Karmarkar, one of the great Indian Indologists who established that the heirs of the Agamic thought were the Tamils while those of the Vedic thought were the Aryans.[79] Since Sanskrit was the media for the intelligentia, both the Aryans and Dravidians utilised it as the vehicle of thought. History unfolds the fact that the philosophical and theological thoughts of the Tamils and those of the Aryans were fused together in course of time. Thus, due to historical compulsion the two different streams merged into the ocean of the synthetic religious culture. In this context it is appropriate to quote atleast some of the reputed Indian scholars to identify the Tamil aspects in the mossaic of Indian thought.

According to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the Tamils originally worshipped Siva, Tirumāl (-Viṣṇu) and Mother Goddess (Kāḷi or Śakti) who were subsequently adored by the Aryans. The relevent passages from his book entitled "The Hindu View of Life" are given hereunder:[80]

1. The Vedic culture becomes transformed in the Epics into the Hindu Culture through the influence of the Dravidians. Image worship which was a striking feature of the Dravidian faith was accepted by the Aryans.
2. The Vedic tradition was dominated by the Agamik, and to day Hindu culture shows the influence of the Agamas as much as that of the Vedas.

The Hindu view of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan is further attested by the eminent Bengali Indologist Dr. S. K. Chatterji whose observation is also given below:[81]

1. To give a brief resume: the ideas of Karma and transmigration, the practice of yoga, the religious and philosophical ideas centering round the conception of the Divinity as Siva, Devi and Visnu, the Hindu ritual of puja as opposed to the Vedic ritual of homa, -all these and much more in Hindu religion and thought would appear to be non-Aryan (i.e.Dravidian) in origin.

2. The conception of the Deity as Śiva and Umā with the figure of Śiva as the great Yogi and the Master of Animals (i.e. Paśupati), was a Dravidian conception to start with.

There are similar views of other scholars highlighting the differences of the Agamic and Vedic religions. For want of space only a few quotations are presented. It is to be borne in mind that the Agamic Tamils even while admitting the authority of Vedas, gave only a secondary position to it, retaining the special and primary authoritative status of the Agamas. Even today it is true that the Sivāchāryas, who are vested with the mandatory and political sanction to officiate as priests in the Siva temples are not given equal status by the Smārthas who use to keep them at a distance, just because the former profess the Agamic prescriptions, while the latter the Vedic injunctions. So, it becomes evident that even after many centuries have passed since the amalgamation of the Agamic and Vedic faiths took place, the difference persists to continue atleast at the psychical level between the two. Be that as it may. Let us briefly summarize the counter arguments advanced by the learned commentator Sivagrayogin, who was in his early years was a smārtha, then turned towards Saiva Siddhānta which is also known as Agamānta, to shackle the very grounds on which the Mimāmsakas placed their slander arguments to neglect the Agamas as one of the sources of knowledge. First of all, let us commence from the very first objection of Sivagrayogin to Mimāmsaka's stand on the authority of the Vedas.

According to Sivagrayogin there are two kinds of eternality viz., 1.*Svarūpanityatva* and 2. *Pravākanityatva.*[82] The first one denotes the eternality of one's own nature, while the second one indicates the eternality like that of a flowing stream. The commentator proceeds to expose the folly of the Mimāmsakas's view by stating that the Vedas do not have either *svarūpanityatva* or *pravākanityatva*.

Mimāmsakas believe in the eternality of sounds. They maintain always that the sounds are eternal: "Sabdam nityam". To the Saiva Siddhantin, since sounds are products of the organs of speech they are not eternal: i.e. "Sabdam anityam". Sivagrayogin has given the following examples to disprove the eternality of sound.[83]

1. There is a difference between the sound 'ga' that one pronounced yesterday and the same sound pronounced by

the same person today. As soon as it is produced it becomes extinct. So, it is erroneous to hold that the sound 'ga' and others are permanent.

2. The Vedas consist of the sentences which are organised by the arrangement of words which, in turn, consist of the group of letters, which again are the written form of speech sounds. Since it is already maintained that sounds, being products, are impermanent, the Vedas possessing the sounds as basic unit of words are also not eternal.

3. The argument of the Mimāmsakas, that the 'ga' articulated to day is the same 'ga', pronounced yesterday on the basis of cognition through recognition, is untenable. Their statement resembles the utterance that the rice, that one ate at Banaras, was the same rice eaten in Cola deśa. The sameness in both the cases is not the size of the several grains, but the quality, called Vrihatva i.e. *rice-ness*. It is known as Jāti eka vacana (-Cātiorumai in Tamil), i.e. both are rice and not wheat. But there is difference in quality between the rice of Banaras and that of Cola deśa: Coming to the sounds 'ga'. There is sameness of the sound 'ga' pronounced yesterday and that of today, not in the volume but in the identity indicating that the particular sound is 'ga' and not 'ba' etc. Neverthless, the minute difference is felt every time whenever it is articulated any number of times. So, it can not be eternal.

4. Further, the commentator has pointed out that the 'ga' strongly pronounced is different from the 'ga' feebly pronounced. The difference between these two 'ga' sounds is perceptible to the auditory sense-organ, i.e. ear.

So, it becomes evident that the Vedas, made up of the various combinations of sounds (*-varṇa samūha*) are not eternal. Thus, Sivagrayogin disproved the claim of the Mimāmsakas. Next, he proceeds to discredit their view that the Vedas are eternal like the stream (*-pravāka nityatva*).

Though the continuous and incessant flow of the stream seems to be eternal at the outset, it is not so if we reflect that the water at a particular point in the stream is not the same of the water of a previous moment. So there is no eternality in the flow of stream. Hence the eternality of the Vedas can not be justified on this analogy.

In this context, it is not improper to mention that the analogy of the moving stream has been very popular in the Buddhist literature. It seems that Buddha (600 B.C.) was the first to apply this analogy to establish that everything was evanescent. Another simile that he used for the same purpose is the flame. Because of the continuance of the flame, the light in the lamp seems to be the same. Actually, it is not so, like the water in the stream. Buddha applied these empirical analogies to instruct the people that all things were impermanent. Due to the concept of continuance i.e. samtāna, they seem to remain the same. He viewed that things of all kinds were changing every instant and hence his concept of transitoriness came tc be styled as the theory of momentariness (Kṣaṇikavāda).

However, Sivagrayogin has employed the analogy of the stream only to disprove the concept of eternality of sound, upheld by the Mimāmsakas. Every product is subject to decay. Since sound is a product it also tends to become extinct. According to Saiva Siddhanta, whenever impermanence or destruction is spoken, it is only in regard to the Kāryarūpa i.e. the form of effect and not to the Kāraṇa rūpa i.e. the form of cause. Since the Siddhantins are realists they accept the basic and causal root of any product, going back to the Primordial Matter which has been classified into three, viz., Śuddha Māyā, Aśuddha Māyā and Miśra Maya in conformity with the threefold types of souls, to provide them with the physical comforts according to their deserts.

Sivagrayogin never got tired of the Mimamsakas in refuting their claim for the eternality of the Vedas. Another argument viz., *aviccinnād Vyāpaka Paramparātinatva,* is advanced by the Mimāmsakas. This argument is meant to exhibit the permanence of the Vedas on the basis that they have been transmitted from generation to generation through the ricital tradition of guru-śiṣya paramparā (-the continuous oral transmission from preceptor to pupil). However, Sivagrayogin points out that there is interval and gap in the tradition, just like the difference in the drops of water of the moving river and hence the argument of the Mimāmsakas is not sound.

Further, the commentator argues that the deluge (-praḷaya) of the past and that of the future are understood through pramāṇas and hence the world with the Vedas would be submerged and thus become impermanent.

In this context it is pertinent to note that the school of Grammarians established the theory of sphota to refute the view of Mimāmsakas. The word sphota denotes the essence of sound revealed by the phoneme, word or sentence, responsible for conveying the meaning. The sphota or the sound-essence is eternal and self-existent. It manifests the cognition of the object. They never accepted the eternality of the Vedas.

After refuting the view-point of the Mimāmsakas, Sivagrayogiṅ ultimately proceeds to pronounce the eternality of the Vedas from the view point of the Saiva Siddhantin.

The eternal significance of the Scriptures

The reasons, adduced by Sivagrayogin for the eternal significance of Vedas and Agamas are quite interesting.[84] It is said that the Vedas have themselves proclaimed that they are eternal. Since they were revealed by Lord Siva, the Supreme Reality, for the eternality of Vedas should be understood figuratively. He gives an anology for the clarification of this view. The letter (not alphabet but epistle) is also known as mukha. Mukha means face. Since the utterances of the letter (i.e. phoneme or speech sound) are emanated from the mouth, the letter is figuratively called the mouth (Śrīmukha). So also, the eternality of the Vedas is to be grasped. Since the Vedas were proceeded from the Eternal Lord known as Svayambhu, they are also figuratively called svayambhu.

With regard to the validity of Agamas, the commentator clarifies the stand of the Saiva Siddhantin. According to Sivagrayogin, Agamas are of two kinds.[85] One set of Agamas do not vary much from the Vedic contents. They are knows as Śrautāgamas. Another group of Agamas go against the Vedic views. These are called Aśraut āgamas, which belonged to Vama, Pasupatha, Lakula, Bhairava etc. They are also given by the Lord with a view to deluding the demonic people and correcting them. The Agamas that are condemned by the Smṛtis are these Aśrauta tantras. Only the Śrautāgamas are acceptable as verbal testimony. Thus the commentator reconciles the difference superficially noticed between the Vedas and Agamas.

Supreme Authority

The commentator has issued a grade sheet in regard to the extent of reliability and validity of the utterences of various kinds of persons. He has classified the trustworthy words into six categories according to their merit. The order of merit is the following.[8]

1. The statements of the seers (ṛṣis) are more reliable than those of human beings.
2. The utterances of deities are superior to those of the seers.
3. The words of Brahma are better than those of other deities.
4. The statements of Visnu are better than those of Brahma.
5. The utterances of Rudra are superior to those of Visnu.
6. Since Siva is the Highest Reality, His words are the most trustworthy.

Thus, Sivagrayogin concludes that the Agamas are the most reliable authority and also eternal, since they are revealed by the Supreme and Absolute Reality i.e. Lord Siva.

In this context it is essential to note that even in the Nyāya system of a later period, different grades were assigned to the various types of verbal testimony. The Naiyāyikas identified four classes of verbal testimony, viz., Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa and Purāṇa. Among them Śruti has been considered to be the most precious source of valid knowledge. Etymologically, the word śruti means that which is heard. Since the Vedas were handed over to posterity only through oral transmission, they were known as śruti which has been called *kēḷvi* in the Tamil classics, having the same semantic significance. The second in order comes 'Smṛti' which means 'the Remembered one'. It denotes the Law books such as Parāsara Smṛti, Manu Smṛti, Sukra Smṛti etc. It is held valid only when it does not run against the Vedas and also when the latter kept silent on a particular issue. Itihasas are the grand epics, viz., Ramayana and Mahabharata. The chief Puranas are eighteen in number. These two classes of literature are primarily meant to disseminate the contents of the Vedas and Law Books among the common people. Hence, some elements of exaggeration, free play of imagination and hyperbolic expressions are naturally found in them to provide literary taste and pleasure. However, the Naiyāyikas assigned to the last two types of verbal testimony only secondary importance. More or less the same position is found in the system of Saiva Siddhanta. A notable difference is seen in giving prominence to Agamas followed by Vedas as understood both from the texts and commentaries. Sivagrayogin has clearly stated that any scriptures or puranas and other religious texts, which do not contradict the Vedic statements, deserve to be upheld as the verbal testimony. He has

also quoted a śloka in grantha libi which informs that just like Mayeśvara is the author of the Agamas commencing with Kāmika, so also the son of Satyavati was the author of 18 puranas. This śloka is taken from Vyāsa bhārata.[87]

Qualification for the Study of Agamas

For the study of Sivāgamas, some qualifications are also prescribed in the commentaries of Sivagrayogin and Sivajñāna Swamigal. Irrespective of castes, all people including the Śūdras and women who satisfy the requirements of purity by totally avoiding the non-vegetarian food and intoxicating drinks are eligible for the study of Agamas. In addition, they should have good lineage both from the paternal and maternal sides. They become eligible to study the Agamas only after receiving Śiva-dīkṣa, exhibiting their thirst for eternal liberation. Sivagrayogin clearly mentions that these persons should possess Saktinipāta, i.e. the dawn of Divine Grace.[88]

So, it becomes clear that caste or sex is no bar for getting rigorous religious instruction in the tradition of Saiva Siddhanta. The main prescription for all persons consists in the ethical preparation which alone can lift the practitioners (-sādhakas) to the upper rungs of the spiritual ladder. It is interesting to note that not only for being receivers (-students), but also for being givers (-preceptors) no caste distinction is made by Dramiḷa Vātsyāyana.[89] *According to him a trustworthy person may be a saint, a noble man or a Mleccha. There is no caste distinction for being a trustworthy person.*

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89. BIJALWAN, *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p.215.

XI. LOGICAL FALLACIES

The Indian logicians of various schools had been keen enough in maintaining the principles of good and valid arguments, essential for the high standard and decency of sound debate and meaningful discussion. They had ably identified both the valid and invalid syllogism. They gave much importance to isolate and classify the different types of fallacies to be avoided by the participants in the philosophical tournaments.

A logical fallacy is known as *ābhāsa* in Sanskrit and *pōli* in Tamil. Ābhās, the root of the Sanskrit word ābhāsa, means to appear, to resemble, to look like etc. Pōl, the root of the Tamil word *pōli* also conveys the same sense. These words are used by the logicians as technical terms to indicate the defective members in a syllogism. Each of the essential members in a syllogism may look like a member and may give the impression that it is a constituent of the syllogism. But in close examination, it may not be so. Though it gives the look of the component member, the mere appearance should not be mistaken for a valid member. The knowledgeable person has the faculty to discriminate between the real and unreal, the correct and the seemingly correct.

The logicians, with a view to identifying the valid from the invalid members, have well-defined the principles that govern the constituent members of a syllogism. The purpose of argument in the public debate and philosophical discussion has been to conquer one's opponents and to establish one's views. If the tools of argument are defective, the purpose cannot be materialised. Hence, the debaters have been very careful and cautious in handling the instruments of argument, so that they could conduct a purposeful discussion. A B. Keith named the fallacies as logical errors.[1]

Sufficient knowledge in the principles of valid and invalid arguments would enable a person to point out the fallacious elements in his opponent's expressions and thus gain victory over him. The Naiyāyikas, who specialised the field of epistemology, were the pioneers in the identification of false and faulty arguments. They considered that any violation or transgression in framing the propositions against the prescribed norms would result in a fallacy.

Akṣapāda, the earliest known exponent of the Naiyāyika system, has included in his Nyāya Sūtra (I.2.4-9) the logical fallacies as one of

the subjects for discussion. In the Hetvābhāsa-lakṣaṇa prakaraṇa, he has dealt with the five kinds fallacies of reason i.e. Hetvābhāsa which has been translated into English as "*Pseudo-probantia*" by Mrinalkanti Gangopādhyāya.[2] They are the following:

1. Savyabhicāra - The discrepant or the inconclusive leading to more conclusions than one. It is also called as *anaikāntika* by the later logicians.

2. Viruddha - The contradictory. It denotes the reason that contradicts the proposition, and serves to prove the antithesis.

3. Prakaraṇasama - The counteracted. It denotes the inconclusive and unascertained nature of both thesis and antithesis. It is known as satpratipakṣa in the later Nyāya school.

4. Sādhyasama - The unproved. It gives a reason which itself requires proof. It is not different from the reason which is to be proved.

5. Kālātīta - The mistimed-A reason deprived of its efficacy due to the lapse of time.

Apart from the aforesaid hetvābhāsas, there is no mention about the *pratijñābhāsas*, i.e. fallacies of proposition or thesis and the *Udhāharaṇābhāsas* i.e. fallacies of example in the Nyāya Sūtra. It seems that during the period of Akṣapāda, the concept of the last two categories of fallacies was not evolved. Even with regard to the fallacies of reason, an exhaustive study was not carried out by Akṣapāda. However, he has understood sufficiently the validity of reason in the establishment of a truth. Hence, he paid due attention to the fallacies of reason which are to be avoided in a sound argument.[3] H.N. Randle observed:

> The fallacies of the proposition and of the example were quite unknown to Vātsyāyana and the early Nyāya, and were rejected by Uddyotakara.

However, it does not mean that the logicians never recognized these types of fallacies. Normally they are identified on the basis of defective members of a syllogism. Though the syllogism consists of five members, the logicians never reckoned five-fold fallacies. Among the five members, the first three viz., pratijñā or pakṣa, hetu and

udhāharaṇa or dṛṣṭānta are the most essential. That is why the fallacies also are threefold. We do not have *upanayābhāsa* and *nigamanābhāsa*, viz., the fallacy of application and the fallacy of conclusion. Even among the first three members, the logicians laid great importance only on hetu. They felt that the validity of inference mainly depends upon the certitude of reason and hence the invalid inference would lead to the fallacy of reason. Since reason plays a pivotal role in the process of inferential knowledge, the early Naiyāyikas focussed mainly on the identification of the hetvābhāsas. In the words of Dr.S.C.Chatterjee.[4]

> The Nyāya account of the fallacies of inference is accordingly limited to those of its members or constituent propositions and these have been finally reduced to those of hetu or reason.

So it becomes evident that any fault in the reason would upset the argument without yielding any result and fall under a fallacy.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan[5] has clearly pointed out that the *pakṣābhāsas* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* are not so important as the *hetvābhāsas*, or the fallacies of middle term. This position of the Naiyāyikas has been well-understood by Sivajñāana Swāmigal,[6] when he stated in the end of his commentary on Aḷavai-y-iyal that the Tārkikas contended that the Pakṣābhasas and Upamānābhāsas (i.e. dṛṣṭāntābhāsas) would come under Hetvābhāsas. According to him, the Tārkikas are the Naiyāyikas. They are famous for their quarelling nature as noted by saint Arunagirināthar in the line *Kalakamiṭu Tarkkar*[7].

However, it is pertinent to remark that in the Saiva Tamil logical tradition, the *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* are often noted as *upamānābhāsas* in the text and commentary. It is again to be understood that the fallacies of comparison in the realm of logic and in the domain of rhetorics are totally different. The former is dealt in the texts on Saiva Siddhānta, while the latter in the chapter on uvamai i.e. comparison, in Tolkāppiyam which has mentioned five kinds of *uvamai-p-pōli* which are to be treated as sub-members under the figure of speech "*Uvamai*", i.e. simile.

Sivajñāna Swāmigal differed from the Tārkikas in that he evinced due recognition to the separate divisions of the Fallacies of Thesis and Fallacies of example. The credit goes to the renowned Buddhist logician Dignāga, his disciple Saṁkaraswāmin, Cāttaṉār and Dharmakīrti who have elaborately dealt with the threefold fallacies

concerned with *pakṣa, hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta.* Only after Dignāga, Praśastapāda has adopted the concept of threefold fallacies in his commentary on Vaiśeṣikasūtra. With regard to their date, Keith considered that Dignāga lived earlier than Praśastapāda.[8] Though some Indian authors have reversed the view, a close study between the works of Dignāga and Praśastapāda clearly indicates an early date to the former. However Stcherbatsky opined that Praśastapāda was an elder contemporary of Dignāga.[9]

In the 27th chapter in Maṇimēkalai, the author has introduced the Nyāyavādi who has summarised not only the logical views of Veda Vyāsa, Kritakoṭin and Jaimini, but also those of Lokāyata, Buddhism, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. He has enumerated ten kinds of pramāṇas that we have noted in the beginning portions of this book. After enumerating them, the author has taken up eightfold pramāṇabhāsas viz., the Fallacies of sources of knowledge.[10] They are the following:

1. Cuṭṭuṇarvu

It denotes the presentative cognition or Nirvikalpaka jñāna. The bare existence of a thing is cognised without its adjuncts such as name, genus, quality, activity and substance. In the Nyāya system, perceptual knowledge has reference not to the mere existence of an object but also to its adjuncts. Hence, the indeterminate cognition was considered to be a fallacy of perception.

2. Tiriya-k-kōṭal

It refers to the misconception, taking one for the other. The illustration to this kind of defective knowledge is seeing silver in the pearl-oyster shell. This is also called viparita jñāna or erroneous perception. It is a fallacy of perception.

3. Aiyam

It indicates the doubtful cognition (Samśaya). Due to confusion, lack of light and distance, the perceiver is not in a position to ascertain the exact object. The example is traditional. One seeing in a dim light, a distant object which shares some of the characteristics of both a pillar and a person, one is not clear to pass a judgement. He doubts whether it is a person or a pillar. This is also a case of perceptual fallacy.

4. Tērātu Teḷital

Without proper deliberation, one takes a false decision. E.g. Deciding a post in the playground of horseman, as a person. This

type of cognition is also to be included under pratyakṣa viruddha i.e. faulty perception.

5. Kaṇṭuṇarāmai

This denotes the upekṣātmakajnāna. Though one sees a thing, he does not realise it. He is simply indifferent towards the thing. E.g. On seeing a ferocious tiger approaching him, he is ignorant of it. It is needless to say that this fault is to be subsumed under pratyakṣābhāsa.

6. Ilvaḻakku

It denotes the recognition of a non-existing thing. E.g. The horn of a hare, the sky-lotus, the blanket of the tortoise's hair etc., are all objects which never have a real existence. They exist only in the words and not objectively. If anybody takes them to their thought then it becomes a fallacy. This type of defective cognition falls under pratyakṣābhāsa.

7. Uṇarntatai uṇartal

This denotes the cognition of what is already cognized. E.g. Being in the proximity of fire is the medicine to the dense-dew. It is a well known fact that the warmth of fire is the antidote to the winter. So, it is not necessary to reconsider it. This may be brought under perceptual fallacy.

8. Niṉaippu

Mental acceptance of other's statement without any reasoning is denoted by the fallacy '*Niṉaippu*'. *Niṉaippu* normally means remembrance or memory. Here it is used in the sense of assumption.

E.g. Others stating to one, "These are your mother and father".

A new-born baby does not have the capacity to identify its own parents. Even after becoming an adult, he is informed either by his own parents or other relatives. So, believing without any further investigation is considered to be a fallacy.

All the aforesaid fallacies of pramāṇa mainly belonged to the category of pratyakṣabhāsa. Among them *cuṭṭuṇarvu* and *aiyam* are considered to be the preliminary steps in the process of valid perception by some systems, and hence not to be held as fallacies.

However, the portion of Maṇimēkalai (27:57-77) that deals with the eightfold fallacies of pratyakṣa pramāṇa has no analogous

passage in any of the existing texts or commentaries on Nyāya. It seems to represent the logical tradition prevalent in the Tamil country. Now, let us turn to the views of the Saiva Siddhānta commentators on the concept of fallacy.

According to Sivagrayogin,[11] Vyāptijñāna i.e. the knowledge of concomitance is an essential pre-requisite for a debater. He declares that the defective and distorted concomitance i.e. Vyāptibhaṅga would result in hetvābhāsa for any system of Indian Philosophy. So, he has underlined that the hetvābhāsa should be treated as the primary *dūsaṇa* (fallacy) in a syllogism. The words[12] *dūṣaṇa* and *ābhāsa* are used as synonyms in the commentary. He further advises that any syllogistic statement should be presented without any defect in reason, thesis and example, and also it should be free from Nigrahasthāna, i.e. Occasions for Reproof. He has openly stated that one should not handle *pakṣa, hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta* in the argument contrary to the principles by which they are governed. [13]He has specifically mentioned that all the fallacies and occasions for reproof are unfolded in the logical tradition of Saiva Siddhānta, especially from the rich materials embedded in Pauṣkarāgama. His disciple Nandisivāgrayogi[14] has also endorsed the same view in his commentary on his master's text, Sivaneṟiprākaśam.

In the last poem of Aḷavai-y-iyal,[15] Aruḷnandisivam has classified all the fallacies under four categories with their sub-members. According to him, pakṣābhāsas are four; hetvābhāsas fell under three divisions, each of which contains seven and thus the total being twentyone. Since the upamās (i.e. dṛṣṭāntas) are twofold viz., Sādharmya (positive) and vaidharmya (negative), the fallacies of comparison (i.e. example) are to be subsumed under two heads, each of which consists of nine, making the total eighteen.

Apart from the aforesaid threefold divisions of fallacies, [16]Aruḷnandisivam has brought all the Nigrahasthānas (*-Tōlvi-t-tāṉam*) viz., the points of defeat under two sections, each of which containing eleven and making the total number twenty two, which are meant for both the parties i.e., the Vādin and Prativādin (i.e. disputant and respondant) engaging in a serious debate.

[17]Thus the grand total of the fallacies including the occasions for reproof comes to sixtyfive. Aruḷnandisivam has not given either the definition or the illustration to all of them in his text. The author of Tattuvaprakāśam[18] has clearly stated that the logical fallacies are more than sixtyfive. But he has not worked out the details. Nevertheless,

he expected that the number would swell due to permutation and combination. Sugiura,[19] the great scholar in Indian logic, who has retrieved it from the Chinese and Japanese translations has calculated the maximum number of fallacies which are given below in his own words:

> "But if we consider the combinations of fallacies of which a syllogism may be guilty, the number is greatly increased. Of this kind, the Thesis is said to possess 9216, the Reason 117, the Example 84, in all then 9417 fallacies".

It seems that he has come to this conclusion based on the Chinese commentary on Nyāpraveśa, authored by Saṁkaraswāmin, the disciple of Dignāga. It is obvious that the Buddhist logicians took the pains to calculate the possible maximum number of fallacies. It shows their involvement and also interest in the descriptive study of fallacies.

It is curious to note that the author of Sivaneṟiprakāśam has not mentioned pakṣābhāsas, though he has to deal with them in his commentary on Aḷavai-y-iyal of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār.

It is the general opinion of the Saiva Siddhāntin that the fallacies occur due to the influence of āṇavamala on the soul. The characteristics of *āṇava* consists in its clouding, confusing and deluding features which are its effects.

In the interpretation of the different types of logical fallacies one can notice the influence of a particular system of Indian Philosophy at least on the commentators of Saiva Siddhanta. It is clear from the commentary of Sivāgrayogin that Aruḷnandiśivam has presented the general trends available from Pauṣkarāgama and also the Nyāya-Vaiśesika systems. Sivaneṟiprakāśsam closely follows Pauṣkarāgama. Though Tattuvaprakāśam follows Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, its author has adhered to the Tamil grammatical and logical traditions especially in the identification of the three major types of fallacies.

Sivagrayogin and his disciple Nandisivagrayogin belonged to one school, mainly following Pauṣkarāgama. Sivajñānaswāmigal represents a unique tradition, exhibiting the areas of variation from the Nyāya school. His chaste language to elucidate the fallacies is conspicuously superb. Pandiperumal closely follows the Buddhist logical traditions as preserved in the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai. His elucidation and examples to all kinds of fallacies are taken from this source. Since Dignāga has been highly regarded to be the

earliest known author on the subject, let us begin with him in the next chapter.

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3. RANDLE, H.N., *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p.215.
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5. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.II, p.169.
6. *Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, Aḷavai, Sivajñānaswāmigal urai* (Kazhagam), p.26.
7. *Tiruppukaḻ*, Saiva Siddhanta Samajam Edition, Chennai, 1953, 432, p.377.
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9. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol.I, p.50.
10. *Maṇimēkalai*, XXVII, 57-77.
11. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivāgrayogi urai, p.63, p.92.
12. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aṟuvar urai, p.240.
13. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Sivagrayogi urai, p.92.
14. *Sivaneṟi-p-pirākāsam*, Nandisivagrayogi urai, pp.29-38.
15. Sivajñāna Siddhiyār Aḷavai, 14, p.2.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. *Tattuva-p-pirakāsam*, 17, p.27.
19. SUGIURA, S., *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, p.58 from "Indian Logic in the Early Schools", p.224.

XII. FALLACIES OF THESIS

Dignāga, the reputed Buddhist logician of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra school, was the first to give much thought on Fallacies of Thesis (-Pakṣābhāsas). In his Pramāna Samuccaya and Nyāyamukha, he has identified five kinds of Pakṣābhasas, viz., 1. *Svavacana viruddha*, 2. *Pratyakṣa Viruddha*, 3. *Anumāna viruddha*, 4. *Loka viruddha* and 5. *Āgama viruddha*. This order of enumeration is found in Tucci's Pre-Diññāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese sources.[1] However, Stcherbatsky, the great interpreter of Buddhist logic has enumerated these fallacies in the following order:

1. *Pratyakṣa-nirākṛta*
2. *Anumāna-nirākṛta*
3. *Agama-nirakrta*
4. *Prasiddhi-nirākṛta and*
5. *Svavacana-nirākṛta*

In this list of Pakṣābhāsas, we find *nirākṛta* in the place of *viruddha*. It seems that though the contents are the same in the two lists, the order given by Stcherbatsky is proper.[2] According to A.B.Keith, Praśastapāda (A.D.450-550) has accepted the whole theory of pakṣābhāsas originally identified by Dignāga and followed him closely. He has presented all the five Fallacies of thesis with characteristic variation of phraseology. He has given them in the same order as follows:[3]

1. *Pratyakṣa-virodhin*
2. *Anumāna-virodhin*
3. *Abhyupagata (-Āgama) – virodhin*
4. *Svasāstra virodhin and*
5. *Svavacana virodhin*

However in the writings of H.N.Randle,[4] instead of virodhin the word viruddha is found. The fourth in the list is named *Sva-siddhānta viruddha*. Both meant the same. From the aforesaid lists, it is clear that the words *viruddha, nirākṛta* and *virodhin* are synonymous in denoting a defective thesis. Closely following the Buddhist school of logic, Praśastapāda has defined first a valid proposition and then identified the semblance of a proposition known as pakṣābhāsas.[5] According to the advocates of pakśābhāsas, the proposition is a

statement of a sādhya which does not involve in any contradiction. The non-involvement of contradiction in the hypothetical statement of a probandum is a necessary feature of a valid proposition. If there is any violation in this condition, then the fallacy of proposition occurs. Contradictory statements could be made at least in five ways and hence the fallacies of proposition are also of five kinds, as noted above.

Dharmakīrti, the author of Nyāyabindu has implicity given the definition of pakṣābhāsa, when he explained a valid thesis in a negative method.[6] He emphasised that a valid thesis should not be:

1. A fact already proved.
2. A fact, although not yet proved, but adduced as a reason, not as a consequence.
3. A fact which the disputant himself does not intend to prove on that occasion.
4. It must not necessarily be a fact explicitly stated and
5. It must not be a fact impossible by self-contradiction.

He has enumerated all the fivefold Fallacies of thesis in his Nyāyabindu.

Saṅkaraswāmin, the predecessor of Dharmakīrti has been considered to be the author of Nyāyapraveśa, sometimes attributed to his teacher Dignāga or an earlier author. In this Buddhist text, a list of ninefold pakṣābhāsas has been given. Apart from the aforesaid five fallacies of pakṣa, the following four are also found:

1. *Apprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*
2. *Apprasiddha-viśeṣya*
3. *Apprasiddhobhaya and*
4. *Apprasiddhasambandha*

All the aforesaid ninefold fallacies of pakṣa are enumerated in the section of the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai that deals with the principles of Buddhist logic.

Though Jayanta has refrained from discussing the fallacies of proposition and example in his Nyāya mañjari, he has counted eleven types of pakṣābhāsas in his Nyāyakalikā.[7] They are the following:

1. *Pratyakṣa viruddha*
2. *Anumāna viruddha*

3. *Āgama viruddha*
4. *Lokaprasiddhi viruddha*
5. *Svasiddhānta viruddha*
6. *Svavacana viruddha*
7. *Upamāna viruddha*
8. *Apprasiddha viśeṣaṇa*
9. *Apprasiddha viśeṣya*
10. *Apprasiddha viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa and*
11. *Pakṣābhāsa.*

A cursory glance at the above lists would reveal the fact that Jayanta has liberally taken from the Buddhist logicians who were the forerunners in the identification and classification of Fallacies of Thesis. He has elucidated the term 'Apprasiddhobhaya' as Apprasiddha viśeṣya and Viśeṣaṇa. He has included two more fallacies of proposition, viz., Upamāna Viruddha and Pakṣābhāsa. which may be subsumed under any one of the remaining nine kinds of Pakṣābhāsas.

With this background, let us proceed to deal with the definition, classification and illustrations as available from the texts and commentaries of Saiva Siddhānta.

Definition of Pakṣābhāsa

It is essential to note that the Naiyāyika term pratijñā was replaced bythe word pakṣa for the first time by the Yogācāra Buddhist logicians, subsequently followed by others.

Sivagrayogin has defined the pakṣābhāsa as the defective proposition which occurs in the inference, even if there is no remainder (seṣa) in the pakṣalakṣaṇa (i.e. the characteristics of a proposition), there are some statements which will present the semblance of a pakṣa and on close examination turn to be not a valid pakṣa.[8]

Sivajñāna Swamigal defines pakṣa first and then its semblance. According to him, out of the whole conditions for generating inferential knowledge (*-anumāna sāmagris*), the characteristic feature of pakṣa consists in its being the locus for the probandum, i.e. sādhya which he calls "*Tuṇiporuḷ*" i.e. the object to be proved. If there is any fault in this feature (i.e. becoming the locus of the

probandum), then the fallacy of thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) occurs. Also if there is a partial fulfilment of this definition, then it gives the semblance of pakṣa.[9]

According to Arulnandisivam there are only four kinds of pakṣābhāsa.[10] He has not mentioned them by name. Nevertheless, Pandiperumal has given first a list of four types which are different from those given by the other commentators. In addition, he has enumerated five more. All of them are taken from the Buddhist logic as expounded in Maṇimēkalai.

As we have already noted, there is no mention of pakṣābhāsa in Sivaneṟiprakāśam. Though the author of Tattuvaprakāśam[11] has enlisted four kinds of pakṣābhāsa, they are different from those enumerated in the commentaries of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār. Let us consider the definition and illustration of each of the pakṣābhāsas as produced by the commentators.

1. The non-existence of the pakṣa

This fallacy has been explained by Sivagrayogin as that which is characterised by the absence of pakṣa. Sivajñāna Swamigal has elucidated that the proposition which does not become the locus of prabandum, is the first type of fallacy enumerated under the division of Pakṣābhāsas.

Sivagrayogin has given the following illustration to explain this kind of fallacy.[12]

Proposition	:	The sky –lotus has fragrance
Reason	:	Because it has the quality of lotus
Example	:	As the lotus that germinated in the lake.

The proposition is itself faulty, since sky-lotus is a non-existent object (*ilporuḷ*). So, there is no valid subject to possess the sādhya. Since the pakṣa is defective, this fallacy is simply called pakṣābhāsa.

2. The non-existence of pakṣatva

According to Sivagrayogin, this fallacy occurs due to the faulty inference in which the quality of pakṣa (i.e. pakṣatva) becomes absent.[13]

E.g. Proposition	:	The soul is permanent
Reason	:	Because it has the atomic form.

Atomic form is physical, and hence subject to decay. But the soul is non-corporeal and is permanent. The quality, i.e. the permanence of the soul is not attested by the middle term and hence the whole statement becomes invalid. This type of fallacy may be treated under Anumāna viruddha.

According to Sivajnana Swamigal, partial non-existence of the subject characterises the second type of pakṣābhāsa.[14] The example as found in the elucidatory notes of Muthaiya Pillai is given hereunder:

Proposition	:	Sound is non-eternal
Reason	:	Because it is perceptible
Example	:	Like a pot.

In this syllogism, sound is the subject which is predicated by the characteristic feature of non-eternality. But, the adduced reason i.e. perceptibility is connected only with the sense-organ eye, while sound is concerned with the sense-organ ear. Since the pakṣa i.e. sound does not have the probans (hetu), it becomes invalid. This kind of pakṣābhasa is to be treated under Anumāna viruddha.

3. The non-existence of Pakṣa and Pakṣatva

Sivagrayogin elucidates that this fallacy occurs due to the absence of subject (pakṣa) and also its quality (pakṣatva). He produces the following illustration:[15]

Proposition	:	The hare's horn has fragrance.
Reason	:	Because it is the modification of earth.

In this syllogism, the hare's horn is the subject (pakṣa). Since there is no horn in a hare, the subject itself is faulty. The pakṣatva, i.e. fragrance being the quality of the subject is equally faulty. Hence the proposition that does not form the locus for both the pakṣa and pakṣatva becomes fallacious.

This fallacy may be considered under the type of *lokaviruddha*. Sivajñāna Swamigal elucidates that the proposition, becoming the locus of the probandum which has already been proved, becoming invalid.[16]

Eg.	Proposition	:	The kitchen has fire.
	Reason	:	Because it has smoke.
	Example	:	As in the places where smoke is seen.

In this illustration, the proposition does not possess an object to be proved or doubted. It contains the already known fire which requires no proof.

This fallacy may be treated under *svavacanaviruddha.*

4. The existence of pakṣa and pakṣatva and the absence of vyāpti

Sivagrayogin contemplated that though pakṣa and pakṣatva are existent, if the concomitance between the probans and probandum may be absent, it will become a fallacy.[17]

Eg. Proposition : Earth is eternal

Reason : Because it becomes an object to eye.

In this syllogism, pakṣa is earth and pakṣatva is eternality. The commentator thinks that the statement contains both the subject and its quality but the concomitance (-vyāpti) is non-existent.

He further says that what he has given as illustrations for the four types of fallacious thesis are only samples and one should identify such fallacies as and when they come in arguments.

Sivajñāna Swamigal explains the fourth type of pakṣābhāsa as the statement that forms partially the locus for the proven subject (sādhya).[18]

Eg. Proposition : The liquor has been drunk by someone.

Reason : Since it is a liquid

Example : As the milk.

In this syllogism, the pakṣa, i.e. subject is the liquor, which cannot have the sādhya, since what was drunk could not be exhibited. It is known that something as liquid nature has been consumed and that something can not be concluded only as liquor. So, the subject possesses only the probans, i.e. hetu - being the watery substance that alone could be drunk. It is sure that it is liquid but not liquor. It may equally be butter-milk, milk or even mere water. It is not certain that the consumed liquid is liquor because nobody has seen it when the person has drunk. Therefore, the faulty statement becomes a fallacy of pakṣa which has only the hetu, i.e. liquid and not the sādhya, i.e. liquor.

So far we have seen the elucidations of fourfold pakṣābhāsas according to the two commentators, viz., Sivāgrayogin and Sivajñāna Swamigal. It is essential to present the views of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar

and Nirambavaḻagiyar who counted the fourfold fallacies with specific names.[19] They are: 1. Pakṣābhāsa (pratyakṣā bhasā), 2. Anumānābhāsa, 3. Pratijñābhāsa (-svānumānābhāsa) and 4. Vacanābhāsa. Let us consider them one by one. The technical names given in the brackets (numbers 1 and 3) are found in the commentary of Nirambavaḻagiyar, who has submitted Sanskrit vākyas to illustrate all the fourfold fallacies. However, their contents remain the same in the commentary of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar.

1. Pratyakṣābhāsa

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar designates this fallacy by the name pakṣābhāsa.[20] When the sādhya, that is to be predicated of the pakṣa (-subject or minor term) is opposed to perceptual knowledge, then the pratyakṣābhāsa i.e. fallacy of perception takes place.

Eg. Fire is without warm (i.e. cool).

This statement is against our practical knowledge. Since perception indicates the knowledge received through the contact of any one of the senses with the concerned objects, this fallacy is called the perceptual fallacy or pratyakṣābhāsa. Jayanta has given the same example and named this fallacy as *pratyakṣa viruddha.*[21] The terms *ābhāsa* and *viruddha* are used as synonyms in the various schools of Indian logic.

2. Anumānābhāsa

When the Sādhya that is to be predicated to the pakṣa is opposed to inference, the inferential fallacy (-anumānābhāsa) occurs.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal.

Non-eternality is the sādhya to be attributed to sound, the pakṣa. It is not to be inferred, since no reason with example has been adduced to prove the statement.

Jayanta calls this fallacy, Anumāna viruddha.[22] The illustration to this defective pakṣābhāsa is given below:

"The visual organ does not apprehend colour".

Since colour is to be apprehended through the visual organ eye, this statement stands opposed to reason.

3. Pratijñābhāsa

Nirambavaḻagiar calls this fallacy as Svānumānābhāsa-pratyābhāsa.[23] When the sādhya that is to be predicated to the pakṣa becomes impossible to be accurately proved, the fallacy of

proposition (-pratijñābhāsa) takes place. This kind of fallacy occurs when one mistakes a pearl-oyster shell for the metal silver and makes the proposition "It is silver". It is really a defective proposition. One can multiply the example. For instance, if one sees a snake in the rope and jumps to say "It is a snake", then it becomes a fallacy of proposition.

Jayanta has mentioned a fallacy with the title "*pakṣābhāsa*" which is semantically similar to pratijñābhāsa. But he has given an entirely different example which is cited below:[24]

"Fire is hot".

Hotness of fire is a well known fact through perception, and hence it requires no proof. Though the statement is correct, it needs not to be offered in a debate for proof. Only statements which require proof are to be pronounced. On that account, it becomes a fallacy of thesis.

4. Vacanābhāsa

This fallacy is also called svavacanabhasa. When the sadhya that is to be attributed to the paksa is opposed to one's own statement, then it becomes a faulty thesis known as *vacanābhāsa.*

Eg. Liquor is drunk by Brahmins.

If a Brahmin makes this statement, it becomes a fallacy, since all Brahmins according to the scripture and also custom refrained from drinking intoxicating drinks. So, the fallacious nature of the proposition depends upon the person who makes the statement.

Jayanta has named this fallacy as *svavacana viruddha* and given the example that "My mother is barren" which is alreay found in Nyāya praveśa and Maṇimēkalai which will be considered in due course.

The two commentators viz., Maṟaijñānadeśikar and Nirambavaḻagiar had identified the aforesaid fourfold pakṣābhāsas to mean the four kinds of Pakkappōli, stated by Aruḷnandisivam. Since the latter did not mention them by name, the commentators took a free role in their identification and interpretation. Maṟaijñāna Deśikar also said that the pakṣābhāsas are also mentioned by some others as 1. Aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa, 2. Aprasiddha viśeṣya, 3. Aprasiddhobhaya and 4. Aprasiddha-sambandha.[25] *These four are mentioned also in the commentary of Pandiperumal. They are taken from Maṇimēkalai.*[26]

The author of Nyāyapraveśa has been identified either as Dignāga, or his predecessor or his student by eminent scholars in Buddhist logic. However, it is quite interesting to remark that Nyāyapraveśa and Maṇimēkalai go hand in hand in the enumeration and interpretation of not only pakṣābhāsa, but also of hetvābhāsas and dṛṣṭāntābhāsas. Among the commentators of the Tamil Saiva Siddhānta texts, it seems that Pandiperumal has been in intimate touch with the tradition of Buddhist logic and introduced the doctrine of logical fallacy closely following it in his commentary on Aḷavai-iyal. Though Arulnandisivam has limited the *pakṣābhāsa* to four only, Pandiperumal has quoted nine, all from the Tamil Buddhist epic Maṇimēkalai.[27]

Since Pandiperumal has given priority to the last four of the ninefold fallacies of thesis, let us begin with them in order.

1. Aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa

This fallacy denotes a defective thesis with an accepted pakṣa and an unaccepted sādhya. The reputed Buddhist logician Dignāga was honest enough to contemplate that the pakṣa and sādhya should be present in the statement. According to him, the characteristic feature of a valid thesis is given below:

> "A thesis cannot be something absurd.... and it must be a proposition which the disputant himself believes, which the bonafide really intends to prove. It would be bad logic if a philosopher attempted to make capital out of ideas which he does not share himself."[28]

From the aforesaid definition, it becomes clear that if there is any deviation, it will result in a fallacy of thesis. Aprasiddha viśeṣaṇa is one such fallacy. The word *prasiddha* means that which is well known. So, Aprasiddha denotes that which is not familiar or known. According to Pandiperumal, *viśeṣaṇa* means *sādhya* (*-tuṇivu*).[29] So the whole technical term *Aprasiddha viśeṣaṇa* indicates the statement in which the viśeṣaṇa is non-existent. Further, it provides the locus for the existence of an unfamiliar sādhya.

In Maṇimēkalai,[30] this fallacy of thesis has been interpreted as a statement with an unfamiliar pakṣa i.e. *aprasiddha pakṣa*, such as the Buddhist speaking to the Sāmkhya that 'Sound is perishable'. In this statement, sound is the pakṣa i.e. subject and 'is perishable' i.e. perishability is the viśeṣaṇa or predicate. This statement should be acceptable to both the parties in a debate. Then only the validity or

non-validity should be proved. Since the Sāmkhya is an advocate of avināśavada, i.e. the doctrine of non-imperishability or permanence, this thesis is not acceptable to him. But it is admissible to the Buddhist who expounds the theory of impermanence. According to him nothing is stable, everything is everchanging and hence under constant flux.

If the statement or proposition is acceptable to both the debaters, then there is no fallacy. Since in the aforesaid thesis, the viśeṣaṇa is acceptable only to the Buddhist and not to the respondent Sāṁkhya, it becomes a fallacy.

The avināśavāda of the Sāṁkhya requires some elucidation. He is a firm believer in Satkāryavāda. He is a realist. He believes that destruction occurs only to the *kārya-rūpa* i.e. effect. Even after a product is destroyed there is no total annihilation, since it exists in its *kāraṇa rūpa* i.e. causal form. Every product exists prior to its creation in its cause. As and when the conditions mature, the object is produced. Hence, the Sāmkhya is known as a *Satkārayavādin* and also *Avināśavādin*. Pandiperumal throws some light on the subject. According to him, the Sāṁkhya upheld that all the objects in the world had no destruction and without knowing his doctrine of avināśavāda, if the Buddhist, mistaking him that he had upheld that somethings had destruction, presented the statement that sound being one of such objects had perishability, then the sādhya dharma being the viśeṣaṇa was unknown to him. Thus the statement became a fallacy. Further, the commentator differentiated between the Sāṁkhya and Buddhist, stating that the former was a *Nityavādin* while the latter, an *Anityavādin*.

However, it seems that it would be more appropriate if the above statement is directed instead of Sāmkhya to a Mimāmsaka who has full faith in the doctrine of eternality of sound.

Cāttaṉār is identical with the author of Nyāyapraveśa when he defines that the *Aprasiddha viśeṣaṇa* consists in the unfamiliarity or non-knowableness (*-teriyāmai*) of the sādhya (i.e. *viśeṣaṇa*) to the opponent. He has given the same illustration.[31]

2. Aprasiddha Viśeṣya

This fallacious statement denotes a faulty thesis with an accepted sādhya and unaccepted pakṣa. Sādhya dharma is the viśeṣaṇa and its possessor is the *dharmin* which is otherwise known as viśeṣya. Viśeṣya denotes the object which is predicated with some

quality or feature. Accoding to Maṇimēkalai, if the probandum i.e. *viśeṣya* in the *pakṣavacana* is not known to the opponent, then it becomes a fallacy of this type. Since the opponent has not known the *dharmin* which is the *viśeṣya*, it becomes quite natural that he cannot know its dharma or the *viśeṣaṇa*. Nyāyapraveśa elucidates this fallacy as the thesis with an unfamiliar major term i.e. *sādhya*. Here *sādhya* denotes the *dharmin* i.e. *Viśeṣya*. The two texts presented the following illustration:[32]

The Sāmkhya, speaking to the Buddhist, makes the statement that "The soul is the possessor of intelligence" (*Caitaṉyavāṉ*). In this pakṣavacana, the soul (*ātman*) is the *viśeṣya* or *dharmin*, predicated with the *viśeṣaṇa* or *dharma* being intelligence. This statement is intelligible to the Sāmkhya who advocates the reality of soul. It is not so with the *prativādin* i.e. respondent Buddhist, since he is an advocate of non-soul theory i.e. *anātma vāda*. Hence the statement becomes invalid, since it deviates from the definition of a valid thesis, prescribed by Dignāga that we have already noted.

In the system of Sāmkhya, all the seen and known objects are subsumed under two ultimate categories viz., *puruṣa* i.e. soul and *prakṛti* i.e. matter. Souls are many. They are not created by anybody. They are eternal. They are the knowing subject. All the material objects are the products, evolved from the Primordial Matter i.e. Prakṛti, which becomes the external reality and object for the intelligent souls. Apart from the subject i.e. soul and object i.e. matter, there is no other entity or reality. So, the Sāmkhya system is also known as dualistic philosophy. But, the Buddhists never accepted the eternal existence of soul. According to them, a sentient being is the combination of some psychical and some physical features which are collectively called '*Nāma-rūpa*' which has been counted as the fourth nidāna in the chain of causation, known as "*Pratītya samutpāda*". Except 'Nāma-rūpa', there is no such thing as soul. So, the Buddhists are known by their non-soul theory.

Pandiperumal clearly noted in his commentary that to the Buddhist, who is the upholder of no-soul theory, the above statement of a Sāmkhya, who is the Ātmavādin i.e. the advocate of soul-theory, has no meaning and hence it becomes a fallacy.[33]

3. Aprasiddhobhaya

This fallacious thesis contains both the unaccepted pakṣa and sādhya. Ubhaya means two. Here, it denotes the two viz., both

Viśeṣaṇa and *Viśeṣya* i.e. the *dharma* and its *dharmin*. If both of them are non-existent in the *pakṣavacana*, then it becomeṣ a fallacy of thesis with the title "*Aprasiddhobhaya*".

Nyāyapraveśa defines this fallacy as the thesis with both minor and major terms being unfamiliar to the opponent. Maṇimekalai elucidates that aprasiddhobhaya denotes *pakṣavacana* with both dharmin and sādhya (i.e. *dharma*) unacceptable to the respondent. The illustration remains the same in the two texts, but a slight variation is found in the way of expression.[34] In Nyāyapraveśa, the following illustration is found:

"The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Buddhist makes the statement, "that the soul has feelings such as pleasurable etc." But in Maṇimēkalai the Vaiśeṣika, pointing to the Buddhist utters that the atman (-soul) is the cause for the effects being the assemblage of pleasure, etc., (which includes sorrow, desire, hatred, exertion, virtue and vice)." Since the Buddhist is the supporter of non-soul theory, the aforesaid statement in which both the *viśeṣya* i.e. soul and the *viśeṣaṇa* i.e. the assemblage of feelings such as pleasure etc., being the product of the former are non-existent to the Buddhist. Hence it becomes a fallacy.

In the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, the various feelings are said to be the qualities associated with the soul.[35] This concept is meaningful to the followers of this system. But to the Buddhists who do not believe in the existence of souls and hence its qualities, the aforesaid statement is defective and faulty. They treated the feelings such as pleasure, pain, etc., to be the products of one's own deeds.

4. Aprasiddha sambandha

The word *sambandha* denotes good relation. When the debater i.e. disputant knowingly or unknowingly makes a statement in such a way as to support the view of the opponent, it becomes a fallacy of this type. In Maṇimekalai the following illustration is given:[36]

When some one has said to the Buddhist that "Sound is non-eternal" (sabdam anityam), since it is his own doctrine, there is nothing for the *Vādin* (disputant) to establish.

A valid statement should be made by a *vādin* with a view to establishing his view. On the contrary, if his statement contains the opponent's view then there is no meaning in his debate. It is quite well known (*-prasiddha*) that only the prativādin i.e. respondent who

was defeated in the debate used to come to the side of the *vādin*. Here, the *vādin* because of his unwitty statement loosing his stand turns to the side of the *prativādin*. Usually it is not a well-known practice. Hence, it is called *aprasiddha sambandha* or unknown relation between the two parties participating in a discussion.

In the commentary of Pandiperumal, the *vādin* is mentioned as a Sāmkhya. He has to establish that "Sound is permanent" since he is an advocate of *avināśavāda*. Forgetting that, he has stated to the Buddhist that "sound is impermant" which is the latter's own view. Hence there is no use of further argument, as this statement itself established the opponent's view.[37]

However, in Nyāya praveśa this fallacy is not found. In its place, "*Prasiddha sambhandha*" is found.[38] It denotes a thesis that is accepted by all and hence it can not be offered for proof. The purpose of a statement is to strengthen one's own view and to refute the view of the opponents. Hence in making a statement which is universally accepted, the author of Nyāyapraveśa noticed a fallacy. The illustration is: "Fire is warm". This example is quoted by S.C.Vidyabhusana from the Tibetan translation of the same text. The example from the Sanskrit version of the text is: "The sound is audible to the ear". Both the illustrations are unobjectionable and well-known facts which do not require any proof. They are universally accepted. So, the statements "Fire is warm" and "Sound is audible to the ear" become fallacious, not because they do not contain any defective dharma or dharmin, but because they are prasiddha i.e. well known. In other words, not only the *viśeṣaṇa* i.e. 'warm' or 'audible to the ear' and the *viśeṣya* i.e. fire or sound are familiar, but their *sambandha* i.e. intimate relation is also familiar (*prasiddha*). Hence, this fallacy is called '*Prasiddha sambandha*'. It is very clear that the disputants in the debate should produce only meaningful and intelligible statements to refute and convince the opponents with a view to winning them over to their side.

So far we have seen the fourfold fallacies of pakṣa as quoted in the commentary of Pandiperumal from Maṇimēkalai and Nyāyapraveśa. It seems that the commentator is concerned only with the former, since he has no mention in his commentary about prasiddha sambandha of the latter.

After having exhausted all the four kinds of pakṣābhāsas. Pandiperumal goes to enumerate a different list of five types of

fallacious thesis which are given in Maṇimēkalai and also in Nyāyapraveśa. Praśastapāda has also quoted them in his elaborate commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. Let us enumerate them in order.

1. Pratyakṣa Viruddha

In Maṇimēkalai, this fallacy is defined as speaking contrary to perception.[39] The illustration is:

"Sound is inaudible to the ear"

The correct thesis should be: "Sound is audible to the ear". Contrary to this, the above statement is made. Since it is incompatible with perception, it is to be treated as perceptual fallacy.

Nyāyapraveśa is identical in presenting the same definition and illustration. However, Praśastapāda has given a different illustration: "Fire is cool". This is a defective thesis, contradicted by perception. The same example has been give by Maṟaijñāna Deśikar, as we have noted already. The following illustration, found in the commentary of Pandiperumal seems to be different:[40]

"Since sound is produced (*-ceytalāl*) it is unknown".

It seems that there happened some defect in the reproduction of the commentary from the palmyra manuscripts when it was printed. *In the original, in the place of 'ceytalāl' there should have been 'Ceviyāl' meaning through the ears.* Then, there is no difference in the illustration as it is to be considered as a faithful quotation from Maṇimēkalai.

2. Anumāna Viruddha

According to Maṇimēkalai, speaking contrary to the inferential knowledge is *anumāna viruddha*. The given example is as follows;[41]

"Speaking the non-eternal pot as eternal".

In Nyāyapraveśa, this fallacy is explained as the thesis incompatible with perception and it gives the same example.[42] Pandiperumal[43] elucidates that since the impermenence of pot is obviously known to all, it is fallacious to predicate it with eternality. It is really a misquote of what is already convincingly established.

Praśastapāda gives the statement: "The space (ākāsa) is dense" (*ghanam ambaram*). This is in contradiction with inference. According to Śridhara, the space (i.e. ether) is eternal. It has no parts. So, the

statement that space is devoid of interstices is opposed to the inference itself which proves the existence of the pakṣa i.e. space.[44]

3. Svavacana viruddha

The word *svavacana* means one's own statement. This is counted as the fifth in the entire list of pakṣābhāsa by the author of Nyāyapraveśa. However, closely following Cāttanar, the author of Maṇimēkalai, Pandiperumal has reckoned this as the third fallacy. Cāttaṉār defines this fallacy as the thesis incompatible with one's own statement. The example follows:[45]

"My mother is barren"

The predicate 'barren' is incompatible with the subject. Hence it is treated as a defective thesis. In Nyāya praveśa, the same definition and illustration are noticed.[46]

Praśastapāda has counted this fallacy as the fifth, perhaps following Nyāya praveśa.[47] But, he has given a different example to this fallacy, i.e. "Words do not convey any meaning". This is really a self-refuting statement, since the given statement itself has communicated some meaning.

4. Lokaviruddha

Here, the word '*loka*' denotes the people living in the world. According to Cāttaṉār, the statement that is contrary to the public opinion becomes a fallacy of this type. In Tamil classical tradition, the word '*loka*' denotes the most evolved souls who would never utter a lie. Even the logicians give due respect to the customary and traditional opinions that are handed down to posterity. They are held in high esteem as they reveal the culture and belief of the people.

In the Tamil ethical treatise Tirukkuṟaḷ (50 A.D.), it is said that one, who contradicts the statement of the public has to be classed along with the devils.[48] It shows the weight of the customary law-abiding nature of the Tamils.

Cāttaṉār illustrates this fallacy through the statement: "The shining moon (mati) is not candra". It is fallacious, since *mati* and candra denote the same. So, the contractory statement becomes a fallacy, as it stands against the public opinion.[49]

Pandiperumal has quoted the usual Tamil source. In Nyāyapraveśa, this fallacy finds the third place in the list of pakṣābhāsas. Further, a different example is given:[50]

"Man's head is pure
Because it is the limb of an animate being
Like the conch shell".
Or
"Money is an abominable thing
But the world does not say so".

The aforesaid statements are commonly held by the people, requiring no proof. Hence producing them in a debate becomes a fallacy. Since the true spirit of a debate is reflected in the establishment of a fact which requires valid proof, the universally accepted themes need not be admitted in a dicsussion.

Praśastapāda has not mentioned this type of fallacy. In the fourth slot, he has mentioned '*svaśāstraviruddha*' which is a fallacious statement against one's own śāstra or scripture. The example is this:[51]

"Effects are existent before their production".

If this statement is put forward by an exponent of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, it becomes fallacious, since he is an advocate of asatkāryavāda, having no belief in the pre-existence of the effects in their respective causes before their manifestation.

5. Agama viruddha

Āgama generally denotes a text or scripture pertaining to a particular system. Cāttaṉār[52] explains that the fallacy of scripture consists in the statement which is contrary to one's own text. Though he has not given any example, he has elucidated that the Vaiśeṣika, the advocate of the doctrine of *anitya* (impermanence) stating the *anita* to be *nitya* (permenent). According to him, the substances that constitute the whole are all dependent objects and hence are impermanent. This is really a statement against one's own theological or philosophical treatise. This may be treated along with what Praśastapāda has mentioned as "*Svasāstra virodhin* or *Svasiddhānta virodhin.*"

In Nyāyapraveśa, this fallacy finds the fourth place. According to its author, a statement incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine becomes a fallacy called Agama viruddha. Unlike Cāttaṉār, he gives an example:

"A Vaiśeṣika philosopher putting forward the statement that sound is eternal".[53]

Since, he is a believer in the impermanence of sound or any products, as enshrined in the Vaiśeṣika texts, the above proposition becomes a defective statement, since it runs against his own doctrine and *sāstra*. As far as this fallacy is concerned, it seems that, Pandipermal has followed both Maṇimekalai and Nyāya praveśa, since he has given the same example also in his commentary. Or, it may be presumed that the portion in the Tamil text presenting an example is missed due to the passage of time and the carelessness of the copyist.

Prasastapāda calls this fallacy as Āgamavirodhin and gives the following illustration:

"Liquor is to be drunk by a Brahmin".[54]

This has been already seen under *vacanābhāsa. Pandiperumal seems to be convinced that the knowledge of Buddhist logic has been held essential for the effective and flawless arguments.*

The author of Tattuvaprakāśam exhibits a separate tradition of pakṣābhāsas which is totally different from the aforesaid types. Let us briefly consider his view.[55]

First of all, he presents a list of four things, viz., earth, water, fire and air-all gross elements. Then, correspondingly he gives another list of four objects viz., mountain (varai), boat (nāvāy), smoke (pukai) and fragrance (maṇam). Then he respectively equates them according to the serial order. The commentator states that earth is the pakṣa to mountain, water is the pakṣa to boat, fire is the pakṣa to smoke and air is the pakṣa to fragrance. He has not explained how this statement has become a fallacy. It is evident that the mountain is an earthly substance. Boat is associated with water. Fire and smoke have concomitance. Since fragrance is wafted in the air, these two are intimately connected.

These four statements seem to be correct. How they turn to be fallacious is to be contemplated. Let us take up the first statement, viz., "The earth is the pakṣa to mountain". Though it appears to be correct, it is defective since the same earth becomes the pakṣa to many earthly objects, other than the mountain. If we consider the second statement, "Water is the pakṣa to boat" it is equally inadequate, since there are other objects both animate and inanimate having connected with water. Similarly the third statement, "Fire is the pakṣa to smoke" seems to be correct. Only smoke is invariably concomitant with fire, and not the other way. Smoke without fire is

impossible. But fire without smoke is possible. Thus the thesis, "Fire is the pakṣa to smoke" becomes a fallacy of statement. So also, the fourth proposition, "Air is the pakṣa to fragrance" is similarly insufficient and inadequate. It is true that air brings fragrance of the flower. Also it brings many other things.

Thus, the four types of statements represent the fourfold fallacies of pakṣa. *They become fallacious on the main ground that they are defective due to restriction.* They do not cover all the related objects. In the Tamil grammatical tradition, each of them is treated as a doṣa (defect) of the type of "*kuṉṟa-k-kūṟal*" i.e. statement with selection or restriction. Its related but quite opposite variety of statement is called "*mikai paṭa-k-kūṟal*" i.e. over-statement which is also treated as a doṣa. In addition, "*kūṟiyatu-kūṟal*" i.e. repetition of the same statement is also considered defective. Similarly contrary statement '*Māṟupaṭak kūṟal*', frivolous statement, '*poruṭila kūṟal*', confused statement, '*mayaṅkak kūṟal*' etc., are included by the Tamil grammarians under the caption, "tenfold defects".[56] They are very similar to the Daśa doṣas mentioned in the Sanskrit tradition.[57] Since such statements form the fallacious propositions, they are also to be identified as defective propositions.

However, it is wonderful that the author of Tattuvaprakāsam has deviated from the thought-patterns of other logicians in presenting the fourfold fallacies of proposition. New, let us move on to discuss the Fallacies of Reason in the next chapter.

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17. *Ibid.*, Sivagrayogi urai, p.93.
18. *Ibid.*, Sivajñānaswamigal urai, p.22.
19. DEVASENAPATHI, V.A., *Saiva Siddhanta*, University of Madras Publication, Chennai, 1974, p.53, f.n.59.
20. Ibid.,
21. *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, pp.170-1.
22. *Ibid.*
23. See No.19 above.
24. See No.21 above.
25. See No.19 above.
26. i. *Sivajñāna bodham, Pandiperumal virutti*, pp.53-5.
    ii. Maṇimekalai XXIX, 154-190.
27. Ibid.
28. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol.I, p.280.
29. *Sivajñānabodham*, Pandiperumal Virutti, p.53.
30. *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimekalai*, pp.292-3.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p.293.
33. *Sivajñānabodham, Pandiperumal virutti*, p.53.
34. *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimēkalai*, p.293.
35. *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, V, 1, 2 & 3.
36. *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimēkalai*, pp.289-90, p.294.
37. *Sivajñānabodham*, Pandipermal Virutti, p.54.
38. i. See No.36 above
    ii. History of Indian Logic, p.291.
39. *Maṇimēkalai* XXIX 154-6.
40. *Sivajñānabodham, Pandipermal Virutti*, p.54.
41. *Maṇimēkalai* XXIX, 157-9.
42. *History of Indian Logic*, p.290.
43. See No.40 above, p.55.

44. RANDLE, H.N., *Indian Logic in the Early Schools,* p.216.
45. *Maṇimēkalai* XXIX, 160-161.
46. *History of Indian Logic,* p.291.
47. *Indian Logic in the Early Schools,* p.217.
48. *Tirukkuṟaḷ,* 850.
49. *Maṇimēkalai* XXIX 162-3.
50. *Buddhism As Expounded in Maṇimēkalai,* p.292.
51. See No.47 above.
52. *Maṇimēkalai* XXIX 164-6.
53. *History of Indian Logic,* p.291.
54. *Indian Logic in the Early Schools,* p.216.
55. *Tattuvappirakāśam,* 15, pp.23-4.
56. i. *Tolkāppiyam, Poruḷatikāram, Iḷampūraṇam* (Kazhagam), sutra 654, p.580-1.

    ii. Naṉṉūl, Arumuga Navalar edition, Chennai, 1947, sutra 12, p.15.
57. SUSHIL KUMAR, D.E., *History of Sanskrit Poetics,* Vol.II, Firma KLM Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1988, pp.8-11; 86-88.

XIII. FALLACIES OF REASON

After the discussion of *pakṣābhāsas*, the commentators of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār turned their attention to the definition, classification and illustration of *hetvābhāsas*, viz., Fallacies of Reason. Sivagrayogin defines that the hetu, devoid of its characteristic features (*lakṣaṇa*) presenting appearance of a *hetu* but not to be so, is technically called the *hetvābhāsa*, i.e. fallacy of reason.[1] His commentary clearly indicates that the absence of the required characteristics of the hetu is the main factor for the germination of the fallacy of reason.

Sivajnāna Swamigal elucidates the circumstances responsible for a reason becoming a fallacy. According to him, if the hetu, which possesses pervasion (*vyāpti*) with the probandum (*sādhya*), is short of its essential characteristics and if it presents the semblance of a hetu, the probans turn to be fallacious.[2]

The views of the commentators tempt us to know much about the details of the hetvābhāsas for which we have to seek two main sources. One of them is the Buddhist source. The exponents of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism have worked out the canons of a valid reason and proclaimed that any infringement of the rule would certainly result in a fallacy. These rules are framed on the basis of the relation of the logical reason to the *pakṣa* (thesis, or subject) and *sapakṣa* (-similar) on the one side, and *vipakṣa* (dissimilar) on the other side. They are the following:[3]

1. The logical reason should be present wholly on the subject of inference (*pakṣa*).

2. It should be present only in the Similars (*sapakṣas*).

3. It should not be present in the Dissimilars (*vipakṣas*).

These celebrated three aspects of the logical reason constitute the Trairūpya theory of hetu which was first introduced by Vasubandhu (400-475 A.D.) in his Vādavidhi. It was elucidated by his erudite disciple Dignāga (450-500 A.D.) in his Pramāṇa Samuccaya and Nyāyamukha.[4] In Nyāyapraveśa, Sankaraswāmin, the student of Dignāga has elaborated the fallacies of reason on the basis of the violation of any one of the aforesaid rules governing a valid reason. Cāttaṉār (500 A.D.) the reputed Buddhist Tamil poet-cum-philosopher has expounded beautifully the theory of Trairūpya and

elaborately dealt with the fallacies of reason in the 29th canto of his immortal epic Maṇimēkalai.[5] After him, Dharmakīrti (600 A.D.) has taken the thread and discussed the same in his Nyāyabindu. It is a historical fact that all of them are in one way or other connected with Kāñchipuram, the centre for specialised Buddhist studies. It is really wonderful that Pandiperumal has closely followed these logicians of Yogācāra School in his commentary on Aḷavai-y-iyal of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār. Let us now turn to the elucidation of the triple rules of valid reason as found in Maṇimēkalai.[6]

1. "*moḻinta pakkattu ūṉṟi niṟṟal*" – i.e. the necessary presence of the reason in the subject wholly.

2. "*capakkattu uṇṭātal*" – i.e. its necessary presence in the similars only.

3. "*vipakkattu iṉṟiye viṭutal*" – i.e. its necessary absence in the dissimilars.

These three aspects of logical reason are elucidated through illustrations by Cāttaṉār. Let us consider them briefly.

Sādhya, which is otherwise known as *pakṣavacana* differs from school to school. With regard to sound, the Mimāmasakas hold that it is eternal (*nitya*), while others such as the Vaiśeṣikas hold that it is impermanent (anitya). The reason i.e. *pakṣadharma vacana,* adduced in favour of the *sādhya* i.e. probandum, should be valid atleast from the view point of the disputant. Let us take one of the dharmas, say impermanence attributed to the pakṣa i.e. sound. It has the following forms:

1. Sound is impermanent (*pakṣa*)

Because it is produced (hetu or pakṣadharma vacana).

In this statement '*anitya*' i.e. impermanence is the fact to be established (*sādhya*). It is the probandum, which exists in the subject (*pakṣa*). For this proof, the existence of the fact i.e. impermanence and its reason, 'because it is produced' should be present in the *sapakṣas* i.e. similars as in the following statement:

2. The impermanence is like that of a pot (sapakṣa). Since pot is also produced, it is subject to destruction. It is also impermanent.

So, impermanence and production are interdependent, since whatever is produced is impermanent and whatever is impermanent is

produced. In the sapakṣas, the Sādharmya dṛṣṭānta i.e. positive example is found.

So far we have seen the presence of the hetu in the *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa*, fulfilling the requirements of the first two rules of logical reason. The third rule viz., its necessary absence in the dissimilars establishes the fact i.e. impermanence in a negative method as given below:

> Whatsoever is not non-permanent (i.e. eternal or permanent) is not produced as in the case of ākāśa (ether).

This statement is known as *vipakṣa.*

It is clear that permanence or eternality is connected with the characteristic feature of non-production.

From the above illustrations, Cāttaṉār has made us understand that the principle of invariable concomitance is the basis for the exposition of the three rules of logical reason. In the words of S.C. Vidyabhusana, the three essential conditions as elucidated in the Nyāyapraveśa are the following:[7]

1. The whole of the minor term (subject) must be connected with the middle term (*hetu*).
2. All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term (i.e. *sādhya*).
3. None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term.

These three conditions are fulfilled respectively in the *pakṣa, sapakṣa* and *vipakṣas.* It is essential to note that even the great Indologist A.B. Keith has reproduced them without any change even in the language in his book.[8]

It is concluded that if one or more of these rules is transgressed, the *hetvābhāsa* occurs. Dignāga has identified three groups of fallacious reasons in accordance with the threefold phases of reason and named them 1. *asiddha* (the unreal), 2. *anaikāntika* (the indeterminate) and 3. *viruddha* (the contrary). *Asiddha* consists of four kinds of fallacies, which are defective in the first phase of the hetu. *Anaikāntika* consists of six kinds of fallacies which are defective in either the second or third phase of the hetu. Viruddha consists of four kinds of fallacies which are defective in both the

second and third phases of the hetu. All in all, there are fourteen kinds of fallacious reasons.[9]

All the threefold classification of the *hetvābhāsas* is also found in the commentaries of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār to be discussed in due course.

Coming to the Vedic systems of Indian Philosophy, it seems that Akṣapāda has concentrated on five kinds of hetvābhāsas that we have noted elsewhere. However, after the popularity of Buddhist logic, Jayanta seems to have evinced keen interest in the formulation of some rules and conditions which are essential for a valid reason, the violation of which would result in the fallacy of reason. Let us briefly present the five rules as framed by him on the model of Buddhist logic.[10]

1. The hetu must be existent in the subject (*pakṣa*).
2. It should be present in the similar pakṣas. (*sapakṣas*) which possess the sādhya.
3. It should not be present in the *vipakṣas* i.e. dissimilars which do not possess the *sādhya.*
4. The sādhya should not be incongruous with perception or verbal testimony.
5. The hetu should not provide any clue to make an inference in the contrary way (*asat pratipakṣa*).

It seems that the first three conditions are only restatements of Dignāga's three canons of logical reason. The violation of the rules effects the fallacy of reason. Since the rules are five, the resultant fallacies due to the violation are also counted five. They are as follows:[11]

1. Asiddha

The statement such as "Sound is eternal, because it is visible" is fallacious, since visibility is a quality not possessed by sound. It is unreal reason. This defective reason cannot prove the sādhya i.e. the eternality of sound.

2. Viruddha

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is created.

The reason i.e. creation does not tally with the sādhya i.e. eternality of sound. It goes contrary to the fact that whatever is created is non-eternal like a pot etc. This hetvābhāsa is also noted in Nyāyasūtra.

3. Anaikāntika

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is an object of knowledge.

Since things which are both eternal and also non-eternal become objects of knowledge, the concomitance of the hetu i.e. *prameyatva* with the probandum (*sādhya*) is not complete, for it governs endless objects.

This hetvābhāsa finds a place in Nyāyasūtra also.

4. Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa

E.g. Fire is not hot.

Because it is produced like a pot etc.

Since perception reveals that fire is hot, the reason is fallacious. Though it is true that fire is a product like a pot, production can not be adduced as a reason to prove that fire is not hot. Further, it goes against the perceptual knowledge i.e. it is hot.

It is also known as Kālātitya in Nyāya Sūtra.

5. Prakaraṇasama

E.g. 1. Sound like a pot is non-eternal.

Because no eternal qualities are found in it.

2. Sound like ether is eternal.

Because no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

In these cases, contrary reasons are adduced for contrary conclusions.

This fallacy has been enumerated as the third in the list of fivefold fallacies mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra.

All these attempts of the Buddhist and Nyāya logicians in the identification of fallacious reasons indicate their unabated interest in the transmission of correct knowledge to others.

So far we have seen the various views on the germination of *hetvābhāsas* and also their classifications. Let us proceed to enumerate them as enunciated by the commentators of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār.

The author of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār has clearly mentioned that the *hetāvabhāsas* (*ētu-p-p̱ōli*) are of three groups (*orumūnru*) without mentioning their names.[12] But he has specifically stated that the total number of all *hetvābhāsas* are twenty one.[13] Most of the commentators agree in holding *asiddha, viruddha* and *anaikāntika* are the major groups. However Nirambavaḷagiyar named them respectively as 1. *aniścita pakṣavritti* 2. *pakṣatṛaiya vṛitti* and 3. *pakṣa vipakṣa vṛitti.*[14] In addition to them, Sivagrayogin has included two more varieties viz., *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* and *prakaraṇasama,* stating that they are only minor variations of the first three.[15] Since he follows Pauṣkarāgama, he has mentioned all the five in his text Sivaneṟiprakāśam.[16]

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar who named hetvābhāsa as hetudhūṣaṇa has mentioned in his commentary that in Pauṣkarāgama, five major groups of hetvābhāsas are stated, while in Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, which contains the quintessence of the Saivāgamas, only the first three are indicated and elaborated by the commentators. He makes a compromise between the two.[17] He dismisses *satpratipakṣa* as a separate *hetvābhāsa,* since the counter-balanced reason is equally existent (*-sat*) on both *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa,* and hence there is no fallacy. In *bādhita,* also known as *kālātīta,* the unreal aspect of the sādhya is to be proved either by perception or other valid pramāṇa and hence it losses the hold to be an independent fallacy. He concludes that it may be brought under viruddha. Though Sivajñāna Swamigal has explained the fallacies individually, he has not given illustrations, which are furnished by P.Muthaiya Pillai. As usual, Pandiperumal follows the Buddhist concept of hetvābhāsas.

Jñānaprakāśar held high respect to Maṟaijñāna Deśikar, when he said that it would swell if he attempted to produce illustrations to all the hetvābhāsas and advised the reader to consult the elaborate commentary of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar with the guidance of an experienced scholar.[18] So, it is better to commence from his commentary to illustrate the twenty one kinds of fallacious reasons.

I. Hetvābhāsas-Maṟaijñāna Deśikar' elucidation

I. Asiddha (-The unproved)

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar explains asiddha to be the unproved ascertion. It is the middle term whose connection with the minor

term (subject) is not proved with certainty. It has twelve forms. A close study of Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra (950 A.D.) reveals the fact that our commentator has been closely following this text in defining and illustrating the twelve kinds of *asiddha hetvābhāsas.*[19] Let us deal with each of them serially.

1. Svarūpāsiddha

Svarūpa means the intrinsic nature. Here it indicates the nature of the reason. If the hetu is not proved by its very nature, then it becomes a fallacy of reason.

E.g. Sound is impermanent (*pakṣa*)

Because it is seen (*hetu*).

The reason, adduced to prove the impermanence of sound, is not valid, for sound is not an object to be seen by one's eyes. The intrinsic nature of sound is different. It is to be cognized through the ear. Here it is said as if it is an object to be seen. So perceptibility (i.e. reason) is not compatible with the subject i.e., sound. This fallacy is known as "*the unproved in respect of its nature*".

2. Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha

It occurs when the hetu exists in a different locus.

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because a cloth is a product.

Here the reason (i.e. creation) exists not in the pakṣa (i.e. sound which is predicated by impermanence), but entirely in a different locus i.e. cloth. Hence, it becomes a fallacy. In the original text Nyāyasāra, instead of a cloth, pot is mentioned.[20] This fallacy is known as "the unproved on account of its abiding in a different locus."

3. Viśeṣyāsiddha

If the hetu is not proved with regard to a *viśeṣya*, i.e. a subject qualified by a *viśeṣaṇa* i.e. attribute, then it becomes a fallacy of the unreality group and gets the name *Viśeṣyāsiddha.*

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because it is perceptible possessing sāmānyatva (generality)

There are various kinds of sounds, which are characterized by the generality viz., soundness, which is acceptable. But perceptibility of sound is impossible and hence unprovable.

This fallacy is known as "the unproved in respect of the substantive."

4. Viśeṣaṇāsiddha

If the hetu is unproved with regard to a *Viśeṣaṇa* i.e. an attribute qualifying a subject i.e. *viśeṣya*, then it turns to be *asiddha* type of fallacy, called *Viśeṣaṇāsiddha.*

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because it has generality (*-sāmānyatva*) which is perceptible.

Here the viśeṣaṇa i.e. 'soundness' is not proved, for it is not visible as stated in the reason.

This fallacy is known as "the unproved in respect of the attribute or adjective."

5. Bhāgāsiddha

Bhāga denotes a part or portion. If the hetu is not proved with regard to a part, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because it is produced after one's exertion.

According to S.C. Vidyabhusana, Nyāyasāra has maintained that the first sound-wave is produced by effort, but the succeeding sound-waves do not, it is said, depend on it.[21] But Maraijnāna Deśikar throws some light on the nature of effort. He has elucidated that initially (pūrva) all the sounds such as y, r, l etc., have been produced due to the exertion of God i.e. *Īśvaraprayatna*. But, subsequently they are produced by human effort (*Mānuṣya prayatna*) through the articulation of dental, palatal and other organs of speech with fast and slow motions.[22] So, it is to be understood that the first sound system was created by God from the principle of Nādatattva of the Śuddhamāyā, for the benefit of the various stratas of souls to provide all kinds of verbal knowledge. Subsequently, the human beings learnt them through the preceptor. So, the sounds produced by them actually have their dependence on the original creation of Īśvara.

Hence, the first part i.e. Īśvara prayatna for the production of sound becomes valid, while the second part i.e. human effort becomes invalid as it is only secondary. This fallacy is called "the unproved in respect of a part".

6. Āśrayāsiddha

The word *āśraya* means substrate, abode etc. The reason, that is not proved in respect of its substrate is called *Āśrayāsiddha.* In order to elicit the opponent's view, the debater used to produce a reason, devoid of the dharma which should be present in it. This type of hetu becomes a fallacy of the type of "Unproved in respect of the substrate".

E.g. The Sāmkhya speaks to the Naiyāyika thus:

"The prakriti exists

Because it evolves into the universe".

A statement should be admissible to both the parties. But this statement is meaningful only to the Sāmkhya who believed in the doctrine of evolution of the entire universe from the Primordial Matter (*Prakriti*). In this inference, *prakriti* (-also known as *pradāna*) is the *āśraya* for the evolution of the universe. But the Naiyāyikas never accepted that *prakriti* is the original source for the universe and hence the unproven reason is known as *āśrayāsiddha.*

Maraiññāna Desikar denoted the Naiyāyikas by the word "*Tārkikas*".[23]

7. Āśrayaikadeśāsiddha

If the hetu is unproved in respect of a part of its substrate, then it becomes a fallacy called "Unproved as regards a part of its abode".

E.g. Pradāna (primordial matter), Jīva (souls) and Īśvara (God) are eternal.

Because they are not produced by anybody.

Since the Naiyāyikas have admitted that the soul and God are eternal and not the primoridal matter, the reason in regard to the matter is not valid. Thus this fallacy arises.

8. Vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha

The word '*viyartha*' denotes meaningless or useless. The hetu, which is not proved on account of the substantive (i.e. *viśeṣya*) being useless, turns to be fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because it has *sāmānyatva* (generality) which is a product.

The generality of sound is soundness. The reason i.e. soundness adduced to the impermanence of sound does not serve any purpose besides being incorrect.

9. Vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha

If the hetu is unproved due to the meaningless attribute qualifying a substantive, then it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because it is a product which is possessed of *sāmānyatva* (generic nature).

It is useless and superfluous to state that a product is possessed of generic nature.

According to Maṟaijñāna Deśikar, the last two types of *asidha* (i.e. Nos. 8 & 9) are peculiar to the system of Mimāmasaka.[24]

10. Samdigdhāsiddha

If the hetu is unproved on account of its doubtful nature, then it becomes a fallacy of this type. The commentator has explained that *samdigdhāsiddha* denotes the ascertainment of a sādhya when the adduced reason stands doubtful.

E.g. When one doubts whether is it vapour or dew that appears yonder, he ascertains that it is smoke and states that there is fire.

The inference tends to be invalid if the smoke turns to be dew.

11. Samdigdhā Viśeṣyāsiddha

If the hetu is not proved on account of the use of a doubtful substantive, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Kapila is even now saturated with passions, hatred etc., Because he is a person in association with *puruṣatattvas* and in whom the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*) has not dawned yet.

In the given inference, the *viśeṣya* i.e. Kapila is doubtful, because he is the earliest exponent of Sāmkhya philosophy, endowed with perfect knowledge. So, the reason that he is devoid of the knowledge of reality is unproved since the substantive happens to be Kapila.

12. Samdigdhā-viśeṣaṇāsiddha

If the hetu is unproved due to the use of doubtful viśeṣaṇa (i.e. attribute), it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Kapila is still saturated with desires etc.,
Because he is a person devoid of knowledge of reality.

The attribute i.e. 'a person always without true knowledge' is doubtful and hence the reason stands unproved.

All these fallacies fall under two descriptions based on the absence of truth involved in them to be accepted by both the parties or one of them participating in the debate.

Thus, the commentator Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has expounded the twelve kinds of unproved Reason (asiddha) closely following Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña. It is essential to mention that Bhāsarvajña was a great Saivite. Unlike the Naiyāyikas who advocated four pramāṇas, he accepted only three, in close agreement with the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta.[25]

Next, let us pass on to deal with the viruddha variety of *hetvābhāsa* as delineated by the same commentator.[26]

II. Viruddha-the Contradictory Reason

According to Bha-sarvajña, Viruddha denotes the reason which exists in the pakṣa and in its opposite i.e. vipakṣa.[27] If a reason, that is used to prove the presence of the predicate, contradicts the predicate, it turns to be a fallacy called *viruddha*, because it contradicts an accepted truth.[28] In the statement, "sound is eternal, because it is produced" the reason (i.e. 'Because it is produced) which instead of proving the proposition (i.e. 'Sound is eternal'), contradicts it. Since whatever is produced is non-eternal and hence this reason can not prove eternality of sound. According to the Buddhist, it is the contradictory opposed part of right reason, otherwise called contrary or inverted reason.[29]

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has identified two types of viruddha hetvābhāsa.[30] He has also illustrated them. Here again he follows Bhāsarvajna to the possible extent. They are given hereunder.

1. Pakṣa vipakṣa vyāpaka viruddha

If the reason exists in the *pakṣa* (i.e. proposition) and also in the *vipakṣa* (i.e. heterologue) then it becomes a fallacy known as *pakṣa vipakṣa vyāpaka viruddha.*

E.g. Sound is eternal.

Because it is a product like the ether (homologue) and like pot (haterologue).

Since the reason 'producedness' (*-kāryatva*) pervades both the sādhya (sound) which is characterised by eternality (nityatva) and its opposite (*antityatva*) as found in the *vipakṣa* i.e. pot, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

2. Pakṣa vipakṣaikadeśaviruddha

If the reason pervades a part of the *pakṣa* and also a part of the *vipakṣa* it turns to be a fallacy called *pakṣa vipakṣa ekadeśa viruddha*. The word '*ēka deśa*' governs both the *pakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is produced after an effort (*prayatnāntara*).

According to Bhāsarvajña and other Naiyāyikas, the first wave of sound is a product of effort but not the succeeding waves of sound. Therefore, 'the producedness' (i.e. *kāryatva*) of effort does not abide in a part of the pakṣa (i.e. succeeding sound waves) and also in a part of the *vipakṣa* such as the grass other than the pot.

Since Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has decided to count only two kinds of viruddha hetvābhāsa to meet the requirements of the grand total of all logical fallacies, he has left out the remaining types as found in Nyāyasāra. Next, he proceeds to deal with seven kinds of *anaikāntika hetvābhāsa.*[31]

III. Anaikāntika-The Uncertain

The reason is expected to remain only in the *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* and not in the *vipakṣa.* But if it abides in all the three, it becomes a fallacy known as '*Anaikāntika*' or the uncertain. It indicates the inconclusive nature of the reason. If the reason will be uncertain no definite conclusion is made possible. There is no consistency in the middle term, since it goes to homologues as well as heterologues. It is inconclusive. It does not guide one to a single conclusion. It has been equated with *savyabhicāra* found in the Nyāyasūtra and *samdigdhā* in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. *It seems that Dignāga was the first to name it anāikantika on the basis of its unpredictableness.* Then this term gained currency even in the homogeneous systems.

Maraijñāna Desikar explains *anaikāntika* as one becoming many.[32] He has presented seven kinds of uncertain reason, following Bhāsarvajña.[33] Let us consider them one by one.

1. Pakṣa traiya vyāpaka anaikāntika

The reason, which becomes doutful due to its existence in all the threefold statements, viz., *pakṣa, sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is impermanent

Because it is cognizable as a pot (sapakṣa)

and as ether (vipakṣa).

The reason 'cognizable' is present in *pakṣa traiya* i.e. in the *pakṣa* (sound), *sapakṣa* (pot) and *vipakṣa* (ether). Therefore, it becomes a fallacy of inconclusiveness.

2. Pakṣa vyāpaka sapakṣa vipakṣa ēkadeśa vritti

The reason, which is uncertain due to its presence in the whole of *pakṣa*, and parts of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* becomes a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is perceptible as in the case of a pot etc. (*ēkadeśa sapakṣa*) and as in the case of generality (*ēkadeśa vipakṣa*).

In the aforesaid threefold statements, the reason i.e. perceptibility (*-pratyakṣatva*) pervades the whole of the *pakṣa* i.e. sound. It exists only in some forms of sapakṣa such as pot and not in other forms of *sapakṣa* such as the binary compound of atoms. Also it abides only in some kinds of *vipakṣa* such as generality and does not abide in other forms of *vipakṣa* such as ether, which is eternal.

3. Pakṣa sapakṣa vyāpaka vipakṣa ēkadeśa vritti

The reason, which is not certain on account of its existence not only in both the *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* but also in part of the vipakṣa becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. This is a cow

Because it has horns

as in the case of all kinds of cows (*sapakṣa*) and

as in some cases of *vipakṣa* such as buffalo.

The reason 'horns' is found wholly in the *pakṣa* (-a particular cow) and all *sapakṣas* (in all kinds of cows) and in part of *vipakṣa* i.e. buffalo. Since it is not found in other parts of *vipakṣa* such as a horse, it becomes uncertain.

4. Pakṣa vipakṣa vyāpaka sapakṣa ekadeśa vritti

The reason, which is uncertain on account of its presence in the minor term (*pakṣa*) and heterologue (*vipakṣa*) and also in some forms of homologues (*sapakṣa*) turns to be a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. This is not a cow

Because it has horns.

as in the case of all cows (*vipakṣa*) and

as in some cases of *sapakṣa* such as horses etc.

The reason 'horns' is found in the seen animal (*pakṣa*) and in all the cows (-*vipakṣa*) and some of the *sapakṣas* such as buffaloes, elephants etc., but not in other forms of *sapakṣas* such as horses, rabbit etc.

Since the reason is not found in some parts of homologues, it is known as *sapakṣa ekadeśa vritti*.

5. Pakṣatraiya ekadeśa vritti

The reason, which is doubtful because of its presence only in a part of *pakṣatraiya* i.e. minor term, homologue and heterologue, becomes a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. The earth is eternal

Because destruction is perceptible.

The reason i.e. perceptibility of destruction is applicable only to the part in the earth which is gross but not in earth which is subtle and atomic. The same reason exists in some forms or parts of homologues such as a pot, but not in other homologues such as a binary compound of atoms (which the commentator indicates by "*iraṇṭu aṇu ādi*; ādi denotes etc.); The same reason also abides in some kinds of heterologues such as generality (-*sāmānyatva*) and not in others such as ether (-Instead of ether, Maṟijñāna Deśikar mentions 'soul').

So, the existence of the reason only in parts of threefold *pakṣas* leads to uncertainty and inconclusiveness and hence it is treated as a fallacy.

6. Pakṣa sapakṣa ekadeśa vritti vipakṣa vyāpaka

The reason, which is uncertain in respect of its maintaining the relation of concomitance with parts of *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* and with the vipakṣas wholly becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Space and time are substances
Because they are incorporeal.

The reason i.e. incorporeality (*amūrtatva*) abides only in some forms or parts of *pakṣa* such as space and time, but not in other parts of *pakṣa* such as mind which has the atomic form. It equally exists in parts of homologues such as soul, ether and not in others such as earth, water, fire and air. Nevertheless it is found in all the *vipakṣas* that include the remaining *padārthas* except dravya viz., quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence.

In the commentary of Maraijñāna Deśikar, the soul and ether are quoted as the ekadeśas of vipakṣa. In the rest of the details, he follows Nyāyasāra.

7. Pakṣa vipakṣa ekadeśa vritti sapakṣa vyāpaka

The reason which is uncertain due to its maintaining the relation of concomitance with a part of *pakṣa* and a part of *vipakṣa* and with the *sapakṣa* wholly, becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Space and time are not substances
Because they are corporeal.

The reason corporeality (*mūrtatva*) abides only in some forms or parts of *pakṣa* such as mind, but not in some others such as space and time. So also it abides in some of the vipakṣas such as soul and not in some others such as generality. Neverthless, it is found in all the sapakṣas, denoted by the commentator as "*guṇādi*" i.e. *guṇa* etc. which clearly indicate the padārthas excepting *dravya*, viz., *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity) and *samavāya* (inherence).

Dr. S C. Vidyabhusana has interpreted this fallacy as found in Nyāyasāra in the following way:[34]

This fallacy indicates the reason which abides in all homologues and heterologues, but only in a part of the minor term.

E.g. Ether, space, time soul and mind are not substances

Because they are devoid of special qualities of momentary character.

The devoidance of special qualities of momentary character (-which is the reason) is applicable to space, time and mind. But it can not be attributed to ether and soul, since sound is the quality of ether and intelligence is the quality of soul. So, the reason abides only in some parts of the pakṣa viz., space, time and mind but not other parts of the pakṣa, viz., ether and soul. Also it exists in some parts of the vipakṣa such as earth, water, fire and also air and not in some others such as ether etc., It abides in all homologues (i.e. sapakṣas) as quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence.

Though there are some variations in the interpretation and illustration as noticed in the commentary of Maraijñāna Deśikar and Nyāyasāra, it is certain that he is guided by the logical principles of the Nyāya system as expounded by Bhāsarvajña, at least when he has dealt with the threefold hetvābhāsas, as noted above.

Now, it is pertinent to present the views of Sivagrayogin who closely follows Pauṣkarāgama in the exposition of logical thoughts pertaining to Saiva Siddhānta. He is very prompt in counting the twenty one types of fallacious reasons. But he differs considerably in their classification from Maraijñāna Deśikar. He has divided all the twenty one fallacies into five groups.[35]

Sivagrayogin's elucidation

According to him *asiddha bheda* of Hetvābhāsa is of sixteen kinds.[36] They may be presented serially.

1. Pratamāśryāsiddha

When the reason becomes unreal as regards the substratum, then it is called *āśrayāsiddha*. One of the five conditions of a reason consists in its presence in the pakṣa (i.e. minor term). If the pakṣa is not real, then the reason can not be attributed to it. As a result, it becomes a fallacy. Sivagrayogin gives the following illustration:

The sky-lotus is fragrant

Because of its lotus-ness

Like the lotus in the lake.

In this inference, the unrealityof the pakṣa (i.e. sky-flower) renders the conclusion impossible. Since unreal or fictitious thing should not be given as an object for reflection. That is why this fallacy has been ranked as a fāllacy of thesis, that we have already seen. Here, it is presented by the commentator to indicate that the reason i.e.

lotus-ness can not be attributed to the pakṣa, since sky-lotus is an unreal object and hence this fallacy equally claims to be counted under hetvābhāsa. He calls it the primary unreal reason as regards the substratum.

A different example has been cited for this fallacy in Nyāyasāra and in the commentary of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar as noted already.

2. Svarūpāsiddha

A valid reason is required to abide in the subject. If it does not abide, it can not provide the basis of any reasoning.

E.g. Pot and others may possibly become primal-atoms (*paramāṇu*)

Because of their impermanent nature (*anityatva*)
Like the soul.

In the doctrine of Pāñcarātra system, soul is described as atomic. But to the pakṣa i.e. pot and other objects, which are impermanent, the attribution of the hetu i.e. permanence becomes unreal by its own nature and hence arises a fallacy called Svarūpāsiddha.

In the commentary of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar a different example was given, as we have seen already.

A.B. Keith has quoted a fresh example for this fallacy which is given below:[37]

The lake is a substance
Because it has smoke

The reason i.e. 'smoke' does not exist in the pakṣa i.e. lake and hence it cannot afford any basis for inference.

There is a fundamental difference between *āśrayāsiddha* and *svarūpāsiddha*. In the former, the subject is false and fictitious, while in the latter it is improper and inappropriate.

3. Viśeṣaṇāsiddha

The same example, that has been found in the commentary of Marijnana Desikar and Nyāyasāra, is provided also by Sivagrayogin. Hence it is not repeated here.

4. Viśeṣyāsiddha

The unproved reason in respect of the *viśeṣya* (-substantive) is called *Viśeṣyāsiddha*.

E.g. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a substance becoming an object for cognition like the pot.

Since the reason '*dravyatva*' (substance-ness) being the *viśeṣya* is unreal, this fallacy is named *viśeṣyāsiddha*. However, a different example is found in the commentary of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar, as noted already.

After the enumeration of these four varieties, Sivagrayogin proceeds to present twelve more under the major division "Asiddha".[38] They are presented hereunder.

1. Ubhayāsiddha

The defective character in both *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* leads to the appearance of the fallacy known as *ubhayāsiddha*. It denotes the unreal or unproved reason in respect of both attribute and substantive.

E.g. Pot is non-eternal

Because it is a quality and not an object for sensory perception.

In this inference, the *viśeṣaṇa* i.e. quality and the *viśeṣya* i.e. not becoming an object for perception are unreal.

In other words, the reason contains two aspects:

1. Quality i.e. viśeṣaṇa
2. not becoming an object for perception i.e. viśeṣya.

The first aspect can not be attributed to the pakṣa i.e. pot, which is not really a quality but a product. Similarly, the second aspect can not be related to the same pakṣa, since pot is an object for sensory perception. Therefore in this inference, the reason consisting of both *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* becomes falsified, since they can not exist in the *pakṣa*. Further, instead of proving the sādhya, 'non-eternality' irrelevant and improper reason has been produced and hence it is fallacious.

2. Bhāgāsiddha

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has given a different example that has already been presented. But, Sivagrayogin has defined this fallacy through the following example.

The soul and body are non-eternal

Because they are effects

Like the pot.

The reason i.e. being an effect or product like a pot is applicable only to the body in the pakṣa and not to the soul. Since the *kāryatva* is not found in a half (*bhāga*) of the pakṣa, it becomes an unreal reason of this type. There is a difference between *ekadeśa* and *bhāga*. The former denotes a part in many, while the latter the half. In the aforesid pakṣa, two objects are given. Among them, one (body) is fitted for the reason (*kāryatva*) and the other, soul not fitted. It is to be noted that in its extension of meaning the word bhāga may also denote a part.

3. Ajñānāsiddha

When the reason that is related to the pakṣa is not knowable then it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. Devadatta has enormous wealth
Because he has adṛṣṭa (lucky)-
Like Yajnadatta.

We are not sure whether Devadatta is rich because of his luck. He may be rich even otherwise i.e. hard work, exertion, perseverance etc. Therefore the adduced reason i.e. adriṣṭa exists or not in the minor term is beyond our cognition and so the fallacy occurs.

4. Adhikaraṇānjñānā siddha

Now the primary atom (*paramāṇu*) may produce a substance in the ether.

Because it is a primary atom.
Like the paramāṇu that produces a pot.

In this inference, we do not have the knowledge about the paramāṇu, the locus of which is ether. So, it becomes a fallacy of uncertainty. Here in this technical term, the word *adhikaraṇa* means the locus. The *ajñāna* or ignorance occurs due to the unknowablity of the locus for the reason. Hence the uncertain reason turns to be a fallacy known by this lengthy term.

5. Vyāpyatvāsiddha

This kind of fallacy arises due to the uncertain pervasiveness of the reason with the probandum.

E.g. All are momentary

Because they are insentient

Like the bubbles in the water.

Since there is no pramāṇa which informs the pervasiveness of the reason i.e. insentience with the sādhya, momentariness, the inference becomes an uncertain fallacy known as *Vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

6. Aupādhika Vyāpyatvāsiddha

If the middle term (hetu) has concomitance with the major term (sādhya) then it is a valid inference. If this rule of valid hetu is violated, then the fallacy of unreal due to *vyāpyatva* occurs.

E.g. The male-infant in the embryo is black

Because it is the child of Maitrai

Like the senior-child of Maitrai.

To prove the blackness of the child, other conditions (upādhi) such as food contents etc., are to be considered. So, there is defect in the reason in respect to the pervasiveness with the sādhya. The reason that the first child of a women is black may not have the concomitance with the infant, growing in her embryo. Hence, it is not valid due to the defect in the pervasiveness with the upādhis (adjuncts and conditions).

7. Āgamabādhita viṣaya sādhyāsiddha

The term *āgamabādhita* indicates the reason contradicted by the scripture of the particular system. If the reason is incompatible to prove the sādhya due to one's own scriptural contradiction, then it becomes a fallacy with this name.

E.g. Sacrifices (yajñas) etc., are not means for
(the attainment of) heaven
Because they are rituals
Like the hīna kriyas (lower or lesser rituals)

Since the scriptures assure that the svarga (-heaven) is to be attained by yajñas, the adduced reason in the above inference stands opposed by scripture.

8. Upamāna bādhita viṣaya sādhyāsiddha

If the reason, intended to prove the major term, stands against the upamāna pramāṇa, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. The forest-cow is not equal to (the ordinary) cow

Because it is an object.

In this inference, the sādhya stands contradictory to comparison (as a source of knowledge). Therefore the fallacy of this type arises.

9. Arthāpatti bādhita viṣaya sādhyāsiddha

If the reason is contradictory to *arthāpatti* i.e. presumption, in proving a sādhya, then it turns to be a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. Devatatta who lives for hundred years is not found either in the house or outside.

Because he does not appear for our perception.

The reason i.e. "not known through perception" contradicts the statement (that Devadatta lives for hundred years) by presumption which implies that he ceased to exist because he is not found either in the house or elsewhere.

10. Anityāsita

This fallacy is also called by the commentator as "*prayojakāsiddha*". He has given the following syllogism to illustrate this kind of fallacy.

E.g. Proposition : The Universe exists always. (in a lineage i.e. uninteruptedly) (*santāna paramparā*)

Reason : Because it is an object (*vastu*)

In this inference, the reason i.e. 'being an object' is not useful to establish the proposition and hence it becomes a fallacy of this type. To be very clear, the reason 'being an object' does not ascertain the probandum viz., "always existing" and hence it turns to be an uncertain hetu resulting in a fallacy.

It is essential to note that in the commentary of Nandisivagrayogin, the fallacy is named "*anadhyavāsita*" instead of '*anityāsita*'.[39] The former seems to be the correct form, since it is also found in the commentary of Praśastapada

11. Anyatarā siddha

If the reason proves the opponent's doctrine, then it is called *Anyatarāsiddha*.

Ed. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is produced.

If this inference is related to the Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika, then it is proved since it is their doctrine. If it is pertaining to Mīmāmsaka, it is unproved since he does not believe in the production and impermanence of sound. So, it is siddha for the former and asiddha for the latter. The twelfth type of uncertain is not found in the existing version of the commentary. However, it should have been in the original manuscript.

So far, we have seen sixteen types of asiddha group as noted in the commentary of Sivagrayogin. In this context, it is pertinent to record that in Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra, upamāna bādhita and arthāpattibadhita are not found. Gangeśa has included the former in the list of ten varieties of incompatible reason in his Tattvacintāmaṇi.[40]

Among the remaining five fallacies of reason, he has identified one fallacy of viruddha, two of Anaikāntika and two of Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.[41] Let us enumerate them accordingly.

Viruddha (Fallacy of contradictory hetu)

If the reason, instead of proving the existence of predicate (sādhya), proves its non-existence, then it becomes a fallacy called contractory hetu (*viruddha*). Though there are many sub-types of this fallacy, Sivagrayogine has given only one.

E.g. Proposition : Soul is not *vibhu* (-that which is omnipresent)
Reason : Because it does not contain in the body.

In this inference, since the reason pervades the soul in the minor term and the ether in the heterologue (-vipakṣa), it becomes contradictory.

Anaikāntika (The indeterminate or inconclusive hetu)

If the reason exists in the subject (pakṣa), its homologues (sapakṣas) and also heterologues, it becomes a fallacy of the uncertain. Maṟaijñānadeśikar has give seven types of Anaikāntika, as we have seen already. However, Sivagrayogin has given only two which are not mentioned by the former. They are: 1. Sādhāraṇa and 2. Asādhāraṇa.[42]

1. Sādhāraṇa (The Ordinary)

Sivagrayogin elucidates that the ordinary anaikāntika results due to the presence of the hetu in all the three pakṣas, viz., minor term, similar and dissimilar.

Eg. Soul is eternal.

Because it is an object of knowledge.

Like the ether.

The reason i.e. *prameyatva* (-being an object of cognition) exists not only in the pakṣa (soul), but in its homologues such as mind and heterologues such as ether. Thus it is indeterminate and hence fallacious. It is the too general middle term. This kind of fallacy has been named by Maraijñāna Desikar as Pakṣatraya Vyāpaka anaikāntika and he has produced a slightly changed illustration to explain it, as we have already seen.

2. Asādhāraṇa (The Non-ordinary)

If the reason exists only in the minor term and not in the similars and dissimilars, then it is a restricted hetu to be called *asādhāraṇa anaikāntika*.

Eg. Earth is eternal
Because it has fragrance.

In this inference, the reason i.e. possessing fragrance abides only in the pakṣa (-earth) and not in its homologues such as ether and heterologues such as water.

It is pertinent to note that in the present editions of the commentary of Sivāgrayogin, the usages '*vākcāti*', '*akācati*' etc. are found. It should be corrected as *ākācāti* which is found in the commentary of Sivaneriprakāśam. It means ether etc.

These two types of uncertain hetu are also discussed not only in the Nyāya and other Vedic systems but in the Yogācāra Buddhism, which we have to witness when the views of Pandiperumal are presented.

1. Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa (Mistimed or incompatible hetu)

If the reason exists in the pakṣa as opposed by evidences, then it becomes a fallacy of this kind. It is also known as *kālātīta* (mistimed) and *bādhita* (incompatible). In this kind of inference, the reason refers to a course of events which follow in a succession. If the events that constitute the reason are simultaneous, then the reason can prove the sādhya (-predicate). If they are not simultaneous, but successive, then the reason is considered to be *kālātīta* i.e. mistimed (-coming after the time) and hence turns to be a fallacy.

Eg.1. All the effects are devoid of *upādāna*
Because they come to exist accidentally (*āgantuka*).

In this inference, bādhita occurs due to the pramāṇa which proclaims that all effects are due to *upādāna*. *Upādāna* denotes the material cause which is the root from which all the effects are either created or emanated.

Eg.2. Fire is not-hot
Because it is an object
Like the water.

In this inference, the reason being an object, adduced to establish the probandum is not valid, since the proposition itself is incompatible to the perceptual knowledge which reveals that fire is hot.

2. Prakaraṇasama

Prakaraṇa literally means 'question' and sama means equal. So, the whole word would indicate a reason which raises the same question which was meant for answering. The later logicians called it *satpratipakṣa,* which has already been mentioned.

This has been translated by the specialists in various forms, such as 'Balancing the controversy', 'Counterbalanced reason' etc. We have already noted that Akṣapāda was the first to mention this hetvābhāsa. Vidyabhusana, following Bhāsarvajña, elucidates that the reason which possesses its three forms, but establishes one's own side as well as the opposite side is called *prakaraṇa sama.*[43]

Sivagrayogin has given the following example.

Karma is eternal
Because it is beginningless
Like the soul.

In this inference, the reason i.e. *anādi* goes to prove the sādhya i.e. eternality of karma. But this argument is counter-balanced by the following:

Karma is non-eternal
Because it has origination through one's
mind, speech and body (action)
Like the pot.

In this inference, the reason *janyatva* (origination of karma) goes to prove the non-eternality of the pakṣa (i.e. *karma*).

Hence, the reason adduced in the first inference (*prakaraṇa*) is counterbalanced in the second which is treated as equal (*sama*). Since absence of counter reason (i.e. *asatprati-pakṣatva*) has been held as one of the five conditions of a valid reason, the presence of counter-reason leads to the fallacy of counterbalanced reason.

So far the contents of the commentary of Sivagrayogin with regard to the variou sub-groups of fallacious reasons have been discussed. Next in order, the views of Sivajñāna swamigal deserve to be stated.

Sivajñāna Swamigal on Hetvābhāsas

He follows his predecessors in grouping all the fallacies of reason under three major heads. They are as follows:[44]

I. Tuṇiyappaṭātatu (Asiddha)

The logical reason that has not been established comes under this division. It is clear that the term '*tuṇiyappaṭātatu*' is a synonym of *asiddha* or *aniścita* i.e. the unreal. There are thirteen kinds of this group.[45]

II. Maṟutalaikkaṭpaṭuvatu (Viruddha)

The logical reason which is contradictory to the major term comes under this division. It is certain that the term '*maṟutalaikkaṭpaṭuvatu*' denotes the contradictory or the contrary reason known as *viruddha*. There are five kinds of this group.

III. Orutalai-p-paṭātatu (Anaikāntika)

The logical reason, which is discrepant or inconclusive and indeterminate comes under this division. It is not one-pointed, leading to more than one conclusion. It is known as *anaikāntika* or *savyabhicāra*. There are three kinds of this type.

Though the commentator has not given examples for the fallacies of reason, they are reproduced from the learned commentarial notes of P.Muthaiya Pillai, the great exponent of Saiva Siddhānta, lived in the early part of this century.[46]

I. Asiddha hetvābhāsas

1. Cārpillatu

If the reason does not abide in the pakṣa, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. The sky-lotus is fragrant

Because it has the flowerness

Like the lotus in the lake.

Since the reason i.e. flowerness does not abide in the pakṣa due to its unreality (i.e. sky-lotus), the fallacy originates. This fallacy has been identified by Sivagrayogin as *pratama-āśrayāsiddha*. He has also given the same illustration.

2. Carpuṇmai aṟiya-p-paṭātatu

If the reason is not ascertained in the subject (pakṣa), it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. Pot and other objects are of the shape of

pramāṇus (-primal atoms)

Because of their eternality (*anityatva*)

Like the soul, as held in the system of Pāñcarātra.

The middle term, 'eternality' is not established in the subject, pot and other things. The same illustration was given by Sivagrayogin for *svarūpāsiddha,* as noted already. But, Sivajñāna Swamigal gives a different illustration for that fallacy that follows next.

However, in all his enumeration, the word *corūpam,* which is derived from the Sanskrit *svarūpa* is used in the sense of probans i.e. reason according to Dr.V.A. Devasenapathi.[47]

3. Corūpam illatu

If the probans is absent in the pakṣa (subject), it is known as *corūpam illatu.* This seems to be a translation of *svarūpāsiddha.*

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is visible.

Like a visible object (such as pot etc.).

The reason 'visibility' is not found in the subject i.e. sound and hence it becomes a fallacy.

4. Corūpam uṇmai aṟiya-p-paṭātatu

If the presence of the reason is not established in the pakṣa, it becomes a fallacy of this type. This fallacy has been identified as *samdigdhāsiddha* from the example, given below:

Eg. When the doubt prevails with regard to the real form of vapour or dew appearing in a hill, one takes it as smoke and argues that there is fire, because there is smoke.

The reason, 'having smoke' is not ascertained in the pakṣa, i.e. hill.

5. Corupattin̲ viceṭan̲am illatu

If the hetu is unproved due to the absence of *viśeṣaṇa* i.e. attribute in the subject, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Because it has visible quality.

Since the reason 'visible quality' does not abide in the pakṣa (sound), it turns to be a fallacy.

6. Corupattin̲ viceṭan̲am uṇmai ar̲iyappaṭātatu

If the hetu is unproved due to the uncertainty of the existence of the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) in the subject, it turns to be a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Kapila has likes and dislikes

Because he is a person without knowledge of reality.

The reason 'without knowledge of reality' is doubtful and hence this attribute in the subject i.e. Kapila is not ascertained.

This fallacy has already been discussed by Maraijnāna Desikar under the title, "*Samdigdhā viśeṣaṇāsiddha*".

7. Corupattin viceṭiyam illatu

If the hetu is not proved due to the contradictory nature with the subject i.e. substantive (*-viśeṣya*), it becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a substance knowable like a pot.

The reason, 'knowable like a pot' is contradictory with the pakṣa, sound and hence it is a fallacy.

8. Corupattin̲ viceṭiyam uṇmai ar̲iya-p-paṭātatu

If the reason is not proved on account of the uncertainty of the existence of the substantive, then it becomes a fallacy of this type. This fallacy is very similar to the *Samdhigdha viśeṣyāsiddha*,

explained by Maraijñāna Deśikar. So, the example to illustrate this fallacy is not repeated here.

9. Corupam orupakkam illatu

If the reason does not abide in a part of the pakṣa (i.e. subject), it becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. The soul and body are non-eternal
Because they are being products
Like the pot.

The reason, 'being products' exists in a part of the pakṣa i.e. body and not in another part i.e. soul. Hence, it turns to be a fallacy of uncertainty.

10. Corupam orupakkam uṇmai aṟiyappaṭātatu

If the exitence of the reason in a part of the subject is not ascertained, it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. The soul and body are eternal
Because they are not created.

In this inference the reason, 'not created' abides in a part of the pakṣa, i.e. soul and not in another part i.e. body and hence it is fallacious.

11. Corupam paraṉukku uṭaṉpāṭillatu

Here the word '*paraṉ*' denotes "the other" as in the usage '*parārtha*'. If the reason is not acceptable to the other party in the debate, it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal
Because it is produced
Like a pot.

In this inference, the reason 'producedness' is not acceptable to the Mimāmsaka who advocates the automative or self-existence of sound.

It is to be noted that the genuine logic demanded the acceptance of the reason by both the parties and only on this principle serious debate was encouraged by the Indian philosophers.

12. Cāttiyattoṭu vyātti uṇmai aṟiya-p-paṭātatu

If the pervasion of the reason with the sādhya is not ascertained, it turns to be a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. Everything is momentary
Because it is non-existent
Like the bubbles in the water.

In this inference, the certainty of the reason i.e. non-existence pervading the sādhya i.e. 'momentariness' is not established. Hence it becomes a fallacy.

13. Ceyaṟkai paṟṟi vyātti uṭaiyatu

If the pervasion of the reason with the sādhya is not ascertained due to artificial means, then it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. Mango fruit is sweet
Because of the soft nature
Like a plantain.

It is to be noted that the co-existence of sweetness and softness is due to the artificial means of making the mango ripe. According to the commentator, Asiddha falls under three divisions. The first two arise on the ground of dependence (*cārpu*) and the next nine on the basis of *svarūpa*, while the last two on the ground of *vyāpti*.

So far, we have seen thirteen types of *Asiddha hetvābhāsas*, as noted by Sivajnana Swamigal. Next, let us consider the *Viruddha hetvābhāsas*, as elucidated by him.[48]

II. Viruddha (uncertain)

1. Maṟutalai-p-poruḷ Cātippatu

If the reason proves the contradictory as opposed to what is to be established, then it turns to be a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. Sound is eternal
Because it is an effect.

In this inference, the reason 'being an effect' proves the non-eternality and not the sādhya dharma, eternality found in the *pakṣavacana*.

2. Maṟutalai-poruḷ Cātippatāy-p-piṟitōr ētuvai uṭaṉkoṇṭu varuvatu

If the reason proves the contradictory as opposed to what is to be established, simultaneously carrying another probans, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Sound is eternal
Because it is audible

The previous argument is to be considered along with this syllogism. In the previous inference, the reason 'being an effect' does not prove the sādhya i.e. the eternality of sound. In this inference which is connected with the previous one, an additional reason i.e. 'audibility' has been adduced to establish the sādhya, but it also proves its contrary i.e. non-eternality of sound.

3. Kāṭci aḷavaiyāl maṟukka-p-paṭṭu-k-koṇṭu varuvatu

When the reason contradicts the fact, established by perception, it becomes a fallacy of this type. This has been discussed already under the title "*pratyakṣa viruddha*". *Kāṭci aḷavai* is a synonym of *pratyaṣka pramāṇa.*

4. Karutal aḷavaiyāl maṟukka-p-paṭṭu-k-koṇṭu varuvatu

When the reason is opposed to the fact, ascertained by inference, it becomes a fallacy of this type. This has been already discussed under the title "*anumāna viruddha*". *Karutal aḷavai* is a synonym of *anumāna pramāṇa.*

5. Urai aḷavaiyāl maṟukka-p-paṭṭu-k-koṇṭu varuvatu

When the reason goes against the fact which has been proved by verbal testimony, it turns to be a fallacy of this kind. This has been already dealt with under the caption "*āgama viruddha*". *Urai aḷavai* is a synonym of *āgama pramāṇa.*

However, a new example is presented to illustrate this fallacy.

Eg. All effects are without a first cause

Because they arise in the middle.

According to the authentic texts, all effects have a first cause. So, the reason that they come into existence in the middle is against the fact supported by verbal testimony.

All the five fallacies, cited above belong to the division of *viruddha hetvābhāsas.* Next, let us see the remaining fallacious reasons subsumed under the group *anaikāntika*, as found in the commentary of Sivajñāna Swamigal.[49]

III. Anaikāntika (Inderminate or Inconclusive)

1. Pakka capakka māttiraiyinaṉṟi vipakkattum cēral uṭaiyatu

When the reason abides not only in the *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* but also pervades in the *vipakṣa*, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. This mountain has fire

Because it is determinable through the means of valid knowledge.

In this inference, 'being determinable through valid pramāṇa' is the reason which is applicable not only to the minor term and homologue but also to the heterologue. Hence, the fallacy of uncertain reason occurs.

This has already been discussed under the title "*pakṣa traiya vyāpaka anaikāntika*".

2. Capakkattil Cēralin̲ri-p-pakka māttiraiyin̲ uḷḷatu

When the reason that abides only in the pakṣa and not in its homologue, then it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

Eg. Sound is eternal
Because it has the quality of soundness.

In this inference, the reason, 'quality of soundness' pervades the minor term i.e. sound only, and not the homologues which are equally eternal such as soul and hence the fallacy of uncertain occurs.

3. Capakkavipakkaṅkaḷ kiṭaikka-p-per̲ātatu

When the reason is absent in the homologues and heterologues, it turns to be a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Everything is impermanent
Because of being knowlable through pramāṇas.

In this inference, the minor term is 'everything' which leaves nothing to be treated as similars and dissimilars. Hence the fallacy occurs due to the unavailability of sapakṣa and vipakṣa.

Thus, the views of Sivajñāna Swamigal on the threefold major groups of fallacious reasons are essentially in agreement with the views of other commentators, though in some places he has given different versions.

Pandipermal's elucidation

In conformity with the views of the Yogācāra Buddhist logical school, as reflected in Vasubandhu's Vādavidhi, Dignaga's Pramāṇa Samuccaya, Nyāyamukha and Hetucakra, Saṁkaraswāmin's Nyāya Praveśa and Cāttan̲ār's Maṇimēkalai, Pandiperumal has reproduced

all the three major groups of Hetvābhāsas with their sub-members and presented the same examples, found in the same source. First of all, the *asiddha hetvābhāsas* may be considered.[50]

I. Asiddha

According to the Yogācāra Buddhists, Asiddha is of four kinds, viz., *ubhayāsiddha, anyatāsiddha, sandehāsiddha* and *āśrayāsiddha.* According to Praśastapāda, these sub-types of Asiddha are known as *ubhayāsiddha, anyatarāsiddha, tadbhavā siddha* and *anumeyāsiddha.*[51] Pandiperumal closely follows the Buddhist logical tradition in the elucidation of *hetvābhāsas.* The first kind of fallacy of the Asiddha group is given below:

1. Ubhayāsiddha

Pandiperumal elucidates *asiddha* as that is not transparent or lumious to citta (consciousness).[52] Ubhaya means two. When the lack of truth of the *hetu-sādhana* i.e. middle-term is acknowledged by both the parties, it turns to be fallacy known as *ubhayāsiddha.*

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is visible

According to the two parties in a debate, the sādhya dharma i.e. non-eternality of sound is not proved by the middle term 'visibility'. Hence, the adduced reason to establish the major term becomes fallacious to both of them.

2. Anyatarāsiddha

This has been wrongly spelt as *Anyatāsiddha* in the text Maṇimēkalai, perhaps due to the copyist's error. Though Pandiperumal has given this form, the original form found in Nyāyapraveśa is *Anyatarāsiddha*. The word '*anyatarā*' denotes one of the two parties engaging in a debate.

If the lack of truth of the hetu-sādhana is admitted by one party only, then it turns to be a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Sound is evolved

Because it is produced.

This reason is not tenable for the Sāmkhya who opines that all products including sound are the emanations from the root cause, Prakriti (-Primordial Matter). Hence, '*kāryatva*' i.e. producedness is not acceptable, since all products exist in a subtle form in the

Primordial Matter. According to him, production means the manifestation of *kāraṇarūpa* or the assumption of *kāryarūpa*. If the effects or products are destroyed, they exist in the *kāraṇa rūpa* and so there is not total absence or destruction of any thing. This example is given by the commentator from Maṇimśkalai.[53]

If the respondent is a Mimāmsaka, the adduced reason in the above statement is untenable, since he never admits that sound is a product. This example is found in Nyāyapraveśa.[54]

3. Sandigdhāsiddha

This technical term of the fallacy, found in the commentary of Pandiperumal is not found in Maṇimekalai. It is noticed in Dignāga's Hetucakra and Nyāya-mukha.[55] In its place, the author of Nyāyapraveśa and Maṇimekalai held *siddhā siddha*. However, the illustration remains the same.

Cāttaṉār used the word "*ētu caṅkayam*" i.e. *hetu samśaya* to denote *hetu sandigdha*, meaning a doubtful reason. Even if the middle-term is in a doubtful condition, one decides. So, a doubtful reason becomes a fallacy. It has been illustrated thus:

The doubt arises: whether it is vapour or dew.

Thinking that it is smoke, one concludes that

there is fire.

Vapour may or may not be an effect of fire and may or may not be connected with it otherwise. If the smoke is the middle-term, it is *siddha*. If dew is the middle-term, then it becomes *asiddha*. Since its real character is not certain, it becomes fallacious. Maraijnāna Desikar has identified this fallacy, as noted already.

4. Āśrayāsiddha

Āśraya means substratum. Here it denotes dharmin, the possessor of dharma. If the disputant presents a dharmin, unacceptable to the respondent and proceeds to establish it by adducing the middle-term, the hetu becomes a fallacy of this type.

Eg. Ether is a substance

Because it has the quality of sound.

For the respondent (prativādin) who does not accept ether as a substance, the dharmin, i.e. ether becomes unreal (*asiddha*) and

hence the adduced reason, 'possessing qualities' turns to be a fallacy known as *Āśrayāsiddha.*

Pandiperumal explains that the above inference is acceptable to the Sāmkhya who holds that ether has been the guṇi, consisting of the guṇa sound. But it is not acceptable to the Buddhist who proclaims that ether is not a substance and hence it is unreal for him.

Though Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has noted this fallacy, he has given an altogether different example.

Next, Pandiperumal proceeds to elucidate the hetvābhāsas of the *anaikāntika* type. He explains *anaikāntika* as one becoming many in conformity with the elucidation given by Maraijnānā Desikar;, as noted already. Further he mentions that it stands in midway between two forms of knowledge.[56]

II. Anaikāntika

This major group contains six types of fallacies, viz., 1. *Sādhāraṇa*, 2. *Asādhāraṇa*, 3. *Sapakṣaika deśa vritti vipakṣa vyāpi*, 4. *Vipakṣaika deśa vritti sapaksavyapi*, 5. *Ubhayaika desa vritti* and 6. *Viruddhāvyabhicārin.* Only in Nyāya pravesa and Maṇimēkalai these six types of Anaikāntika are found.[57] In Dignāga's Hetu cakra, only four varieties are recorded. In Nyāya Bindu, Dharmakirti has differed from his predecessors in the classification and increased the number and illustrations.

Pandiperumal follows Maṇimēkalai. First, let us consider Sādhāraṇa type of Anaikāntika.

1. Sādhāraṇa

This is a fallacy of being too general. If the reason, that is said to prove the sādhya abides both in the pakṣa and vipakṣa, then it becomes a fallacy called the Uncertain of ordinary type.

Eg. Sound is eternal

Because it is knowable

The middle-term i.e. "knowable" is common to both the propositions, viz., 'sound is eternal' and 'sound is non-eternal'. So, the reason becomes the means to establish both the eternality and its opposite non-eternality. So the doubt arises with regard to be knowability. Separate examples are given to the twofold sādhyas. The reason becomes uncertain. It is not determinate whether the

knowability is in regard to non-eternality of things such as pot or the eternality of things such as ether. Since the middle-term is dubious it becomes a fallacy.

Sivagrayogin has noted this fallacy in his commentary which has been mentioned already.

2. Asādhāraṇa

When the middle-term, that exists in the minor term (-pakṣa) does not abide in the major term (i.e. sādhya or sapakṣa) and its opposite vipakṣa, becomes a fallacy known *Asādhāraṇa.*

Eg. Sound is eternal

Because it is audible.

In this inference, the reason 'audibility' is related only to the pakṣa (i.e. sound) and not to its sapakṣa, the ether and vipakṣa, the pot.

In this syllogism, it is not certain to which object, (-sapakṣa) other than sound among the various objects of both eternal and non-eternal character, the 'audibility' becomes the middle term. Therefore, the indeterminate reason becomes a fallacy known as *Asādhāraṇa.*

Though Sivagrayogin has identified this fallacy, he has given a different example which has been quoted already.

3. Sapakṣaika deśa vritti vipakṣa vyāpi

Though Sivagrayogin has identified this fallacy, he has given slightly a different name and also a different example (vide, No.6 of the uncertain as seen in his elucidation, noted already). According to Pandiperumal who closely follows the Buddhist epic Maṇimekalai, the probans that is related to the minor term (pakṣa) abides in some parts of homologues (sapakṣas) and in all forms of heterologues (vipakṣas), resulting in a fallacy of the uncertain group, known by this name, i.e. *sapakṣa ekadeśa vritti vipakṣa vyāpi.*

Eg. Pakṣavacana : Sound is not a product of effort

Probans : Because it is non-eternal

Example : Like the lightning and ether.

If sound is not a product, then the probans 'non-eternality' (anitya) can not abide in the pakṣa, i.e. sound. Eternality (*nityam*) and non-eternality of an object (*anityam*) are respectively concerned with the absence of effort (*kāryatva* or *prayatna*) and its presence. That

which is not produced is eternal like ether etc. That which is produced is non-eternal like a pot etc.

In the above syllogism, the middle-term or probans 'non-eternality' abides in some of the things which are not products of effort (i.e. some parts of sapakṣas) such as lightning and exists in all parts of heterologues (vipakṣas) which are products of effort such as a pot etc.

So, the reason i.e. 'non-eternality' can not ascertain the probandum since it pervades the dissimilar object which is produced out of effort like the pot (vipakṣa) and the similar object which is not produced out of effort like the lightning (part of sapakṣa). Hence it turns to be a fallacy of uncertain group.

4. Vipakṣaika deśa vritti sapakṣavyāpi

This fallacy has been identified by Sivagrayogin with a slight change in the name and example (vide No.7 of the uncertain in his commentary as noted already). In Nyāya praveśa and Maṇimēkalai, it has been defined as the middle term abiding in some of the things heterogeneous from, and in all things homogeneous with, the probandum i.e. major term.[58]

However, Pandiperumal simplifies the definition of this fallacy in his commentary. According to him, when the reason that is said to pakṣa exists in a part of vipakṣa (*-vipakṣa eka deśa*) and abides in sapakṣas (homologues) wholly, then it turns to be a fallacy of indeterminate and uncertain nature bearing the name "*vipakṣa eka deśa vritti sapakṣa vyāpi*".[59]

Eg. Proposition : Sound is a product

Reason : Because it is non-eternal

In the previous example, the pakṣa contained a statement reflecting the view of the Mimāmsakas and a faulty reason was adduced to prove the probandum resulting in a fallacy, as elucidated above. But, in the present inference, both the proposition and reason are not acceptable to the Mimāmsakas. However it is admissible to other parties like the Sāmkhyas and Naiyāyikas.

The non-eternality (*anitya*) exists in some of the things which are not products of effort (i.e. some of the vipakṣas) such as lightning, and exists in all things which are products of effort (sapakṣas) such as pot etc.

Since the pakṣa is the statement with regard to the objects which are products, its heterologues, i.e. vipakṣas are the statements with regard to the objects which are not products. The given examples for vipakṣa are ether and lightning. The hetu "non-eternality' (anitya) exists in pakṣa (sound) and in all sapakṣas (homologues) such as pot etc. But, it exists only in part of vipakṣa (heterologue) such as lightning, but not in other parts of vipakṣa such as ether.

Since the reason i.e. non-eternality pervades the whole of similars and exists only in parts of dissimilars, it becomes a fallacy of this type of Uncertain.

The inconclusive nature of this fallacy is to be explained. The pakṣadharma and reason are considered in determining the validity of the syllogism. In the afore mentioned example, *kāryatva* (product of effort) is the dharma of the dharmin sound (i.e. pakṣa). *Anityatva* (non-eternality) is the hetu. Both the dharma and hetu should be present to prove the sādhya. They are present in all sapakṣas. But one of them exists in a part of vipakṣa, as in the case of lightning in which only *anityatvam* exists and not *kāryatva*. So the reason does not prove the dharma i.e. *kāryatva* and hence becomes partial fallacy of this type, i.e. "*Vipakṣa eka deśa vritti Sapakṣa vyāpi*".

5. Ubhaika deśa vritti

According to Nyāya praveśa and Maṇimēkalai, if the hetu exists in some of the things homogenous with, and in some heterogeneous from, the major term it becomes a fallacy of this kind.[60] In the footsteps of Cāttaṉār, Pandiperumal elucidates the same that if the reason is present in a part of sapakṣa and a part of vipakṣa, then it turns to be a fallacy called *ubhaya eka deśa vritti*.

Eg. Sound is eternal

Because it is incorporeal.

This pakṣa is valid for a Mimāmsaka. The reason i.e. incorporeality (*amūrta*) exists in a part of sapakṣa i.e. ether which is eternal and does not exist in some other parts of sapakṣa i.e. *paramāṇu* which, eventhough eternal, is corporeal, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems.

Similarly in the cases of vipakṣa, (i.e. objects that are not eternal), the hetu, incorporeality exists only in a part such as pleasure and not in some other part such as pot.

The anaikāntika occurs with regard to the reason i.e. incorporeality. It is expressed in the form of a question which is given below: "Is the incorporeality like that of ether which is eternal, or that of pleasure which is non-eternal?"

Since the presence of the hetu is found in the similars and also in dissimilars, it is not definite and hence inconclusive, bewildering one unable to identify the sādhya. Thus the fallacy arises.

6. Viruddhāvyabhicārin

According to Nyāyapraveśa, when there is a non-erroneous contradiction, i.e. when a thesis and its contradictory (i.e anti-thesis) are both supported by what appear to be valid reasons, the fallacy of this type occurs.[61] Cāttaṉār defines that the imperfect reason gives room also for *viruddha hetvābhāsa* and hence it gets the name *Viruddhāvyabhicāri.*[62]

The following example is found in Nyāyapraveśa and Manimekalai.

The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Mīmāksaka:

"Sound is non-eternal
Because it is a product"

The Mīmāmsaka speaking to the Vaiśeṣika:

"Sound is eternal
Because it is always audible".

The reasons adduced by both the parties are correct. But they lead to contradictory conclusions, viz., 'sound is both eternal and non-eternal' and hence they are fallacious of inconclusive and contradictory type. This fallacy is the last of *anaikāntika* and justaposed to *viruddha* as evidenced from its very name.

Pandiperumal interprets this fallacy in his own way. He mentions that the same sādhya gives place to two contradictory statements. But he has given the same example.[63]

Next, he proceeds to deal with Viruddha hetvābhāsas which are classified under four titles.[64] They are:

1. Dharmasvarūpa viparīta sādhana
2. Dharmaviśeṣa viparīta sādhana

3. Dharmisvarūpa viparīta sādhana and
4. Dharmiviśeṣa viparīta sādhana.

In Nyāyapraveśa the final word is sādhaka. There is no much difference between the words *sādhana* and *sadhaka.* Sādhana means 'means', hetu, reason etc. Viparīta sādhana denotes the erroneous means or fallacious reason. Let us consider these hetvābhāsas serially.

1. Dharmasvarūpa viparīta sādhana

According to Nyāya praveśa, when the middle term is contradictory to the major term (sādhya), then it becomes a fallacy of this type. Cāttaṉār defines that the adduced reason contradicting the intrinsic nature (svarūpa) of the sādhya dharma becomes a fallacy known by this name i.e. *Dharmasvarūpa viparīta sādhana.*

Eg. Sound is eternal (Major term)

Because it is a product (Middle term)

A product, which is being made is subject to destruction. It is *anitya* i.e. non-eternal. So the reason, instead of proving eternality, the intrinsic nature of the sādhya i.e. sound, goes to prove the non-eternality (*anitya*) of sound and thus it becomes contradictory.

Pandiperumal closely follows Cāttaṉār in the elucidation of this fallacy.

2. Dharmaviśeṣa viparītaka sādhana

When the reason contradicts the special feature (*viśeṣa*) of the sādhya dharma, it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

Eg.

1.	Pakṣa	: The sense-organs such as eye are serviceable for other being (*parārtha*).
2.	Reason	: Because they are the assemblage of various particles.
3.	Example	: As in the case of bed and seat (*sayanāsana*).

Like the bed and seat are not meant for themselves, but for the use of some one, so also the sense-organs etc., indicate the existence of the user which is called the soul (*parārtha*).

The advocate of Sāṁkhya system places his argument for the existence of soul before the Buddhist who has been an advocate of

non-soul theory. The reason, adduced by the Sāmkhya, is the assemblage of various particles indicating the user. Though this reason establishes the existence of the soul who is the user of the *indriyas,* it goes against the special feature (*viśeṣa*) of the *sādhya dharma.* According to Sāmkhya, soul is not an assemblage of particles. It is devoid of any avayava (limbs or particles). It is *niravayavin.* Being without *avayava* is the special feature (*viśeṣa*) of the soul. Instead of establishing the soul without any *avayava,* the reason goes to prove the soul with *avayava* (*sāvayava*). So, the reason contradicts the *viśeṣa* of the *sādhya dharma* and becomes a fallacy of this type.

It is expected that the middle-term should establish the major term without disturbing its special feature. If it does not prove it, then it is erroneous of the contradictory type.

3. Dharmisvarūpa viparīta sādhana

When the middle term is contradictory with the intrinsic nature (*svarūpa*) of the *dharmin* (minor term), then it turns to be a fallacy of this type.

Pakṣa : Bhāva (existence) is not one among the substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*).

Hetu : Because it differs from the bhava of all the substance, quality and action.

Dṛṣṭānta : Like generality (*sāmānya*) and speciality or particularity (*viśeṣa*).

According to the Vaiśeṣika, the bhāva of the three viz., *dravya, guṇa* and *karma* is different from the common bhāva which abides in all the six *padārthas* (categories), viz., substance, quality, action, generality, speciality and inherence.

Since the reason i.e. the common *bhāvatva,* that is different from the *bhāvatva* of the trio i.e. *dravya, guṇa* and *karma,* does not abide in the *sādhya pakṣadharmin* (stated in the *pakṣavacana*) and since in the example among the objects, characterized by generality and speciality, one does not exist without the other, the middle term contradicts the *svarūpa* of the *dharmin* and proves its *abhāva* i.e. non-existence. Hence it becomes a fallacy of this type.

4. Dharmin Viśeṣa viparīta sādhana

When the middle term is inconsistent with the special feature (*viśeṣa*) of the *dharmin* (minor term), then it turns to be a fallacy of

this type. It proves the *abhāva* of *viśeṣa* of the dharmin, instead of proving its *bhāva*.

The same reason (-shown in the previous fallacy) i.e. the common *bhāvatva* which is different from the *bhāvatva* of the three, viz., *dravya, guṇa* and *kriyā* (*-karma*) proves the *bhāva* of *kriyā* and *guṇa* and presents a contradictory conclusion to the proposition, thus distorting the special feature of the *dharmin*.

The special feature of the *dharmin* (i.e. general *bhāvatva*) remains in that, that it is different from the trio, viz., *dravya, guṇa* and *karma*. This special feature i.e. *viśeṣa* is disproved by the adduced reason, shown above and hence the fallacy occurs.

Thus, Pandiperumal closely following Cāttaṉār, the author of Maṇimekalai has expounded the three major groups of *hetvābhāsas* with their sub-members consisting a grand total of fourteen fallacies of reason. It is apparent, that the commentator has left out the main statement in Sivajñāna Siddhiyār which has noted only twenty one kinds of hetvābhāsas. Though the text is there, the commentator has felt the need of introducing all the logical fallacies not from the sources of Nyāya cum Vaiśeṣika systems or from Pauṣkara āgama as done by other commentators, but from the Yogācāra Buddhist sources as preserved in Maṇimēkalai.

Next, let us consider the views of Sivaneṟiprakāśam in the treatment of the logical fallacies.

Sivaneṟiprakāśam on Hetvābhāsas

Sivāgrayogin, the author of Sivaneṟiprakāśam has enumerated five kinds of hetvābhāsas, viz., 1. *Asiddha*, 2. *Viruddha*, 3 *Anaikāntika*, 4. *Anadhyāvasita* and 5. *Bādhita viṣaya*. Under the first category, the commentator, Nandisivāgrayogin has enumerated eleven types of fallacious reasons. They are the following:[65]

1. Svarūpāsiddha,
2. Bhāgāsiddha
3. Āśrayāsiddha
4. Viśeṣaṇāsiddha
5. Viśeṣyāsiddha
6. Ubhayāsiddha
7. Hetu-ajñānāsiddha
8. Adhikaraṇājñānāsiddha
9. Anyatarāsiddha
10. Vyāpyatvāsiddha and
11. Aupādhika vyāpyatvāsiddha.

These eleven types are also mentioned by Sivagrayogin in his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, as noted already.

Under the second division Viruddha, Nandisivagrayogin has given two types viz., *Sādhya viparīta vāyptan* and *Sādhana viparīta vyaptan*. He has illustrated them adequately. Let us briefly present them one by one.[66]

1. Sādhya viparīta vyāptan

E.g. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a product

Like the ether.

In this inference, the reason '*kāryatva*' (being a product) does not abide in the eternal 'ether' but pervades in its opposite, the non-eternal sound. So it is a fallacy of contradictory reason known as *sādhya viparīta vyāptan*.

2. Sādhāna viparīta vyāptan

E.g. Mind (*manas*) is non-eternal

Because it is sentient

Like the soul.

In this inference, the *sādhana* (reason) 'sentience' does not prove the sādhya i.e. non-eternality of mind, because it is the quality of the soul and not of the mind. In other words, since the sādhana 'sentience' having pervasion with the dissimilar i.e. soul, contradicts the sādhya i.e. non-eternality of the mind, the fallacy is named *sādhana viparīta vyāptan*.

Among the two kinds of contradictory reason, the first one reflects the fallacy due to the defective sādhya and the second, due to the defective sādhana. With regard to the third major division of fallacious retasons, viz., *anaikāntika*, the commentator Nandisivāgrayogin follows his master, Sivāgrayogin who has classified it into two viz., *sādhāraṇa* and *asādhāraṇa* in his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, which we have already seen.

The fourth category i.e. *Anadhyavasita* is found in the commentary of Sivagrayogin with the form *anityāsita* which seems to be the erratic form due to the carelessness of the copyist in the palmyra leaf. His disciple Nandisivagrayogin has mentioned this

fallacy with the correct form. Praśastapāda was the first to recognize this fallacy as hetvābhāsa as noted already. But he included it under the sub-types of *asiddha*. However, Sivāditya has treated it as a separate class of hetvābhāsa.[67] The logical reason that does not prove the certainty of sādhya is called *anadhyavasita* by Nandisivagrayogin.

E.g. The universe is eternal

Because it is a product.

In this inference, the reason 'being a product' does not prove the sādhya i.e. the eternality of the universe and hence it turns to be a fallacy of this type. To put it in other words, any product is not eternal and hence this reason can not prove the eternality of the universe.

The fifth class viz., *Bādhita viṣaya* is nothing but *kālātyayopadiṣṭa* found in the classification of Sivagrayogin. It is of five kinds viz., 1. *bādhita*, 2. *pratyakṣa bādhita*, 3. *anumāna bādhita*, 4. *āgama bādhita*, 5. *arthāpatti bādhita*. Nandisivāgrayogin according to his own statement, follows closely the Pauṣkarāgama in making this classification. It is interesting to note that in Nyāyasāra, Bhāsarvajña has mentioned a list of six types of bādhita out of which the first five remained the same as noted by Nandisivāgrayogin. If we look into the enumeration of Sivāgrayogin, we can find out that the bhādita types of Āgama and Arthāpatti are included in the list of the asiddha group of Hetvābhāsas. In addition, *upamāna bādhita* and *anitya-acita* which is the misspelt form of *anadhyavasita*, or *prayojāsiddha* are added under the same group. Prakaraṇasama is not stated by Nandisivagrayogin.

Despite the minor differences in the classification of hetvābhāsas, in most cases Sivagrayogin and his disciple Nandisivagrayogin have identical views on the subject.

Tattuvaprakāśam on Hetvābhāsas

The author of Tattuvaprakāsam has his own views of hetvābhāsas. *It seems that he follows the school of Tamil grammarians rather than the logicians in the identification and elucidation of these fallacies.* He has also counted twenty one types of fallacious reasons.[68] But they are different from those mentioned by the commentators of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār and Sivaneriprakāśam. He too classified all the twenty one under three major groups, viz. 1. *iyalpu ētu* (svabhāva hetu), 2. *kārya hetu* and 3. *anupalabhdhi hetu*, which

again do not tally with those of others that we have seen already. Each of these three divisions consists of seven fallacies of reason, thus making the total twenty one. They may be presented here below:

I. Svabhāva hetvābhāsas

If the reason by its own nature is defective in proving the subject (-pakṣa), then it becomes a fallacy of this group. Under this head, 1. identity or emblem (*aṭaiyāḷam*), 2. association (*cērvai*), 3. Substance (*poruḷ*), 4. season (*irutu*), 5. krama (*viṉai*), 6. *kāraṇa* and 7. *dharmādharmin* are subsumed. The commentator points out briefly the fallacies based on these seven aspects both at the empirical and spiritual levels. Here, we quote only the examples which are mundane and sometimes religious. The commentator is very brief in giving the illustrations which are not elucidated.

1. Svabhāva of identity or emblem

If the reason, characterized by the nature of identity does not abide in the minor term, then it turns to be a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Brahma bears trident in his hand
(Kamalattōṉ Śūlapāṇi).

The weapon Śūla (trident) is the identity of Śiva. But, here it is said to be possessed by Brahma. Hence, the fallacy arises on account of the svabhāva of identity or emblem.

2. Svabhāva of association

If the reason, characterized by the nature of association does not abide in the minor term, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. The Gods in the Hindu Trinity are the threefold guṇas.
(Mummūrti Mukkuṇam)

Brahma, Viṣṇu and Rudra form the Hindu Trinity. They respectively represent the sattva, rājasa and tāmasa guṇas. If the statement is expanded to mention the three Gods and guṇas by name, then these is no fallacy. Since they are mentioned in a general way without any specific remark, it is not clear for a person other than a Hindu, with regard to a particular God representing the concerned quality. Hence, the fallacy arises on account of the nature of association.

3. Svabhāva of Substance

E.g. Kārāḷar denotes Vēḷāḷar.

The word *kār* means the dark cloud. *Kār* + *āḷar* are those people who make use of the rain. But, here it denotes the *vēḷaḷar*, i.e. the agriculturists. Instead of denoting all the people who make use of the rain, the word under reference indicates a particular caste and this is due to the fallacy of the nature of substance. i.e. *kār*.

4. Svabhāva of season

E.g. 1. Kār kālam

The black season (Rainy season)

2. Paṉi-k-kālam

The dew season (winter season)

In the above examples, the names *kār* and *paṉi* do not denote respectively the primary sense of black and dew, due to the fallacious nature of season.

5. Svabhāva of Karma (action)

E.g. If it is said that some one has produced a pot, then the person should be a potter.

The Tamil word '*vaṉaital*' means producing or creating. But when it indicates the making of a pot and its related objects out of clay, it becomes the fallacious nature of action.

6. Svabhāva of cause

E.g. There is red water in the river

Because of the rain in the Kudaku hills.

In this inference, the reason i.e. rain, does not necessarily prove the sādhya i.e. red-water, since it is possible due to the breakage in the reservoir. Hence the cause of the śeṣavat type turns to be a fallacy.

7. Svabhāva of dharmā dharmin

E.g. Due to the svabhāva of smoke, there is fire.

Smoke is the dharma. Fire is the possesser of the dharma and hence it is called dharmin. But even without smoke, fire can exist. Hence the reason becomes a fallacy of this type.

The second batch of fallacious reasons subsumed under the major division of *kārya hetu* has been briefly exemplified without any interpretation. However, let us attempt to apprehend the fallacious feature characterized by them.

II. Kārya hetvābhāsas

Under this head, the author of Tattuvaprakāśam has counted seven aspects viz., 1. *Māyā*, 2.*Aṇu* (atom), 3.*Oṣadhi* (-herb), 4. *Annam* (food), 5. *uṭal* (Body) 6. *Shukla* and 7. *vāyu* (air). The commentator attempts to find out the causal relation among these seven. According to him, atom is the effect of Māyā; Oṣadhi (herb) is the effect of atom; food is the effect of oṣadhi; body is the effect of food; shukla is the effect of body, and vāyu (air) is the effect of shukla.

Though the causal relation among these objects seems to be valid, a close study would expose its folly. Atom is not the only effect of Māyā i.e. Primordial matter. Oṣadhi is not the only effect of atom. Food is not the only effect of oṣadhi. Body is not the only effect of food. Shukla is not the only effect of body. Similarly air is not the only effect of shukla. Thus the seven kinds of *kārya hetvābhāsas* occur.

The third group of fallacious reasons, coming under the major divison of *anupalabdhi hetu* has also been briefly stated. They are also of seven kinds.

III. Anupalabdhi hetvābhāsas

Anupalabdhi means non-existence. The absence of dew indicates the absence of coolness. The fallacious reasons due to anupalabdhi hetu are not sufficiently elucidated. The text mentions that sevenfold anupalabdhis are concerned with body, mouth, eye, nose, ear, mind and intellect (*buddhi*). The commentator simply stated that anupalabdhi hetvābhāsa should be cognized through one's experience through these seven organs, the first five comprising the *indriyas* and the last two *antakaraṇas*. Attempts of adventious interpretation would prove futile. Hence, these fallacies are left out for future researchers to work out in detail, in case if some useful materials will be made available in course of time.

Thus, a meaningful survey of the hetvābhāsas which have been treated in the texts and commentaries of Saiva Siddhānta, Maṇimēkalai and other works has been attempted. Next in order, particulars in regard to the fallacies of examples are to be culled out from the same sources in the forthcoming chapter.

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XIV. FALLACIES OF EXAMPLE

In a valid syllogism, *dṛṣṭānta* i.e. example is essential to support the middle term in establishing the major term. Since the relation of concomitance between the hetu and sādhya is proved in two ways, viz., positive (*anvayin*) and negative (*vyatirekin*), the examples also are classified into two kinds, viz., the positive example (*Sādharmya dṛṣṭānta*) and the negative example (*Vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta*).

It is the opinion of the specialists in Indian logic, that the Naiyāyika term, *Udhāharaṇa* was replaced by the word *Dṛṣṭānta* for the first time by the Yogācāra Buddhist logicians. Also, the fallacies of example like those of proposition were unknown to Vātsyāyana and the early Naiyāyikas. They were first identified and elaborated by Dignāga, Samkaraswāmin, Cāttaṉār, Dharmakīrti and others. They were adopted by Praśastapāda and modified by the Jain logician Siddhasena Divākara (575 A.D.) as noticed in his Nyāyāvatāra.[1] Though some Naiyāyikas like Uddhyodakara neglected them, some others admitted.

If the rules governing the valid examples are transgressed, the examples become fallacious. According to Buddhist logic, when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is chosen to illustrate the general proposition (*pakṣa*), eventhough it is not qualified to fulfil its own function, it will turn to be an incorrect and invalid example.[2] The wrong examples are not capable of demonstrating either the general character of a valid reason, viz., its presence in the *sapakṣas* only and its absence in all the *vipakṣas*, or the special characters of its varieties, the uniformity of co-existence, and the uniformity of succession. Therefore these invalid examples are unacceptable and hence are to be avoided.

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar defines *dṛṣṭābhāsa* in his own way. First of all, he defines a valid example, the main function of which is to grasp the relation of concomitance (*Vyāpti*) between the *hetu* (middle term) and the sādhya (major term). He quotes a Sanskrit sloka written in Tamil script in support of his view. He mentions one Vadarajyakāraṉār, to be the author of the śloka.[3] According to him, if the example, which presents a mere semblance of it, due to the fact of the relation of concomitance, existing between the middle term and major terms or their contradictories is not ascertained with certitude, then it turns to be a fallacy known as *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*.

According to Sivāgrayogin, when the example instead of illuminating (the relation of concomitance between the hetu and *sādhya*) presents a mere appearance, without doing its function, becomes a fallacy called *uvamai-p-pōli*, which literally means *upamānābhāsa*.[4] In Sivaneriprakāsam, authored by him, he calls it *dṛṣṭāntavirodha*.[5] The commentator of the text, who is none other than his student explains the *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* to be the example which gives the impression of an example but not turns to be so.

According to Sivajñāna Swamigal, when the comparison (*uvamai = upamāna*) which forms the ground for the ascertainment of *vyāpti*, is bereft of its characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) and presents the mere appearance of a comparison, it is known as fallacy of comparison (*uvamai-p-pōli = upamānābhāsa*). Both in the text and commentary, the term *uvami-p-pōli* is used in the sense of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*. The latter term also finds a place in some commentaries.

Classification of Fallacious Examples

Aruḷnandisivam, the author of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār has generally noted that there are eighteen kinds of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas*.[6] Nevertheless, the commentator Maṟaijñāna Deśikar has given a list of eighteen fallacies of example.[7] Sivagrayogin has made a clear classification of all these fallacies into two major groups viz., *Sādhya vikala* and *Sādhana vikala*.[8] He has also identified the positive and negative examples. In his text, Sivaneriprakāsam, the commentator Nandisivagrayogin has given more or less the same list of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas*.[9] Sivajñāna Swamigal has brought all of them under two heads viz., *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*.[10]

Pandiperumal, in his introductory commentary on the first aphorism of Sivajñānabodham, has given, as usual, the view of the Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhist logicians on the *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas*. He has presented a list of ten fallacies of example under two heads viz., *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*, each of which has five members.[11] All of them are reproduced from Maṇimēkalai and Nyāyapraveśa. He has ignored the total number eighteen as stated in the text of Sivajāna Siddhiyār.

The author of Tattuvaprakāśam follows a separate school of logical thought, perhaps belonging to the Tamil traditional grammarians. He has enlisted eighteen varieties of fallacious examples, which are totally different from those quoted by others.

First of all, let us commence from Maraijñāna Deśikar who has enumerated eighteen kinds. He has not made a distinction between the positive and negative *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas*, though he implied them in the course of enumeration and interpretation.[12]

The elucidation of Maraijñāna Deśikar

I. Positive dṛṣṭāntābhāsas

1. Sādhya Vikala

The word vikala means defective. The example which is defective in the sādhya (major term) is called *sādhya vikala.*

E.g. Mind is non-eternal

Because it is corporeal.

Like the primal atom (*paramāṇu*).

In this inference, since the example i.e. primal atom does not possess the dharma i.e. non-eternality which is to be proved, it turns to be a fallacy known as *sādhya vikala.*

2. Sādhaka vikala

This has its alternant form *sādhana vikala* in Nyāyasāra. An example which is defective in the *sādhana* (i.e. hetu) is called *sādhana vikala.*

E.g. Mind is non-eternal

Because it is corporeal

Like an action (*karma*).

In this inference, the example i.e. action does not tally with the reason 'corporeality'. So, the example is defective on account of the reason.

3. Ubhayavikala

If the example is defective in both the *sādhya* and *sādhana,* then it turns to be a fallacy called *Ubhayavikala.*

E.g. Mind is non-eternal

Because it is corporeal

Like ether.

Since in the example 'ether' both the sādhya, i.e. non-eternality and sādhana, i.e. corporeality are absent, it becomes a fallacy on account of both the major term and middle term.

4. Āśraya-hīna

If an example is supportless, it is called *aśraya hīna.*

E.g. Mind is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Like the sky-flower.

Since the example sky-flower is not a reality which is not related to the sādhana 'corporeality' and sādhya 'non-eternality', it is defective due to lack of substratum or substantive (*āśraya*). In Nyāyasāra, the given example is the horn of a hare. Both are the same in content.

5. Avyāpti

If the example is non-pervasive, it has the defect of *avyāpti.* The word *vyāpti* means pervasion. So, *avyāpti* means non-pervasion.

E.g. Mind is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Like a pot.

Since there is pervasion between corporeality and non-eternality, the example becomes defective.

It is clear that Maraijñāna Deśikar has revealed his knowledge in Nyāyasāra when he presentd the above types of dṛṣṭāntābhasas and examples. But instead of *avyāpti*, he used the term *Avyāpti abhidhāna* for which a different example is given in Nyāyāsara.[13] It is reproduced here:

E.g. Whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal
Like the ether.

6. Viparītavyāpti

If an example whose pervasion is erroneously stated, it becomes a fallacy known by this name. For the same *sādhana* and *sādhya*, instead of stating the pervasion in the form: "Whatever is corporeal is non-eternal", its opposite is stated in the form: "Whatever is non-eternal is non-corporeal".

E.g. Mind is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is corporeal like a pot.

This statement should be made thus:

Whatever is corporeal is non-eternal like a pot. Maraijñāna Deśikar has used the term *Viparīta vyāpti abhidhāna* to mean *viparītavyāpti*. But, in Nyāyasāra a different illustration is found to substantiate this.[14]

E.g. Whatever is not corporeal is not non-eternal like the ether.

The aforesaid six types of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* belong to the affirmative group, as found in Nyāyasāra.

7. Sādhanavyā-vritta

An example of exluded hetu is called *sādhanavyāvritta*.

E.g. Whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal
Like the primal atom (*paramāṇu*).

In this example i.e. primal atom, the *sādhana* or *hetu* i.e. noncorporeality (*amūrtatva*) is excluded and hence the fallacy arises.

8. Sādhyāvyāvritta

An example of excluded *sādhya* is known as *sādhya vyāvritta*.

E.g. Whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal
Like an action.

In this example, i.e. action, 'non-eternality' (*antityatvam*) being the *sādhya* is excluded and hence the fallacy occurs.

9. Ubhayāvyāvritta

An example of excluded *sādhana* and *sādhya* is called *ubhayāvyāvritta*.

E.g. Whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal
Like a pot.

This example'pot' is not compatible with both the sādhana, *amūrtatvam* (non-corporeality) and sādhya, *anityatvam* (non-eternality) and hence the fallacy arises.

10. Āśraya-hīna

In number 4 given above, the same name of the fallacy is found. If an example is defective on account of its lack of support (*āśraya*), it turns to be a fallacy known by this name.

E.g. Whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal
Like a sky-flower.

Since the example 'sky-flower' itself is a non-reality, lacking support for its being and hence it is needness to say that it is incompatible with the *sādhana* and *sādhya*, viz., non-corporeality and non-eternality.

In Nyāyasāra also, the same example is given.[15] It is essential to note that Maraijñāna Desikar has given the same example in No.4, elsewhere cited. There is a difference. In that case, corporeality is the sādhana. But here, non-corporeality is the sādhana. The former is meant for positive dṛṣṭāntābhāsa while the latter for the negative one.

11. vyāvritti abhidhāna

This fallacy is nether clearly elucidated nor exemplified. Perhaps this may be *avyāptyabhidhāna* enumerated in Nyāyasāra, since it is mentined next to *āśraya-hīna*. The following example is given by Bhāsarvajña.

E.g Whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal
Like the ether.

The example 'ether' is non pervasive and hence it becomes the fallacy

12. Viparītavyāptyabhidhāna

An example with inverse pervasion becomes a fallacy known by this name.

E.g. Whatever is not corporeal is not non-eternal
Like the ether.

13. Saṁdigdha Sādhya

An example with the doubtful sādhya (-major term) becomes the fallacy known by this name.

E.g. This person will become an emperor
Because he hails from the lunar race
Like a prince who is eligible for the throne.

The example i.e. Prince of a royal origin is doubtful whether he will become an emperor or not. Hence it is a fallacious example of doubtful nature.

14. Saṁdigdha Sādhana

An example with a doubtful reason turns to be a fallacy known by this name.

E.g. This person is not omniscient.

Because he has lust, hatred etc.

Like the man going in the street.

In this example, the reason is dubious for it is not certain whether the man going in the street has lust, hatred etc.

15. Saṁdigdhobhaya

An example with both the doubtful sādhya and sādhana is a fallacy of this type.

E.g. This person will go to heaven

Because he has accumulated merits of previous birth

Like Devadatta.

In the example, i.e. Devadatta, it is not definite whether he has accumulated merits-being the sādhana and whether he will go to heaven, being the sādhya.

16. Saṁdigdhāśraya

When the example whose *āśraya* (support) is doubtful, it turns to be a fallacy with this name.

E.g. This person is not omniscient

Because he speaks evil

Like the Devadatta who will be born.

The support for the example i.e. Devadatta is absent and hence on that account, it becomes a fallacy.

17. Saṁdigdha sādhya vyāvritta

E.g. Whoever does not exercise his sovereignty is not a descent from lunar race.

Like the prince of a different origin.

In the example there arises *sādhyā vyāvritta* and doubt, since it is not certain whether the prince of a different origin can exercise his supreme royal power or not.

18. Saṁdigdha sādhanā vyāvritta

E.g. Whoever is omniscient is devoid of lust, hatred etc.

Like a scholar in all scriptures.

In the example there arises *sādhana vyāvritti* and doubt, since it is not sure whether a scholar, having erudition in all śāstras is devoid of lust, hatred etc.

The last two types are not found in Nyāyasāra. However, Maraijñāna Deśikar is well-versed in the Nyāya texts especially in Nyāyasāra as evidenced from his exposition of dṛṣṭāntābhāsas. It is essential to point out that Bhāsarvajña has enlisted ten varieties of affirmative dṛṣṭāntābhāsas (see 1-6: 13-16 in the above enumeration) and only six kinds of negative fallacies (see 7-12).

Next, let us consider the presentation of these fallacies as found in the commentary of Sivagrayogin.

The Elucidation of Sivāgrayogin

All the fallacies of dṛṣṭānta are grouped under the two divisions viz. 1. Sādhyavikala and 2. Sādhana vikala. They multiply into eighteen kinds.[16] First of all, the commentator has given a list of four fallacies of the sādharmya dṛṣṭāntas. They are: 1. *Sādhya vaikalya* 2. *Sādhana vaikalya* 3. *Ubhaya vaikalya* and 4. *Svarūpa vaikalya.* Similarly, he has given a parallel list of four fallacies of the vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta. They are: 1. *Sādhyā-bhāva vaikalya* 2. *Sadhāna-bhāva vaikalya* 3. *Ubhayā-bhāva vaikalya* and 4. *Āśrayā-bhāva vaikalya.*

Sivāgrayogin further enumerates five kinds of fallacious utterances which he collectively calls *yukti-dosha* for each of the twofold divisions of *dṛṣṭānta.* He includes them along with the aforesaid eight types of *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* and brings the total to eighteen. The fallacious utterances for the positive examples in the affirmative inference are the following:

1. Utterance against the anvaya dṛṣṭānta
2. Utterance against the pervasion (vyāpti) of both Anvaya and Vyatireka
3. Utterance of contradictory sādhya and sādhana in the vyāptis.
4. Uttering sādhya as sādhana, and
5. Uttering sādhana as sādhya.

These five kinds of faulty speech are applicable to the negative examples in the negative inference. But he did not give examples for these ten kinds of *yukti dosha* (-faulty speech).

The commentator has given examples initially for the two kinds of positive as well as negative *dṛṣṭāntabhāsas.*[17] Let us present them accordingly.

I. Anvaya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa

1. Sādhya Vaikalya

E.g. Soul is eternal

Because it is pervasive *vibhu* (-omnipresent)

Like the ether.

The Vedic Saivism and other systems do not admit the eternality of ether. So, the example 'ether' is defective, since it cannot prove the sādhya i.e. the eternality of soul. So, the dṛṣṭānta turns to be a fallacy on account of the unproved sādhya, known as *Sādhya Vaikalya.*

The commentator, further states that the same fallacy gets the new name i.e. *Sādhya-abhāva vikala* of the *vyatireka dṛṣṭānta.*

2. Sādhana Vaikalya

E.g. Vimatam (-heterotox doctrine) is an effect

Because it is perceptible

Like the present time (dṛṣṭām).

In the example i.e. dṛṣṭānta, the sādhana i.e. perceptibility is absent. Hence, it becomes a fallacy on account of the defective sādhana.

The commentator, further states that the same fallacy gets the alternant name, i.e. *Sādhana-abhāva vaikalya* of the *vyatireka dṛṣṭānta.*

Next, Sivagrayogin illustrates ubhaya and svarūpa vaikalyas.

1. Ubhaya Vaikalya

E.g. Vimatam (-heterodox doctrine) is an effect

Because it is perceptible

Like the Māyā

In the example i.e. Māyā both the sādhya i.e. *kāryatva* and sādhana i.e. perceptibility are absent. Therefore it becomes a fallacy known as *ubhaya vaikalya.* Here, ubhaya indicates both the *sādhya* and *sādhana.*

The commentator has mentioned that the same example is also meant for Vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta.

2. Svarūpa Vaikalya

E.g. Vimatam (-heterodox doctrine) is an effect.

Because it is perceptible

Like the sky-flower.

The example i.e. sky-flower is itself a non-reality. Hence the very nature of the example is defective and hence a fallacy.

The commentator indicated that the same example is applicable to vyatireka dṛṣṭānta.

It is really strange to notice that Sivāgrayogin has not illustrated other kinds of dṛṣṭāntābhāsas. Perhaps, those portions that dealt with them were lost during the passage of time and carelessness of the people.

Next, the views of Sivajñāna Swamigal are to be recounted.

The elucidation of Sivajñāna Swamigal

According to this commentator, an example becomes a fallacy due to the defect of the pervasion of the sādhya by the sādhana.[18] He has clearly classified all the eighteen fallacies of example into two major groups on the basis of Anvaya and Vyatireka, each of which has an equal number of nine types. It is essential to note that Aruḷnandhisivam has used the term 'உவமப்போலி' (-uvama-p-pōli), to denote dṛṣṭāntābhāsas. First of all, the fallacies of Anvaya group may be enumerated. The illustrations wherever necessary are reproduced from the explanatory notes of Thiru P. Muthaiya Pillai.

I. Fallacies of the affirmative examples (Anvaya)

1. Cāttiyam uṭaittu ākātatu

In the example, if the sādhya is not present, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Mind is non-eternal

Because it possesses colour

Like the primal atom (*paramāṇu*).

The Naiyāyikas upheld that *paramāṇu* is eternal. This example i.e. primal atom which is eternal does not prove the sādhya, i.e. the non-eternality of mind. This fallacy is also known as *sādhya vikala*, already noted.

2. Cāttiyam uṭaimai niccayikka-p-paṭātatu

The example, wherein the presence of the sādhya is not ascertained, becomes a fallacy of this type. This is otherwise known as samdigdha sādhya, explained by Maraijnāna Desikar.

3. Ētu-v-uṭaittu ākātatu

The example, wherein the sādhana is not present, becomes a fallacy of this name. This fallacy is also called Sādhana vikala, discussed already.

4. Ētu-v-uṭaimai niccayikka-p-paṭātatu

The example, wherein the presence of the hetu is not ascertained becomes faulty. This fallacy is otherwise known as samdigdha sādhana, already seen.

5. Cāttiyamum ētuvum uṭaittu ākātatu

The example, which has neither the sādhana nor the sādhya, becomes fallacious. This fallacy is already discussed under Ubhaya vikala.

6. Cāttiyam uṭaimaiyum ētu-v-uṭaimaiyum niccayikka-p-paṭātatu

The example, wherein the existence of the sādhya and hetu has not been determined, turns to be a fallacy of this type. This is a restatement of Samdigdhobhaya of Maraijnana Desikar's commentary.

7. Corūpam illatu

If the example is a non-existent object, then it becomes a fallacy of this name. This has been noted already by Sivāgrayogin.

8. Corūpam uṇmai paraṉukku uṭanpāṭu ākātatu

If the example is not tenable for other person, it turns to be a fallacy of this type. This is identical with Samdigdhāśraya, noted already.

9. Ceyaṟkaiyāṉ ākiya vyātti uṭaiyatu

If the example has pervasion with the proban and probandum, it becomes a fallacy on account of artificial means. This has been already elucidated.

So far, the nine kinds of positive dṛṣṭāntābhāsas have been enumerated. Next, the same number of negative ones are to be presented.

II. Fallacies of Negative examples

1. Cāttiyam iṉmai uṭaittu ākātatu

The example which has not possessed the non-existence of the sādhya becomes a fallacy.

E.g. Soul is eternal

Because it is pervasive

Whatever is not eternal is not pervasive like ether.

According to the Naiyāyikas, ether is an eternal substance. For them, the negative example "ether" does not possess the non-existence of sādhya i.e. eternality. Hence it becomes a fallacy of this type.

2. Cāttiyam iṉmai uṭaittu eṉpatu niccayikka-p-paṭātatu

The example wherein the absence of sādhya is not ascertained, turns to be a fallacy of this type. This fallacy has come under Saṁdigdha sādhya, that has been discussed already.

3. Ētu iṉmai uṭaittu ākātatu

The example, wherein the absence of sādhana is not ascertained, turns to be a fallacy of this type. This dṛṣṭāntābhāsa is connected with the first of the positive dṛṣṭāntābhāsa series.

E.g. Mind is non-eternal

Because it has colour

Whatever is not non-eternal has not colour

Like the primal atom (*paramāṇu*)

Since the primal atom has colour, there is no non-existence of the hetu in the example.

4. Ētu inmai utaittu enpatu niccayikkap paṭātatu

The example, wherein the non-existence of the reason has not been determined, becomes a fallacy of this type. This has been already discussed under Samdigdha sādhana.

5. Cāttiyam inmai ētu inmai uṭaittu ākātatu

The example, which excluded both the sādhya and sādhana, turns to be a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Mind is non-eternal

Because it has colour

Whatever is not non-eternal has no colour

Like the pot.

In this inference, since the example pot, which does not possess non-eternality and colour, the non-existence of both the hetu and sādhya are not found in it. The same fallacy with a different illustration has been discussed already under Ubhayā vyāvritta.

6. Iraṇṭu inmaiyum uṭaittu enpatu niccayikka-p-paṭātatu

The example, wherein the non-existence of the hetu and sādhya has not been ascertained, turns to be a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Mind is eternal

Because it has no colour

Whatever is non-eternal, is not without colour like ether.

Since in the example ether, the reason i.e. colour and sādhya i.e. eternality are not ascertained, it becomes a fallacy. Though the Naiyāyikas accept the eternality of ether, others doubt it.

7. Corūpam illatu

The example, which has no existence or reality, becomes a fallacy of this kind. Svarūpa means the personality or one's own form. This fallacy has already been noted under the title Svarūpa vaikalya by Sivagrayogin. It is essential to point out that Sivajñāna Swamigal has also mentioned this under the same heading when he dealt with the *Sādharmya dṛṣṭānatābhāsas*. But here, for the negative type of fallacy the following example is given:

Mind is non-eternal

Because it has colour

Whatever is not non-eternal has no colour

Like the sky-flower.

Since the sky flower, which has been produced for the negative example for its possessing of the hetu and sādhya is non-existent, the example becomes a fallacy.

8. Corūpam uṇmai paraṉukku uṭaṉpāṭu ākātatu

This has already been discussed under the same title for the Sādharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa. But a negative example has been given to show its defective nature.

E.g. This person is omniscient

Because he has no lust, hatred etc.

He who has no omniscience is not devoid of lust, hatred etc.

Like the Devadatta who will be born.

Since the example etc., are not acceptable to another party, due to its uncertain nature, it becomes a fallacy.

9. Vyatireka vyātti ceyaṟkaiyāl uṭaiyatu

E.g. Water is that which does not undergo any change of taste

Because it is not cooked

What is subject to change of taste is cooked like a plantain fruit.

Since in this example, the vyāpti of the change of taste in the plantain fruit due its ripening through artificial means is found, it becomes a fallacy of this kind.

It is a symmetrical feature that the commentator has attempted to find between the first list of nine kinds of Sādharmya dṛṣṭānta and the second list of the same number of Vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta. The lucid expression in the classical Tamil is conspicuous in the commentary of Sivajñāna Swamigal.

Next, let us proceed to present the views of Paṇḍiperumāl, who follows the Buddhist logical tradition, as frequently noted.

The Elucidation of Pandiperumal

Though the text Sivajnāna Siddhiyār has given the total number eighteen for all the fallacies of example, Pandiperumal does not

follow the text. Strictly adhering to Maṇimekalai and Nyāya praveśa, he has given a list of five kinds for each of the two divisions of fallacious examples. First of all, the fallacies of affirmative examples are to be enumerated.[19]

I. Sādharmya Dṛṣṭāntābhāsas

1. Sādhana dharma vikala

If the example is short of sādhana dharma, then it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is eternal
Because it is incorporeal (*amūrta*)
Whatever is incorporeal is eternal
Like the primal atom (*paramāṇu*).

In this example i.e. atom which possesses the *sādhya* i.e. eternality, but not the *sādhana* i.e. incorpoeality, as the Naiyāyikas hold that it has its own form. So, the example is defective not because of sādhya but of sādhana dharma. it has to be considered along with Sādhana vikala, noted by Maraijañāa Deśikar who has given a different example for this fallacy.

2. Sādhya dharma vikala

If the example is defective on account of sādhya, then it becomes a fallacy of this type. It is expected that both the *sādhya* and *sādhana* should be present in a valid example. If the sādhya does not exist in the example, it becomes defective.

E.g. Sound is eternal
Because it is incorporeal (*amūrta*)
That which is incorporeal is eternal as intellect.

In the example i.e. intellect, the incorporeality of sādhana is present and the eternality of sādhya dharma is absent. On this account, it becomes a fallacy. Maraijñāna Deśikar has treated this fallacy under Sādhya vikala, but he has given a different example.

3. Ubhaya dharma vikala

If the example is defective due to the absence of both sādhana dharma and sādhya dharma it becomes a fallacy known as *ubhaya dharma vikala*. It is of two minor types. One of them occurs in an example of existing object and the other in a non-existing object. First of all, let us deal with the fallacious example of existing object.

a. Ubhaya dharma vikala (sat)

If the sādhya dharma and sādhana do not tally with the example of sat type, then it turns to be a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is incorporeal

Whatever is incorporeal is eternal, as a pot.

In the example, i.e. pot, which is an existing object, the eternality of sādhya and the incorporeality of the sādhana are not present and hence it becomes a fallacy.

b. Ubhaya dharma vikala (asat)

If the sādhya dharma and sādhana dharma do not tally with the example of asat type, then it turns to be a fallacy of this kind.

E.g. Sound is non eternal

Because it is corporeal

Whatever is corporeal is non-eternal like the ether.

In the example i.e. ether, the non-eternality of sādhya and corporeality of the sādhana are absent and hence it is called a fallacy by the Buddhists and also Jains who do not accept ether as an existing object.

For the advocates of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, who admit ether as an object of existence with the sādhya dharma of eternality and sādhana dharma of incorporeality, the example becomes a fallacy on account of both the proban i.e. corporeality and probandum i.e. non-eternality.

Maraijñāna Deśikar has dealt with this fallacy under the title *Ubhaya vikala* with a different example. *It is essential to note that no Indian logicians other than Cāttṉār and the author of Nyāya praveśa have classified ubhaya dharma vikala into two kinds, as seen above.*[20]

4. Ananvaya

A homogeneous example becomes a fallacy due to showing a lack of universal connection (*-anvaya*) between the sādhana and sādhya.

E.g. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is produced

In the pot, producedness and non-eternality are present.

This syllogism is defective due to the absence of the *anvaya vyāpti vacana* in the form:

"Whatever is produced it is non-eternal like a pot".

If the statement of universal connection (*anvaya*) between the hetu and sādhya is not made, the doubt arises whether there is *anvaya* between the two in the cited example i.e. pot, leading the opponent to put hurdles in the argument. So, due to the lack of this statement of *anvaya*, the example becomes fallacious.

It is essential to note that a different illustration is found in Nyāya praveśa. It is presented here below:[21]

This person is passionate

Because he is a speaker

Whoever is a speaker is passionate, as a certain man in Magadha.

Though a certain person in Magadha may be both a speaker and passionate, there is nevertheless, no universal connection between being a speaker and being passionate. Hence, this is a fallacy of absence of connection. Pandiperumal has named it as doubtful connection (*samśayānvaya*).

5. Viparītānvaya

If one presents an example showing an inverse connection between the hetu and sādhya, it turns to be a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a product of effort.

Whatever is non-eternal is a product, like a pot.

Though the given example 'pot' is both non-eternal (*sādhya dharma*) and a product of effort (*sādhana dharma*), the connection (-*anvaya*) between the *sādhya* and *sādhana* has been inversed. In other words, all products of efforts are non-eternal: but all non-eternals are not products of efforts. Thus, the fallacy of example arises due to erroneous connection (*anvaya*).

Pandiperumal elucidates this fallacy in his own way. With the help of sādhya dharma, existing in the objects like pot which are produced out of effort and like lightning, not produced by effort, one

ascertains the sādhana dharma existing in the objects like pot which are incorporeal.

Next, he proceeds to explain the fallacies of negative examples.

II. Vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsas

1. Sādhya vyāvritti

If in the negative example, the opposite of sādhana dharma is present while the opposite of sādhya dharma is absent, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is incorporeal

Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal

Like the primary atom (*paramāṇu*)

In the example of vipakṣa i.e. primary atom, which is both eternal and corporeal, the opposite of sādhana i.e. corporeality is found, but not the opposite of sādhya i.e. non-eternality. On account of this, the example becomes a fallacy of Included Middle Term in a heterogeneous example.

It is essential to note that in Nyāya Praveśa, instead of primal atom, intelligence is given as the example.

2. Sādhana vyāvritti

Vyāvritti literally means exclusion or rejection. If in the negative example i.e. found in the vipakṣa, the opposite of sādhya dharma is present, while the opposite of sādhana dharma is absent, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is incorporeal

Whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal

Like the karma (-action)

In this Vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta i.e. action, the vyāvritti of sādhana i.e. corporeality is absent and the vyāvritti of sādhya i.e. non-eternality is present. Therefore it becomes a fallacy of Included Major Term in a heterogeneous example.

In Nyāyapraveśa instead of karma, atom is given as the example in the heterologue.

3. Ubhayā vyāvṛitti

If in the negative example of the vipakṣa both the dharma of the opposite sādhya and sādhana are present, then it becomes a fallacy known by this name. It is of two kinds: a. sat and b. asat.

a. Sat ubhayā vyāvritti

This fallacy arises when in the negative example of sat type both the dharmas of the opposite probandum and proban are not present.

E.g. Sound is eternal
Because it is incorporeal
Whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal
Like the ether.

Since in the example of heterologue i.e. ether which is both eternal and incorporeal, the opposite of sādhya dharma, i.e. non-eternality and the opposite of sādhana dharma, i.e. corporeality are absent, it becomes a fallacy known by this name. The disputant accepts ether as a reality and placed his argument.

b. Asat Ubhayā vyāvritti

This fallacy arises when in the negative example of asat type, both the dharmas of the opposite sādhya and sādhana are not present.

E.g. Sound is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal
Whatever is non-eternal is not corporeal
Like the ether.

The same example, ether is not admitted as an object by some like the Buddhist. Since ether is non-existent for him, the dharmas of both sādhya and sādhana which are to be attributed positively and negatively to it become useless, for these features are meant only for existing objects. Thus, the example of a non-existent object becomes a fallacy on account of the lack of dharmas.

It is essential to note that in Nyāya praveśa, this sub type is not mentioned.

4. Avyatireka

If a heterogeneous example shows the absence of disconnection between the sādhana and sādhya, it becomes a fallacy known by

this name. In other words, if there is no sādhya dharma, the absence of sādhana dharma is left out wihout being mentioned.

E.g. Sound is eternal

Because it is not produced

Like the pot.

In this syllogism, the vyatireka vacana in the form:

"Whatever is not eternal is not non-produced like the pot" is required to be stated. It shows the disconnection between sādhana and sādhya. Though the example 'pot' possesses both the dharmas viz, non-eternality and producedness, it becomes a fallacy on account of the absence of vyatireka vacana.

In Nyāya praveśa a different example is given:

E.g. This person is passionate

Because he is a speaker

Whoever is non-passionate is not a speaker

Like a piece of stone.

In this syllogism, even though the vyatireka vacana is present, the example is defective. Hence, it becomes a fallacy due to the defective vyatireka vacana. Pandiperumal calls this fallacy as doubtful vyatireka.

5. Viparīta vyatireka

If a heterogeneous example shows the absence of inverse disconnection between the sādhana and sādhya, it becomes a fallacy of this type.

E.g. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a product

Whatever is non-product is not non-eternal

Like the ether.

The example should be inverted as:

Whatever is not-non-eternal (i.e. eternal) is not

a product like ether.

This defect is called a fallacy of Inverted Negation of a heterogeneous example.

The above illustration is found in Nyāya praveśa. But in Maṇimēkalai a different example is given. Cāttaṉār defines the fallacy in clear terms.[22] This fallacy originates due to the inverted statement of the *vyatireka vyāptivacana.*

E.g. Sound is non-eternal
Because it is corporeal

These two constitute the *sādhya sādhana vacana* for which the *vipakṣa vyatireka vyāpti* statement is as follows:

Instead of stating "Whatever is non-eternal is not corporeal", its inversion is stated thus: "Whatever is not corporeal is non-eternal". Thus the fallacy arises due to erroneous or inverted vyatireka.

Pandiperumal has given the same example to illustrate this fallacy. Thus,. the commentator has delat with the fallacies of affirmative and negative examples closely following the Buddhist logical school as understood from Maṇimēkalai and Nyāyapraveśa.

In other texts

Sivāgrayogin in his Sivaneṟiprakāśam has not enumerated the list of the two divisions of fallacious examples. But he has presented a list of four kinds of fallacies, each for the two groups in his commentary on Sivajñāna Siddhiyār. However, the commentator of Sivaneṟiprakāśam closely follows his master in the enumeration of these fallacies. It is needless to reproduce them. But it is pertinent to note that all these dṛṣṭāntābhāsas are quoted in accordance with Pauṣkarāgama.[23]

Last, but not least the author of Tattuvaprakāśam has reckoned an entirely different list of eighteen fallacies of examples under the heading *Uvama-p-pōli* i.e. *upamābhāsas* otherwise called fallacies of comparison. The commentator of this text has illustrated all of them. They are the following.[24]

1. The fallacy due to comparison of action

   E.g. The act of Lord Siva who cut the head of Brahma with His finger is compared to the act of an instrument.

2. The fallacy due to comparison of effect

   E.g. Mental perception is just like the sensual perception.

3. The fallacy due to comparison of colour

   E.g. Intuition is like the sun's light.

4. The fallacy due to comparison of shape or form

   E.g. The form of a preceptor is like the form of a man.

5. The fallacy due to comparison of strength (viṟal)

   E.g. Ahaṁkāra is like the act of elephant.

6. The fallacy due to comparison of quality

   E.g. One's quality is like that of a cow.

7. The fallacy due to comparison of genus (jāti)

   E.g. Soul is like internal sense organ

8. The fallacy due to comparison of karma

   E.g. What is uttered is equal to what is done.

9. The fallacy due to comparison of substance

   E.g. Good heart is like water.

10. The fallacy due to confused similie

    E.g. Primordial matter is like soul.

11. The fallacy due to unique similie

    E.g. Heart is like stone

12. The fallacy due to similie of image

    E.g. Siva is like sun.

13. The fallacy due to similie of nature

    E.g. Death is like transcendental state.

14. The fallacy due to similie of Mārga

    E.g. The attainment of preceptor is like that of children.

15. The fallacy due to similie of number

    E.g. Giving to one devotee of Maheśvara is equal to the establishment of thousand temples.

16. The fallacy due to similie of compound

    E.g. The five letters are like the five-fold grace.

17. The fallacy due to similie of evolutes

    E.g. The Vidhyā tattvas are like the Ātma tattvas.

18. The fallacy due to similie of source of origin

E.g. The fructification of the result of one's deeds is just like the shoot of paddy.

In the field of rhetorics, comparison is the most prominent figure of speech. In Tolkāppiyam, an entire chapter is devoted to eleborately deal with the various aspects of comparison.[25] But in the sphere of epistemology which is wedded to the identification of the certitude of one's statement in a debate or discussion, the ornamental and rhetorical statements are to be avoided. Hence, the author of Tattuvaprakāśam and its commentator have explored the possible kinds of comparison which are descriptive in a sense and limited to the maximum number of eighteen in order to give the sum total of fallacies arising out of these different forms of comparison. *It is not known whether these are discussed by any author or commentator in Sanskrit. It seems that they are first introduced in Tattuvaprakāśam.* But it is essential to point out that the comparisons are not given in the aforesaid illustrations, related to the sādhya and sādhana. Fallacy arises only in an inference, usually meant for others. Since the examples are not presented in a syllogistic form, they are not to be treated on a par with the hetvābhāsas that have been discussed already. Even Tolkāppiyar, the earliest author in Tamil (500 B.C) has noted only five kinds of semblance of similie which are entirely different from those enumerated in Tattuvaprakāśam and its commentary. The five kinds under reference are identified by Iḷampūraṇar, the earliest known commentator on Tolkāppiyam. They are expressed in the following way:[26]

1. This object has no comparison.
2. This is equal to this.
3. If one has taken all the relevant limbs of various objects then, the collection of them would be a comparison to this particular thing.
4. If the beauty, that is existent in various objects is found in a particular place, it will be a comparison to the concerned object and
5. Comparison with a disagreeable object.

A mere glance at these five kinds which are called *uvamai-p-pōli* by Tolkāppiyar would reveal the fact that they have little to do with the

fallacies of example. It is clear that Tolkāppiyar has delat with the expressions of the rhetorical embellishment in a poetry to generate aesthetic enjoyment. However, when we compare the contents of the upamānābhāsas of Tattuvaprakāśam and Tolkāppiyam, the former form themselves a separate class, different from the latter. The relevance of the former in a syllogism is beyond the cognition of the present writer. In this context, it is proper to mention that Aristotle has treated the figure of speech including comparison under the category of Fallacy.[27]

Though the Sanskrit logical texts do not deal with the fallacy, arising out of the figures of speech vividly, the Siddhānta treatises in Tamil have dealt with the same. The commonness, found in the text of Aristotle and Tamil texts may be treated as an accident.

So far an exhaustive study of the fallacies of examples has been made. Next, the details of some more types of defective arguments are to be explicated in the following chapter.

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XV. DISCUSSION, QUIBBLE AND ANALOGUE

Among the sixteen subjects which have been discussed in Nyāya sūtra the last seven, viz., *vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* belong to one division. Out of them, *hetvābhāsas* have already been elaborately treated. Sivagrayogin has made a reference to *Vāda kathā*.[1] Umāpatisivam has clearly stated *Vāda, Jalpa (Cerpai)* and *Vitaṇḍā (vitaṇṭai)* in Sankarpa Nirākaraṇam (2.45) which has been commented by Jñānaprakāśar. The commentator of Tattuvaprakāśam has also made a mention to them.[2] Since nigrahasthāna requires a separate treatment, let us deal with the remaining subjects very briefly.

1. Vāda (Discussion)

Though Sivagrayogin has used the words *vāda* and *kathā* to denote the same, a difference is made in Nyāyasūtra and its Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana. According to the latter, the word *kathā* means a debate, which has three forms, viz., *Vāda, Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* (Cavil).[3] First of all, *Vāda* may be elucidated.

Vāda is that form of debate in which two contestents participate upholding the thesis and antithesis. They engage in the substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) aided by the means of knowledge and argument, without contradiction to the proved doctrine. So, *Vāda* has two main objectives, viz., establishing one's view and refuting the opponent's view. The first is done by *sādhana* and the second by *upālambha*. These two aspects of *vāda* are adhered by the two contestents, *Vādin* and *Prativādin*, till the claim of one is finally silenced and that of the other is established.

In such debates, the use of *nigrahasthāna* is forbidden, though the use of pseudo-probans is allowed. Even if the debaters are inspired by the arguments only for substantiation, their arguments are called vāda. But, it is not sufficient if one limits himself to substantiate his own points. He is required to quash the views of his opponent and then only his arguments would legitimately be called a *vāda*.

According to Jñānaprakāśar, the learned commentator of Sankarpanirākaraṇam, Vāda is twofold viz., *Vitāram* and *Viciyuḻi*.[4] *Vitāram* is the Tamilized form of *vicāra* which means investigation. It denotes the examination of the arguments between the preceptor

and disciple, without contradictions to the facts arrived at by the pramāṇas and finally casting away the defects, thus establishing the real sense of true object. Vici-y-uḻi assumes two forms viz., *Ceṟpai* (-*Jalpa*) and *Vitaṇṭai* (*vitaṇḍā*).

2. Jalpa (Wrangling)

The second form of *Kathā* i.e. debate is *Jalpa*. Its Tamilized form is *Ceṟpai*. The initial voiced palatal becomes in Tamil voiceless but followed by a palatal vowel (e).

Jalpa denotes that particular debate in which sādhana (substantiation) and upālambha (refutation) are made with the auxiliaries of *chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. These three auxiliaries are found to be destructive in nature. These require some elucidation.

3. Chala (Quibble)

1. *Chala* denotes the rebuttal of the opponent's words or arguments not by proper means but by crooked way such as reading an adventious meaning which is against the intended meaning of the word. It is the verbal quibbling, carrying the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the only purpose of vanquishing him. It is of three kinds:

a. Vākchala

If an ambiguous phrase is uttered by one of the contestants, the other would read a meaning which is against the intention of his opponent. In the ordinary speech, a clever and tricky speeker is known as *vāy-c-cālakaṉ* in Tamil.

Eg. '*navakambaḷa*' may mean either a new blanket or nine blankets. If it is said that the person has a *navakambaḷa* to mean new blanket, the quibbler would argue that he has not nine blankets but only one. The word *nava* in Sanskrit possesses the sense new and also nine. In *Paṭṭimaṉṟam* (debating halls) and poetic forums this technique is largely used by the involved participants.

One more example may be quoted for *vāycālakam*:

"If I marry I would be unhappy, because I would have to take care of my wife and children. If I remain unmarried. I would be unhappy because, there would be nobody to take care of me. Either I should marry or remain unmarried, in any case I would be unhappy."

The above statement may be reversed, using one's cleverness and skill of speech, in the following way:

"If I marry I would be happy, because there would be somebody to take care of me. If I remain unmarried I would be happy, because I need not take care of anybody. Either I should marry or remain unmarried, in any case I would be happy."

This kind of arguments may also be called dilemma, creating more than one situation which is either desirable or undesirable.

b. Sāmānya chala

If a statement is made with reference to a specific individual, the quibbler would argue for the whole with a view to rejecting the statement. If it is said that a particular Brahmin is learned and perfect, he would argue that it is not true with all the Brahmins and hence to prove the statement false.

c. Upacārachala

In Tamil, this is very commonly known with the title "*upacāra vaḻakku*" or '*Mariyātai vaḻakku*'. Normally figurative expressions are taken in a literal sense.

If it is said that, "the platform cries out", the quibbler would wrangle that the platform being an inanimate object can not be expected to cry out. Actually it means that the person standing on the platform cries out. Such cases are many. They are labelled as metonymy in the domain of rhetories. They have been discussed when we have dealt with the fallacies of comparison as found in Tattuvaprakāsam.

4. Jāti (Analogue)

Jāti being the second auxiliary of, *Jalpa* is a futal rejoinder based on insignificant and negligible similarity and dissimilarity. According to Akṣapāda, it comprises twenty four types of futile objections. They do not have the same seriousness evinced in the arguments of the debater. For the simple sake of refutation, the opponent advances his reasons through improper and unlawful means. One example is enough.

If it is propounded that sound is non-eternal because it is a product like ether, then the quibbler would twist the argument by stating that sound is eternal, because as an object of auditory perception it is not similar to a pot.

5. Vitaṇḍā (Cavil)

A *jalpa* becomes a *vitaṇḍā* if it functions only as a destructive criticism with the only aim of repudiating the doctrine of the opponent without aiming to establish his own view-point or to formulate a fresh doctrine.

So, it becomes very clear that the authors and commentators of the Saiva Siddhānta texts have known the principles of *vāda* and the unfair means of *jalpa, chala, jāti* and *vitaṇḍā* which they do not like to impose in religious and philosophical debates. They stressed on the fair and proper means of arguments. According to Akṣapāda, these auxiliaries are employed for the purpose of defending the well-established conclusions.[5] They are compared to the fence of thorny plants and branches for safeguarding the garden plants. It seems that the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta do not subscribe to this view.

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XVI OCCASIONS FOR REPROOF

The builders of Nyāya system have worked out the details concerning with the points of defeat which are technically called *Nigrahasthāna* in Sanskrit and *Tōlvi-t-tānam* in Tamil. Among the sixteen topics, discussed in Nyāya sūtra, Nigrahasthāna is placed at the tail end. This technical term has been variously rendered into English as occasions for reproof or rebuke, points of defeat, clinchers, points of disgrace, places of humiliation etc. Akṣapāda has identified at least twenty two kinds of circumstances in which one of the disputants participating in a debate meets with humiliation and defeat at the hands of his opponents.[1] The main reasons, adduced to the defeat are twofold: 1. The misunderstanding or wrong apprehension of the argument and 2. The ignorance of understanding the argument. These two are respectively called *vipratipatti* and *apratipatti* by Akṣapāda. They are noted in the commentaries of Sivajnāna Siddhiyār.[2]

Even before the advent of Nyāya Sūtra, scholars have contemplated about the situations and factors responsible for the reproof of a disputant. Though Caraka Saṁhitā, which is supposed to be a work before the period of Akṣapāda, is a treatise on indigenous medicine, the last section in it is devoted to the methods and rules of debate i.e. Vādavidhi. In this section, there are about 44 topics, being delineated. The 44th topic is on *nigrahasthāna* which is a point of defeat when the debater becomes a laughing stock due to his imperfect knowledge of understanding or utter ignorance.[3] The same text also states that the occasion for rebuke may also occur when the debater refutes that which deserves not to be refuted and keeps silence when he has to legitimately refute. Only some forms of *nigrahasthāna* such as *pratijñā-hāni*, *abhyanujñā*, *hetvantara*, *arthāntara* etc., are treated under separate numbers i.e. from 40-43. So, it may be presumed that during the period of Caraka Saṁhitā, the totality of counting twenty two nigrahasthānas was not prevalent in the circle of debaters and logicians. Even the number may be increased. Nevertheless, giving prominence to the twenty two occasions, it seems that Akṣapāda has been the first writer to present this figure in his Nyāya Sūtra. It is essential to note that the Buddhist logician Vasubandhu has enumerated all the twenty two points of defeat in the third and final chapter of his logical work, known as Tarka Śāstra, which has been translated into Chinese by Paramārtha in the middle of the sixth century A.D.[4] Another

Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (A.D.625), a native of Kāñci has also mentioned all the twenty two according to Vācaspati and Jayanta, the two great exponents of the Nyāya system.[5] However Dharmakīrti has made a fresh classification of all the nigrahasthānas into two, viz., 1. *Asādhanānga-vacana* and 2. *Adosodbhāvana*, instead of the Naiyāyika division of 1. *vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*.[6] According to Dharmakīrti, *asādhanānga vacana* denotes the speech of a disputant not in conformity with reason *adosodbhāvana* indicates the forced defeat in an argument which is actually devoid of any defect.

Apart from Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti, the earliest Buddhist logicians also made a mention of Nigrahasthāna in their works. Bodhisattva Nagarjuna in his Upāya Kauśalya Hirdaya Śāstra (300 A.D.) has revealed his acquaintance with Akṣapāda's Nyāya Sūtra, when he enlisted the points of defeat.[7] The former has indicated only nine while the latter has exhaustively given twenty two. The titles or labels of them did not change, though the order or enumeration has changed. They are presented here below with their numbers.

In Nagarjuna's work	In Akṣapāda's text	English equivalent
1. *Avijñātārtha*	8	The unintelligible speech
2. *Aparatibhā*	16	Non-ingenuity i.e. Speech without any Illumination
3. *Ananubhāṣaṇa*	14	Silence
4. *Nyūna*	11	Speaking very tittle
5. *Adhika*	12	Speaking too much
6. *Nirarthaka*	7	The meaningless speech
7. *Aprāptakāla*	10	The inopportune speech
8. *Apārthaka*	9	The incoherent speech
9. *Pratijñāhāni*	1	Hurting the proposition i.e. Defective statement.

The reason for the omission of the remaining *nigrahasthānas* in Nagarjuna's text is not easily understandable. Perhaps, he should have thought that the aforesaid nine kinds of clinchers are the most notable points to be avoided in a healthy discussion and also in public debates. Since, the text Upāya-Kauśalya Hṛdaya Śāstra has been ascribed to Nagarjuna who lived in 300 A.D., it is inferred that he is different from the original author of Mūla Mādhyamika Kārikā (150 A.D.). It is essential to note that the logical text of the later Nagarjuna has been translated into Chinese in A.D. 472.

Maitreya, (350 A.D.) one of the early founders of Yogācāra Buddhism has also concentrated on the art of debate. In the fifth chapter of his book Saptadaśa Bhūmi Śāstra Yogācārya, he has dealt with three kinds of nigrahasthāna.[8] They are given here below:

1. If a disputant in the initial stage disagrees with the opponent's thesis and subsequently speaks in support of it, then it becomes a point of defeat.
2. If a disputant is not capable of defending his proposition and brings another topic for discussion, he is treated to be unsuccessful.
3. If his speech is irrelevant and purposeless, he is considered to be in the point of defeat.

All these remarks are adequate to substantiate that the dialecticians and logicians of Buddhist school evinced interest in the identification of *nigrahasthānas*. Since the doctrine of *nigrahasthānas* is also enshrined in the Caraka Saṁhitā and in some systems of Indian philosophy including Saiva Siddhānta, it is not improper to suggest that it belonged to the national stock of Indian logic and was adopted and adapted according to the needs of the particular system in its onward journey of logical thought. However, the lion-share in the building of the doctrine goes to the Naiyāyikas who have specialised the art of debate, even before the advent of Nagarjuna, Vasubandhn and other Buddhist logicians.

In Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, Arulnandisivam has made a bare mention of twenty two kinds of *nigrahasthāna* (*-tōlvi-t-tāṉam*) without mentioning their names and the twofold divisions under which they have been accomodated.[9] Usually the commentators of the text, having erudition in Saiva Siddhānta and Nyāya came forward to enumerate all of them with apt illustrations. Among them

Maraijñāna Deśikar, Sivagrayogin and Nirampavalakiyar are in adequate agreement in the order of enumeration. Only the first two have given illustrations to explicate each of the *nigrahasthanas*. Jnānaprakasar has advised his readers to go through the commentary of Maraijñāna Deśikar to know about the subject. *The speciality in the commentary of Sivajñāna Swamigal remains to be the naming of the terms in chaste and lucid Tamil to the possible extent.* However, he has left out the last point of defeat which is hetvābhāsa, since it has already been discussed in detail under separate heading. In its place he has substituted the repetition of meaning in addition to the repetition of words which has been recognised by all the commentators.

Among the remaining texts on Saiva Siddhānta, Sivaneriprakāśam and its commentary closely follow the general scheme of nigrahasthāna, though the full commentary is not available for all the points of defeat. It is particular to note that Tattuvaprakāśam and its commentary belong to a separate school in the identification and exposition of the points of defeat. First of all let us consider the views of *nigrahasthāna* as upheld by the commentators.

Maraijñāna Deśikar has commented that *apratipatti* denotes the ignorance of the disputant who is not aware not only of what he has stated but also what is stated by his opponent.[10] According to him, *vipratipatti* denotes the demonstration of contradictory knowledge of his own speech and that of his opponent.[11]

Sivagrayogin defines *apratipatti* as the expression of the disputant without knowing its meaning and *vipratipatti* to be the contradictory statement.[12]

Sivajñāna Swamigal elucidates that *nigrahasthāna* arises due to the ignorance of how to speak in a debate. He has given a different two-fold classification.[13] They are:

1. Confused speech (*mayaṅka-p-pecutal*) and
2. Keeping quiet (*vāḷā-v-iruttal*).

According to Maraijñāna Deśikar the first thirteen points of defeat fall under *apratipatti*, while the remaining nine under *vipratipatti*.[14] Nirampavalakiyar subsumed the first fourteen under one division and the remaining eight under the second division.[15]

Vātsyāyana, the reputed commentator of Nyāya Sūtra has isolated and identified that the six points of defeat viz.,

1. Ananubhāṣaṇa, 2. Ajñāna, 3. Apratibhā, 4. Vikṣepa, 5. Matānujñā and 6. Paryanuyojya upekṣaṇa belonged to the class of *nigrahasthāna* known as ignorance (*-apratipatti*) and the rest to the class called "contradictory knowledge" (*-vipratipatti*).[16]

However H.N. Randle, is of the opinion that the whole conception of nigrahasthāna is rhetorical or eristical rather than logical, while some of the 'points of defeat' are conventional. He has arranged in an organised manner all the twenty two points of defeat under seven heads, viz., 1. Inconsistency, 2. Irrelevance and obscurity, 3. Want of method, 4. Tautology, 5. Want of understanding, 6. Points concerning opinion and censuring and 7. Deviation from principle and reason.[17] (The last two names are given by the present author for the sake of convenience). The first five points of defeat come under inconsistency, while the next four under the second division. Nos.10-12 belong to the third group, 13a and 13b to the fourth. Nos.14-17 go to the fifth division 18-20 to the sixth and the last two to the seventh.

From the different methods of classification of Nigrahasthānas, it is evident that the commentators and authors evinced their keen interest and individuality in the subject. Now, it is proper to enumerate them as found in the Tamil commentaries of Sivajñāna Siddhiyār. Since Sivajnāna Swamigal has given a brief elucidation in Tamil for each term, it is also given in brackets after the Sanskrit name for the *nigrahasthāna*.[18]

1. Pratijñā-hāni (Tān eṭuttu-k-koṇṭa meṟkōḷai-c Cātikka māṭṭāmal ataṟku-k kēṭu vara-p-pecutal

When the disputant, without establishing his own thesis or proposition speaks in a manner that hurts his own statement, running counter to his own view, he commits the mistake, known by this name.

Eg. The argument of the disputant is as follows:

Proposition	:	Sound is non-eternal
Reason	:	Because it is cognisable by the sense
Example	:	Whatever is cognisable by the sense is non-eternal like a pot.
Application	:	Sound is so (cognisable by the sense)
Conclusion	:	Therefore, sound is non-eternal

The counter-argument of the opponent is as follows:

Just like the pot is knowable by the sense, the potness, being the generic nature of all pots (i.e. jāti or genus) is also knowable by the sense. When the opponent argues pointing out the (class of) potness is not non-eternal, the disputant who made the proposition (*pratijñā*) that "sound is non-eternal" turns to accept the statement of the opponent that pot is also eternal, for it is knowlable by the sense. Thus, he contradicts his own statement.

2. Pratijñāntara (piṟitoru meṟkōḷai-k-kūṟutal)

This term denotes the shifting of the proposition of the disputant. It arises when he defends a proposition which is criticised by his opponent through importing a new character to his example and also to the counter-example.

The argument of the disputant is as follows:

Letters are impermanent

Because they are grasped by the ear

Like the sound-ness (-being the generic nature of the sound).

The opponent would raise his objection to this inference, by pointing out the flaw of irregularity due to the pervasion of the letters with the concerned sounds. Then the disputant changes his original proposition and presents it with the modification thus:

"The letters with their corresponding sounds are not permanent". Hence, shifting the proposition from the original is to be rebuked by the umpire and knowledgeable onlookers.

In Nyāya Sāstra, a different example is given.[19]

3. Pratijñāvirodha (Mēṟkōḷukku maṟutalai-p-paṭa-p-pēcutal)

The clincher of contradictory proposition arises when the proposition and reason are opposed to each other.

Eg. Substance is different from quality.

Because it is cognisable to be non-different

from its quality, like the colour.

In this argument, it is to be noted that if substance (dravya) is different from quality (guṇa), then the same substance must necessarily be different from colour. Hence, the reason that

substance is non-different from colour, etc., runs counter to the original proposition, viz., "Substance is different from quality". Thus, the person who unwittingly uses a reason that is against his own proposition embraces defeat in the debate.

4. Pratijñā-sanyāsa (Mērkōḷai viṭṭu viṭutal)

Sanyāsa means renunciation. It occurs with *pratijñā.* In a debate it means the abandonment of one's proposition when he disclaims his own statement.

Eg. Sound is eternal

Because it is produced due to effort

Like the ether.

This statement is questioned by the opponent on the ground that whatever is produced can not be eternal and hence sound being a product also can not be eternal. The disputant retracts from his original proposition and utters loudly thus: "Who says that sound is eternal". Thus, the denial of one's own original proposition, due to the flaw in the probans, pointed out by the opponent, creates a situation for rebuke.

A different example is given in Nyāya Sāstra for this clincher.[20]

So, the aforesaid four forms of nigrahasthāna take place on account of the defect in the proposition in one way or other.

5. Hetvāntara (Tāṉ kūṟiya ētuviṟku-k-kuṟṟam vantuḷi vēṟōṟāṟṟāṉ ētu kūṟutal)

This is the clincher of departing from the adduced reason.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is cognisable by the sense.

When the above argument is advanced by the disputant, the opponent raises his objection that the reason 'cognisablity' is not an adequate means to prove that sound is non-eternal, because pervasion exists between cognisability and the genus of the sound i.e. soundness (*sabdatva*) which is eternal unlike sound. Accepting this remark, when the disputant revises his original argument and places it with a modification in the reason in the following manner, he has to face the point of defeat in the debate.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a genus and is cognisable by the sense.

This clincher is to be considered along with *pratijñāntara*. In the latter, the disputant meets the point of rebuke due to the submission of the modified proposition, while in the former, due to the presentation of the qualified reason.

6. Arthāntara (Ta̲nakku varum tōlviyai-p- pi̲rito̲n̲r̲u pēci mar̲aittal)

This denotes the shifting of the topic in an argument by an irrelevant fresh topic in order to shield one's defeat. In other words, when the respondent brings forth the flaw in the probans, the disputant talks something else to conceal his defeat. This point of defeat is known as *arthāntara*.

If a disputant advances his argument thus:

"Sound is non-eternal

Because it is knowable by the senses".

The opponent rejects it on the ground that knowability is not an adequate reason to establish the probandum that sound is non-eternal, since it is also found with the eternal soundness, being the class or genus of sound. On receiving this, if the disputant changes the topic of his discussion in order to cover up his weakness and argues thus:

"Sound is a quality of ether

Because the relation of inherence abides between sound and ether.

Hence this relation of inherence is also non-eternal"

It is clear that he has changed his proposition which is irrelevant to the argument and becomes guilty of this defective statement.

7. Nirarthaka (paya̲noṭu paṭāta̲na pēcutal)

This clincher of defeat arises when the disputant makes a meaningless and purposeless argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters in a sequence.

If one wants to establish the sādhya that 'pot is non-eternal', he argues in the following manner:

Pot is non-eternal

Because the sounds in the form of A, K, Y and R can not denote the sounds which are their caused form (i.e. form of non-effect).

From this argument, it is presumed that the sounds A, K, Y and R can denote something other than their causal form. The presumption is baseless, since individual sounds have no sense. Thus the argument is useless and meaningless and the debater suffers humility before the audience, when his mistake is exposed by the opponent.

8. Avijñātārtha (poruḷiṉitu viḷaṉkāta coṟkaḷai ēṭuttu-k-koṇṭu pecutal)

The Tamil equivalent elucidates this clincher occurring as a result of employing words whose meaning is not lucidly understood. It denotes the unintelligible argument, which although repeated thrice is beyond the understanding of both the mediators and also the opponent.

This clincher of defeat arises when the disputant resorts to the use of ambiguous expressions in order to confuse his opponent.

Eg."The white goes".

In this statement of the disputant, "the white" may mean a dog of white colour, or a white horse or a person with the name white (The Sanskrit word 'Sveta' has its equivalent in Tamil Veḷḷai). Even if he says the above statement any number of times, its meaning is not ascertained due to its ambivalent behaviour.

The explanatory note of P.Muthaiya Pillai deserves to be mentioned. The way in which the disputant speaks makes the respondent very difficult to identify the minor term and major term in the proposition. It is one kind of clincher of being unintelligible type. Another kind is found in the speedy expressions unable to be followed. A third kind consists in the usage of obsolete words.

9. Apārthaka (avāynilai takuti aṇmai illaṉavāka-p-pēcutal)

It denotes the incoherent argument which does not convey any connected sense due to the words put in the sentence without any syntactical order. Elsewhere, it has been pointed out that the words in the sentence convey the meaning due to their expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā-avāynilai*) consistency of fitness (*yogyatā-takuti*) and contiguity (*sannidhi* or *āsattiḥ-aṇmainilai*). If these three aspects of the position of words in an utterance are not found, then the point of defeat known as *apārthaka* arises.

When a person who is unable to reply to the opponent's argument finds no other means for self-defence, then he utters thus:

"ten pomegranates, six appams (edibles), a bowl, goat's skin, a lump of flesh; this ornament callaṭam belongs to the virgin; the father of the man Dhairyakṛta is Prāticīna; food is in the brook; He goes after bathing - These types of statements which contain unconnected and incoherent words can not transmit any sense either to the audience or to the opponent. Hence the disputant who utters such unintelligible words becomes a laughing stock.

10. Aprāptakāla (Mērkōḷ mutaliya aintiṉaiyum muṟai piṟaḷa-p-pēcutal)

It denotes the clincher of inopportune and inconsequential argument in which the members of the syllogism are presented without any order of preference.

When a person who desires to prove that the hill has fire presents the syllogism in the following way, the clincher takes place:

1. Proposition : The hill has fire
2. Example : Whatever has smoke has fire, like a kitchen
3. Conclusion : Therefore the hill has fire
4. Reason : Because it has smoke
5. Application : The hill has smoke.

Since the coherence in the order of the syllogistic members and the meaning are affected, the disputant, who pays little attention to the order, is unable to prove the probandum and thus meets the point of defeat. The regular order is proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion.

11. Nyūna (Meṟkōḷ mutaliyavaṟ ṟil cila kuṟaiya-p-pēcutal)

It denotes the clincher of incomplete syllogism. Normally a syllogism consists of five members. If the disputant uses a syllogism which lacks some essential members, then it is known as *Nyūna* which literally means 'too little'. According to Nyāya-Sāstra, even the absence of only one member may be taken as a defective syllogism.[21]

Eg. "The hill has fire

Because there is smoke"

If a disputant places the above syllogism with two members, the Naiyāyikas and others who advocate the five-membered syllogism will protest the above argument on the ground of lacking the

remaining three members which are essential for a correct and valid inference to be transmitted to the understanding of others.

12. Adhika (oṉṟukku-p-pala kūṟutal)

In this kind of defective argument, superfluous members of syllogism are employed. It is enough if the admitted members are present in a syllogism. Normally the increase in the members occurs with regard to reason and example.

Eg.

Proposition	:	The hill has fire
Reason 1	:	Because it has smoke
Reason 2	:	And because it has brightness
Example 1	:	As in the kitchen
Example 2	:	And as in the furnace of the blacksmith.

In the above argument the second reason i.e. brightness and the second example are redundant and unnecessary for proving the proposition.

Saying too much is as much defective as saying too little. So, neither maximum nor minimum is preferable than the optimum which is the Aristotlean golden mean not only in Ethics but also in Logic. This kind of middle path has been taught long before Aristotle by Buddha. In Tirukkuṟaḷ, the moral philosopher Tiruvaḷḷuvar advises that both increase and decrease would affect, thereby implying the significance of balance and middle way.[22] In the Tamil grammatical tradition *kuṉṟa-k-kūṟal* i.e. deficient statement and *mikaipaṭa-k-kūṟal* i.e. over statement are prohibited.[23] Only the apt and adequate statement which avoids the two extremes is recognized to be effective and essential. So, in the field of logic also, the specialists expected that the just needful statement was sufficient in an argument.

13. Sabda punarukta (Collai iraṭṭittu-c-collal)

It denotes the clincher of the repetition of a particular word in an argument. Sometimes the whole sentence also is repeated.

Eg. Sound is non-eternal
Sound is non-eternal

Sivajnāna Swamigal has stated the repetition of meaning also.[24]

Eg. Sound is non-eternal and it is liable to destruction.

In this statement non-eternality and destruction denote the same sense and hence it is sufficient if any one of them is used.

In this context, it is essential to note that some scholar has opined that neither the other commentators nor the Naiyāyikas speak of the repetition of meaning.[25] It is not so. In the second chapter of Nyāya Sūtra, repetition of the meaning (*arthapunarukta*) has also been included under repetition of word as one of the sub-members of Nigrahasthāna.[26]

Eg. Sound is non-eternal

Echo is perishable

What is heard is impermanent etc.

In this argument, the subject sound, echo, what is heard denote the same. The predicate 'non-eternal', 'perishable' and 'impermanent' give the same meaning. So, it is a clincher for the debater who is required to limit his usage of words and their sense.

Further another kind of repetition is also found in Nyāya Sāstra.[27]

Eg. A thing which is not non-eternal does not possess the character of a product.

This statement is the rewriting in a different form of the following:

"A thing which has the character of a product is non-eternal".

This kind of repetition consists in mentioning a thing by name, although it has been suggested through presumption.

However in the case of reinculcation, the repetition is allowed in the system of Nyāya.

Eg. Proposition	:	The hill has fire
Reason	:	Because it has smoke
Example	:	Whatever has smoke has fire Like the kitchen
Application	:	The hill has smoke
Conclusion	:	Therefore the hill has fire.

In this syllogism, the conclusion is a restatement of the proposition, serving a particular purpose, i.e. proving emphatically the thesis, "The hill has fire". So it is allowed.

Nevertheless, some Buddhist logicians, as we have already seen, do not accept the last two members, since they felt that they are a case of redundancy to be dispensed with.

14. Ananubhāṣaṇa (Piṟaṉ kūṟiya poruḷai aṉuvatikka māṭṭāmai)

This clincher arises due to the disputant keeping silence when the opponent is expected to make a reply to the disputant's statement which has been repeated thrice and understood very well by the audience. Everybody in the assembly would expect the opponent to substantiate the disputant's statement and to indicate its untenability. If he maintains an attitude of solid silence, the disputant can not continue his argument. Hence, his attitude of silence becomes the point of defeat.

15. Ajñāna (Piṟaṉ kūṟiya poruḷai aṟintum aṟiyāṉ pōṉṟu viṉātal)

It denotes the clincher due to ignorance arising out of the pretention of the disputant who has cognizant of the import of his opponent's argument which has been well understood by the participants and spectators in the assembly. Though the opponent has elucidated the contents of his argument lucidly, the disputant, due to his inability to refute the opponent's statement, gains time by way of raising unnecessary questions to clarify the already expounded argument. It reveals only his pretention of incomprehension of the opponent's argument. Thus his pretention betrays himself to the audience for rebuke.

16. Apratibhā (viṭai colla-t- teriyātu vēṟoru karuttu uṭaiyāṉ poṉṟiruttal)

It denotes the non-ingenuity or lack of brilliance of the disputant. When he is incapable of giving a fitting reply to the argument of his opponent, eventhough it has been explained thrice and understood by the audience, he is positioned in an embarrassing situation. His lack of ingenuity is seen when he pretends to be in constant meditation on God keeping silence and diverts the attention by telling the royal duty, reading some slokas, scanning his hair, seeing the sky, writing on the ground etc. Thus, his exhibition of non-ingenuity becomes a point of defeat for rebuke.

17. Vikeṣepa (Vātattai viṭṭu-p - piriton̲ran̲ai-c - colli-p-poḻutupōkkal)

According to the Nyāya Sūtra, this clincher of evasion arises if a participant in the debate stops an argument in the pretext of going away to attend some other important work.[28] It happens when the disputant has commenced his argument and he feels that it is impossible for him to prove his stand. Lastly he resorts to the technique of evasion from further argument, indulging in irrelevant talks. In order to while away the time, when he says that the scholars who are the judges have not come to the hall, the chair person of the assembly being the king has not come, the sound of horns proclaiming his arrival is not heard etc., then he is caught in a point of defeat.

If the disputant is not competent and well-versed in the subject, he should not enter the hall of debate. In Tirukkuṟaḷ, it is said that without erudition a person entering into the hall of debate is just like the gamble-play without having a stage.[29]

18. Matānujñā (Cupakkattukku-c- Colliya Kuṟṟattai-p- parikariyātu uṭampaṭṭu-p-parapakkattukku-k kuṟ ṟam pēcutal)

It denotes the clincher of the admission of an opinion. If the disputant is brought to the notice of the defect in his argument by his opponent, the former has to prove that there is no defect in his statement and then to proceed to prove that the statement of the latter alone is defective. Without following this procedure, if the disputant charges that the same defect is found in the opponent's argument, then he commits a serious blunder of accepting the defect in his own statement. Thus, the counter-charge of the disputant brings him disgrace and defeat in the debate.

Eg. If the disputant says addressing the opponent that he is a thief, then the latter without engaging to remove the charge against his own self, throws the same defect on the former. The counter-charge proves that the former is a thief and hence meets the point of defeat.

Though the example is found in Nyāya Sāstra and in the commentary of Sivagrayogin, the explanation given by Sivajnāna Swamigal has much relevance to the discussions with philosophical bearings. He introduces the technical terms Svapakṣa (cupakkam) and Parapakṣa (parapakkam) to denote respectively one's own side and the side of the opponent. Without vitiating the defects on Svapakṣa, pointed out by the opponent, the disputant knowingly and

unknowingly accepts them and advances them as counter-charge against the Parapakṣin. Since the text Sivajñāna Siddhiyar has two parts, the first of which Parapakṣa and the next Svapakṣa, the elucidation of Sivajñāna Swamigal carries much weight. In addition, it is essential to note that even in Parapakṣa of the same text, the substantiation of the tenets of the systems of opponents are presented, followed by the refutations from the view-point of the exponents of Saivasiddhānta. Even in the Svapakṣa of the text, the views and principles of Saiva Siddhānta are elaborately discussed on a comparative outlook, i.e. examining the views of the opponents in regard to the existence, nature and function of the triple realities viz., God, soul and matter and finally establishing the conclusion (siddhānta).

The word '*mata*' in the term Matānujñā denotes the doctrine of a particular philosophy. It is fascinating to note that the fourteen systems and sub-systems of Indian philosophy as presented in the Parapakṣa of Sivajnana Siddhiyar are known by the name "Matam".

19. Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa (Tōlvit-tāṉam eytiṉōṉai-t- tōlvittāṉam eytiṉāy eṉṟu aṟintu kūṟātiruttal)

It denotes the clincher of overlooking what is censurable in an argument. According to the principles of debate, it is just to express strong disapproval to a debater who argues in a way which provides an occasion for condemnation. If the defeat in his argument is transparent to the audience, then the opponent should come forward to consure him. If he does not do so, he is liable to be charged by the audience for his silence and negligence of duty. If the audience do not censure, then they are also liable for rebuke on account of their "overlooking the censurable".

In Tirukkuṟaḷ, it is said that it will end in disaster if one does what aught not to be done and also if one does not do what aught to be done.[30] This applies to the next clincher also. So, the maxim is applicable in this context. It is the commitment of the participants and audience to blame what is to be blamed in an argument. If it is not done, there is no use for conducting such debates.

20. Niranuyojyānuyoga (Tōlvi-t-tāṉam eytātāṉai eytiṉāy eṉṟu kūṟutal)

This clincher denotes the point of defeat arising on account of censuring a person who does not deserve any censure. It is really a discredit to the person who charges his opponent when the latter is free from any defect in his exposition.

The commentator uses the word '*parikācam paṉṉukai*' to mean censure. But it has a soft connotation meaning mockery. *Parikācam* is derived from Sanskrit "*pari-hāsa*" and it literally means a joke or burlesque. It is also used in the sense of derision and ridicule.

21. Apasiddhānta (Taṉ cittāntattiṟku iṇaṅkātavaṟṟai-c colli-c- cittāntam Cāttittal)

This denotes the point of defeat due to the deviation from one's tenet. It arises when the disputant after accepting a particular siddhānta, i.e. tenet goes back from it in the course of his argument and ultimately admits to a contrary tenet.

A person, who argues for the Sāṁkhya philosophy says:

1. What is existent never becomes non-existent and
2. What is non-existent never comes into existence etc.

The above argument contains the *Satkāryavāda* which is central to the Sāmkhya system.[31] However, the opponent who refutes it would argue thus:

"All human activity would be impossible if the thing now non-existent could not come into existence in the course of time, and no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever."

After listening to this argument, the disputant revises his original tenet of *Satkāryavāda* and subscribes to the *Asatkāryavāda*, expressed in the above statement of the opponent.

In the commentary of Sivagrayogin, the same idea has been presented in the following way.[32]

The exponent of Sāṁkhya argues thus:

Evolutes such as mahat etc., are emanated from the sole material cause prakriti, because they are seen to possess the same nature as prakriti, just like the pot which is produced out of clay is nothing but an evolute of clay, i.e. possessing the same nature of clay.

The opponent advances his rejoinder putting the following questions to the Sāṁkhya:

1. What is Prakriti?

2. What is its evolution?

To these questions if the Sāṁkhya replies thus:

1. That from which the unreal evolutes appear is Prakriti.
2. Those which have origination and destruction are the evolutes.

Naturally, his reply goes against his original *sat-kāryavāda*, lending him to espouse *asatkāryavāda* which is totally contrary to his siddhānta. Thus, he meets the point of defeat.

Sivagrayogin concludes that the exposition of the tenets of Saiva Siddhānta in the following twelve sutras is devoid of all fallacies and points of defeat. Since he has counted two kinds of *punarukta* viz., repetition of sound and repetition of meaning, he has left out the last *nigrahasthāna* i.e. hetvābhāsa. In this respect, he is followed by other commentators including Sivajñāna Swamigal with the only exception of Maṟaijñāna Deśikar.

22. Hetvābhāsa

The fallacy of reason is also treated as one among the clinchers of points of defeat. If the disputant employs the semblance of reason in his argument, it is certain that he will be defeated.

Maṟaijñāna Deśikar indicates that the defect in any of the members in the five-membered syllogism would result in hetvābhāsa which is to be avoided in an argument.[33]

According to the Nyāya, the points of defeat are innumerable. Out of them only twenty two which are very prominent have been enlisted and explicated.[34]

The exposition of Nigrahasthāna (*Tōlvi-t-tānam*) in Tattuvaprakāsam and its commentary is something individualistic and deserves a separate treatment.

Clinchers of defeat in Tattuvaprakāśam

According to the text, there are only eleven clinchers of defeat which occur equally in the arguments of both the disputant and opponent on the basis of the fourfold arguments, viz., *Vāda, Jalpa, Vitaṇḍā* and *Hetu*.[35] They become twenty two due to the two parties, engaging in the debate. They are the following:

1. Etirttu-t-tōṟṟal

This denotes the point of expousing defeat after accepting the opponent's argument.

Eg. If someone says that there is God (Siva), the opponent raises his objection stating that there is no God, since He is not perceptible. The disputant squarely accepts the statement and meets the point of defeat.

2. Tōlā-t-takai kēṭṭal

It denotes the point of defeat on account of accepting the opponent's view-point without giving a reply.

3. Taṉi-c-col Cārtal

It denotes the point of defeat of the person who gives a soft reply which does not sound well.

4. Coltavaṟutal

It indicates the point of defeat due to one's own erroneous statement.

5. Taṉ col cātiyātu Cāṟṟiṉēn ilai eṉṟal

Instead of establishing the sādhya taken by a person for argument, if he says that he has never said so, then his contradictory statement creates a situation for reproof.

6. Kalviyāl aḻital

It literally means the defeat on account of one's over education. It is akin to *adhika* that has been already discussed.

7. Uraiyāl aḻital

The commentator elucidates this point of defeat as the result of repeating a word four times. This may be taken as *punarukta*.

8. Col-utavātu aḻital

If one does not face the opponent's argument due to defective knowledge and inability to use apt words, then he is caught in the trap of defeat.

9. Uvamai paṭātu aḻital

If the example adduced by the disputant in his argument does not serve the purpose, he is liable to be defeated.

10. Ilicollāl alital

One should know what kinds of words are to be used in a debate. If one uses the derogatory and obscene words in his argument, he is to be condemned. On account of the usage of dirty words, he is censured by the assembly. Unparlimentary words are totally abhorred in a debate. Tolkāppiyar labelled such usages as "*avaiyal kiḷavi*"[36] i.e. unparliamentary words.

11. Mārriya Manattināl alital

If one alters his statement in the course of argument anticipating his defeat if he further continues in the same direction, then he is exposed by the opponent. Thus he is driven to the point of defeat on account of shame.

The list of the aforesaid elevenfold points of defeat are common to both the disputant and opponent and thus the total number comes to twenty two. It seems that the author and commentator of Tattuvaprakāsam hailed from a local tradition which attached much importance to the usage of words rather than techniques.

So far, a detailed account about the Nigrahasthānas as found in the texts and commentaries of Saiva Siddhānta has been presented. It reveals the fact that though the exponents of this system have developed their own doctrines governing any aspect of epistemology, they have closely observed the original ideas found in the Nyāya and Buddhist texts and suitably adapted them for the purpose of interpretation and elucidation of their own tenets.

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XVII. VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Western Epistemologists have finalised that correspondence and coherence are the two chief factors in the determination of the truth of knowledge. Correspondence indicates the relation between the subject-content and the concerned objective fact. If there is real identity between the two, then it is held to be valid and hence truth. A valid judgement, in the form of a subject and predicate relating the correspondence between the substance and objective fact, generates in the knower the awareness of the object of knowledge. Those, who have argued that coherence has been the criterion of truth, have stated that the truth of the judgement consists not in the correspondence but its coherence with other judgements. These logicians never required the existence of a world consisting of external objects to be represented through correspondence. They never accepted the concept of precept and image.

The criterion of truth by which the validity or invalidity of knowledge has been exhaustively discussed by the Indian Epistemologists. According to them, there are two distinct doctrines by which the validity or invalidity of cognitions is ascertained. They are known as Parataḥ prāmaṇya and Svataḥ prāmaṇya. They are also respectively called Paratastva vāda and Svatastva vāda especially in the system of Bhatta Mimāmsa. Parataḥ prāmaṇya denotes that truth or falsehood is an extrinsic character of knowledge, since it is cognised through some external tests. The advocates of this doctrine upheld that either truth or falsehood is ascertained not intrinsically but extrinsically with the instruments of extraneous factors. On the other hand, Svataḥ prāmaṇya indicates that the validity of knowledge or its invalidity is purely intrinsic and does not require any external factors for its certitude.

Among the various systems of Indian philosophy, the Naiyāyikas have expounded that validity and invalidity of knowledge are ascertained by extraneous conditions and hence they subscribed to the view of Parataḥ prāmaṇya. The Sāṁkhyas hold a diametrically opposite view. According to them, both truth and falsehood are inherent in the cognition itself. They are intrinsic and self-evident. So, they advocated the doctrine of Svātaḥ prāmaṇya. The Mimāmsakas shared with the Sāmkhyas when they accepted that validity of knowledge was intrinsic (svātaḥ). They also go with the Naiyāyikas when they admitted that invalidity of knowledge is ascertained

through some extrinsic means (paratah). The Buddhists upheld a contrary view to the Mimāmsakas. They argued that valid cognition is determined by extraneous factors (paratah) and invalid cognition is self-evident and intrinsic (svātah). These particulars of the position of various systems with regard to the validity and invalidity of knowledge are beautifully presented by Mādhava in his Sarva darśana Saṁgraha in the section dealing with Jaimini darśana.[1]

Though the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta accepted the theory of Svātah prāmanya, their interpretation considerably varies from others. Let us consider the different views with regard to the validity of pramānas from the stand point of Saiva Siddhāntin.

1. The Buddhist view

The Buddhists stressed on the experiment of practical efficiency (arthakriyākāritva) to establish the concept of extrinsic validity of knowledge. The object which is given to our perception is definite and the cognition of it becomes valid. Nevertheless, an imaginary or fictitious object is neither definite nor valid. Since any imaginary thing does not fullfil our practical purpose, it does not stand the test of practical efficiency and hence the knowledge of it is invalid intrinsically. Therefore, validity and invalidity of knowledge respectively depend upon the practical efficiency and its absence.

Saiva Siddhāntin criticises the Buddhist view exposing the folly of the standard of valid knowledge, being the practical efficiency, which is spoiled due to the defect of non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) with regard to inferences whose contents belong to the past or future. Sivagrayogin quotes an example: "There is inundation in the river due to previous heavy rain in the hills". In this instance, one sees the flood and not the past rainfall. There is artha (flood) and not kriyā (rainfall). There is pervasion between the cause and effect, not to be tested by the standard of practical efficiency. Similarly, the commentator adduces the defect of over-pervasion (*-ativyāpti*) stating that practical efficiency is workable even in memory cognition (*smṛtijñāna*) and determinate perception (*savikalpa jñāna*) both of which were not accepted by the Buddhist.[2] Next, the view of the Mimāmṣakas may be reviewed.

2. The Mimāmsaka view

Since the Mimāmsakas believed in the eternality and self-existence of the Vedas, they advocated the theory of svātah prāmānyam i.e. the doctrine that cognitions are intrinsically valid.

The validity of knowledge is ascertained from itself and nothing from extraneous factors. They held that cognition, which has been generated from something else and which undergoes changes through the passage of time, is alone false. According to them, the validity of scriptural authority can not be either questioned or set aside. Nevertheless, they argued that invalidity of knowledge is extrinsically ascertained.

In this context, it is pertinent to note that the Prabhākara school of Mimāmsa system held a slightly different view. They gave importance to experience (*anubhūti*) in the determination of valid knowledge. *Anubhūti* is different from *smṛti* (memory). Memory or remembrance is one type of cognition which is produced by the impressions of past cognitions. Hence in this kind of cognition, the validity is tested by some extraneous evidences as against the other Mimāmsaka doctrine of intrinsic or self-evidence.

However, the Saiva Siddhāntin carefully examined the view of the Mimāmsakas and exposed the defect in their arguments. The knowledge of the sense of Vedic scriptures arises due to the remembrance of the meaning of Vedic words. So, cognition of Vedic texts is not intrinsic but extrinsic. Further memory cognition excludes the nature of anubhūti i.e. experience. Their view, that experience alone constitutes valid knowledge, is not acceptable.

According to Jayanta, the author of Nyāyamañjari, the intrinsic validity of knowledge as held by the Mimāmsakas is untenable on various grounds.[3] They argued that the validity of a judgement could not be ascertained afterwards, because the judgement lasted only for two moments and when it stops to exist at the second moment, it can not be determined extrinsically. Jayanta has pointed out that they accepted that the invalidity of a judgement was extrinsically ascertained. He questions that if the invalid or false statement is impermanent, on what basis they determine it? If they say that they determine the invalidity on the support of remembrance which is purely extrinsic, then Jayanta argues that the same external evidence is equally suitable in the determination of the validity of a true judgement also.

Thus, the intrinsic validity of knowledge as admitted in the system of Mimāmsakas has been refuted both by the Saiva Siddhāntin and Naiyāyika. Next, the view of the Sāmkhyas may be examined.

3. The Sāmkhya view

The Sāṁkhyas advocated the doctrine of Svātaḥ prāmaṇya for both the validity and invalidity of pramāṇas. According to them, the validity and invalidity are inherent in cognition. The cognition takes place due to the reflection of consciousness in the buddhi tattva (i.e. the principle of intellect), when the Purusha tattva is a passive spectator. Valid cognition results when the intellect grasps the things in their true forms, and invalid knowledge occurs due to cognising them erroneously. The Sāmkhyas held that both validity and invalidity are not external aspects but exist in knowledge always in a subtle form. When causes and conditions are ripe they come out from the intrinsic state.

However, the exponent of Saiva Siddhānta does not admit the Sāmkhya theory of Svātaḥ prāmaṇyam. Opposite characteristics can not constitute the property of a thing. Hence validity and invalidity can not be inherently coexist in knowledge. Since the causal conditions that generate cognition did not reveal simultaneously both validity and invalidity that are considered to be intrinsic and self-evident, their view is untenable. Further, if the factors that generate cognition reveal either the validity or the invalidity which is innate and the remaining one-which may be either validity or invalidity, is exposed by different group of factors, then it goes without saying that the Sāmkhyas have knowingly or unknowingly accepted the extrinsic evidences as against their original view point.[4]

Next, the view of the Naiyāyikas has been criticised.

4. The Naiyāyika view

The Naiyāyikas are the advocates of Parataḥ Prāmaṇya both for *pramāṇas* and *apramāṇas*, i.e. validity and invalidity of cognition. According to them, the sense-object contact generates cognition. If the ideas have regular correspondence with their due external objects, valid cognition takes place. If they do not agree with the objects, then invalid cognition results. Since the validity and invalidity of cognitions are determined purely by external factors, their theory is known as Parataḥ prāmāṇyam.

Saiva Siddhāntin examines carefully the view of the Naiyāyikas. Sivagrayogin argues that when a cognition is not valid, then the invalidity itself is understood only through some other cognition which is extrinsic. So far as invalidity of knowledge is concerned, there is no difference between the two systems. With

regard to the validity of knowledge, Saiva Siddhāntin does not agree to the doctrine of Parataḥ prāmaṇya of the Naiyāyikas, since knowledge and knower are inseparable and hence knowledge should be intrinsic.[5]

Further, Sivagrayogin has used the word 'Parataḥ' also in the sense of autonomous, separate, distinct, individual etc. In his commentary, he makes a reference to the Naiyāyikas, Prabhākara and Kumarilabhatta who have respectively admitted upamāna, arthāpathi and abhāva as Parataḥ pramāṇas viz., autonomous sources of knowledge.[6] Similarly he refers to the Paurāṇikas who included Pāriśeṣa, Sambhava, Aitihya and Svabhāvalinga as Parataḥ pramāṇas.[7] His attempt to subsume all the pramāṇas under the first three viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony has been elucidated elsewhere in this volume. However, he has emphatically stated that all the pramāṇas are intrinsic in nature. He calls them Svataḥ pramāṇas[8] which ultimately go to denote atman's cit-śakti.

Let us briefly present the view of Saiva Siddhāntin with regard to the theory of self-validity of knowledge.

5. The Saiva Siddhantin's view

According to Pauṣkara Āgama, one of the primary sources for Sivajñana Siddhiyar, Sivaneṟiprakāśam and other Tamil texts, there is fourfold classification concerning the factors of cognition. The knower or *pramātā* is the soul (*ātman*). The object or *prameya* is the thing to be cognized by the subject, i.e. soul. The instrument of knowledge i.e. *pramāṇa* is the intelligence-energy i.e. *cit-śakti*. The obtained valid experimental knowledge is known as *pramiti*. These four are distinct, though they are inter-related.

Saiva Siddhānta considers that perception, inference and verbal testimony are only *Vyañjakas* or manifestators of knowledge for the ātman's cit-śakti. They illumine things (*-prameyas*) and serve as auxiliaries to the intelligence-energy of the soul, just like the lamp-lights illumine the objects for cognition.

In the system of Nyāya, a particular object can be a *pramāṇa* in a given context and also a *prameya* in a different situation. Vātsyāyana, the Bhāṣyakāra of Nyāyasūtra has indicated that the principle of intellect (*-buddhi tattva*) becomes a *pramāṇa* when it functions as an instrument to cognize an object and also turns to be a *prameya* when it becomes the object of cognition, or its accuracy is

examined.[9] But, it is not so with the Saiva Siddhāntins. To them, the internal organs (*antakaraṇas*) like buddhi and the external sense organs (*indriyas*) like eye, ear etc., are not *pramāṇas*, since the demerits (*dosha*) of *avyāpti* (non-pervasion) and *asambhava* (inapplicability) are noticed in them. The sense organ eye can not be a source of knowledge, since due to non-pervasion it can not cognize either smell or sound. For the other organs also, similar defects are found. Further, these sense organs are the evolutes of Primordial Matter, called Maya which is a reality as held in Saiva Siddhānta. They are inert and hence can not function without the stimulation of ātman's cit-śakti. Even, the internal organ i.e. buddhi, the principle of intellect is a finer product of matter and hence it can not cognize all by itself. When the buddhi tattva undergoes the psychosis in the form of pleasure and pain, it becomes an object (*-prameya*) for the cit-śakti of the soul which alone has been considered to be the valid pramāṇa. Further, it should be noted that a pramāṇa should be characterised by intelligence. Since the internal as well as external organs are inert and function only through the influence of ātman's cit-śakti, treating them as pramāṇas is a case of inapplicability (*asambhava*).

In the embodied state (i.e. *baddha-kāla*), the threefold pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony are the manifestors (*-vyañjakas*) of knowledge to *the ātman's ćit-śakti which is the sole pramāṇa. These three sources of knowledge are called pramāṇas only in a figurative and derivative sense. The knowledge, that they generate, is only material knowledge which is technically called Pāśajñāna in Saiva Siddhanta.*

However, at the state of release (*mukti kāla*), the manifestor of knowledge to the perfected soul is the Divine Grace which has been glorified as "Sivajñāna", the Absolute knowledge, i.e. the Cit-śakti of Śiva. It is only through the Eye of Divine Grace, the perfected soul is able to know its own nature, the nature of all objects and the intrinsic nature of the Absolute. It should not be misunderstood that Śiva is extrinsic. He is described in the Tamil devotional classics (600-700 A.D.) as "*uyirkku uyirāy*" which means that He is the Soul of all souls.[10] He is at once both immanent and also transcendent. He is one with the soul and along with it, though due to other characteristics,[11] He is different from the category of souls. Jnāna is associated with Śiva and also Jīva. But there is a difference. The knowledge of soul is restricted and constricted due to the defilement of *āṇava*, the principle of ego. Since the Absolute is untouched by

the matter including āṇava, He is by nature free from all defects and is characterised by Absolute knowledge. There is possibility for the soul to abandon the defilement and to get purified to imbibe the nature of Śiva.

When the power of ego in soul is exterminated through the means of release which include ethical preparation, devotion, meditation and divine wisdom, then the recovery of soul is made possible. In this state of release, the soul's intelligence is illumined by the immanent Divine power known as Cit-śakti of Śiva also known as Śivajñāna. As and when conditions matured, the presence of Śivajnana along with the ātman's Cit-śakti is realised. Sivagrayogin on the authority of Pauṣkara Āgama ascertains that in the ultimate analysis, *the sole pramāṇa is Śivajñāna.*[12] It seems to contradict with the previous concept that ātman's cit-śakti alone is the only pramana. However in the light of Saiva Siddhanta texts, he reconciles the apparent contradiction and has established that *the sole pramāṇa is Śivajñāna also known as Patijñāna.*[13]

The brilliance of Sun that illumines the sphaṭika (prism) presents different colours. But at noon, it dispels the manyfold colours and imparts its own luminosity in the crystal. So also, Sivajñāṇa illumines the ātman's Cit-śakti to cognize the material objects known as *pāśa* at its embodied state. In its state of release, the same Divine wisdom reveals the Absolute.[14]

Since ātman's cit-śakti which is present in the three pramāṇas cognizing the wordly objects can not cognize Śiva, it is subject to the defect of *avyāpti* (-non-pervasion). Since Śivajñāna helps the Cit-śakti of the soul not only in the cognition of material objects but also the Absolute, it is clear that Siva is not a prameya for *jīva* cit-śakti. Further, Śiva is not a *meya* but *māna,* and hence the defect of over-pervasion (-ativyāpti) occurs. The defect of *asambhava* (inapplicability) also results in it, since it can not cognize Śiva all by itself, i.e. without the help of Śivajñāna.

Though the soul is citrūpa of eternal and pervading characteristics, it can not cognize either Śiva or Matter (*pāśa*), if its *mala* is not wiped out and illumination is not generated by Śivajñāna. As the ātman's cit-śakti is subject to the triple defects of non-pervasion, over pervasion and inapplicability, Sivagrayogin concludes that *the Cit-śakti of Śiva is the sole pramāṇa for the soul, both in its embodied and free states. It is only through the help of*

Śivajñāna, the ātma cit-śakti is freed from doubt, error and remembrance and also from the three defects of non-pervasion, over-pervasion and inapplicability. Thus it attains divine wisdom. It imbibes the nature of Śiva. Even then, soul is soul and God is God. The attainment of Śivatva enables the soul to enjoy and immerse in the Śivabhoga.[15]

The exponents of Saiva Siddhānta elucidate that there are two aspects governing the pramāṇa viz., 1. Pramāṇa that helps and 2. Pramāṇa that is helped. The former indicates Siva's cit-śakti and the latter denotes the jīva cit-śakti. Since the first one is inherent in the second one, the self-validity of cognition (svataḥ prāmaṇyam) is established in the Epistemology of Saiva Siddhānta.[16]

In the formation of the theory of truth, the Siddhāntins have paid much attention on two aspects, viz., inclusiveness and harmony. Their catholicity of outlook consists in admitting all the systems and schools of Indian philosophy in a hierarchical order which are conveniently classified into four groups each of which comprising six systems. The first group, being the outer most (*-puṟa-p-puṟam*) consists of Lokāyata, the four sects of Buddhism, i.e. Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Mādhyamika, Vaibhāṣika and Jainism. The second group is the outer (*puṟam*) consisting of the six systems of Indian philosophy, viz., Pūrva Mīmāmsa, Sāṁkhya, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Uttara Mīmāmsa. In the third group which is called *akapparam* (inner-outer), Pāsupata, Mahāvṛata, Kāpālika, Vāma, Bhairava and Aikyavāda are subsumed. Though these sects accepted Lord Śiva, the Supreme Reality on the basis of some principles, they vary from one another. The fourth group, known as *akam* i.e. "inner" consists of six sects of Saivism differing on some vital issues.

However, the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta have accorded due place to all these systems and schools in the realm of thought and go a step further to deliver the final conclusion, which gets the name Siddhānta with regard to the existence and nature of the Absolute God, Souls and Matter on the one hand and the means of release on the other.

The next criterion, i.e. harmony in the identification of truth is well expounded in the system of Saiva Siddhānta. There are various levels and grades among the people. In order to meet their requirements, the specific graded codes of ethics and spiritual means

are prescribed. If one goes through the hagiology of the Saiva Saints as narrated in Periyapurāṇam (1150 A.D.), he will easily be convinced that Lord Śiva showered mercy on the different cadres of devotees, according to the standard of their accumulated merits.

In Tirumantiram the story of blind men searching for the real elephant has been beautifully narrated.[17] Each one of them touched a part of the elephant, claimed it to be the whole. But the truth consists in taking all the parts to constitute the whole. It is essential to note that the same story is also found in the Jain scriptures.[18]

Therefore it is clear that in the identification of truth, inclusiveness and harmony have been taken as proper principles by the Siddhāntins.

Doubtful Cognition

Doubtful and Erroneous cognitions are generally considered to be forms of invalid perception. Among them, doubtful cognition is known as *samśaya* in Sanskrit and "*aiyam*" in Tamil. Not only epistemologists but the authors on poetics and grammar have also dealt with this type of cognition vividly. Before directly proceeding to discuss its epistemological aspects, it is not out of place to briefly present its role in the sphere of poetics and grammar as preserved in Tolkāppiyam (500 B.C.), the earliest extant Tamil treatise.

Tolkāppiyar has detailed out the pre-marital and post-marital life of the Tamils in the third book of Tolkāppiyam which provides the substance for poetics and prosody. The premartial stage is known by the technical term *kaṭavu* i.e. the clandestine love-affair. The first scene commences thus: An accomplished youth meets a beautiful girl in a grove and falls in love with her. This first meeting is called "*kāṭci*", literally meaning perception. (-This word in the later period actually meant pratyakṣa pramāṇa in Tamil classics). On seeing the damsel, the hero doubts whether she is a celestial, a peacock or a pretty girl, bedecked with ornaments. The doubt arises due to the rarity of the arresting beauty, being the characteristic feature of the heavenly damsel and delightful nature of the peacock, shared by the damsel. This kind of doubting is technically known as "*aiyam*" or doubtful perception.[19] In his emotional and aesthetic mood, the hero has been imaginative and fanciful, leading him to doubtful cognition. In the next stage of cognitive process, he applies his mind and properly perceives that she is neither a celestial nor a peacock but an earthly girl, on account of the peculiar and precious ornaments

adorning her personality. This aspect of decision is called "*ārayntu teḷital*" i.e. ascertainment after due deliberation.

Though this account of doubtful cognition has no direct bearing with proper epistemology, it furnishes the basic requirements for *saṁśaya* which is the prior condition to determinate perception envisaged by the Indian logicians. In the Tamil classics and even in the rhetorical treatises, copious illustrations for such forms of doubtful cognitions are very many.

In the opening portion of the second book of Tolkappiyam which descriptively deals with syntax and morphology of the classical Tamil, there are clear references to doubtful cognition. On the basis of empirical usages and literary occurrences, Tolkāppiyar has legislated some specific syntactical rules for the sentence forms, governing the expression of doubtful cognitions. In this context, *it is essential to note that such expressions are certainly older than the Nyāya traditions*, preserved in Akṣapāda's Nyāya Sūtra and its early commentaries of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. The doubtful expression is technically called "*aiya-k-kiḷavi*", i.e. samśaya-vākya in Tolkāppiyam. According to the grammatical tradition of Tolkāppiyam, there are at least three forms of doubtful expression.[20] They are based on gender, number and *tiṇai* (category). In the Tamil grammatical system, the words are classified into two major divisions, viz., uyartiṇai (-superior category) and akṟiṇai (-inferior category). Uyar tiṇai includes all human beings which are classified into masculine, femine and epicene plural, while Akṟiṇai includes things other than human beings. Again, it denotes neuter singular and plural. It is essentiall to note that in the Sanskrit texts, this kind of tiṇai cum gender-number classificaiton is not found. According to Subramanya Dikshitar, the author of *Prayoga Vivekam* and Sivajñāna Swamigal, it is pecular only to the Tamil grammatical tradition. Since the doubtful cognition is concerned with these gender, number and tiṇai classifications their number is also three-fold. Let us present them serially as illustrated in the commentaries of Tolkāppiyam.

1. Doubtful gender

On seeing a person at a remote place, one doubts whether the person is a male or female. Then the expression of doubtful gender should be as follows:[21]

"*āṇ makaṉ kollō peṇṭātti kollō iḵtō tōṉṟuvār?*" or,

"*āṇ makaṉ kollō peṇṭāṭṭi kollō tōṉṟā niṉṟa urupu?*"

In the first expression, the finite verb is in the epicene plural "*tōṉṟuvār*" (-those who appear) which is common to both the genders, viz., masculine and feminine. The doubt is expressed by the word "*kollō*". Āṇmakaṉ denotes a male, while *peṇṭāṭṭi* denotes a female. In the second expression, the epicene plural verb is replaced by the noun phrase "*tōṉṟā niṉṟa urupu*" (i.e. the form that appears).

Thus, Tolkāppiyar prescribed the proper ending or a predicate in the syntactical structure of doubtful gender cognition.

2. Doubtful number

On seeing the devastation of paddy plants, one doubts whether one or many cows entered the fields. This kind of doubt arises in the absence of the cow or cows, only on noticing the foot prints of the animal. Then the doubtful number cognition should be expressed thus:[22]

> "*oṉṟu kollō pala kollō cey pukka peṟṟam?*" *or,*
>
> "*oṉṟu kollō pala kollō cey pukka urupu?*"

In the first expression of doubtful cognition, the words *oṉ ṟu* and *pala* respectively denote one and many. '*Cey*' means paddy field. *Pukka* is a relative participle meaning 'that which entered' governing the noun '*peṟṟam*' which means either a cow or an ox. In the second expression, the word *peṟṟam* is replaced by the word '*urupu*' which means 'form' (rūpa). The doubtful cognition is generated by the presence of the animal's foot prints. The man who notices them is not in a position to ascertain the number of animals that caused damage to the paddy.

3. Doubtful Tiṇai-category

If there is a vascilation in the mind and sight of a man on seeing a distant object which shares common features of a pillar and person, then the doubtful expression should be as follows.[23]

> "kuṟṟi kollō makaṉ kollō tōṉṟā niṉṟa urupu?"

The word "*kuṟṟi*" denotes a post or a pillar and *makaṉ* any person. So, the doubt is in regard to the yonder object which belongs either to superior category (uyar tiṇai) or inferior category (akṟiṇai). This kind of illustration is also available in the Naiyāyika treatises and commentaries both in Sanskrit and in Tamil. It is essential to note that all types of expressions of doubtful cognition should be in the interrogative structure.

Thus, we have seen the Tamil tradition associating with *samśaya jñāna* as preserved in the poetical and grammatical portions of Tolkāppiyam. Now let us proceed to discuss the same as revealed in the epistomological sections of Tamil philosophical classics and their commentaries.

It is interesting to note that Sivajñāna Swamigal has not considered doubtful cognition either under valid perception or invalid cognition, for it is not at all a definite cognition. It lays between the indeterminate cognition and determinate knowledge.

In the Saiva texts

Arulnandisivam defines doubtful cognition consists in thinking the seen object in two ways.[24] Sivagrayogin elucidates this statement in his own way. According to him, doubtful cognition arises on two factors:

1. Common mark shared by two ojects and
2. Essential feature (dharma), found between two objects.

He illustrates them in the following way:[25]

In the dim and dismal evening one sees at a distance the forest-cow and doubts whether is it a forest-cow (gavaya) or domestic cow. Actually, the two animals belong to the same genus having common characteristics which constitute the ground for doubting. Due to remoteness and dimness, one can not identify and ascertain that it is the forest-cow.

In the next example the king and his close administrative officer donned on the royal robe stand at a distant place. On seeing them, one doubts who is the king and who is the officer. In the first example there is only one object i.e. gavaya. But here there are two objects, generating doubt in the onlooker's consciousness due to their similarity of personality. Sivagrayogin has reproduced the same definition and illustration in his treatise, Sivaneṟiprakāśam.[26] He follows Pauṣkara Āgama closely in the elucidation of doubtful cognition.[27]

Pandiperumal has given the traditional illustration with a difference: "Is the form a post that appears (yonder)".[28] Here, the alternative object is not presented. The doubt persists in taking the form as a post, even though a definite decision is not made. It is not a conclusive statement, since the actual and real character of the object is not grasped and ascertained.

According to Sivajñāna Swamigal, the ātman's jnāna śakti, after cognising the object in an indeterminate manner (*nirvikalpaka*) without passing any judgement, is called doubtful cognition (*-aiya-k-kāṭci*).[29] He did not accept the Naiyāyika view that the past impressions of memory are operative in the perceived object through doubtful perception.

The author of Tattuvaprakāśam included doubt as one of the seven forms of perception. The remaining six are: error, indetermination, sensuous perception, mental perception, svavedana perception, and yogic cognition. Among them, the last four types are valid perception, while the first three are the antecedants.[30] The commentator of this text quoted the stock example:

"Is the form that appears yonder a post or pillar?" However, doubtful cognition has been included in the list of eight-fold fallacies of pramāṇas as noticed in the system of Nyāya, preserved in the Buddhist epic Maṇimēkalai.[31]

Among the other examples, doubting between shell and silver, rope and snake, smoke and vapour, sand and sugar etc. is also mentioned in the Tamil classics. In the first pair of objects, the shining aspect forms the common feature for doubting. In the second pair, coiling is common which makes the person to doubt. Steam-like property is the general character between smoke and vapour and whiteness in the last pair of sand and sugar.

After a close study, it becomes evident that doubtful cognition is neither true nor false. It is really in the preliminary and preparatory stage in the process of valid perception. Actually the perceiver has crossed the stage of indeterminate perception, moving towards valid perception. If he is able to ascertain the specific attributes and properties of the concerned object without wavering and oscilation, he becomes determinate in his cognition.

It is to be noted that *samśaya* is not a false perception as held by Sivagrayogin. It becomes false only if it leads to erroneous cognition (*-viparyāya jñāna*). Perhaps, the commentator should have considered only such doubts, being antecedent to erroneous perception, to be false.

Nevertheless, in the system of Nyāya doubtful cognition has been defined by Akṣapāda to be a conflicting judgement on the specific property of an object.[32] Vātsyāyana, the commentator of

Nyāya Sūtra has classified all the doubtful cognitions into five types. They are briefly given below:[33]

1. Doubt arising out of the common characters of many things. The illustration is the stock example: In the dim light one sees a tall object and doubts it either a man or a post, since tallness and uprightness being the feature of the two.

2. Doubt generating from the apprehension of a unique and specific quality. It has been illustrated. On cognizing the sound, one doubts whether it is eternal or non-eternal since it is not identified either in eternal objects like ātman or temporal things like water.

3. Doubt arising due to conflicting views. On studying various systems, one has to doubt about the existence of soul, since some systems advocate its existence as an eternal entity, while other systems like Buddhism totally reject its reality.

4. Doubt germinating due to the irregularity of perception. Doubt arises whether water is perceived in a tank where it actually exists or also in a mirage where its appearance and not actual presence is noticed.

5. Doubt arising from the irregularity of non-perception. It has been exemplified. The water actually existing in the roots, vegetables like water melon, pumpkin etc., and also in some fruits like orange etc., is not perceived. So also it is not seen in the dry land where it does not exist. The doubt arises whether water is not cognized where it does not exist or also where it exists.

Among the aforesaid five kinds of doubt, the first one is accepted by all. The next two types, concerning the eternality of sound and existence of soul exhibit different views in the various systems. They do not come under a general classification. The last two kinds are based on *bhāva* and *abhāva* of substance. It is pertinent to note that even among the Naiyāyikas, there is no uniformity of opinion with regard to the types of doubtful cognition. However Praśastapāda, the commentator of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, has emphatically stated that there is only one type of doubtful cognition which arises out of the common characters, shared by two or more objects.[34] Saiva siddhānta also endorses the same view.

Next, let us proceed to deal with the erroneous cognition which is called "*tiripu*" in Tamil and *viparyāya* in Sanskrit.

Erroneous cognition

Each system has developed its own theory of error in order to arrive at a correct theory of truth. The main theories are: 1. Sat khyāti, 2. Asat khyāti, 3. Anirvacanīya khāyti and 4. Anyathā khyāti. Each of them may be briefly explained. The word "*khyāti*" literally means apprehension or cognition. The prefix to the word such as *sat, asat* etc., indicates the nature of apprehension.

I. Sat khyāti

The advocates of this theory argue that erroneous perception takes place due to the manifestation of a real object in the form of a similar object. It is the sat or real which is perceived erroneously. The error occurs due to the identification of a real object in the form of different object which shares common features with it.[35] *Sat khyāti* has some sub-members among which *ātma khyāti, akhyāti* and *anyathā khyāti* are the most significant.

a. Ātma khyāti

The theory of *ātma khyāti* has been advocated by the Yogācāra school of Buddhism.[36] The Yogācāras are idealists who accepted that the ideas are the only reality. The external objects owe their existence to the internal ideas. Since the Yogācāras admitted *vijñāna*, the substrate for ideas to be the only *sat* (real), they are also called *Vijñāna vādins*. They held that erroneous cognition occurs in the improper process of projecting the internal ideas as external objects. The external world has no reality, since it is the conglomeration of cognitions which are the results of *vijñāna* (-consciousness) and under constant flux. In short, the advocates of *Ātma khyāti* maintained that the supposed objective world is only the subjective self i.e. *Ātma* which indicates not the soul but the consciousness, the storehouse of ideas. In this context, it is to be mentioned that since the Buddhists of all branches are *anātmavādins*, the word in *ātma khyāti* should be taken to mean consciousness and not the soul, as understood in other systems.

However, the view of *sat khyāti vādins* is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas as well as the exponents of Saiva Siddhānta. It has been criticised by these realists who find correspondence between ideas and objects which are equally real. The Naiyāyikas have pointed out

the folly of the theory by stating that if there is no difference between the knowing subject and the known object instead of saying 'this is silver', one should say 'I am silver'. Even the idealists never used to say this and hence their theory is illegitimate and improper. The Saiva Siddhāntins opined that the object of cognition was different from cognition. According to them, an extra-mental reality is not proved either by perception or by inference.

b. Akhyāti

The theory of *akhyāti* was advanced by the Prabhākara school of Mimāmsakas. It is the theory of non-apprehension.[37] According to this theory, an erroneous cognition indicates a positive misapprehension, resulting due to the absence of discrimination between two objects, having common properties. One sees silver in a shell. The shell and silver are characterised by lustre. Because of the common feature i.e. lustre, which generated in the person of defective senses, the remembrance of silver as has been perceived by him already, he mistakes the shell for silver. The commentator of Sivaneṟipprakāśam beautifully explains this type of erroneous cognition.[38] The person sees only the shining part, being the common aspect of both the shell and silver, fails to perceive the underlying black triangular part of the shell. Hence, he erroneously perceives silver in the shell. In this type of faulty cognition not only the common shining character but also some specific feature of silver is simultaneously seen, due to defective sight.

c. Anyathākhyāti

Anyathā khyāti is advocated by the Naiyāyikas and also by Saiva Siddhāntins. The word *anyathā* means 'other'. If an object is apprehended as '*anyathā*' other than what it really is, then such apprehension may be said to be *anyathā khyāti*. Again, the shell-silver cognition is given to illustrate this kind of erroneous perception. In front of the percipient, the shell exists. But he perceives other object i.e. silver in the shell, because the lustre of the shell and that of the silver are identical. The commonality of the two objects excites in the percipient's mind the residual impressions (*vāsana*) of silver. Due to the revival of these impressions arises the cognition of silver, just like the cognition of the features of an object leads to the apprehension of the object which is intimately associated with its features. As far as the shell is concerned, there is sense-object contact. Only the shell is given to the sense perception. But, in the case of silver it is not given for presentative cognition. It is

actually an object of knowledge of the soul, associated with the impressions of the mind and senses. As far as the Saiva Siddhāntin is concerned, both the shell and silver are reals which are presented to the self. However, the shell exists before the percipient's eye, while the silver exists elsewhere. The difficulty in the shell-silver perception is sublated, if the two objects are apprehended one by one. The substrate i.e. shell and the super-imposed i.e. silver can be perceived independently in their own form. On account of the relation of identity between the sublated and sublator on some occasions, one of them is taken for other (*anyathā*) and hence this kind of erroneous cognition is called *anyathā khyāti*.[39]

In the Saiva Texts

In this context, it is proper to present the view of the Saiva Siddhāntins who subscribed to the theory of anyathā khyāti. Arulnandisivam briefly but beautifully defines that erroneous perception (*-tiripu*) denotes the assumption of a thing differently (*anyathā*).[40] Sivagrayogin produces examples to elucidate erroneous perception. According to him, it consists in seeing a cow in a gavaya and a king in a royal officer. Further, he includes memory (*smṛti*), arising out of the impressions of previous experiences, under the division of erroneous perception. His example to the error of memory is as follows:[41]

> "For a lusty man, the visual image of his lusty
> woman is presented before him out of his memory".

It is certain from the commentary that Sivagrayogin holds that error and memory are fallacies of perception. He follows closely the Naiyāyikas in identifying them in the list of *pratyakṣa ābhāsas*.

Pandiperumal interprets that erroneous perception indicates the grasping of an object different (anyathā) from the true. He gives a fresh illustration:[42] If one assumes that the world is self-created and involves in Śiva, then that kind of assumption falls under erroneous perception, for the advocates of Saiva Siddhanta upheld that the world is created from the Primordial Matter through the agency of the efficient cause Lord Śiva and His inseparable auxiliary cause Śakti, and during the time of involution, the world resolves in its material cause i.e. Primordial Matter and not in Śiva directly.

According to Sivajñāna Swamigal, the *jñāna śakti* of the ātman ascertains due to confusion, a different (*anyathā*) thing that has

semblance to the real object.[43] The stock example is the apprehension of a snake in the rope, silver in the shell, sugar in the sand etc.

Tattuvaprakāśam simply states that confusion is error.[44] The commentator of this text illustrates that seeing a person in a pillar is erroneous perception.[45]

Sivaneṟiprakāśam defines that seeing one thing and taking it for a different but similar thing constituted error.[46] The commentator explains that because the special feature of the object is not seen, one object is misunderstood for another (*anyathā*). It is also called *bhrāntijñāna*. This wrong perception is also known as *viparíyāya*.[47] He gives the traditional example that on seeing only the shiny part of the shell i.e. nacre, without knowing the underlying black triangular portion of the same shell, one erroneously apprehends it to be silver. The same example is at least as old as Maṇimēkalai where it is cited as an illustration to error which has been included in the list of eightfold *pramāṇābhāsas*, as held by the Naiyāyikas.[48] The same text has also noted one more type of erroneous perception which is called "*terātu teḷital*" i.e. ascertainment without investigation. The example to this defective cognition is as follows: On seeing the post in an open field, meant for horse-riding, one mistakes it for a person, i.e. horse-rider.[49]

The error of perception occurs due to the defect in the contact between the sense-organ and object. The defect may be either in the organ or sometimes in the object. Prior to the erroneous perception, doubtful cognition takes place. If the latter leads to determinate perception, then it becomes valid as we have already noted. On the contrary, if it ends in false apprehension, then it becomes erroneous perception (*-tirup-k-kāṭci*) to be subsumed under non-valid perception.

So, it is evident that the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta adopted the theory of error known as *anyathā khyāti*. In this respect, they stand very close to the advocates of Nyāya system.

Next, let us proceed to deal with the doctrine of *asat khyāti*.

II. Asat khyāti

Unlike the Yogācāra Buddhism which admitted the theory of Ātma khyāti, Mādhyamika Buddhism advocated the theory of Asat khyāti.[50] According to this theory the non-existent (*asat*) becomes the object of erroneous judgement. Error occurs due to the misapprehension of the non-real (*asat*) as real. It is the apprehension of

non-being (*asat*). The Mādhyamikas held that nothing in this empirical world is real. They contemplated that void (*śūnya*) is the ultimate reality which is devoid of any quality. Since they preached the theory of voidness (*śūnyatā*) of all existence, they were called *śūnyavādins*, i.e. nihilists and their doctrine, *śūnyavāda* (nihilism). The real nature of things is called *Śūnyatā* which is indeterminable, transcending all limits of knowledge. Śūnyatā or voidness is entirely different from 1. Reality, 2. Unreality, 3. Both reality and unreality and 4. Neither reality nor non-reality. So it is called indefinable.

There is a difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins, who are also called Yogācāras, in regard to the theory of error. The latter contended that in error the internal impressions of mind appear to be the external objects. But, the former hold that the classification of internal and external itself is absurd, since there is no such thing to be characterised as such. The underlying principle of every thing is mere *śūnya* or void. So, they have maintained that in the delusive cognition of a shell as a piece of silver, neither of them is real. If silver is real, it should not be sublated. Since it is sublated at the destruction of delusion, it is not real. Similarly, the shell is also unreal because it is only one factor of the sublating cognition, while silver and the relation between shell and silver are the remaining factors. It is the conviction of the Mādhyamikas that if one or more of the factors for the sublating cognition are not real, then all should be treated as unreal. They argued that either real existence or non-existence can be attributed to be the nature of any object, since in the case of the former, it would render the potter's activity a surplus, because a real thing need not be produced. In the case of the latter (i.e. non-existence), a non-existent thing can not be produced by anybody. If there is neither reality nor unreality, one may argue that the combination of both reality and unreality may be attributed to be the nature of existence. But, this concept has also been rejected by the Mādhyamikas on the ground that two contradictory characters can not qualify the same thing.

Therefore the nature of things transcends the description in terms of four alternatives, as noted above. Then the question arises: Whatelse can be the real nature of things? Since things have only an apparent existence, the indeterminable and attributeless nature underlying the apparent existence of things is aptly called *Śūnyata*, i.e. voidness, which has been elaborately discussed by Nagarjuna in

his immortal treatise Mūla mādhyamika kārikā. Eminent philosophers like T. R. V. Murthy treated *Śūnyatā* as a positive entity, while some others considered it as a negative principle. The Mādhyamikas have believed that if one contemplates on Śūnyatā, the apparent mānifestations of manifold objects tend to disappear. The realisation of Śūnyatā results in the attainment of Nirvāṇa, the summum bonum of the Buddhist life.

However, the Buddhist view of *asatkhyātivāda* met with serious criticisms at the hands of the Naiyāyikas, Saiva Siddhāntins and other realists. According to them, the reality of an object should stand the test of experience and practical efficiency. An object which has no existence can not be experienced and utilised. Since shell and silver either collectively or individually are experienced and utilised, the reality of their existence can not be invalidated. If all things are characterised by voidness, then the question arises: What made it appear to be shell in valid cognition and silver in invalid cognition. In the erroneous and illusory cognition in the form of "this is silver", 'this' (i.e. shell) as well as 'silver' are not unreal. They are real. But what is unreal has been their relation as expressed in the jdugement "this is silver".

If it is said that the shell-nature is real to the void, while the silver-nature is illusory, then it is to be presumed; that the void is also characterised by some nature, as against the original view that it is bereft of any feature. If it is said that both shell and silver are illusory, then it is to be understood that both of them, which exist in some other place and time, make their appearance in the present locus, i.e. void, resulting in the invalidity of the view that everything is void. Finally, the realists argued that an absolutely unreal object can never be cognized. Thus, the theory of *asat khyāti* has been repudiated and rejected.[51]

Next, let us pass on to deal with the theory of error as adumberated in the system of Advaita Vedānta.

III. Anirvacanīya khyāti

This theory of error has been advocated by the Advaita Vedāntins. According to this theory, the object of erroneous cognition is inexpressible either as existent or non-existent. If the perceived object is taken either as real or as unreal, then that cognition is said to be erroneous. For instance, if shell is perceived as silver, both the shell and silver can not be ascertained either as

real or unreal. The silver should be present in the shell at least as long as the illusion persists. The illusory silver is perceived for some time till the illusion continues and then sublated by a correcting experience when it is dispelled on the dawn of right knowledge. That is why it can be neither absolutely real nor unreal, nor both together and hence it is said to be indefinable i.e. anirvacanīya.[52] Instead of cognizing silver in the shell, one cognizes the real silver, then in this case, its cognition cannot be sublated, because there is no sublation for the real. Nevertheless, the sublative cognition in the form "this is not silver" rejects the existence of silver in a particular locus where it exists or appears to exist. Hence, it is concluded that silver is not real. On the other hand, if silver is unreal, the unreal can not become the object of cognition. If it is said that it is both real and unreal, then it is to be understood that two contradictory predicates can not qualify the same object. Therefore, the Advaita Vedāntin has pointed out that the illusory silver is indefinable i.e. *anirvacanīya.* As this illusory silver can not serve our practical purpose, it can not be classified along with the object of empirical existence to which the actual silver belongs. It has only illusory reality (*pratibhāsika satta*).[53]

Similarly the shell also can not be either absolutely real or unreal. If it is real, then there is no necessity for illusion. If it is unreal, it can not be the object of sublating cognition. Since two contradictory characters can not be attributed to the same thing, i.e. shell, it can not be both real and unreal or both together. Therefore, it is said to be inexpressible and indefinable. It is the contention of the Advaitin that which is absolutely real, such as self, is unable to be sublated and that which is absolutely unreal, such as the sky-flower, can never be cognized.

However the shell, which is cognized on the disappearance of delusion, has a phenomenal reality since it can be physically experienced. But, the silver of the illusive apprehension can not withstand the test of practical efficiency, it has no physical and empirical reality. In the erroneous and illusive cognition, both the presentative and representative features of the object are fused. The shell is the substrate. The super-imposed object on it is silver-like thing which is not the same silver, revived by the impressions of memory. The source for such super-imposed-illusory cognition is traced to Māyā whose manifestation in the form of *avidyā* (-nescience) and *āvaraṇa* or "*mūṭal*" (-concealment) along with the

defective sense organs which collectively contribute to such erroneous apprehension.[54] The Advaitins hold that both the material cause i.e. Māyā and its effect i.e. the object of illusive cognition are indescribable or *anirvacanīya*.

The technical term Māyā is used in Saiva Siddhānta to denote the Primordial Matter which is positive entity or reality. It is used in the sense of Prakṛiti of the Sāmkhya system. But it is not so with the Vedāntins, who hold that Maya is the principle of delusion, illusion, nescience etc., In the above passage, it is used in the Advaitic sense, since it is spoken as *anirvacanīya* only in that system.

The exponents of realistic systems including Saiva Siddhānta did not accept the theory of error as envisaged in the Advaita. Let us briefly present their views.

According to the Advaitin the illusory silver, which is predicated with an indefinable nature, is different from the absolutely real and absolutely unreal on the basis of the indefinability of its being perceived and being sublated. It has been pointed out that if it is different from the absolutely real, like the hare's horn, it can not be perceived anywhere at any time. On the other hand, if it is different from the absolutely unreal, like the ātman, it can not be sublated. Therefore, the illusory silver which is treated by the Advaitin to be different from the absolutely real and absolutely unreal can not be either perceived or sublated, whereas it is actually perceived and sublated. Hence the concept of *anirvacanīya* is untenable to the advocates of Saiva Siddhānta.

If the Advaitin asserts that the object of the illusion 'this is silver' be an indefinable silver, what would be the object of the correcting cognition "this is not silver". The mere negation of the perceived indefinable silver can not be produced to be the said object. If it is produced, the relation of the sublated and the sublator involving the two cognitions has to be inverted. It has been pointed out that the first apprehension in which the object is an indefinable silver and the subsequent apprehension in which the object is the negation of a real silver are to be equated respectively with the cognition of a pot and the cognition of the absence of a cloth. Therefore, between these two the relation of the sublated and sublator is rendered impossible. It is to be understood that the two cognitions indicate two different things, without any opposition

between them. In this way, the Advaita theory of *anirvacana khyāti* has been refuted by the realists.

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    "........

    puntikku mēlāṉa pōtam āki-c-

    Ceyyaciva cattituṇai yāyviḷankum civa

    Ciṟcatti pramāṇam enatteripar terintōr"

    "eṉṉum pavuṭkara vacaṉattai aṉu carittu"

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XVIII. CONCLUSION

Indian Epistemology has a continued and perennial history of more than 2,500 years. The metaphysicians, dialecticians and also grammarians have contributed much to the field of Indian Epistemology. Each system of Indian philosophy has developed its own theory of knowledge to establish its vital principles and to withstand the criticism, advanced by the advocates of rival systems. Epistemological thoughts have been nurtured not only by the authors (sūtrakāras) but also by the commentators (bhāṣyakāras). The philosophers and logicians of the South, having their base at Kāñchi, the reputed centre for higher studies in Buddhism and also Jainism have enriched the domain of Indian logic. Language, region and religion did not stand on the way of free exchange of views among the thinkers, theorists and exponents of different systems of Indian philosophy. So far scholars unearthed the abundant materials available mainly from Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit and Tibetan sources and explicated the epistemological views and thoughts as upheld by the philosophers of various systems and schools. However, *the study carried out in the foregoing pages established beyond doubt that the contribution of the Tamil philosophers and logicians to the field of Indian thought could not be underestimated. In certain areas of epistemology, their original thoughts and unique interpretations deserve to be underscored.* Their involvement and active participation in the philosophical and epistemological discussions pertaining to the main streams of Indian metaphysical systems and their rich contribution to the advancement of epistemology especially of Buddhism and Saiva Siddhanta have been highlighted in this study. Some of the salient findings and significant conclusions of the study are enumerated here below:

1. In conformity with the view of Vātsyāyana, the native of Kāñchi and earliest commentator of Nyāya Sūtra, the Tamil philosophers have developed the methodological processes of enunciation, definition and critical examinations.

2. The technical terms known as *Nūlpuṇarppu* in Tamil and *Tantrayukti* in Sanskrit which are considered to be the earliest devices of argument are very well preserved respectively in the Tamil grammatical tradition, headed by Tolkāppiyam (B.C.500) and Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra (B.C.300).

3. Similarly the doctrine of various points of view collectively called *'Naya'* or *'Nayam'* has been developed by the Tamil Buddhists of the period of the epic Maṇimēkalai (A.D.500) and also by the Tamil grammarians.

4. The techniques of question and answer in the process of epistemological thought are agreeably organised and adequately adopted by the Tamil grammarians, etheticians and Buddhist philosophers.

5. In the consolidation of the varied sources of knowledge, there are five logical traditions as evidenced by the Tamil Buddhist, Jain, Advaita, Viśiṣtādvaita and Saiva Siddhānta texts.

6. The unique pramāṇas, which are not mentioned in the Sanskrit texts are highlighted from the Tamil classics.

7. Though the exponents of the system of Saiva Siddhanta accepted the first three sources of knowledge, they ultimately upheld the Ātman's Cit-śakti to be the sole pramāṇa.

8. Reference to Kritakoṭi, the earliest commentator of Uttara Mimāmsa Sutra who accepted eight sources of knowledge is found only in the Tamil Buddhist epic Maṇimēkalai.

9. Vasubandhu, the first Buddhist logician to propound the theory of twofold sources of knowledge, has been celebrated, *"Adijinendra"* by Cāttaṉār, the author of Maṇimēkalai.

10. All the sources of knowledge are classified by the Tamil Jain metaphysicians into two divisions, viz., *Kāṭci-y-aḷavai* and *Kāṭci-y-il aḷavai*, viz., perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual sources of knowledge.

11. The Tamil Jain logicians closely followed Umāsvāti, Siddhasena and Māṇikya Nandi in the exposition of their views of pramāṇas.

12. The inadequacy of the theory of Knowledge as upheld by the Lokayata, Naiyāyika, Mimāmsaka of Prabhākara and Bhatta schools etc., has been elucidated by the commentators of Saiva Siddhanta texts.

13. In the exposition of *Iyalpu* (-sahaja or svabhāva lınga), Tolkāppiyar and other Tamil grammarians provided ample guidelines, unique to the native tradition.

14. The concept of *Akam* and *Puram* in the practical efficiency of the sources of knowledge which is peculiar and unique, is not found in any of the Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit sources, except in the texts and their commentaries of the theological and philosophical system of Saiva Siddhanta.

15. The concept of indeterminate perception has been implied in the aphorisms of Tolkappiyam for the first time in the history of epistemology in Tamil.

16. The classification and exposition of different kinds of perception in the system of Saiva Siddhanta are unique in several respects.

17. Patipacupāca-p-paṉuval closely follows the Naiyāyika system in the enumeration and elaboration of sixfold types of sense-object contact.

18. Vedāntadeśika criticised some of the logical doctrines of the heterodox systems from the stand-point of *Viśiṣṭādvaita.*

19. Among the exponents of Saiva Siddhanta, Arulnandisivam laid stress on universal concomittance (avinābhāva), while Sivagrayogin emphasised pervasion (vyāpti) in the determination of valid inference.

20. The common belief that if the ants carried their eggs in an array, it would rain-being an instance for one type of inference as noted by Dramiḷa Vātsyāyana, has already been noticed in the Sangam anthology, Puṟanāṉūṟu (173.5-8).

21. The classification of logical reasons into material cause, auxiliary cause and efficient cause is unique in the system of Saiva Siddhanta.

22. The concept of inference for oneself and inference for others was first introduced by the Sautrāntika Yogācāra Buddhist logician Dignāga and followed by Praśastapāda and others.

23. The exponents of Saiva Siddhanta adapted and adopted ingeniously the trayrūpya theory of inference, originally propounded by Dignāga, Cāttaṉār, Dharmakīrti and others.

24. Two sets of three-fold types of vyāpti have been adumberated by the logicians of Saiva Siddhanta.

25. The epistemologists of both the homogeneous and heterogeneous systems of Indian philosophy have evolved atleast four types of

syllogisms consisting of the maximum number of ten members and of the minimum number of two members.

26. Tirujñāṉa Sambandhar (A.D.650) has made a passing reference to the Yogācāra Buddhist logical school of Dharmakīrti, advocating two-membered syllogism.

27. The Yogācāra Buddhist usage of *pakṣa* and *dṛṣṭānta* in the place of *pratijñā* and *udaharaṇa* has been followed not only by the later Naiyāyikas and other orthodox systems, but also by the advocates of Saiva Siddhanta.

28. The types of inference based on perception, inference and verbal testimony and also the types of *arthānumāna* and *sabdāmumāna* are peculiar to Saiva Siddhānta.

29. The relationship between word and its sense, and the significance of meaningful syntactical structures being a pre-requisite for valid verbal testimony have been discussed in Tolkāppiyam and its commentaries.

30. The technique of lakṣaṇātraya with their classical Tamil equivalents is noticed first in the Tirumantiram (A.D.500) and then in Kaivalya Navanītam and Vēdānta Cūḷāmaṇi among the Vedantic texts in Tamil.

31. Among the three techniques, the third one, i.e. Viṭṭuviṭātatu (-Jahal Ajahal) alone elucidates the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute soul, as interpreted in the aforesaid Tamil texts.

32. The Saiva Agamas, Tirumuṟais and Meykanda Śāstras are collectively upheld to be the valid verbal testimony by the Saiva Siddhantins.

33. Arulnandisivam has strongly criticised the concept of verbal testimony, as advocated by the adherents of Mimāmsa schools.

34. The Tamil commentators have exposed the folly of Mimāmsaka's negligence of Āgamas and refuted the reasons for the rejection of the authority of Āgamas.

35. The Saiva Siddhantins accorded a special status to the Āgamas rather than to the Vedas and hence their philosophy came to be known as *Āgamānta*.

36. The threefold groups of logical fallacies were elaborately discussed by the author of Nyāya Praveśa and Maṇimekalai.

37. Since the eight kinds of perceptual fallacies as enunciated by the Nyāyavādin in Maṇimēkalai are not found in the texts of Nyāya Sutra, they may be taken to represent the logical tradition prevalent in the Tamil country.

38. Sivagrayogin and his disciple Nandi Sivagrayogin followed Pauṣkarāgama and the texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in the explication of logical fallacies, as noted in the treatises on Saiva Siddhanta.

39. Tattuvaprakāśar seems to represent a separate logical tradition of the Tamil grammatical school, in expounding the various types of logical fallacies.

40. Pandiperumal closely followed the Buddhist Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai and also Nyāya Praveśa in the elucidation of the threefold groups of fallacies, when he commented on the chapter, Aḷavai-y-iyal.

41. There is complete similarity between Cāttaṉār and the author of Nyāya praveśa in the definition, enumeration and classification of logical fallacies, with some minor exceptions.

42. Aruḷnandisivam identified four types of faulty thesis or proposition, twenty one kinds of defective reasons subsumed under three heads and eighteen types of fallacies of example which are brought under two divisions.

43. The tenfold defective statements of the Tamil grammatical tradition are to be treated along with the fallacies of proposition.

44. Defects in the triple rules of valid reason lead to the formation of hetvābhasas, viz., fallacies of reason.

45. The commentaries of the texts on Saiva Siddhanta reveal the different schools of logicians in the identification and illustration of the fallacies of reason.

46. The fallacies of example, as developed by the Yogācāra Buddhist logicians have been adopted by others in the course of time with some modifications.

47. Tattuvapirakāśam deviates from other texts in the identification and enumeration of fallacies of example also.

48. The exponents of Saiva Siddhanta, like the Naiyāyikas devoted much care in the avoidance of defective debates in the form of *vāda, jalpa, vidaṇṭā* and the like.

49. *Nigrahasthāna*, known as *Tōlvi-t-tānam* in Tamil logical texts has been counted 22 which are subsumed under two divisions.

50. The identification and enumeration of clinchers of defeat, as recorded in Tattuvaprakāśam do not find a place in any other texts either in Tamil or in Sanskrit, and hence they are unique.

51. The validity of knowledge has been determined through two distinct doctrines viz., Parataḥ and Svataḥ prāmaṇyas, by the exponents of different systems of Indian Philosophy.

52. Doubtful cognition is not by itself invalid, since it leads to valid perception also.

53. The Tamil texts including Tolkāppiyam have carefully analysed the various aspects of doubtful and erroneous cognitions in the process of attaining valid knowledge.

54. The commentators of Saiva Siddhanta texts have thoroughly examined the various theories of truth such as Satkhyāti, Asat khyāti, Anirvacanīya khyāti and Anyathā khyāti.

55. They advocated twofold aspects, governing the source of knowledge viz., 1. Pramāṇa that helps i.e. Siva's cit-śakti and 2. Pramāṇa that is helped i.e. Jiva's cit-śakti, not only in the attainment of valid knowledge of secular and empirical life, but also of spiritual and transcendental existence.

Areas for future study

The epistemological aspects of a particular system may be compared with their counter-parts of another system, either homogeneous or heterogeneous, though some features are discussed with the comparative and contrastive view-points in this study. The evolution of a particular source of knowledge such as perception and inference would be traced chronologically and conceptually, underlining the necessity of additions, deletions and changes if any. The relationship between the schools of grammarians and the logicians deserves to be studied separately. The practical side of epistemology in the transactions of daily life forms a valuable topic for detailed discussion. The epistemological principles of Indian tradition would be compared at least with those of Greek tradition. These and similar areas of study are left out for future research.

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